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Abstract 
 
Theory development in the field of sales is relatively limited compared to other 
disciplines, particularly since sales managers have lower rates of participation in 
academic studies than other professions. By exploring in depth the perceptions of 
sales managers about their resourcing choices, this study brings rich linguistic data 
to bear on the “make-or-buy” question in sales, which could be further tested by 
quantitative means.  It is the first comprehensive approach to the topic in the sales 
function, exploring constructs across three theoretical schools – transaction cost 
economics, the resource-based view and real options theory.    
 
This study explores how UK sales managers perceive that they make their sales 
resourcing decisions, focusing particularly on the resourcing option of using third 
parties such as “contract sales organisations” rather than recruiting employees. 
Given the lack of research about the sales function to date, and in particular the lack 
of research on outsourcing in the sales function, the resulting model of the make-
or-buy decision in the sales function is a significant contribution to an emerging 
body of literature, discerning antecedents from two levels of moderating factors, 
and accommodating exceptions as well as probable scenarios. 
 
This study posits that, depending on context, cost, access to skills or speed to 
respond to the market are important antecedents of resource changes and 
resourcing decisions in the sales function; desire to control on the basis of 
reputational risk is a primary moderating factor, and ability to manage third parties 
together with availability of suitable suppliers are secondary moderating factors.   
The primary research in this study involved in-depth telephone interviews with an 
under-researched managerial elite - senior sales managers and sales directors. It 
adds to the recent evidence that telephone interviewing can be successful in 
gathering large quantities of data from respondents without loss of rapport or 
emotional emphasis. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
This section describes the context of this research and the key issues that will be 
explored.  It provides a justification for the research, on the basis of the current 
gaps in the literature. It also provides a guide to the contents of the thesis. 
 
1.1 Background to this research - the importance of the sales function     
 
Despite the importance to shareholders of companies being able to grow without 
resorting to acquisitions (Favaro, Meer & Sharma, 2012), examination of the sales 
function which usually bears the targets to achieve volume growth forms a 
relatively small and declining body of literature (Avlontis & Panagopoulos, 2010). 
Richards, Moncrief and Marshall (2010) noted 388 scholarly articles on the topic of 
sales and sales management from 19 journals (of which all bar three were in based 
in the USA) between 2003 and 2007. They observed that the field is opening up 
outside of the USA, but only eight UK business schools were attributed with 
authorships.  This is surprising, given that more people are employed in sales than 
in marketing (Piercy, 2006) and companies in business-to-business sectors spend 
heavily on their sales function (Avlonitis & Panagopoulos, 2010). 
 
Sales revenue growth is a measure of a company’s ability to grow organically, i.e. 
from its own resources and capabilities, including the capability to leverage external 
resources (Kazanjian, Hess & Drazin, 2006). Meer (2005) found that top quartile 
performance in a sector was associated with above average organic growth, but 
organic growth is a very tough objective to realise in developed economies, where 
saturated markets, intense competition and economic uncertainty are observed 
(Hitt, Ireland & Tuggle, 2006). If organic growth matters, then the contribution of 
the sales function is critical (Avlonitis & Panagopoulos, 2010). Colletti and Chonko 
(1997) state, on the basis of a large survey and three case studies, that a high 
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performance sales organisation demonstrates a number of attributes, including 
revenue growth greater than industry norms and success with new products and 
customers. Without these factors, the sales function would become obsolete.   
 
Nevertheless, there has been relatively little literature since to explain how a 
modern sales function should be designed. In particular, the role of outsourcing in 
the sales function is overlooked, with only a handful of studies involving primary 
research since 1985 which are specifically about sales outsourcing (Anderson, 1985; 
Wilson & Zhang, 2002; Krafft, Albers & Lal, 2004; Rogers, 2009). In a working paper, 
the authors most associated with consideration of the outsourcing of sales 
commented that it was relatively rare in practice compared to other functions, 
despite evidence of its potential value (Anderson, Dalsace & Ross, 2003). 
 
1.2.1 The research problem 
 
Economic crises can create an environment in which new resourcing models evolve. 
The poor economic conditions of 2008-2009 in the UK resulted in widespread 
redundancies and/or shifts to part-time and self-employment (ONS, 2010/11). 
Hammer and Champy’s (1993) “Reengineering the corporation: a manifesto for 
business revolution”, which was published just after the previous recession (of 
1991/92), was associated with an increasing trend in the 1990s for large companies 
to outsource activities that had previously been integrated into their operations. 
The sales function largely escaped that mega-trend (Anderson et al., 2003). More 
recently, Web sources suggest growth in the outsourcing of sales activities in the 
UK. United Drug Plc reported that their contract sales division grew 13% from 2008 
to 2009 (2009 company report), 9% from 2009 to 2010 (2010 company report) and 
19% from 2010 to 2011 (2011 company report).  Peopleperhour.com reported that 
demand for field and telesales contract staff grew by 19% from 2008 to 2009 (PPH, 
2009), that in 2010 demand for telesales had grown again by 6.8% and was the top 
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skill requirement in their project postings (PPH, 2010). The number of sales 
outsourcing consultancies registered on freeindex.co.uk increased from 187 in 
February 2010 to 384 in July 2012. Tracking sales outsourcing in the UK is 
challenging, as organisations may define themselves as sales agents, telesales or 
telemarketing, contract sales organisations or sales outsourcing consultancies.   
Nevertheless, it would appear that there is at least a sustained increase in supply, 
which suggests some demand. 
 
It is important for business academics to understand why companies might be 
turning to contract sales organisations to achieve their objectives, when the sales 
function is held responsible to a large degree, especially in business-to-business 
sectors, for organic growth in companies, and hence in the economy. It is perhaps 
the uncertainty in the economy, combined with a skills gap in the sales function in 
the UK (CFA, 2012), that has, in part, prompted consideration of new resourcing 
models. 
 
There is a wide choice of third party resourcing models available to sales managers, 
even within single sectors (e.g. Rogers, 2009 on pharmaceuticals). Contractors may 
take on particular product lines, customer segments or sales activities such as 
product launches, new market entry, lead generation or sales support. They may 
also provide individuals to cover long-term absence of sales employees. It is not 
unheard of for whole sales functions to be outsourced (e.g. the example of Takeda, 
quoted in Rogers, 2008), but contracting out selected sales activities is much more 
widespread. The terminology “out-tasking” (Krishnamurthy, Jegen & Brownell, 
2009) seems more applicable to the multiple business models used in the UK. 
Channel strategy is discussed in the literature review, as contract sales 
organisations may be compared to resellers or distributors when channel strategy 
choices are made. For sales managers, all types of third party “indirect” 
arrangements are alternatives to direct employment. This thesis primarily focuses 
on discussing the contracting out of sales activities compared with the option of 
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employing people to do them, but has observed that there are grey areas between 
outsourcing and channels, or even bilateral co-operative selling.  
 
It is noticeable that growth objectives can be linked to particular observed uses of 
contract sales organisations, such as accelerating new products into existing 
markets and introducing existing products into new markets. It is anticipated that 
the underlying reason for their use would be some aspect of improved sales 
performance, although establishing the relativities of sales performance between 
responding companies is not specifically investigated here.  As with any case of 
resource allocation, the objectives of effectiveness and efficiency are assumed, 
even though managerial perceptions of objective measures are frequently flawed 
(Mezias & Starbuck, 2003).  
 
Overall, the research problem is that the sales function in companies in the UK, 
which has the objective of generating growth, has to design a suitable resourcing 
model for growing revenue in a time of unprecedented pressure on costs and 
unprecedented risk.  Outsourcing some sales activity is an option that should be 
considered when there are resourcing challenges, and the increasing availability of 
sales outsourcing suppliers in the UK suggests that outsourcing is reaching into the 
sales function.   
 
1.2.2 Research aim  
 
The overall aim of this study is: 
 
To explore UK sales managers’ perceptions of the antecedents and moderating 
factors influencing the outsourcing of sales activities. 
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The allocation of scarce resource is the essence of strategy, and since the sales 
function is deemed to be expensive and becoming more expensive (Anderson, 
1985; Taylor, 1990; Anderson et al., 2003; Anderson & Trinkle, 2005), it seems 
appropriate that sales managers should be asked about the justification for their 
organisational design and effectiveness. The overall aim of this study is to establish 
the perceptions of UK sales managers towards the factors that influence make-or-
buy options when it comes to their resourcing decisions. This is a contribution to 
the call for more research on the sales function (Marshall & Michaels, 2001; Plouffe, 
Williams & Wachner, 2008).   
 
Although Anderson et al. (2003) argue that the negative attitude of sales managers 
towards outsourcing is a factor in the predominance of insourcing, the primary aim 
of this study is to gain some insight into the way sales managers respond to and 
make sense of the constructs that research indicates should prompt make-or-buy 
decisions. Both perceptions and attitudes are subjective, but perception precedes 
attitude and might be only one factor in forming it, e.g. consumers perceive 
marketing as the means by which companies push products; because of their 
perceptions about the consequences of that, they have a negative attitude towards 
it (Heath & Heath, 2008). The perceptions of sales managers are not assumed to be 
reality, but they should provide some insight into the resourcing decisions they have 
made in their careers and the antecedents of insourcing or outsourcing particular 
sales activities.  
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1.2.3 Research objectives 
 
Objective 1. The first objective is to explore sales managers’ perceptions of the 
antecedents of outsourcing. 
 
“Antecedent” in the outsourcing literature (e.g. Mol, van Tulder & Beijeet, 2005), 
commonly indicates a reason for outsourcing – an event or pre-existing condition. It 
has been observed from the literature that for make-or-buy decisions in general, 
and for make-or-buy within the sales function, that there are three main theoretical 
models that aim to explain the conditions which predict whether something should 
be insourced or outsourced:  transaction cost economics, the resource-based view 
and real options theory (Leiblein, 2003). Transaction cost economics is focused on 
the cost of controlling an activity; the resource-based view is focused on relative 
competences internally and externally and how they generate “rent” for the firm; 
real options theory is focused on the need for choice in an uncertain business 
environment, and therefore favours the replacement of fixed costs with variable 
costs.   
 
It is possible that constructs from each of these theoretical perspectives play some 
role in the outsourcing of sales activities, although each would claim a dominant 
role. Translating theoretical constructs into terminology commonly used by sales 
managers can be challenging, but the adoption of a qualitative approach enables 
exploration of the relationship between the subjective view of the respondent and 
the predictions of theory. This study examines the perceived strength of each of 
these theoretical models as an indicator of the outcome of make-or-buy decisions in 
the sales function. 
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Objective 2. The second objective is to explore sales managers’ perceptions of 
factors moderating their resourcing choices.   
 
Cause and effect are not always linear, as decisions can be moderated by 
intervening circumstances. The desire to outsource or insource an activity can be 
established but the preferred sourcing model may not be feasible. Espino-Rodríguez 
and Padrón-Robaina, (2004) distinguished between the desire to outsource and 
outsourcing behaviour.  Moderating factors are worthy of exploration.  
 
Respondents in Anderson’s 1985 study reported that there should have been a 
question about the availability of good manufacturers’ representatives, and in 2003 
Anderson et al. returned to the effect of perceptions of a poor supply market. This 
factor will be specifically examined. Anderson et al. (2003) also revisited the 
question of the legitimacy of sales outsourcing raised by Weiss, Anderson and 
Macinnis (1999). Concerns about whether or not sales outsourcing is perceived by 
customers to be normal and reputable might inhibit the practice. The 2003 paper 
also observed that competency in managing outsourcing would be an important 
factor in sales managers’ perceiving that they could succeed with outsourcing 
(perceptions of outsourcing performance are also considered), and this theme is 
explored in outsourcing in general (Madhok, 2002).  Although Anderson et al. 
(2003) made other propositions about conditions affecting sales outsourcing, most 
of them were contextual; these three were perceptual.  Adopting an exploratory 
approach, and selecting a sample from a variety of contexts, these three perceptual 
factors may be observed across different sales managers with experiences of 
different industry sectors and types of company. 
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Objective 3. This study will also consider which sales activities are considered most 
suitable for outsourcing. 
 
Although there is no discernible guidance in the literature about which sales 
activities might be seen as suitable for outsourcing, it is important to take a granular 
approach, as in Watjatrakul and Drennan (2005). The primary research will prompt 
not only for the proportion of contracted activities (Gilley & Rasheed, 2000), but 
also for the activities that are actually outsourced. On the basis of preliminary 
discussions with the companies that provide outsourced sales, the following are 
expected to feature: lead generation, lead qualification, end of life products, desk-
based support for key accounts, merchandising, product launch, non-strategic 
customer segments, difficult to serve locations, new market segment entry, after 
sales follow-up and sales temps (e.g. maternity leave cover). 
 
Empirical examinations of sales outsourcing to date have focused on all-or-nothing 
outsourcing to manufacturers’ representatives or sales agents. However, there are 
many in-between states that are observed in other functions, such as IT and FM, the 
“hybrid governance” state described in transaction cost economics (Gilley & 
Rasheed, 2000; Martinez-Sánchez, Vela-Jiménez, Luis-Carnice & Pérez-Pérez, 2007;  
Krishnamurthy et al., 2009). This may be described as partial outsourcing or out-
tasking. This study contributes to knowledge by exploring how sales managers 
divide up sales activities to realise opportunities to use contractors, or to mix 
contractor expertise with in-house expertise.  
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1.3 Contribution to knowledge 
 
By pursuing these research objectives, this study offers a contribution to theory by 
modelling the decision-making of sales managers when they are considering 
whether to insource or outsource activities. This model encompasses the perceived 
antecedents for sales outsourcing decisions and perceptual factors that moderate 
the outsourcing of sales activities. The value of the model has been validated with 
respondents, and has potential for further exploration and testing.  
 
Because sales outsourcing has not been addressed by a qualitative cross-sectoral 
study before, this is the first comprehensive model of sales managers’ perceptions 
of their resource decision-making process. 
 
Within the exploration of this decision-making process, insight has also been 
generated about the type of sales activities that are usually contracted out and 
contextual norms, but exceptional cases have also been identified. The sales 
managers’ view of the contrast between motivating salespeople and controlling 
contractors has been explored. Findings have been generated which address a 
number of gaps in the literature on sales outsourcing, specifically: 
 
1. The focus of this study is on the outsourcing of individual sales activities, 
rather than the outsourcing of the sales function as a whole, so a variety of 
business models and concepts can be examined. By exploring what activities 
within the sales function are being outsourced in a granular way, greater 
insight can be generated about perceptions of the “make-or-buy” decision. 
2. This study accommodates recent findings in the literature which challenge 
the assumptions about the nature of internal and external contracts that 
underpin transaction cost economics. By adopting an exploratory approach, 
apparent contradictions such as flexible contracting with third parties and 
rigidity within employment contracts can be exposed.  
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3. This study looks at predictors of resourcing choices from transaction cost 
economics, the resource-based view and real options theory in a way that 
has not previously been attempted. Quantitative studies tend to focus on 
the constructs of a single theoretical lens, whereas an exploratory study 
opens up the possibility of more than one approach being considered in 
practice.  
4. This study examines the perceptual moderating factors flagged up by other 
researchers but not yet consolidated into a “make-or-buy” study of sales. It 
has been noted that the antecedents which have driven outsourcing in other 
functions do not have the same effect in the sales function, therefore 
exploring what might come between the intention to outsource and 
outsourcing behaviour is important insight. 
5. This study identifies which sales activities are commonly outsourced, and 
exceptional contexts for sales outsourcing. In an exploratory study, it is 
important to note exceptional circumstances and to consider the reasons for 
exceptions to general rules. 
6. This study makes use of qualitative methods so that causality can be 
explored. 
7. Significantly, this study offers a theoretical model of the sales managers’ 
decision-making process when considering resourcing options. A conceptual 
model mapping the perceptions of sales managers when faced with make-
or-buy decisions has not previously been attempted. The proposed model 
has been verified by a significant proportion of respondents, and it is worthy 
of further testing. 
8. This study also identifies some interesting possibilities for future research, 
such as the bond between sales managers and their reporting staff. Work on 
the psychological contract has tended to focus on the way employees feel 
about their employers and immediate managers; this study has identified an 
interesting angle on the way managers feel about their reporting staff. 
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1.4 The gap in the sales management literature 
 
Although outsourcing has been extensively used in most functions in organisations, 
it is perceived as underused in the sales function in the US and Europe (Anderson et 
al., 2003). With sales outsourcing suppliers growing in terms of number and size in 
the UK (see page 4), there is clearly a change to some degree, which is worthy of 
investigation, as a contribution to knowledge about both outsourcing and sales 
management. Equally, if sales is a function where outsourcing only has limited 
applications, that is also worthy of exploration. The literature offers the view that 
“salespeople are value-creating knowledge workers, much like architects” who 
operate in “unique contexts” (Dixon & Tanner, 2012, p. 12), so their work cannot be 
standardised. However, since many organisations outsource knowledge work such 
as architecture, even at the most sophisticated levels of selling, the question 
remains – why are salespeople usually employed? 
 
Senior sales scholars have noted the need for new research on the effectiveness of 
the whole sales function (Marshall & Michaels, 2001; Plouffe et al., 2008; Williams 
& Plouffe, 2007). Plouffe et al.’s review concluded that of the 1012 sales research 
articles in top journals (1983-2006), only 68 considered the sales organisation. 
“Sales research that is truly strategic would, for example, evolve beyond the 
individual salesperson as the principle unit of analysis.” (Plouffe et al., p. 89). 
Considerable thinking is needed about how the sales resource is optimised, 
enhanced or changed, and this research will contribute to that. It examines 
particular choices for UK sales managers by looking at make-or-buy alternatives in 
sales resourcing at a granular level, i.e. out-tasking, rather than the outsourcing of 
the whole sales function. This research is important in examining whether the 
theoretical models for “make-or-buy” are applicable to the out-tasking of sales 
activities in the recessionary UK economy of the early 21st century. Even in 1985, 
Anderson referred to the “exploding cost of personal selling” (p. 234), but a study of 
the contracting out of sales activities needs to go beyond the production cost 
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advantage argument to encompass the constructs of transaction cost economics, 
the resource-based view and real options theory. 
 
1.5 Extant literature concerning resourcing issues in the sales function 
 
The purpose of sales, according to the UK Marketing and Sales Standards Setting 
Body is: 
“To create and sustain mutually beneficial and profitable relationships through 
personal and organisational contact” (CFA, 2012, p. 10). From a practitioner point of 
view, there seems to be an underlying assumption that human capital is involved in 
selling. But does it have to be human capital that is directly employed? 
 
“The sales force” is certainly a big part of companies, especially in business-to-
business markets. Piercy (2006) points out that there are more salespeople than 
marketers in the US and the UK, and that the sales function in most companies is 
very expensive; more is spent on selling in the UK than either advertising or sales 
promotions. He also focuses on the impact that the sales organisation has on 
customer relationships, some of which have become very big and strategic. Another 
pertinent point is that the sales function has faced enormous change over the past 
twenty years, changing from a focus on product sales to solving customers’ 
challenges (Piercy, 2006; Rogers, 2007).  
 
Nevertheless, sales function obsolescence is a possibility, observed by Colletti and 
Chonko (1997) and Rackham and DeVincentis (1999). Jones, Chonko and Roberts 
(2004) found that 73% of companies were reporting the cost of sales calls 
dramatically increasing, and 54% of the buyers they dealt with saying that they no 
longer needed to see a salesperson. Therefore, the shape and role of the sales 
function should now be a strategic corporate issue (Piercy & Lane, 2005; Rogers, 
2007 and Zoltners, Sinha & Lorimer, 2008). Zoltners et al. (2008) draw the logic of 
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sales effectiveness from the business environment through business strategy to 
sales force structure, activities and results. The need for new effectiveness models 
is a very pertinent topic for sales managers (Ruzicic & Danner, 2007).  
 
A direct sales force has many advantages – sales representatives are directly and 
selectively recruited. The “owning” of a sales force is expected to lead to shared 
values, participation in the company, information sharing and working in teams. 
Salespeople can be quickly switched from one task to another. In return, employed 
salespeople expect the commitment of employment security, promotion from 
within, training, fair treatment and a high basic wage, as well as additional 
incentives (Colletti & Chonko, 1997). Much sales research to date has focused on 
the performance of the individual salesperson. In 1985 Churchill, Ford, Hartley and 
Walker conducted a meta-analysis of 116 studies of salesperson performance 
dating back to 1918, and concluded that none of the predictors studied could 
account for a great deal of variation in performance. Nevertheless, researchers are 
still addressing individual predictors of salesperson success, for example: 
personality traits (Deeter-Schmeltz & Sojka, 2007); demographics (Fu, 2009); 
knowledge structures (Sharma, Levy & Evanschitzky, 2007); ability to perceive 
emotion (Kidwell, McFarland & Avila, 2007); learning (Bell, Menguc & Widing, 
2010); use of technology (Ahearne, Jones, Rapp & Mathieu, 2008); role conflict 
(Onyemah, 2008); and customer orientation (Jaramillo & Grisaffe, 2009). Since 
1998, when Piercy, Cravens and Morgan found evidence for behavioural control 
being strongly associated with better sales performance, there has been some 
interest in the behaviour-based control of employed salespeople (Mackenzie, 
Podsakoff & Rich, 2001; Baldauf, Cravens & Piercy, 2005; Panagopoulos & Avlonitis, 
2010; Piercy, Cravens & Lane, 2012).  
 
The primary focus of this study, however, is on how companies use third party sales 
resource, an element of sales resourcing that has not been extensively researched 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Rapp, 2009). Throughout history, manufacturers have 
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delegated customer management to distributors, retailers or other intermediaries 
in the supply chain.  McQuiston (2001) traced the history of sales agents in the US 
back to the textile industry in the north-east USA in the early 19th century. Textile 
mills contracted them to sell their cloth.  They did not take title to the goods, but 
relied on the “principal” to manufacture, ship, invoice and service. This business 
model, called in the US “manufacturers’ representative” is still the clearest and best 
documented in academic literature.   
 
Marketing strategy textbooks always include consideration of what are generally 
called channels to market – the third parties that may act as intermediaries 
between manufacturers and consumers. In business-to-consumer markets, multi-
channel approaches have been embraced by many companies since technology has 
enabled new options (Wilson & Daniels, 2007). The way in which goods and services 
are delivered to customers is a platform for value innovation (Kim & Mauborgne, 
1997), and a critical aspect of productivity (Ledingham, Kovac & Locke Simon, 2006). 
The central decision for any new venture is whether to “make-or-buy” the sales 
force (Zoltners, Sinha & Lorimer, 2006).  
 
Mehta, Dubinsky and Anderson (2002) define marketing channels as a set of 
external organisations that a firm uses to achieve its distribution objectives. They 
include direct, indirect and “agency” sales, where a sales agent (in person, over the 
telephone, or over the internet) represents the manufacturer to the end-user and 
brokers a sale without taking title to the goods. Agency arrangements can be 
described as “outsourced” sales. The customer may not even be aware that they 
are dealing with an agent. Bousfield (2003) comments, in writing about outsourcing 
call centres, that companies may do so “to gain access to world-class capabilities in 
customer management, an area that, though vital to any organisation’s success, is 
not a core business skill for most.” (p. 111). 
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There are many thousands of channel intermediaries in the USA, which includes 
brokers, manufacturers’ representatives and sales agents. Half of US firms use 
external sales representatives, but only just over a tenth of business-to-business 
volume is handled by manufacturers’ representatives (Anderson et al., 2003), which 
suggests that a lot of partial outsourcing is going on. Although some companies do 
outsource all sales activities to contract sales organisations in the US, hybrids are 
also observed (Novick, 2000). Some manufacturers’ representatives are one-man-
bands, others employ over one hundred people (Gulati & Bristow, 2005). US 
researchers observe that if a company buys into a channel and its existing 
customers, cost and risk can be reduced, and productivity increased (Narus & 
Anderson, 1996; Ross, Dalsace & Anderson, 2005). These arguments are even more 
compelling in export markets where there are strong cultural differences, e.g. 
between the USA and Asia (Anderson & Coughlan, 1987). Their study of 94 product 
introductions over twenty years concluded that a market entrant should achieve 
economies of scale, economies of scope and reduce bureaucracy by using local 
agents. 
 
There are two seminal empirical studies of the use of manufacturers’ 
representatives/ contract sales organisations, one in the USA and one in Germany. 
Anderson’s 1985 study of sales outsourcing examined “all rep salesforce” or “all 
direct salesforce” (p. 242) samples, and Krafft et al.’s 2004 study also excluded 
hybrids, even though hybrids and partial out-sourcing/out-tasking have been 
mentioned in some of the outsourcing literature as feasible or even desirable 
business models (Dutta, Bergen, Heide & John, 1995; Gilley & Rasheed, 2000; Aron, 
Clemons & Reddi, 2005; King, 2006; Rothaermel, Hitt & Jobe, 2006; Martinez-
Sánchez et al., 2007; Raiborn, Butler & Massoud, 2009; Krishnamurthy et al., 2009).  
 
Overall, it is clear that within the small sales management literature, there is an 
even smaller body of literature on “make-or-buy” in sales. This study is significantly 
different from the extant studies in that it is interested in partial outsourcing or out-
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tasking, as the researcher’s studies to date have shown it to be present and thriving 
in the UK pharmaceutical sector (Rogers, 2009). Other studies of outsourcing have 
identified “propensity to outsource”, which means the proportion of activity that is 
outsourced as an alternative dependent variable compared to wholesale 
outsourcing of a function (Gilley & Rasheed, 2000; Espino-Rodríguez & Padrón-
Robaina, 2004). However, since it is of interest to establish which sales activities get 
outsourced as well as the degree of outsourcing, this study will attempt to identify 
particular activities that may or may not be outsourced as well as the proportion of 
the sales function that is outsourced.  
 
Although the sales outsourcing literature is very small, there have been many 
studies of “make-or-buy” in other parts of the internal value chain, which can 
provide a theoretical framework for a study of this kind. 
 
1.6 Conceptual framework for “make-or-buy” decisions 
 
Delegating selected selling activities to third party organisations is common, but 
sales outsourcing has not been embraced as broadly as outsourcing of other 
activities such as information technology, logistics and facilities management 
(Anderson et al., 2003). The principles, however, are not very different. Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse (2002a, p. 1) explain:  “Outsourcing involves contracting with a third 
party to provide goods and services to the host organisation that would otherwise 
have been available in-house”. Anderson & Trinkle (2005, p. 1), in discussing sales 
outsourcing, are even more succinct: “To outsource a function is to pay someone 
else to do it for you.” This study will therefore utilise the generic “make-or-buy” 
literature to provide constructs for sales outsourcing.  
 
  
17 
 
These theoretical schools of thought about “make-or-buy” will be presented in 
chronological order of their impact on business literature: 
 
• transaction cost economics (originating in a 1937 article, popularised in the 
1970s/80s);  
• the resource-based view (its origin has been attributed to a 1959 book, but 
RBV was popularised in the early 1990s);   
• real options theory (introduced into general business literature in the 
1990s). 
 
The issue of cost versus price will be considered, as it will always be examined in 
practice. A meta-review of 210 studies found that the benefit of cost advantage is a 
dominant factor (Kremic, Tukel & Rom, 2006).  However, this is only part of the 
theoretical lens of transaction cost economics, based on the seminal works of Coase 
(1937) and Williamson (1975), which focus on the costs of controlling contracts and 
future hazards in contracts. In short, an activity will be outsourced only where it is 
easier to control by a market contract. It is imperfections in the market leading to 
costly contracting that drive firms to insource.   
 
Broad support for the constructs of transaction cost economics, especially asset 
specificity (the uniqueness of assets) and behavioural uncertainty (difficulty in 
measuring performance) is given in a number of meta-analyses encompassing 
hundreds of empirical studies (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; David & Han, 2004; Carter 
& Hodgson, 2006; Geyskens, Steenkamp & Kumar, 2006; Macher & Richman, 2008). 
In TCE, these factors create hazards in external contracting leading to a preference 
for insourcing. However, the assumption underpinning TCE that contractual hazards 
exist in the market and that employment contracts are more adaptable is not 
universally accepted (Moscheandras, 1997).  Agency theory expects opportunism 
within firms as well (Fama & Jensen, 1983). This study will also explore perceptions 
of internal opportunism among employed salespeople, as observed by Jelinek and 
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Ahearne (2006), as a counter-balancing factor to the argument that external 
contractors are more difficult to control. 
 
The strategic view, sometimes labelled the “resource-based view” (Grant, 1991) 
focuses on capabilities. Grant argues that “capabilities involve complex patterns of 
co-ordination between people and between people and other resources.” (p. 122). 
In short, “core” capabilities are valuable sources of differentiation and economic 
rent; non-core activities can be outsourced (Espíno-Rodriguez & Padrón-Robaina, 
2006). Some researchers note complementarities between TCE and RBV (Argyres & 
Zenger, 2007) and this was a conclusion in one UK study of sales outsourcing 
(Wilson & Zhang, 2002). Nevertheless, the view that capability is something beyond 
asset specificity is strongly held (Barney, 1999). The degree to which accessing 
capabilities is a factor in determining “make-or-buy” decisions in the sales functions 
will be explored in this study. 
 
Real options theory, which has its roots in financial portfolio analysis, was applied to 
strategy by Sanchez (1993). In uncertain business environments, it is prudent to 
diversify the way in which activities are resourced. In general, there is a value in 
having variable rather than fixed costs (Stigler, 1939) and adaptability can be a 
source of improved performance (Fantazy, Kumar & Kumar, 2009). Real options can 
also be complementary to both TCE and RBV, since diversity of control may be 
perceived to increase overall control of a function, and the acquisition of other 
firms’ capabilities may be part of a firm’s competency-building strategy. Option-
optimising behaviour has been observed in outsourcing sales activities in the UK 
pharmaceutical sector (Rogers, 2009) and its value is worthy of exploration in other 
industry sectors. 
 
These predictive theories will be discussed in detail in the literature review, and 
antecedents derived from them will be explored in the primary research phase of 
this study.  The advantage of this exploratory study using a qualitative method is to 
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elicit the views of senior sales decision-makers about a variety of possible 
antecedents and moderators which are suggested by theory and previous research 
findings.  
 
1.7 The treatment of moderating factors in the extant literature 
 
There are moderating factors that may come between a company’s intention to 
outsource, and its actual behaviour (Espíno-Rodriguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2005). 
These do not appear to have been examined in previous studies of sales 
outsourcing, although researchers have alluded to them in discussions about 
further research (Anderson, 1985; Anderson et al., 2003). This study will explore 
some specifically “perceptual” moderating factors, in order to address this gap.   
 
Anderson (1985) raised the possibility that the availability of good vendors was an 
important consideration, as was switching costs (although this is less likely to be an 
issue where limited tasks are outsourced). The work of Dyer and Singh (1998), 
Lonsdale (1999) and Mantel, Tatikonda and Liao (2006), is supportive of the view 
that, for outsourcing in general, availability of good vendors is important to success. 
It is important to examine perceptions about the availability of suppliers and 
services of sales outsourcing, because Anderson et al. (2003) suggested that sales 
managers’ perceptions were worse than reality, indicating that the perception itself 
is the powerful moderator. 
 
This study will also consider the role of industry norms as an external mediator for 
out-tasking in sales, which has been explored to some degree by Anderson (1988) 
and Weiss et al. (1999).  A few researchers have observed a tendency for firms to 
copy one another, even where imitation has a negative effect on performance 
(Deephouse, 1996; Gimeno, Hoskisson, Beal & Wan, 2005; Miranda & Kim, 2006; 
Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 2006). It is necessary to explore whether the outsourcing of 
sales activities is considered “legitimate” in an industry, or among a peer group of 
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companies, and to what degree. Weiss et al.’s 1999 study is particularly interesting 
as it aligns adherence to norms with concerns about company reputation. Here 
also, perceptions of legitimacy are potentially strong constraints (Anderson et al., 
2003). 
 
In addition, there are factors about individual companies that may make it more or 
less easy for them to undertake outsourcing. For example, although US firms 
wanted to emulate the Japanese capability to work co-operatively with suppliers in 
the 1980s, they were trying to accelerate a process that had been built up over 
many years (Barney, 1999). Companies and individual managers have to experience 
a learning process.   
 
Researchers have noted the importance of clients’ vendor management skills in 
making outsourcing successful (Mayer & Salomon, 2006; Barthélemy & Quélin, 
2006; Judge & Dooley, 2006; Díez-Vial, 2007; Handley & Benton, 2009). Kakabadse 
and Kakabadse (2002a) noted that less than 10% of companies in their study were 
demonstrating aspects of best practice, which suggests that many companies may 
still be far from confident about the on-going management of outsourcing 
relationships. This suggests that those tasked with managing outsourcing may 
perceive that they do not have the necessary skills to be successful with it, which in 
turn affects their perceptions of the performance contribution of outsourcing 
(Anderson et al., 2003). The primary research will explore where respondents 
perceive themselves in terms of outsourcing capability, and how that influences 
how much outsourcing they do. 
 
Anderson et al. (2003) have suggested that the preference of the sales director or 
manager may be itself a significant moderating factor, as sales managers are often 
given considerable autonomy over resourcing decisions. This study is rooted in the 
perceptions of sales managers, so is likely to indicate preferences and explain to 
some degree why they arise. Why sales managers might have more power than 
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managers of other functions to act upon their preferences cannot be easily 
explained by asking them, and is beyond the scope of this study.  
 
1.8 Summary of the existing gap in knowledge 
 
Although the use of contract sales organisations is under-researched worldwide, 
there is at least a small body of literature on various topics concerning 
manufacturers’ representatives in the United States.   There are very few studies in 
Europe. Indeed, there are relatively few UK studies about the way sales functions 
are managed. The sales academic community is relatively small worldwide and only 
a few academics in the UK have a sales specialism (Richards et al., 2010). 
 
There are two landmark studies of sales outsourcing – Anderson in 1985 (one sector 
in the US) and Krafft et al. in Germany in 2004. Anderson looked specifically at the 
constructs of transaction cost economics; Krafft et al. looked at TCE and agency 
theory. Both supported TCE, specifically that insourcing is preferred where 
behavioural uncertainty and asset specificity are high. The most notable empirical 
study of the sales function from the RBV point of view is Menguc and Barker (2005) 
in Canada, although Wilson and Zhang (2002) in the UK manufacturing sector 
compared TCE with RBV. The construct of “flexibility” as a driver for outsourcing 
sales activities was explored in the qualitative study preceding this thesis (Rogers, 
2009) in the context of the UK pharmaceutical industry. This study builds on those 
studies, but also addresses a number of gaps, as discussed in 1.3. 
 
1.9. Need for the present study 
 
Although there is a small body of literature on sales topics, the majority is focused 
on the individual performance of employed salespeople. A few studies exist about 
the use of external agents for sales activities, enough to indicate that the practice is 
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well-established in some companies in the USA and Europe. With a large body of 
literature on competing explanations for make-or-buy decisions, it is important to 
apply this knowledge to the sales field. With more objective understanding about 
the perceptions that enable or inhibit sales outsourcing in the UK, it might be 
possible to improve sales resource effectiveness and efficiency, leading to better 
outcomes for UK companies.  With a persistent skills gap in the sales function in the 
UK (CFA, 2012), it is clear that even in a recession, companies are having difficulty 
recruiting staff of sufficient calibre. Therefore, alternative approaches are necessary 
to ensure that sales functions have the means to fulfil the growth objectives of their 
oganisations. 
 
This study will make a contribution to filling the gap in the sales management 
literature in general, as well as the specific contribution of modelling sales 
managers’ decision-making when evaluation resourcing options. It should also make 
a contribution to practice, enabling sales managers to approach external resource 
options with a full understanding of what problems they can and cannot solve. As 
such, it should also be of value to professional institutes representing the sales 
profession. 
 
1.10.1 Research philosophy  
 
Subjective facts are opinions that people hold that would be constant assuming 
consistent circumstances (Arbnor & Bjerke, 2009). This study is a search for 
subjective facts - the perceptions that sales managers have about their resourcing 
choices and resulting outcomes. The research paradigm most likely to help in this 
respect is interpretivism.   
 
Meaning is not a function of data (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005). In this study, the 
interpretivist philosophy has been adopted to explore meaning, because causal 
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impact and local context are relevant (Longshore-Smith, 2006) in pursuit of research 
results that are “informative, complete, balanced and useful” (Burke Johnson, 
Onwuegbuzie & Turner, 2007, p. 129).  
 
1.10.2 Research methodology 
In the case of a study about the use of contract sales organisations, it is important 
to recognise that there is not much historical guidance. The extant literature can, at 
best, be described as “modest” (Rapp, 2009), and, apart from Krafft et al. (2004), 
within the few key empirical studies, the contexts are rather narrow (e.g. single sub-
sector or geographical area). That leads to an expectation that in-depth qualitative 
research would yield most insight. The application of a qualitative research method 
enables exploration of specific contexts that have led to particular resourcing 
models being deployed, so that the unusual can be considered alongside the usual.  
 
This study is different from previous studies, not only in its geographical focus, but 
in its cross-sectoral sample and methodological approach. The purpose of a 
qualitative study is to improve understanding about the use of contract sales 
organisations in the UK by exploring the expressed views of respondents. In this 
study, in-depth qualitative interviews were conducted by telephone, which required 
a reasonably structured approach. Quintamensional question design (Gallup, 1947) 
was a helpful guide in ensuring that factual and open questions could be converged 
to provide a comprehensive analysis of the research question (Cresswell, 2003).  
 
In this study, the unit of analysis is sales managers. The correct respondents for this 
study were managers with responsibility for the effectiveness and efficiency of the 
sales function in their organisation, or part of it. These managers are the primary 
decision-makers when it comes to employing salespeople or contracting out. Some 
consideration may be needed for the influence of other decision-makers, but the 
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purpose of this study was to focus on the perceptions of sales managers about 
outsourcing sales activities. 
 
Finding a suitable sampling frame was not as easy as it might be for other 
professions, which is discussed further in the methodology chapter. Given problems 
with the incompleteness of national statistics on the population of sales managers, 
lack of a professional institute with critical mass and problems observed with a 
commercial database used for another purpose, a snowball approach was 
considered the only feasible way. Sales managers are difficult to engage in research 
(Carter, Dixon & Moncrief, 2008), therefore an approach via their network might be 
the best way of achieving a reasonable number of responses.  
 
Interviewer-administered surveys tend to achieve higher response rates (de Vaus, 
2002; Saunders, Lewis & Thornhill, 2003), and with these respondents, who 
represent a highly mobile organisational “elite”, telephone interviews were 
preferred. 
 
1.10.3 Data analysis 
 
Replication in social science should be accorded critical importance (Lindsay, 1995), 
and constructs from earlier studies were used to guide the interview design. 
However, examination of the wider literature beyond previous studies of sales 
outsourcing demanded the exploration of new angles as well, and therefore the 
data gathered in this study was words rather than numerical scales.   
 
Respondents were asked to explain in their own words how they perceive cause 
and effect. The purpose of asking an open question is to establish whether the 
answer is related to an already established possibility, or whether it represents a 
new possibility (Christy & Wood, 1999).   
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Directed content analysis was carried out on the data. The analysis was conducted 
on the basis of the frequency and emphasis of key words and phrases, 
accommodating synonyms and shared meaning. The text was searched, structured 
and analysed into themes using the software package Nvivo.  
 
1.11 Some definitions 
 
Throughout this thesis, the company that is doing the outsourcing will be referred 
to as “the client”, and the company supplying the outsourced function will be 
referred to as “the vendor”. In the specific case of companies providing an 
outsourced sales function, there are a variety of terms in the literature including 
“manufacturer’s representatives”, “independent sales organisation”, “agents”, 
“resellers” and “contract sales organisations” which will have to be used alongside 
“vendor”. Most of the prior literature on this topic is focused on the manufacturers’ 
representatives’ model. Manufacturers’ representatives are “independent 
professional providers of field sales and marketing services to manufacturers or 
suppliers” (Kaufman, 1999). They do not set prices or handle stock like wholesalers 
and retailers. They do not sell competitors’ products. They sell a complementary 
portfolio of products to provide convenience for the end-customer (Novick, 2000; 
Anderson & Trinkle, 2005). However, in the primary research anything that 
respondents classify as contracting out of a sales activity will be considered.   
 
Sales agents have a particular legal standing. It is common practice for a company to 
employ a third party to negotiate a contract on their behalf. The agent acts for the 
principal in completing tasks, under the terms of a legal arrangement in which the 
principal may set limitations on the activity of the agent. Some sales agents are 
clearly acting as agents for a principal, and may have their own brand. Others act 
under the brand umbrella of the principal (this is common in telesales). Where the 
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principal is “unseen” by the customer, UK case law suggests that principals’ 
attempts to limit agent behaviour are overridden by the “custom and practice” of 
what the customer would expect them to honour (Watteau v Fenwick, 1993, 
discussed in Rogers K. M., 2004). 
 
Companies that undertake selling on behalf of clients do not always operate under 
agency law, but where outsourcing is being discussed in contractual terms, it will be 
necessary to identify the company that is devolving activity as “the principal” and 
the company carrying out devolved activity as “the agent”.  
 
1.12 Assumptions 
 
Sales managers have bounded rationality, but have a professional concern to 
ensure the optimal effectiveness and efficiency of the sales function. 
 
1.13 Organisation of the thesis 
 
This thesis begins in this first chapter with an introduction to the research topic and 
its importance as a contribution to knowledge.   
 
The literature review (Chapter 2) begins with an exploration of the literature on 
“make-or-buy”/outsourcing as a means to operational effectiveness in pursuit of 
strategy and it examines the observed strengths and weaknesses of “outsourcing” 
per se, and hybrid/partial outsourcing (2.1).   
 
The literature review then moves on to consider the main theoretical approaches to 
explaining outsourcing: transaction cost economics (2.2.1), the resource-based view 
(2.2.2) and real options theory (2.2.3). In 2.3, consideration of the sales literature 
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will identify previously discussed antecedents of sales outsourcing and their 
theoretical roots. The literature on moderating factors will then be discussed in 2.4. 
The literature review concludes with a summary of the themes from the literature 
and a discussion of the questions to be explored in the primary research (2.5).  
 
Chapter 3 provides an in-depth rationale for the research methodology. The 
philosophical positioning (interpretivism) is explored. The range of research 
methods available is discussed and the choice of research design is explained. The 
approach to identifying and recruiting respondents, questionnaire design, piloting, 
administration of the interviews and data processing is presented. Reliability and 
validity are discussed. The ethical approach to the research is stated.   
 
Chapter 4 both describes the results from the analysis of the primary research data, 
and provides analytical and critical discussion of the primary research results in 
relation to research questions. 
 
Chapter 5 revisits the objectives and questions and summarises the main findings, 
conclusions, implications, and contribution to knowledge. It also identifies research 
limitations and new directions for future research. 
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Figure 1: Model of the thesis contents 
Source: The author 
 
1.14 Summary 
 
This chapter has explained the importance of the research and provided an 
introduction to the research topic. It has presented the research aims and 
objectives, and outlined the research questions and research methodology. The 
next chapter is a review of the literature relevant to “make-or-buy” decisions, with 
a focus on sales activities where sources allow. 
 
Model of the contents
1. Introduction
2.2 Theories of 
outsourcing
2.4 Moderating 
factors
2.3 Antecedents of 
sales outsourcing
3. 
Methodology
5. Conclusions
4. Findings and 
discussion
Literature 
review 2.1 Overview of 
outsourcing
2.5  
Propositions
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
 
This chapter examines the extant literature that underpins “make-or-buy”, 
starting with consideration of the importance of the alignment of organisational 
design with strategy. This is followed by a review of the literature on outsourcing. 
Theoretical constructs of “make-or-buy” antecedents are then reviewed, in 
chronological order of their appearance in the business literature, starting with 
transaction cost economics (1937), then the resource-based view (1984) and 
subsequently the more recent theory of real options (1993).  The extant studies of 
outsourcing sales activities are then discussed, examining how theories have been 
used and exploring how theoretical antecedents might be perceived in practice. 
Most studies consider limits to the application of theory based on moderating 
factors, and these are reviewed in 2.4. In conclusion, propositions based on the 
literature are discussed. 
 
2.0 The alignment of organisation design with strategy 
 
“Virtually all issues of corporate strategy and many of business strategy involve the 
boundaries of the firm” (Foss, 1999, p. 728). 
 
Profitable growth is the expectation of virtually all investors, (Hitt et al., 2006), but 
saturated markets, intense competition and economic uncertainty have challenged 
companies in developed economies. Much that was described as growth in the 
1990s was the result of financial engineering or serial acquisitions. Growing from 
within requires change, but firms that plan to change do not always have the means 
to succeed and need to leverage external resources (Kazajian et al., 2006).  
 
Effective adaptation to market conditions and efficiency (eliminating waste) are 
both very important considerations for firms, but adaptation is particularly crucial 
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(Williamson, 1991). It can be costly to make the wrong choices in, for example, 
“make-or-buy” when entering new markets (Anderson & Coughlan, 1987), as 
switching causes loss of investment and redeployment problems (Anderson & 
Weitz, 1992). Nevertheless, the cost of change has to be offset against the cost of 
misalignment.   
 
A high performance system is one that can adapt rapidly. Adaptation can involve 
getting things done in the market, within the firm (hierarchy) and with in-between 
organisational forms (hybrids). Aligning strategy with the business environment is a 
“central anchor” for management, and “intuitively appealing” (Venkatraman & 
Prescott, 1990, p. 15). Indeed, there is strong empirical support from a two-sample, 
longitudinal study that achieving alignment between the business environment and 
strategy has a positive effect on a firm’s performance (Venkatraman & Prescott, 
1990). Much subsequent literature on the alignment of organisation design with the 
business environment has been more about building theory than testing it (see 
table 1).  
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Table 1: Aligning organisational design with business environment and company 
strategy 
 
Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
Venkatraman 
& Prescott 
1990 Empirical Environment/ 
strategy 
co-alignment 
Positive performance impact 
of environment-strategy 
coalignment. 
Williamson O 1991 Comment Structural 
Alternatives 
Adaptation is the key 
economic problem – a high-
performance system is one 
that can adapt rapidly; 
market, hierarchical and 
hybrid all possible. 
Hitt et al. 1998 Comment Competitive 
advantage 
Developing new organisational 
structures as part of 
leadership in 21st century. 
Noble  1999 Literature 
review 
Strategy 
implementation 
Success is associational with 
fluidity/flexibility in adjusting 
organisational structures. 
Dijksterhuis 
et al. 
1999 Theory 
building 
Where do new 
organisational 
forms come 
from? 
Organisational form is 
supposed to align company 
with its environment. But 
shared management 
“schemas” are part of the 
environment. 
Snow et al. 2005 Comment Organisational 
design theory 
Managers need to anticipate 
changes needed: overcome 
weaknesses of current form; 
exploit underused potential in 
current form. 
Dovey & 
Fenech 
2007 Case study – 
finance 
sector 
Organisational 
learning 
Tight structures are the cause 
of organisational stagnation. 
 
The 21st century business environment, characterised by discontinuity, blurring of 
boundaries and hyper-competition, requires innovation in organisational design 
(Hitt et al., 1998; Snow et al., 2005). For example, in a survey of European 
pharmaceutical sales managers, 60% reported piloting new sales models to respond 
to the increasing power of governments and insurance companies who pay for 
treatments (Ruzicic & Danner, 2007).  There is not a deep body of literature about 
the implementation of strategy (Noble, 1999), but what there is suggests that 
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successful implementers are those able to adapt to change in the business 
environment and the ability to change organisational design is a key part of that 
(Noble, 1999).   
 
Although the business environment is considered to be the main driver of change in 
organisational design, the perceptions of managers about how to change are also 
relevant (Dijkerhuis et al., 1999). Organisational barriers can be “pervasive” (Meer, 
2005, p. 14), and managers can be unaware of the misalignment between activity 
and strategy (Strahle, Spiro & Acito, 1996). Rigid structures can lead organisations 
to fail to learn and transform, and to fail to realise the business results necessary for 
the organisation’s survival (Dovey & Fenech, 2007). Many companies that plan to 
change are already in difficulty (Wheeler, McFarland & Kleiner, 2007).  Being able to 
direct change is key (Coase, 1937).  Like Coase, some managers may perceive 
market structure and exchange transactions as complicated in comparison with 
directing employees (Coase, 1937). Other may perceive that vertical integration is 
“competitively inflexible in a rapidly changing business environment” (McIvor, 2000, 
p. 41). 
 
Williamson (1991) argued that hierarchies and markets are polar opposites, with 
hybrids in between. Because of presumed risks associated with market transactions, 
internal change used to be asserted as the easier option (e.g. Ansoff, 1987), but it is 
outsourcing into the market that has boomed in the past thirty years. Outsourcing is 
even “on the rise for business activities that are knowledge intensive, non-
standardized, interactive, and intended to generate new knowledge” (Mudambi & 
Tallman, 2010, p. 1435).   
 
Since accessing and leveraging external resources through outsourcing seems to be 
a solution that many companies have used to better align their organisational 
design with the business environment, the next section examines the literature on 
the outsourcing phenomenon. 
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2.1 Outsourcing: a literature review 
 
This section traces the outsourcing literature to the link between business strategy 
and organisational design and tracks the emergence of outsourcing as an 
increasingly popular organisational design choice throughout the 1990s and 2000s. 
It introduces the main theories associated with outsourcing and examines how sales 
outsourcing is discussed in the marketing literature. It considers different 
outsourcing models; in particular, it discusses the concept of out-tasking, an 
approach to outsourcing at a very granular level of analysis. 
 
2.1.1. Outsourcing as an organisational design choice 
 
2.1.1.1 A short history of outsourcing 
 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2002b) point out that the Romans outsourced tax 
collection, and that most public services in 18th and 19th century England, such as 
prison management and road maintenance, were carried out by the private sector. 
The vertically integrated firm, and vertically integrated government, were products 
of the early 20th century. In the 1950s, only specialist functions such as advertising 
and legal services were “outsourced”.  
 
By the end of the 20th century, large bureaucratic self-contained firms were 
regarded as inefficient; unable to meet their own needs for cost discipline and 
service quality (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002b). In “make-or-buy” decisions, the 
consensus was for buy (Ford, Cotton, Farmer, Gross, & Wilkinson, 1993). Almost 
anything could be outsourced, apart from what determines the firm’s identity, such 
as intellectual property or a brand (Sucky, 2007).  
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Corporate enthusiasm for downsizing has fuelled the popularity of outsourcing. 
Outsourcing is now widespread in the developed world, with both public and 
commercial organisations contracting several business processes to third party 
specialists (Morgan, 2003). The majority of firms in Kakabadse and Kakabadse’s 
(2002b) study of 747 senior executives in North America and Europe reported that 
they were outsourcing at least “basic” services.  The first generation of outsourcing 
was rarely strategic, but driven by the finance and purchasing function for short-
term cost advantage (Ford et al., 1993). 
 
In 1989, the market for information technology and business process outsourcing 
alone was worth US$9-12 billion; by 2007 it was worth US$200-250 billion (Lacity, 
Willcocks & Rottman, 2008). Based on their twenty year research programme 
involving 500 companies worldwide, Lacity et al. (2008) expected the outsourcing 
phenomenon to continue increasing in “size, importance and complexity” (p. 32).    
 
One business function seemed to have bucked the trend. Selling has been by-
passed by the outsourcing boom, even in the USA (Anderson et al., 2003). Their 
estimate (based on US census data) of approximately one tenth of business-to-
business volume being generated by manufacturers’ representatives (contract sales 
organisations) has not changed since the 1980s.  However, supply-side indicators in 
the UK, such as the substantial growth of large contract sales organisations (e.g. 
United Drug company reports 2009-2011; http://www.ttmc.co.uk/news/42, posted 
25th September 2012) and increased numbers of small sales outsourcing 
consultancies (www.freeindex.com), suggest recent growth in the use of contract 
sales organisations. 
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2.1.2 Definitions of outsourcing 
 
Usually in the academic literature, outsourcing is associated with large companies 
who have historically been vertically integrated (providing support services in-
house). Therefore, the user organisation (the client) is transferring property, staff 
and/or decision rights over a business function to an external organisation (the 
vendor) (Loh & Venkatraman, 1992). However, outsourcing is a traditional “make-
or-buy” decision for all organisations, even start-ups. It means purchasing services 
from another organisation rather than employing staff to do them “in-house”. 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2002a, p. 1) explain: “Outsourcing involves contracting 
with a third party to provide goods and services to the host organisation that would 
otherwise have been available in-house”.  
 
Espino-Rodriguez and Padrón-Robaina in their 2006 review of the outsourcing 
literature noted that most authors agree that “outsourcing” means acquiring 
activities from external companies rather than conducting those activities internally. 
They argued that because outsourcing modifies the boundaries of the firm, it is a 
strategic decision. While Sucky (2007) encompassed his definition of outsourcing to 
include transferring the ownership of traditional and value-adding functions, Quinn 
and Hilmer (1994) limited outsourcing to acquiring activities which are not part of 
the firm’s core capabilities. Morgan (2003) argued that outsourcing “is an attractive 
vehicle in a bid to create an agile organisation, but it is not a substitute for creating 
a coherent strategy for managing resources to optimise strategic performance” 
(Morgan, 2003, p. 44). However, Gilley and Rasheed (2000) observed that 
companies sometimes use outsourcing as a means of tactically abstaining from 
performing an activity in-house.  
 
Anderson and Trinkle’s (2005, p. 1) succinct definition: “To outsource a function is 
to pay someone else to do it for you” will be the guide for this study of the 
outsourcing of sales activities. Anderson researched sales outsourcing across three 
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decades, and this short definition can encompass all models of sales outsourcing, 
including strategic, tactical and hybrid. 
 
2.1.3 What gets outsourced? 
 
There are no definite limits to what can be outsourced. 40% of drug development 
expenditure is committed to contract research organizations (CanBiotech, 2005; Sen 
& Shiel, 2006), demonstrating that even where intellectual property is being 
created, outsourcing can be managed effectively. Nevertheless, basic services such 
as catering, printing, maintenance and cleaning are most likely to be outsourced 
(Ford et al., 1993; Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002b). There is a particular focus in 
academic journals and the trade press on IT outsourcing, which is a huge business 
(Lacity et al., 2008) and the outsourcing of manufacturing (Bengtsson & Dabhilkar, 
2009). Facilities management (Simms & Rogers, 2006), logistics (Rafiq & Jaafar, 
2007), advertising (Beverland, Farrelly & Woodhatch, 2007) and auditing (Beattie & 
Fearnley, 1995) are less frequently examined.  Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2002b) 
observed that customer contact is frequently entrusted to outsourcing vendors, and 
recent trade sources suggest that the outsourcing of call centres is increasing in the 
UK (Contactbabel, 2011).  
 
There is a theme in practitioner comment that firms should take a strategic 
overview of their organisation and its processes in deciding which functions to 
outsource and how much to outsource overall, and they will vary in their approach 
(Tompkins, 2005). The academic literature offers a choice of theories about the 
dominant driving force for outsourcing, but also assumes that for different 
companies, different functions or tasks will be outsourced.  (These theories are 
discussed in subsequent sections of the literature review.) The possibility of 
complex configurations involving integrating internal capabilities and capabilities 
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bought in from several suppliers has led to a distinct sub-theme in the supply chain 
literature concerning networks (see table 2).  
 
 
2.1.4 Integrated networks in supply chains 
 
Table 2: Integrated networks 
 
Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
Stern & Weitz 1997 Comment Distribution 
networks 
Importance of supply chain 
optimisation. 
Friedheim 1999 Examples Competition “relationship enterprises” – 
multiple networks. 
Wisner 2003 Empirical, 556 
firms US and 
EU 
Supply chain 
performance 
Supplier and customer 
relationship management 
capabilities are 
complementary; both need 
development plus 
engagement with capable 
supply chain partners. SCM 
best practice associated with 
competitiveness. 
Snow et al. 2005 Comment Organisational 
design theory 
Multi-firm collaborative 
network is the new paradigm. 
Baraldi et al. 2007 Commentary IMP approach 
to supply chain 
Firms so reliant on partners 
that the idea of independent 
strategy is futile. 
Klibi et al. 2010 Theory-
building 
Supply chain 
networks (SCN) 
SCN design involves decisions 
about collaborating 
customers but often does not 
take enough account of 
uncertainty – risks and 
hazards, value vs cost, 
robustness/resilience. 
 
The Industrial Marketing and Purchasing Group posits that firms are so reliant on 
partners that the idea of independent strategy is futile; what happens to strategic 
control in supply networks may not be the call of the original designer (Baraldi et 
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al., 2007). Since the challenge of risk analysis and modelling for hazards, robustness, 
resilience and responsiveness as well as value creation is not trivial (Klibi et al., 
2010), it is better done in partnership. When a distribution system is established, it 
becomes a network of relationships, which also need managing - upstream and 
downstream (Wheeler, Jones, & Young, 1996; Stern & Weitz, 1997; Wisner, 2003). 
Global competition in the 21st century has become a matter of positioning between 
multi-firm collaborative networks (Friedheim, 1999; Snow et al., 2005). 
Nevertheless, while the production and movement of goods undoubtedly has 
become more interdependent in some sectors, large brands tend to dominate and 
drive supply networks (Rossetti & Choi, 2005).  
 
The scope of this study does not include supply chain dynamics. It purposefully 
focuses on situations where stock is not being moved, but on situations where the 
interface with customers (or some part of it) has been outsourced. It is notable that 
the literature which addresses business-to-business marketing is referred to as 
“buyer-seller literature” (Borg & Freitag, 2012) and the focus of analysis, even when 
discussing collaborative relationships, is between seller and buyer (Athaide & 
Zhang, 2011).  The dyadic nature of the seller-buyer relationship in business-to-
business sectors may be a stronger influence on sales managers’ perceptions when 
considering outsourcing, rather than network design. Nevertheless, some studies of 
the downstream network of companies, also known as marketing channels, share 
some theoretical constructs with studies of sales outsourcing and are therefore 
used in this literature review (see table 3). 
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2.1.5 Marketing channels 
 
 “Strategic positioning…requires the performance of different sales activities or the 
performance of similar sales activities in different ways” (Colletti & Chonko, 1997, p 
12). 
 
Designing marketing channels, also known as routes to market or the downstream 
supply chain, has been claimed as the key element of marketing strategy by Stern 
and Weitz, (1997) and key to building market share (Hardy & Magrath, 1988). For 
researchers interested in the sales function, it can be called sales strategy (Novick, 
2000), since it is fundamentally about who introduces the customer to the 
product/service. The central decision for any new venture is to “make-or-buy” the 
sales activity (Zoltners et al., 2006). In delivering products/services to customers, 
suppliers have a lot of options and the market maps for some goods and services 
are very complex (Cespedes, 1988). The need for an optimal channel mix in multi-
channel strategy has to be addressed with analytical detail (Sharma & Mehrotra, 
2007; Rosenbloom, 2007). 
 
Channels need to be analysed, planned and organised. Firms need a proactive 
channel strategy and salesforce structure, congruent with other elements of the 
business and marketing plan (Zoltners et al., 2008). Success in channel management 
can be a source of competitive advantage (Mehta et al., 2002), and sales managers 
must have the training to be effective channel managers (Anderson R, 1996).  
Although some researchers have focused definition of channels on external 
organisations, channel choices for companies encompass: 
• Direct channels, which are in-house salespeople, telesales or Internet 
portals;  
• Indirect channels, where stock may be held, such as wholesalers, 
dealers and value-added resellers; 
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• Third party selling arrangements where stock is not held, such as 
sales agents, manufacturers’ representatives, contract sales 
organisations, freelance salespeople or outsourced telesales. 
 
Indirect and agency channels involve third party organisations, who are often called 
“channel intermediaries”. There are over half a million channel intermediaries in 
the US.  This includes brokers, manufacturers’ representatives and sales agents. 
Indirect channels generally appear to be associated with long-term contractual 
arrangements, whereas when stock-holding is not an issue, arrangements can be 
more tactical and short-term.   
 
The choice of whether channels are direct or involve third parties has been linked 
with both transaction cost economics (Klein, Frazier & Roth, 1990; Neves et al. , 
2001) and the resource-based view (Wilson & Zhang, 2002; Tuominen, 2004). There 
are many circumstances where companies need to engage with third party 
organisations to introduce their product to prospective customers (Anderson & 
Coughlan, 1987). Channel intermediaries are an opportunity for cost saving and 
productivity improvements (Narus & Anderson, 1996), but can be used for other 
strategic purposes such as market entry at low risk (Zoltners et al., 2006). Customer 
choice sometimes requires a variety of channels to be used, driving channel 
“hybridisation” (Gassenheimer et al., 2007) and change (Cespedes, 1988; Magrath 
& Hardy, 1988; Narus & Anderson, 1996; Staelin, 2008). Channel choices may also 
be influenced by the nature of particular markets, types of products and 
environmental factors (Mehta et al., 2002). 
 
Once channels are established, manufacturers can become very reluctant to add to 
them or change them, but proactive management of channels must include 
frequent redesign (Anderson & Coughlan, 1987; Mehta et al., 2002). Good metrics 
are needed to track the effectiveness and efficiency of channels (Cespedes, 1988; 
Sharma & Mehrotra, 2007). Sales managers also have to detect and resolve channel 
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conflict (Mehta et al., 2002; Gassenheimer et al., 2006). Channel conflict may be 
constructive when market coverage is needed (Webb & Hogan, 2002), but soon 
reduces performance in mature markets. Channels require careful design and 
management, and each channel partner needs a clear role.  
 
Wholesalers, dealers and value-added resellers are important players in supply 
networks and have a place in the supply chain literature. There are some similarities 
between these players and third party selling arrangements where stock is not held, 
as manufacturers’ relationships with their external representatives can be quite 
long-term. Nevertheless, the use of sales agents, manufacturers’ representatives, 
contract sales organisations, freelance salespeople or outsourced telesales have 
more usually been associated with organisational design and the outsourcing of a 
business process (Rapp, 2009). It is this angle - sales activities as customer-facing 
processes that may or may not be outsourced - that is adopted in this study, rather 
than network design. Each sales activity is regarded as a granular transaction. While 
the whole may add up to a network, the focus of this study is the “make-or-buy” 
decision per activity. 
 
Table 3: Channels / routes to market – integration / co-ordination 
Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
Cespedes 1988 Case study Channel 
management 
is general 
management 
Complexity in market maps, 
importance of channel 
decisions being embedded in 
business strategy. 
Magrath & 
Hardy 
1991 Comment Distribution 
network 
design 
Should be driven by markets 
needs and company strategy. 
Anderson R 1996 Comment Sales 
management 
in new 
millennium 
Companies must train sales 
managers to be channel 
managers/ manage hybrid 
salesforce. 
Colletti & 
Chonko 
1997 3 case studies 
of change 
management 
in sales 
High 
performance 
sales 
organisations 
Strategic positioning requires 
performance of different sales 
activities, or doing similar in 
different ways (quote p 12). 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
Neves et al. 2001 Theory 
building 
TCE 
Model for 
channel 
planning 
Asset specificity (core/non-
core) relevant to channel 
design. 
Zoltners et al. 2006 Comment 
based on 
consultancy 
experience 
Sales force 
strategy 
Central decision (for any new 
venture) is “make-or-buy” 
(sales). 
Sharma & 
Mehrotra 
2007 Empirical; 
customer 
database of 
large software 
vendor 1990-
2005 
Need for 
optimal 
channel mix 
Companies must measure 
channel level profitability; 
must also take into account 
channels that cannot be 
abandoned. In case, firm 
decided to increase salesforce 
and distributor accounts, and 
shifted some key accounts to 
regular salesforce. 
Staelin 2008 Comment Channel 
structure 
Need to capture numerous 
space/competition situations. 
Zoltners et al. 2008 Comment 
based on 
consultancy 
experience 
Salesforce 
effectiveness 
External forces > company 
strategy > marketing/sales 
strategy > sales force 
structure > activities > results. 
 
But there is potential for conflict, which has to be managed 
 
Webb & Hogan 2002 Empirical, 65 
channel 
managers (4 
companies) 
Too many 
channels 
causing 
conflict which 
reduces 
performance 
Constructive when market 
coverage is needed, 
destructive in maturity, needs 
managing. 
Gassenheimer 
et al. 
2007 Theory-
building 
Hybrid 
distribution 
Managerial challenge in 
managing the co-existence of 
co-operation and competition 
in channels. 
Rosenbloom 2007 Literature 
review 
Multiple 
channels in 
business-to-
business 
Pros but also cons – channel 
conflict. 
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2.1.6 The specifics of sales outsourcing 
 
Sales outsourcing has a long history, since independent representatives were the 
dominant form of distribution and sales in the 19th century (Anderson & Trinkle, 
2005) and it has been a common route for small companies to achieve market 
coverage. Their use in market entry is one of the most long-standing applications 
(Anderson & Coughlan, 1987; Peng, Zhou & York, 2006). Product launches are also a 
time when additional flexible sales resource is required (Anderson & Trinkle, 2005; 
Rogers, 2008). The impact of using contract sales organisations in on-going 
customer relationships has been briefly explored (Palmatier, Scheer & Steenkamp, 
2007). Strategic challenges such as making marketing plans work (Bonoma, 1984), 
improving the supply chain (Christopher & Ryals, 1999; Wong, Tjosvold, Wong & Liu, 
1999), and internal change management (Colletti & Chonko, 1997), invite the 
consideration of sales outsourcing, but it is an option that is rarely studied in depth 
(Dishman, 1996; Rogers, 2008; Rapp, 2009). 
 
Effectively, manufacturers’ representatives or contract sales organisations are sales 
agents, though usually not governed by agency law (Novick, 2000). Some US 
manufacturers’ representatives focus on particular industry sectors and have their 
own association, such as the Manufacturers Agents Association for the Food Service 
Industry (MAFSI), which has 316 independent manufacturers' representative 
members in North America, and the National Electrical Manufacturers 
Representatives Association (NEMRA). Others focus on particular geographies, and 
others on a particular part of the sales process, such as lead generation, trade show 
follow-up or merchandising (Feiertag, 2005). 
 
Usually manufacturers’ representatives sell for more than one manufacturer per 
call, but carry a complementary assortment of products (this is described as 
syndicated selling in the pharmaceutical sector or multi-line selling in 
manufacturing). In fact, manufacturers’ representatives firms can perform the role 
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of category managers for smaller retailers, as they assemble category assortments. 
The manufacturers’ representatives firm is designed to solve problems for their 
client and the client’s customer (e.g. Allegrezza, 2000), but can be seen as 
middlemen, duplicating effort rather than relieving it (Anderson & Trinkle, 2005). As 
independent organisations, their clients may perceive that they lose control of the 
relationship with the customer, hence why the desire to control the salesforce may 
be a driving force for insourcing it (Turner, 1994). 
 
Contract sales organisations can be part of the supply chain, not necessarily 
competing with distributors but cooperating with them or working alongside e-
channels; they can also be part of a hybrid salesforce, not necessarily competing 
with direct salespeople, but blended with them, covering distinct customer 
segments, product categories or geographical territories (Kaufman 1999; Landry & 
Pandrangi, 2005). Jackson, Widmier,Giacobbe & Keith, (1999) reported that half of 
all US companies used manufacturers’ representatives in some way. It is commonly 
assumed, according to Dishman (1996) that rep firms are predominantly used by 
small manufacturers, but the Manufacturers’ Representatives’ Educational Research 
Foundation (MRERF) in the USA claims that even global firms such as IBM, Maytag 
and 3M are making use of contract sales organisations (Kaufman, 1999).   
 
Manufacturers’ representatives accounted for 1.83 million sales jobs in the USA in 
2010, according to the US Department of Labor. These jobs were spread throughout 
a variety of industry sectors and across the country. The number of sales jobs in rep 
firms is expected to grow by 16% between 2010 and 2020. 288,900 new jobs were 
anticipated, suggesting that sales agents will be handling more clients 
(http://www.bls.gov). It is evident that sales outsourcing is widespread - 50% of US 
companies use manufacturers’ representatives; but it is also a minority interest - 
they only account for 11% of wholesale volume (Anderson et al., 2003).   
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Despite the contribution of the manufacturer’s representative sector to economic 
growth in the USA, the multi-line selling function has been described as one of the 
least studied and least understood segments in business and academe (Taylor, 
1990).  Table 4 below lists the main studies in this field. Arguably, all aspects of sales 
outsourcing are neglected by researchers (Rapp, 2009). One of the possible 
problems in understanding the phenomenon is a historical focus on all-or-nothing 
“make-or-buy” (Anderson, 1985; Krafft et al., 2004), when many intermediate 
models are being used (Rogers, 2009). It is distinctly possible that most companies, 
particularly larger companies, only use them for some products or activities. 
Therefore, this study will focus on those intermediate states. The outsourcing 
literature has not overlooked the possibility of partial outsourcing, and the next 
section examines the findings for it. 
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Table 4: Sales outsourcing 
 
Authors Date Type of research Context Relevant findings 
Anderson & 
Schmittlein 
1984 Empirical, 145 
responses, one 
industry sector, 
16 firms 
Why would 
you employ 
salespeople? 
TCE constructs asset 
specificity and behavioural 
uncertainty proven. 
Anderson 1985 Empirical, 13 
companies 
TCE and sales 
outsourcing 
TCE constructs asset spec and 
behavioural uncertainty 
proven. 
Anderson & 
Coughlan 
1987 Empirical, 94 
overseas ops 
1955-1975 
TCE and 
export 
Asset specificity relevant; and 
uncertainty of cultural 
distance of the market. 
Powers 1987 Theory-building Make-or-buy 
decision in 
sales 
Classical cost/price business 
case. 
John & 
Weitz 
1989 Empirical, 161 
firms 
TCE within 
internal sales 
compensation 
TCE is useful framework – 
most significant element is 
performance-output difficulty 
(behavioural uncertainty). 
Klein et al. 1990 Empirical, 375 
companies 
TCE in 
international 
markets with 4 
models 
TCE supported; hybrids only 
weakly distinguished from 
market exchanges. 
Wheeler et 
al. 
1996 Quals 14 agents, 
14 subsids in UK 
(machine tools) 
Market entry 
mode 
Critique of control approach: 
TCE explanations not 
consistently helpful. 
Wilson & 
Zhang 
2002 Empirical, 610 
firms; UK 
manufacturing 
Does type of 
manufacture 
affect sales 
choice 
RBV led approach, but “firm-
specific assets” (TCE) most 
explanatory. 
Anderson et 
al. 
2003 Theory-building Examination 
of the lack of 
sales 
outsourcing 
Influence of the sales 
directors/managers’ 
preference. 
Ross et al. 2005 Comment Make-or-buy 
decision in 
sales 
Cost case understated. 
Krafft et al. 2004 Empirical, 270 
sales executives 
in Germany 
Comparing 
agency theory 
and TCE 
TCE construct asset spec 
proven. 
Rogers 2009 Quals, 12 pharma 
companies 
Use of CSOs Flexibility is valued more than 
cost and skill advantages. 
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2.1.7 Out-tasking 
 
Multi-sourcing (which can also be interpreted as partial outsourcing or out-tasking) 
has been observed in the outsourcing literature for many years (see table 5 below). 
Within the overall growth of the outsourcing sector in the past twenty years, there 
is an increasing trend for smaller, shorter deals (Lacity et al., 2008). This does not sit 
well with the assumptions of transaction cost economics, where market contracting 
and internal hierarchy are polar opposites with “hybrid” governance in between 
(Williamson, 1991). Hybrid governance is not, for Williamson (1991) “an amalgam of 
market and hierarchy, but possesses its own disciplined rationale” (p. 294), such as 
franchising, in which credible commitments are made.  
 
Rindfleisch and Heide (1997) criticise transaction cost economics for ignoring how 
plural governance forms can be combined. It is the question of how small a 
transaction might be that creates mixes of contracting types in one function. 
Transactions range from frequent purchases of standard, non-strategic items to 
constructing a factory (Williamson, 1979). In sales management, the cost per sales 
call, estimated to range upwards from US$150 (Krafft et al., 2004), is a frequent 
point of reference, but there are other activities in the sales process, and many that 
vary according to the product or customer type. Like Anderson in 1985, Krafft et al. 
(2004) examined all-or-nothing scenarios in sales outsourcing, i.e. the outsourcing 
of the whole sales function in a company or division, and ignored hybrid or 
granulated models. This excluded a lot of workable partial outsourcing scenarios 
from their findings.   
 
Different choices of outsourcing models result in different risk management 
challenges, and thus the need for different relationship management (Sanders, 
Locke, Moore & Autry, 2007). Higher risks are not necessarily eschewed because 
there is the potential for higher reward. It has been argued that total service 
outsourcing enables companies to focus on their core business (Hancock & Oates, 
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2001). An extensive empirical study of over 14,000 UK firms involved in the Annual 
Census of Production 1980-1992 found that outsourcing intensity within firms was 
linked positively to their productivity (Girma & Görg, 2004). 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Outsourcing models   
Adapted from Sanders et al., 2007 
 
Concerns have been raised that wholesale outsourcing introduces excessive risk 
(Raiborn et al., 2009). Sanders et al. (2007) urged managers not to “fall prey to the 
apparent momentum of the outsourcing movement” (p. 13) and maintain a flexible 
and dynamic approach to sourcing strategy. In contracting, there is always the issue 
of incongruent goals (Eisenhardt, 1989). Dual distribution or multi-sourcing can be 
used to avoid “lock-in” to a powerful supplier (Dutta et al., 1995). Smaller scale 
empirical studies suggest that outsourcing selectively has the best association with 
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performance (Rothaermel et al., 2006; Martinez-Sánchez et al., 2007). Notably 
Rothaermel et al. (2006) find support for a balance between internal integration 
and outsourcing of value chain activities (called taper integration), as pursuing 
either in isolation produces sub-optimal performance. The balance needs to vary 
over time to respond to the business and competitive environment. Alvarez and 
Stenbacka (2007) proposed a model for thresholds of partial outsourcing driven by 
market uncertainty, but noted other variables such as cost and control. The degree 
of outsourcing that a firm can adopt may also have to accommodate supply market 
constraints, as it has been found that the desire to outsource is often greater than 
actual outsourcing (Espíno-Rodriguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2005).  
 
The degree to which companies outsource can be very variable (Gilley & Rasheed, 
2000; Sanders et al., 2007; Martinez-Sánchez et al., 2007); even in IT, Oh (2005) 
found average outsourcing intensity of only 17%. Facilities management is also 
rarely outsourced in full (Kleeman, 1994). Krishnamurthy et al. (2009) encompassed 
the variety of contracting arrangements they found within information systems 
management as “out-tasking”. Based on discussions with fifty of Cisco’s top 
customers, they theorised that the old model of full-function IT outsourcing results 
in lock-in for client and stagnation for vendor. Out-tasking “breaks the cycle of 
negative compromises associated with traditional outsourcing approaches” (p. 47). 
 
Since transactions (or activities) vary in terms of frequency, uncertainty, and the 
degree of asset specificity involved (Williamson, 1979; 1991), managers need to de-
construct functions into small parts to optimise what is outsourced and what is 
insourced, in order to minimise risk and improve performance. This process was 
observed in case studies by Aron et al. (2005) and described as “strategic 
chunkification” (p. 38). They observed and advocated both vertical chunkification 
(the distribution of activities between client and vendor/s) and horizontal 
chunkification (sub-division of an activity between client and vendor/s). They 
argued that this approach to outsourcing reduces risk and enables the client to 
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control performance and costs. It should be noted that outsourcing does not 
necessarily occur on a continuum between “make-or-buy” - Parmigiani (2007) found 
that concurrent sourcing (internal and external to the firm) was a distinct choice.  
 
Of course, this introduces the issue of the complexity of monitoring partial 
outsourcing. Selective outsourcing might be associated with better performance in 
theory (Embleton & Wright, 1998; Mantel et al., 2006) and practice (Rothaermel et 
al., 2006; Martinez-Sánchez et al., 2007) but it can be very complex to track total 
cost of ownership and return on investment, which makes it difficult to design the 
most profitable service portfolio (vom Brocke & Lindner, 2004). Porter (1996) warns 
against the granularisation of tasks to outsource on the grounds that strategic fit for 
activities is fundamental to competitive advantage. McIvor (2000) noted, in a case 
study of a large firm, a tendency to outsource problem activities rather than 
activities positively identified as suitable. Nevertheless, some companies are clearly 
able to integrate outsourced and insourced activities in innovative and competitive 
ways, either by detailed contract management (Mayer & Salomon, 2006) or 
proactive relationship management with vendors (Handley & Benton, 2009). King 
(2006) observed that firm boundaries evolve, therefore firms needs to be proficient 
in multiple sourcing methods and willing to switch. Indeed, all the benefits of cost 
management, control, flexibility and innovation have been attributed to out-tasking 
(Krishnamurthy et al., 2009). At a very detailed level, companies can outsource 
tasks to “contingency employees” (Hitt et al., 1998, p. 29) who form over 25% of the 
US workforce and are usually provided by specialist agencies.  
 
An example of the granular approach to outsourcing is provided by Watjatrakul and 
Drennan (2005) in an examination of e-mail marketing, itself a limited activity 
within a broader portfolio that a marketing manager might be expected to co-
ordinate. In three case studies, the companies’ approach to each step in the 
process, i.e. designing, building, testing, deploying, tracking, reporting and 
analyzing, was tracked over six months. They found that companies considered 
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outsourcing options for each step rather than the combined activity, and that the 
asset value of the whole activity emerged from its components. This detailed 
approach seems to be appropriate for a study of the sales function, where 
outsourcing of particular process steps, product categories and market segments 
has been observed (Rogers, 2009). 
 
In the case of the sales function, it has been posited that a mix of internal and 
external resources can be used successfully (Dishman, 1996; Landry & Pandrangi, 
2005; Rogers, 2009). Dishman (1996) argued that the task-based approach to using 
contract sales organisations (e.g. on new territories or product introduction) is 
speculative rather than positive, whilst Landry and Pandrangi (2005) suggest that 
each company has a different optimal sales force mix. Rogers (2009) described 
some models used in the pharmaceutical sector in the UK:  
• syndicated sales, where the rep details different companies’ products in a 
single call,  
• contract sales teams dedicated to particular clients, by product line or 
customer segment,  
• vacancy management (where contract staff are effectively “temps”).  
Granularity may be considerably important in make, buy or mix resourcing decisions 
for sales managers.  
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Table 5: Propensity to outsource 
Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
Dutta et al. 1995 Empirical; 
Sample of 199 
manufacturers 
reps 
TCE and dual 
distribution 
Dual distribution used to 
avoid “lock-in”. 
Gilley & 
Rasheed 
2000 Empirical; 31 
large firms 
Outsourcing 
performance 
Firms more or less inclined 
to outsource; may outsource 
in parts. 
Girma & Görg 2004 Empirical; 
14,000+ firms 
involved in 
Annual Census 
of Production  
UK 1980-1992 
Outsourcing 
and 
productivity 
Outsourcing “intensity” 
positively related to 
productivity. 
Oh 2005 Empirical; 
Secondary data 
on 169 firms 
Intensity of IT 
outsourcing 
Average outsourcing 
intensity 17%. 
Espino-
Rodriguez & 
Padrón -Robaina 
2005 Empirical; 50 
hotels in 
Canary islands 
Outsourcing Desire to outsource may be 
greater than actual 
outsourcing. 
Mantel et al. 2006 Theory building Make-or-buy It need not be a binary 
decision; %age 
insourced/outsourced can 
vary. 
Sanders et al. 2007 Quals with 19 
managers; 
theory building 
Categorising 
outsourcing 
A variety of levels of 
outsourcing can be 
observed. 
Parmigiani 2007 Empirical; 193 
small firms in 
manufacturing 
Why do firms 
make and buy 
Concurrent sourcing is 
distinct choice from 
make/buy. Propensity of 
outsource affected by 
behavioural uncertainty. 
Martinez-
Sanchez et al. 
2007 Empirical; 156 
Spanish 
companies 
Intensity of 
outsourcing 
(RBV view) 
Outsourcing just peripheral 
activities has better 
association performance 
from outsourcing. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Quest for the right balance of outsourcing/insourcing: 
 
Embleton & 
Wright 
1998 Theory building Contracting 
out and 
outsourcing 
are different 
things 
Combination of insourcing, 
outsourcing and contracting 
out may be optimal. 
vom Brocke & 
Lindner 
2004 Theory building SOA as means 
of out-tasking 
and co-
ordinating IS 
processes 
Suggests framework for 
tracking TCO and ROI; points 
out challenge in designing 
the most profitable service 
portfolio design. 
Aron et al. 2005 Comment 
based on case 
studies 
Outsourcing 
performance 
Advocates “strategic 
chunkification” of processes 
into activities that can be 
outsourced, as opposed to 
outsourcing entire function. 
King  2006 Theory building 
based on a 
supply chain 
case study 
Outsourcing in 
uncertainty 
Firms need to be proficient 
in multiple sourcing 
methods and willing to 
switch. 
Rothaermel et 
al. 
2006 Empirical; 
3,500 product 
introductions 
Balancing 
vertical 
integration 
and 
outsourcing 
Careful balance helps to 
achieve superior 
performance. 
Raiborn et al. 2009 Comment Outsourcing 
support 
functions 
Wholesale outsourcing 
introduces excessive risk. 
Krishnamurthy 
et al. 
2009 Theory building 
based on case 
of Cisco and 
their top 50 
customers 
A better 
model than 
wholesale 
outsourcing 
Strategic out-tasking delivers 
more control to the 
“principal”; enables 
flexibility and innovation. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
And this is true for sales as well: 
 
Anderson & 
Schmittlein 
1984 Comment in 
empirical study 
Sales 
outsourcing 
Use of reps widespread, but 
%age volume through reps 
limited.  Market mode much 
less common than 
integrated. 
Dishman  1996 Theory-building Sales 
outsourcing 
Two approaches – positive 
(100%) use of CSOs and 
speculative (task-based). 
Landry & 
Pandrangi 
2005 Opinion (based 
on 
consultancy) 
Sales 
outsourcing 
There is an optimal sales 
force mix – different per 
company. 
Rogers  2009 Exploratory: 12 
pharma firms 
in UK 
Sales 
outsourcing 
The challenge in larger firms 
is getting the right balance. 
 
How granular can outsourcing be? 
 
Kleeman 1994 Market survey, 
US 
Out-tasking in 
FM 
FM rarely outsourced in full, 
but broken up into 13 sub-
functions. 
Watjatrakul & 
Drennan 
2005 3 case studies 
at process step 
level in email 
marketing 
TCE test Finds for relevance of asset 
specificity at process step 
level. 
 
 
  
55 
 
2.1.8 Summary 
 
This section has outlined the recent surge in outsourcing as a popular organisational 
design choice, and explains the context for this study. The role of transaction cost 
economics (control), resource-based view (competence) and real options theory 
(flexibility) as antecedents to outsourcing have been introduced. The limited 
discussion of sales outsourcing in the marketing literature aligns sales outsourcing 
with the major theoretical schools. However, since the extant literature has focused 
on wholesale outsourcing or insourcing of sales, any primary research in this field 
should explore beyond their scope. The concept of partial outsourcing, or out-
tasking, is an alternative to full scale outsourcing, and a granular approach to the 
activities that may be insourced, outsourced or dual-sourced needs to be 
considered in the primary research. Each granular decision may be prompted by 
different antecedents.  
 
The next three sections explore in detail the theories concerning the antecedents of 
outsourcing, examining their constructs and their applicability to the outsourcing of 
sales activities.  
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2.2 Theoretical schools addressing the design of organisational boundaries 
 
2.2.1 Transaction cost economics 
 
A substantial body of literature suggests that cost implications are dominant 
considerations in organisational design decisions. A list of key studies is provided at 
the end of this section. Whether an activity is insourced or outsourced, there will be 
costs involved in managing it over time, as well as the immediate costs of “make-or-
buy”. The cost of managing an activity over time has been defined as “transaction 
cost” and has attracted a great deal of academic attention across all business 
disciplines. This section critiques the theory associated with transaction cost, 
comparing it both with agency theory and co-operation theory.  
 
2.2.1.1 Transaction cost economics and the cost of governance 
 
 “Transaction cost theory has become the predominant theoretical framework for 
explaining organizational boundary decisions.”  (Geyskens et al., 2006, p. 519) 
 
Transaction cost economics differs from a traditional emphasis on prices and output 
by focusing on governance (Williamson & Ghani, 2012). There is a very clear 
agreement between practitioners (Forst, 1999; Biederman, 2005) and theorists 
from both the transaction cost economics approach (Williamson, 1975) and agency 
theory approach (Eisenhardt, 1989) that there are outsourcing hazards inherent in 
the bounded rationality of decision-making and the incongruent goals of principal 
and vendor. In line with transaction cost theory, these hidden costs can be 
described as the cost of control – the cost of managing employees versus the cost of 
managing third parties. TCE focuses on “the lens of contract”, i.e. the costs of 
getting a task (transaction) done (Williamson, 2005b, p. 1).  Specifically, transaction 
57 
 
costs reflect the time involved in “finding, negotiating, and monitoring the actions 
of potential partners” (Brettel, Engelen & Müller, 2011, p. 43). 
 
Originally designed to determine whether or not firms should exist at all (Coase, 
1937), TCE has been extensively applied to determining the boundaries between 
the firm, the market, and hybrid forms of organisation in between (Williamson, 
1991). It has broad appeal because it can be applied to a wide variety of activities in 
almost any type of organisation. Meta-analyses of TCE have found broad empirical 
support for TCE (David & Han, 2004; Carter & Hodgson, 2006; Macher & Richman, 
2008) and some find strong support for its predictions concerning the need to 
minimise behavioural uncertainty, characterised by the difficulty of aligning 
outcomes with effort (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997; Geyskens et al., 2006).   Key 
studies of sales outsourcing or vertical integration of channels (Anderson, 1985; 
Brettel et al., 2011; Dutta et al., 1995; John & Weitz, 1988; Krafft et al., 2004; 
Majumdar & Ramaswamy, 1994; Rangan, Corey & Cespedes, 1993; Shervani, Frazier 
& Challagalla, 2007) have examined the “make-or-buy” decision in sales from a 
transaction cost point of view.  
 
TCE generates substantial interest among researchers, including recent literature – 
Business Source Premier listed 61 scholarly articles with “transaction cost 
economics” in the abstract between January 2011 and June 2012. In 2005, 
Williamson observed that Coase’s citations grew 2.4 times between 1981-1985 and 
1996-2000, and his own grew by a multiple of 4.2. The highest proportion of 
citations in 1996-2000 occurred in the business literature (Williamson, 2005a).  
These TCE studies provide a useful framework for examining the control issues 
associated with external contracting. However, there are two scenarios that are not 
always accommodated by TCE. Co-operation theory creates the possibility of 
minimising the governance costs of working with third parties through adopting a 
long-term relational management approach. Also, as is observed in agency theory, 
incongruent goals may also occur in internal relationships.   
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It is clearly important for a research study concerned with sales outsourcing to 
explore the issue of control from the broadly supported theoretical standpoint of 
TCE. Nevertheless, although Coase (1988) claims to have always believed that 
“suppliers are not hostile and employees are not docile” (p. 31), TCE seems to over-
emphasize the threat of opportunism from suppliers (Ghoshal, 2005) and under-
emphasize the potential for opportunism from employees (as observed in Jelinek & 
Ahearne, 2006).  
 
2.2.1.2 Assumptions about the hidden costs of control 
 
Williamson (1988; 1991) argued that the main challenge of the firm is adaptation, 
so governance structures must evolve as the business environment changes. 
Although vertical integration has its limitations in terms of efficiency, since 
contracts cannot cover every future possibility to which a company may need to 
adapt, vertical integration should improve adaptability (Williamson, 1991).  
Concerns about opportunism, lock-in and other contractual hazards have been used 
to explain why, despite its surge in the 1990s, outsourcing often failed to deliver 
performance improvements (Bahli & Rivard, 2003). 
 
There is an assumption in TCE that employees are directly controlled, and therefore 
more adaptable than agents who are free to carry out tasks in their own way 
(Coase, 1937). In today’s business environment, while it might be assumed that an 
individual worker can be sacked more easily than a whole firm (Hart & Moore, 
1990), employment law in Europe presents considerable difficulties to a employer 
who believes that an employee has broken their contract (Moules, 2008). Agency 
theory, which is associated with contract law and is often examined in tandem with 
TCE, shares many of its assumptions. However, in contrast with TCE, agency theory 
recognises that employees, including directors of firms, can act like agents with 
goals incongruous to those of shareholders (Fama & Jensen, 1983). 
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Table 6: Key assumptions of transaction cost economics (and agency theory) 
Key idea Principal-agent relationships should reflect efficient 
organisation of information and risk-bearing costs. 
Unit of analysis Contract between principal and agent. 
Assumptions about 
individuals 
They act in self-interest. 
They have bounded rationality. 
They are risk averse. 
Assumptions about 
organisations 
Their goals conflict. 
Efficiency is the key criterion. 
Principal and agent will have different information. 
Contracting 
problems 
Moral hazard (shirking and guile) 
Lock-in. 
Problem domain Principal and agent have different goals and risk 
preferences. 
 
Adapted from Eisenhardt, 1989. 
 
The key assumptions underpinning TCE (which are also evident in agency theory 
and contract law) include bounded rationality (leading to incomplete contracts) and 
incongruous goals leading to opportunism (Williamson, 1975; Eisenhardt, 1989) (see 
table 6 above). It is regarded as inevitable that a contracted third party will pursue 
their own interests and therefore, if it is difficult to link performance to contract 
outcomes, the principal to the contract will not get value for money. Opportunism 
may be passive (shirking) or active (guile) (Wathne & Heide, 2000). It is feasible that 
opportunistic behaviour can be provoked by perceptions of unjust terms (Husted & 
Folger, 2004), and it should also be noted that principals can act opportunistically 
towards their agents (Rossetti & Choi, 2005).  However, from the point of view of 
the managers considering “make-or-buy”, it is the behaviour of the agent that will 
be of most concern.  
   
Indeed, studies undertaken to test transaction cost economics have also been 
criticised for using perceptual indicators for transaction costs, rather than evidence 
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(Grover & Malhotra, 2003). For example, managers may perceive that the cause and 
effect between activity and outcome for a particular task is difficult to measure, 
leading to a preference for insourcing, but few studies attempt to actually measure 
the monitoring overhead and whether it is greater when a contractor carries it out 
rather than an employee. 
 
TCE assumes that contract terms can preclude hazards, but even contract law 
sometimes recognises the imperative for co-operation between principal and agent 
in a contract. In the case of Powergen v Vertex (2006), Vertex, who had been 
providing outsourced customer service for Powergen, tried to sue for “specific 
performance”, a discretionary remedy in cases of breach of contract, when the 
relationship broke down. The court would not compel the client to continue with 
the vendor, on grounds that the contract required mutual co-operation for it to be 
effective (Nettleton & Hill, 2007). Of course, the costs of going to court when a 
business relationship fails are transaction costs that TCE predicts. 
 
2.2.1.3 Deconstructing the conceptual model of TCE 
 
Transaction cost economics endeavours to be a comprehensive explanation of the 
boundaries of the firm. It claims five factors as predictors of transaction cost levels 
and therefore degree of channel integration: 
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Table 7: Predictors of transaction cost levels 
Transaction specific assets If investments are needed, such as 
extensive training, marketing channels 
will be integrated. 
Technological uncertainty 
Market-related uncertainty 
(Sometimes combined as “business 
uncertainty”) 
If technology change is frequent, 
marketing channels will be integrated. 
If the market is volatile, marketing 
channels will be integrated. 
Internal uncertainty (Also referred to as 
“behavioural uncertainty”) 
If it is difficult to monitor performance, 
marketing channels will be integrated. 
Transaction frequency The larger the firm, the easier it is to 
absorb administrative overhead, 
therefore marketing channels will be 
integrated. 
 
Adapted from Brettel et al., 2011. 
 
For the purposes of this literature review, the TCE concept of asset specificity is 
examined alongside the concept of “core competence” or skills in the resource-
based view (2.2.2).  Carter and Hodgson (2006) argued that human asset specificity 
(which, according to Anderson (1985) is the only facet of asset specificity present in 
sales) could be reinterpreted as the resource-based view and recommend it should 
be a separate construct aligned with competency.   
 
Technological uncertainty and market uncertainty, sometimes combined in the 
literature as “business uncertainty” or “environmental uncertainty”, are considered 
in the section on real options (2.2.3). In Anderson’s (1985) seminal work, findings on 
its predictive value were mixed. Some recent studies, some of which have actually 
taken place in uncertain conditions (Díez-Vial, 2007; Martinez-Sánchez et al., 2007; 
Miranda & Kim, 2006; Rogers 2009; Li, Boulding & Staelin, 2010), suggest that 
business uncertainty is a predictor of more outsourcing rather than less, as 
managers will not make long-term cost commitments such as permanent 
employment in uncertain conditions.   
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Transaction frequency/company size was not found to be significant in Anderson’s 
(1985) examination of the sales function, was not found to have predictive power 
even in the case of new ventures (Brettel et al., 2011) and has been largely 
overlooked by meta-analyses of TCE. Therefore it is not examined any further in this 
review. 
 
What is discussed here as the strongest contribution of transaction cost economics 
to understanding why sales resource might be internalised rather than outsourced 
is the concept of “internal uncertainty”, also called in the literature “behavioural 
uncertainty”. It is not without its critics, but Anderson (1985), whose work has been 
acknowledged by Williamson and Ghani (2012) as most influential in applying TCE to 
marketing issues, found that the strongest effect in predicting internal or 
outsourced salesforce is difficulty in evaluating performance. It was stronger than 
any of the indicators of transaction specificity. This was reinforced by Krafft et al. in 
2004; it was also the strongest indicator of vertical integration of channels in a large 
sample, cross-industry study by Majumdar and Ramaswamy (1994) and it has broad 
support in major meta-analyses (David & Han, 2004; Geyskens et al., 2006; Macher 
& Richman, 2008; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). The following sub-sections focus on 
the behavioural uncertainty concept, which is strongly tied to TCE’s expectation of 
opportunism. 
 
2.2.1.4 Behavioural uncertainty – where performance is difficult to measure 
 
“The challenge of ascertaining ex post whether transaction partners have complied 
with contracts” (Brettel et al., 2011, p. 46). 
 
There is evidence that performance ambiguity leading to behavioural uncertainty 
does lead to control problems and hidden costs in outsourcing (Rindfleisch & Heide, 
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1997).  Outsourcing risks include being locked-in by transferring control of a 
function to a single supplier, costly contractual amendments, unexpected 
management costs and disputes leading to litigation (Bahli & Rivard, 2003).  
Bureaucracy is deemed necessary where performance ambiguity is high (Ouchi, 
1980). Usually, the indicator chosen to measure for behavioural uncertainty in the 
sales function is difficulty in measuring performance (e.g. Anderson, 1985). This is 
also common in studies of commission versus salary in internal sales; Krafft et al. 
(2004) finding a direct relationship and Rouziès, Coughlan, Anderson and Iacobucci 
(2009) observing it as an indirect cause of a higher proportion of salary to variable 
pay. In an early empirical study, Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) found that 
uncertainty was directly and strongly associated with in-house integration, and that 
the most significant indicator of uncertainty was difficulty in measuring 
performance.  
 
There is specific empirical support for the argument for employment where the 
performance of a contract is difficult to measure (Mayer & Salomon, 2006). Mullin 
(1996) suggests that one year into a multi-year contract it is virtually impossible to 
measure the vendor’s performance against original expectations. In any event, 
although contracts are always signed, they are rarely referred to thereafter 
(Roxenhall & Ghauri, 2004). It appears that mismatches between contractual 
performance and expectations can lead to the deterioration of relationships 
between principal and agent over time, as critical incidents accumulate and lead to 
relationship stress (Holmlund-Rytkönen & Strandvik, 2005; Halldórsson & Skjøtt-
Larsen, 2006). The mature stage of a contract is never better than the build-up 
stage, as both parties lose momentum (Jap & Anderson, 2007). Perceptions of 
strategic vulnerability are more important to managers than access to the 
competences of suppliers (Mantel et al., 2006). If relationship quality deteriorates, 
outsourcing contracts are likely to be terminated and those functions are then 
brought back in-house (Whitten & Leidner, 2006). In mitigation, highly formalised 
relationships with common long-term performance measures and shared 
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monitoring and measurement information can reduce the risk of deterioration 
(Daugherty, Richey, Roath, Min & Chen, 2006). The ability to manage contracts 
through hazards by relational exchange is highly relevant to success (Brown, Dev & 
Lee, 2000; Mayer & Salomon, 2006). Relationship management capability will be 
discussed later as a factor that may moderate concerns about control.  
 
2.2.1.5 Agent opportunism is not always the norm 
 
TCE assumes that humans act in their own interest, and are willing to pursue those 
interests without ethical constraint. Bahli and Rivard (2003) take the view that TCE 
assumes not only self-interest, but also that people involved in forging contracts 
between firms will demonstrate “guile”, such as over-stating their capabilities. 
Supplier opportunism will be expected to reduce the effectiveness performance of 
the buying firm. This assumption has been widely challenged. 
 
Robbins (1947) notes that, in contrast to other means of acquiring things, trade is 
unique in that it is two-way.  It can be described as “a cooperative organisation in 
communications to achieve economic ends” (p. 230). Assumptions about goal 
conflict may seem reasonable in advance of a contract, but perhaps assumptions 
could equally well be made about co-operation. Collaborative approaches to 
business relationships provide an alternative to adversarial contracts.  
 
The potential for collaborative relationships is often associated with the rise of 
Japanese-style supply chain management in the 1980s. Dyer (1997) noted that GM’s 
procurement transaction costs were six times those of Toyota because suppliers 
saw them as less trustworthy. In Asia, enduring enterprise groups and networks are 
common because the collectivist culture emphasises obligation to one’s “ingroup” 
(Chen, Peng & Saparito, 2002).  Even in individualistic cultures, such as North 
America and Northern Europe, fairness and common purpose are possible, and 
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most economic transactions are, in fact, underpinned by trust (Lunn, 2009). 
Williamson and Ghani (2012) are sceptical about the use of “trust” in business 
relationships, arguing that what matters is the exchange of credible commitments.  
“Trust” involves both credibility and benevolence (Flaherty & Pappas, 2000).  
 
There are other contextual variations to consider. There is more tolerance of 
opportunism in some business sectors in the UK than others (Grant, 2007). Where 
business sectors and supply chains exert some kind of social control, opportunism is 
less likely. A firm’s reputation is an important factor in signalling trustworthiness 
(Pillai & Sharma, 2003). Partnering organisations form expectations about how a 
potential partner will behave in the future based on the firm’s “standing”, or 
reputation, in its industry as indicated by  references from customers or other 
stakeholders, and whether they have won awards. A company’s commitment to its 
reputation and on-going development of communications skills is useful in volatile 
markets (Perks & Halliday, 2003). Some supply chains are closely interdependent 
(Eisenhardt, 1989). In terms of achieving strategic objectives, there is widespread 
recognition that a coalition of companies can be an effective unit of competition 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Dyer & Singh, 1998). 
 
Goal congruence can be established up front and help business relationships to 
recover when problems arise (Jap & Anderson, 2003). In particular, third party 
salespeople do identify with the brands they represent and work harder for the 
brands with which they feel the strongest link (Hughes & Ahearne, 2010). Brand 
owners should invest in “capturing reseller salesperson share of mind” (Hughes & 
Ahearne, 2010, p. 82). Even Williamson (1991) observed that hybrid organisation 
forms with relational governance can exist in between market exchange and vertical 
integration.   
 
The establishment of good citizenship “norms” of openness commitment and 
sharing of problem solving and idea generation can be as important as a statement 
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of work, and contact and communications plans (Morgan, 2003). As goal conflict 
decreases, there is more likelihood of risk-sharing, which would suggest a different 
approach to contracting. Some principals are very risk averse and it is attractive to 
pass risk to the agent (Eisenhardt, 1989).  The downside of assuming congruent 
goals is that it can lead to “groupthink” or the risk of hidden co-operative goals 
(Faulkner & de Rond, 2000). Firms should also beware that a spirit of co-operation 
at a senior level cannot make up for broken processes in mission-critical activities 
(Kern & Willcocks, 2000). 
 
Although assumptions of co-operation may accrue risk, there are empirical, dyadic 
studies in which interorganisational trust is observed as the over-riding driver of 
exchange performance. It reduces the costs of negotiations, the incidence of 
conflict, and creates a climate in which transaction value can be enhanced (Zaheer, 
McEvily & Perrone, 1998; Judge & Dooley, 2006). A meta-analysis of the effect of 
co-operation on productivity studies found that co-operation induced higher 
productivity than competition or individualistic approaches. Co-operation is 
particularly useful in achieving complex tasks (Tjosvold, 1984).  Relational rents, i.e. 
supernormal profits generated in a business relationship that neither firm could 
generate alone, can deliver mutual value to all parties to co-operative business 
relationships (Dyer & Singh, 1998). Some empirical studies indicate that 
performance is enhanced through proactive relationship management (Brown et 
al., 2000; Handley & Benton, 2009). It is significant that small companies in the UK 
that have inter-firm partnerships grow faster than those that do not (Wynarczyk & 
Watson, 2005). 
 
From these studies, it is clear that TCE’s assumption that governance structures 
must be built to control opportunism where performance is ambiguous may make 
those structures inefficient (Ryals & Humphries, 2010).  As Moscheandras (1997) 
noted, non-opportunists’ behaviour may even be adversely affected by the 
assumption of opportunism, resulting in lower productivity.   
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Although transaction cost theory allows for relational and hybrid contracts, it does 
not seem to account for the importance of trust and commitment, or any aspects of 
inter-firm relationships that are not enshrined in the contract (Rindfleisch & Heide, 
1997). TCE assumes that perceptions of fairness are irrelevant, but governance 
design will only be successful if it is perceived to be fair (Husted & Folger, 2004). 
This means that TCE is not necessarily a good predictor of eventual success or 
failure over time (Faulkner & de Rond, 2000).  
 
2.2.1.6 Employee compliance is also not always the norm 
 
In his 1988 article, Coase stated that he had always believed that “employees are 
not docile”, but that “integration creates a different institutional setting” (p. 31). 
However, why should workers submit to subordination in employment? A Marxist 
analysis of vertical integration suggests that workers sacrifice considerable personal 
freedom for the social insurance that some employment contracts seem to offer 
(Linder & Zacharias, 1993).  Employees might not always be the most adaptable 
resource option. Anderson (1988) questioned whether opportunism is a concern 
only where an outside organisation is contracted to sell. While integration may 
reduce opportunism, employment is not complete slavery (Hart & Moore, 1990). 
Although it is of less concern to transaction cost economists, to agency theorists 
employees may be internal agents with all the management challenges of external 
contractors. Even within organisations, individuals’ goals are only partly congruent 
with their employer (Ouchi, 1979), and incumbents tend to defend the status quo 
when change is proposed (Sliwka, 2007). Employees also need supervision, but 
firms’ returns decrease with the inefficiencies of centralised control. Too much 
monitoring can provoke opportunism as much as too little (Moshcheandras, 1997; 
Heide, Wathne & Rokkan, 2007). 
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Internal resistance to change is perhaps inevitable, as some employees stand to lose 
from change and others may believe strongly in the way things are done at the 
moment and see change as an offence to those values (Hambrick & Cannella, 1989). 
Insecurity may be fuelled by management uncertainty, aversion to new tasks, fear 
of redundancy, fear of being incompetent at the new tasks, fear of losing face and 
being unwilling or unable to learn new skills. Add to that the organisational factors 
such as reduced rewards, loss of influence over decisions, loss of control over 
resources and loss of prestige, and you have a powerful recipe for resistance 
(Ansoff, 1987). Contractual safeguards are needed to ensure that employees do 
adapt. However, employers may find it difficult to challenge workers with firm-
specific skills who are difficult to replace (Battu, McMaster & White, 2002).  
 
Advocates of TCE make a number of assumptions about the properties of internally 
organised functions. They assume that managers have more power and control over 
internal activity through monitoring and being able to reward behaviour as well as 
output.  TCE also assumes that being able to offer long-term rewards such as 
promotion prospects, and socialisation into company “culture” will diminish 
opportunistic behaviour. Therefore, detecting opportunism and facilitating 
adaptation should be easier within the firm, but it is not always so (Rindfleisch & 
Heide, 1997). 
 
Employees can even be a reason for outsourcing. In culturally “political” councils, 
where internal opportunism might be a concern due to different views and 
interests, concern about external opportunism was insignificant in outsourcing 
decisions (Miranda & Kim, 2006). Internal departments may not even be given the 
opportunity to bid for contracts on the same terms as external suppliers where they 
are considered problematic (Fan, 2000). Outsourcing has been used as a means of 
avoiding trade unions and pay bargaining in the UK public sector (Kerr & Radford, 
1994) and the US manufacturing sector (Whitford & Zeitlin, 2004).  
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Such situations arise when employees indulge in activities to preserve their own 
interests (Noble, 1999). These include protecting their power base, but delaying the 
implementation of change is predominant. Active or passive resistance to 
adaptation results in employees appropriating economic rents, and therefore 
companies cannot return all the rent they generate to shareholders (Coff, 1999). 
Knowledge-based assets, such as highly skilled salespeople, promise the firm 
specificity and causal ambiguity that make them resources that are difficult to 
replace. The people who generate rent are likely therefore to have the bargaining 
power to appropriate it. Internal stakeholders have power when they can act 
together, have access to key information and are costly to replace, but do not face 
switching costs themselves if they join another firm (Coff, 1999).     
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Table 8: Transaction cost economics and the predictive value of “behavioural 
uncertainty”  
 
Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
The argument for employment where the performance of a contract is difficult to measure is 
strong. 
 
Coase 1937 Theory-
building 
Why do firms 
exist? 
Opportunism is a real and 
present danger in market 
contracts; because 
contracts cannot cover 
every future possibility, 
employment should be 
more controllable and 
adaptable. 
Ouchi 1980 Theory 
building 
Organisational 
control 
Bureaucracy necessary 
where performance 
ambiguity is high. 
Williamson 1991,  
2002, 
2003, 
2005b 
Comment Contract Contract is the means to 
ensure gains are realised 
and conflict is minimised in 
an ordered way. 
Wathne & 
Heide 
2000 Theory 
building 
Opportunism May be passive (shirking) or 
active (guile), and it may be 
wise to tolerate a certain 
amount. 
Bahli & Rivard 2003 Theory 
building 
Outsourcing risk 
(IT) 
OS risks include lock-in, 
costly contractual 
amendments, unexpected 
management costs and 
disputes/litigation; TCE 
offers mitigation 
approaches. 
Husted & 
Folger 
2004 Theory 
building 
Org justice and 
TCE 
If governance mechanism is 
considered unjust, it will 
create transaction costs. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
The argument for employment where the performance of a contract is difficult to measure is 
supported by meta-analyses: 
 
Rindfleisch & 
Heide 
1997 Meta-analysis 
of 45 articles, 
1982-1996 
Applications of 
TCE in marketing 
Broad support for 
behavioural uncertainty. 
David & Han 2004 Quants Meta-
analysis, 308 
tests from 63 
articles  
Validity of TCE 
across a variety 
of applications 
Broad support. 
Geyskens et al. 2006 Quants meta-
analysis, 200 
articles 1975-
2003 
TCE and make-
buy-ally 
Strong support and it leads 
to enhanced performance 
as well. 
Macher & 
Richman 
2008 Meta analysis 
across the 
social sciences 
TCE empirical 
studies 
Broad support. 
 
From different angles, the argument for employment where the performance of a contract 
is difficult to measure is supported by empirical findings – especially the deterioration of 
contract relations over time 
 
Holmlund-
Rytkönen & 
Strandvik 
2005 Quals: 2 case 
studies 
Relationship 
stress 
Cumulative negative critical 
incidents lead to 
relationship stress. 
Mantel et al. 2006 Empirical; 
scenarios with 
302 
respondents 
Behavioural 
factors in “make-
or-buy” 
Perception of strategic 
vulnerability has greater 
influence than competency 
considerations.  
Mayer & 
Salomon 
2006 Empirical; 405 
service 
contracts 
Contractual 
hazards 
Contractual hazards lead to 
insourcing. Ability to 
manage hazards can help, 
but where it is difficult to 
observe quality, risks still 
high. 
Halldórsson & 
Skjøtt-Larsen 
2006 Case study Outsourcing over 
time 
Changes over time caused 
relationship to deteriorate 
from trust to conflict. 
Whitten & 
Leidner 
2006 Empirical; 160 
IT managers 
Backsourcing or 
switching 
Poor relationship quality 
indicator of switch 
(product/service also has 
to be bad for backsource). 
Jap & 
Anderson 
2007 Empirical; 
1,660 resellers 
Relationship 
cycles 
Maturity is never better 
than build-up phase; both 
parties lose momentum. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Not all of the assumptions of behavioural uncertainty are supported: 
 
Mayo et al. 1998 Empirical; 2 
studies of 300+ 
beer 
wholesalers 
Satisfaction in 
channels 
Non-coercive power 
tactics, such as rewards, 
most successful; coercive 
and influence less so. 
Brown et al. 2000 395 hotel 
managers 
Governance 
mechanisms 
Managers should focus 
effort on effective 
relational exchange – only 
this governance 
mechanism limits 
opportunism. 
Jap & 
Anderson 
2003 Empirical; 300 
buyers and 
sellers; 
longitudinal 
Ex-post 
opportunism 
Opportunism arises. When 
things are bad, goal 
congruence can ensure 
recovery. 
Wynarczyk & 
Watson 
2005 Empirical; 211 
UK 
subcontractors 
Growth and 
supply chain 
partnerships 
SME firms with inter-firm 
partnership grow faster 
than others. Opportunism 
less of a cost than 
complete contracting and 
resorting to law. 
Rossetti & 
Choi 
2005 Case study - 
aerospace 
Strategic sourcing Principals can be just as 
opportunistic as agents. 
Nettleton & 
Hill 
2007 Legal case 
study 
Outsourcing of 
customer care – 
no remedy for 
agent failure? 
Court refused to compel 
principal to fulfil contract 
on grounds that it 
required mutual co-
operation to be effective. 
Grant  2007 33 supply chain 
partnership 
cases 
Opportunism in 
co-operative 
exchange 
There is more tolerance of 
opportunism in some 
sectors than others – so in 
some sectors it is less 
likely to happen (social 
control). 
Heide et al. 2007 Empirical; 105 
responses; 
longitudinal 
Interfirm 
monitoring 
Monitoring can both 
increase and decrease 
opportunism; decrease 
likely if backed up by 
“social contract”. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
The assumption of opportunism is disputed by theorists 
 
Tjosvold 1984 Theory 
building 
(co-operation 
theory) 
Organisational  
practice 
Most complex tasks better 
completed in co-operation; 
members need to perceive goal 
interdependency (affects 
employment as well as inter-firm). 
Dyer & 
Singh 
1998 Theory 
building 
Inter-
organisational 
competitive 
advantage 
Relationship-specific assets, 
knowledge-sharing, 
complementary capabilities and 
effective governance can lead to 
relational rents. 
Lunn 2009 Comment 
from 
behavioural 
economics 
viewpoint 
Rationality Fairness and common purpose are 
possible, even between strangers; 
most economic transactions are 
underpinned by trust. 
 
In practice, contracts are rarely the drivers of performance quality 
 
Mullin 1996 Comment with 
examples 
Outsourcing Within two years, most contracts 
are irrelevant. 
Roxenhall 
& Ghauri 
2004 Exploratory – 
3 case studies 
Use of written 
contract 
Contracts routinely signed but 
seldom used.  
 
There is evidence for trust as an indicator of good performance 
 
Mohr & 
Spekman 
1996 Empirical; 102 
computer 
dealers 
Successful 
working 
relationships 
Co-ordination, trust, 
communication quality and 
information sharing are related to 
satisfaction. 
Zaheer et 
al. 
1998 Empirical; 107 
buyer-supplier 
dyads 
Does trust 
matter to 
performance? 
Interorganisational trust does 
matter. 
Brock 
Smith & 
Barclay 
1997 Empirical; 338 
dyads in IT 
industry  
Effectiveness 
of selling 
partner 
relationships 
Interdependence, co-operation 
and mutual trust are linked with 
effectiveness (performance and 
satisfaction). 
Conklin 2005 Exploratory; 
First major 
case of HR o/s 
Risks and 
rewards 
Inter-firm governance structure 
must be effective; but trust 
necessary as not all circumstances 
can be foreseen.  
Judge & 
Dooley 
2006 Empirical; 158 
healthcare 
orgs 
Strategic 
alliances and 
TCE 
Trust and control can be 
complementary and lead to 
confidence and mutual reduced 
risk.   
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
There is potential for employees to be opportunistic within their employment contract 
 
Linder & 
Zacharias 
1993 Theory 
building 
Vertical 
integration, 
Marxist outlook 
Why should workers 
submit to subordination in 
employment? They need 
the social insurance. 
 
Internally, goal incongruence still happens 
 
Ouchi 1979 Theory 
building 
Organisational 
control 
Even within organisations, 
individuals’ goals are only 
partly congruent – there is 
still the challenge of 
evaluation and control. 
Moschandreas 1997 Theory 
building 
Opportunism Humans are too 
complicated to all be 
motivated by self-interest 
– too many variables. 
Control may encourage 
opportunism, and 
managers may be 
opportunist towards 
employees. 
Coff 1999 Theory 
building 
RBV and 
stakeholder 
bargaining 
Stakeholders (e.g. 
managers, employees) can 
appropriate rents. 
Fan 2000 Exploratory; 
Case studies 
Outsourcing IT Outsourcing in most cases 
considered only option – 
inhouse dept “not 
capable”. 
Powell 2004 Model 
building, 
based on case 
study 
Implementing 
strategy 
Rationality is not 
“bounded” but idle – 
managers fail to act 
(execution holes). 
Miranda & Kim 2006 Empirical; 214 
USA local 
authorities 
IT outsourcing In highly political LAs, 
concern about external 
opportunism competes 
with concern about 
internal opportunism. 
Sliwka 2007 Model 
building 
Strategic change May be necessary to 
replace staff when change 
has to be implemented, 
incumbents will defend 
the past. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Outsourcing has been used to avoid internal incongruence 
 
Kerr & Radford 1994 Comment Competitive 
tendering 
CCT used to address 
inflexible pay bargaining. 
Whitford & 
Zeitlin 
2004 Theory 
building 
Manufacturing 
collaboration 
Outsourcing regarded as 
means to avoid unions. 
 
 
  
76 
 
2.2.1.7 Summary 
 
TCE has attracted considerable attention in the past twenty years, where its 
arguments about the full costs of different organisational design choices have been 
explored by academics during a boom in outsourcing. It is positioned both as an 
alternative to production cost comparison and as a consecutive supplement to it 
(Williamson & Ghani, 2012). “Malleability…has allowed the theory to spread rapidly, 
but has also resulted in many rather loose applications” (David & Han, 2004, p. 53). 
It has many critics, but a substantial meta-analysis by Geyskens et al. in 2006, based 
on a dataset of 557 correlations from 209 samples, found considerable empirical 
support for TCE. They also found that choosing hierarchical or relationship 
governance in response to the level of transaction hazards increased firms’ 
performance.  
 
The cost, time and effort involved in controlling post-contract opportunism are 
relevant considerations in outsourcing. In the case of sales outsourcing, the use of 
“difficult to measure performance” as an indicator has a strong track record in 
predicting the make/buy outcome. Nevertheless, this review has also explored the 
phenomena of relational contracts with third parties and employee opportunism, 
both of which would undermine or at least modify the TCE assumptions, and both 
of which are observed in practice. TCE certainly raises two pertinent questions 
concerning the resourcing of any function: Which option will be cheaper? Which 
option will be easier to control? 
 
A theme that is also strong in TCE is that vertical integration is needed to leverage 
specific assets. Although often positioned as an alternative to resource-based 
theory, the asset specificity argument within TCE has also been aligned with the 
resource-based view. The RBV is considered in the next section. 
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2.2.2 The resource-based view 
 
The “resource-based view” of the firm advocates a differentiation approach to 
outsourcing. The theory focuses on the distinction between “core” capabilities 
that make a company differentiated and “non-core” activities that might be 
outsourced. The terminology of the resource-based view has crossed into 
practice, and it is an idea that appears to have intuitive appeal to managers. 
Theoretically, it has been aligned with the concept of “asset specificity” in 
transaction cost economics, and through that alignment has empirical support. 
This chapter analyses the literature exploring both the “asset specificity” and 
“competences” approach to differentiation and its influence on the “make-or-
buy” decision. A list of key studies is provided in table 9 at the end of this section. 
 
2.2.2.1 Resources and organisational design 
 
“To assure survival and success, the firm must optimise the efficiency of its 
resource-conversion process”, Ansoff (1987, p. 54). 
 
Williamson (2002) conceded that organisational knowledge and learning are dealt 
with only in a limited way by TCE, so exploration of alternative approaches can 
provide more depth to this critical consideration in deciding the boundaries of 
firms. The resource based view is a strategy-driven approach to the organisational 
design of firms, which has a robust history (Barney et al., 2011).  Business Source 
Premier listed 173 scholarly articles including “resource-based view” in the abstract 
published between January 2011 and June 2012, so it appears to geneate more 
interest than TCE in the recent literature. The language of the resource-based view, 
such as core competences, has easily passed into practitioner publications.  
The resource-based view focuses on the role of specialised capabilities as a source 
of value creation for firms (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007). It focuses on the acquisition of 
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competitive advantage and the ability to earn more revenue, rather than reduce 
costs, something that might be intuitively appealing to sales managers.  
 
The resource-based view is often positioned as an alternative to TCE. For example, 
Safizadeh, Field and Pitzman, (2008), in an empirical study of customised services in 
financial services, concluded that given the competency value gained from 
providing such services the resource-based view may “trump” (p. 89) transaction 
cost considerations. However, as Carter and Hodgson (2006) argued, on the basis of 
a meta-analysis, human asset specificity in TCE could be reinterpreted as 
competence, a view supported by Argyres and Zenger (2007) on the basis of 
exploratory research. This lends credence to the competency approach to “make-
or-buy”, given the larger body of literature on TCE’s “asset specificity” concept. 
Both the resource-based view, as evidenced in Espíno-Rodriguez and Padrón-
Robaina’s 2006 review, and TCE assume that the more unique the resources in a 
business activity, the less likely it is to be outsourced. However, an over-
concentration on protection of current competences at the expense of renewal 
would not represent successful resource management (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). 
 
The origin of the resource-based view is a theory of growth. Penrose (1959) is 
accredited as the first author to argue that firms can create economic value not just 
because they own assets, but through the effective and differential management of 
them, i.e. she identifies a causal link between resource management and the 
generation of opportunities. Notably though, the focus of her book was a theory of 
the growth of the firm (Rugman & Verbeke, 2002). Arguments for acquiring talent 
via outsourcing can be linked to Penrose’s observation that limits on the availability 
of talent constrain a company’s rate of growth (Kor & Mahoney, 2004). 
 
When firms have competitive gaps (weaknesses versus the competition) resource 
development is needed to close the gap. The company could acquire that resource 
or develop it in-house (Ansoff, 1987). There is a start-up cost and time lag in 
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developing new skills internally and the company also bears the risk. For example, 
when a company needs a quick entry to a difficult market, acquisition of resources 
is preferable (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007). Of course, in other circumstances, it might be 
better to develop resources internally. All firms are different in their access to 
resources and how they manage them (Hooley, Möller & Broderick, 1998). Given 
that access to specialist selling skills has been claimed as the second most common 
reason for companies to outsource sales (Anderson & Trinkle, 2005), but keeping 
firm-specific knowledge in-house has been empirically observed to be a reason for 
insourcing sales (Anderson, 1985; Wilson & Zhang, 2002; Krafft et al., 2004), the 
resource-based view literature is an important source of possible antecedents for 
make-or-buy decisions in sales.  
 
2.2.2.2 The principles of RBV 
 
The resource-based view of the firm is widely attributed to Wernerfelt (1984), 
although Barney (1991) is more widely quoted. Wernerfelt explained that 
differences between firms are characterised by different sets of resources, and 
these differences should form the foundation of competitive strategy. These 
resources should also be applied to developing new capabilities.  
 
The recent popularisation of the resource-based view can be traced to the work of 
Prahalad and Hamel (1990) who focused more on market share than growth. 
Achieving competitiveness, they argued, relies on the concept of the firm as a 
bundle of “core competences”. “Core” competences are those that the firm can 
uniquely exploit, or the new ones it must speedily acquire. Companies achieve core 
competence leadership by better resource leverage.  
 
In the resource-based view, strategy is a quest for “rents”. Rents are returns 
(profits) above the normal rate of return in the industry. The achievement of rents 
is an indication that a firm has a competitive advantage over others (Mahoney & 
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Pandian, 1992; Lonsdale, 1999; Phelan & Lewin, 2000). The ultimate aim of the firm 
is to earn rents. 
 
Resources are not perfectly mobile between firms (Hooley et al., 1998); they are 
strengths that cannot be imitated (Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). Several researchers 
have supported the logic that specialised and differentiated capabilities are sources 
of rents for firms (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007; Helfat & Peteraf, 2003; Hooley et al., 1998; 
Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Rugman & Verbeke, 2002; Ray, Barney & Muhanna, 
2004; Kor & Mahoney, 2004; Hoopes, Madsen & Walker, 2003; Safizadeh et al., 
2008). 
 
The resource-based view has become popular due to the influence of strategy 
thought leaders such as Prahalad and Hamel (1990) and Michael Porter (1985), who 
argued that differentiation through competences that are difficult to imitate 
delivers better than average profitability. There is empirical evidence that 
differentiation and entry barriers lead to higher than average profits, both from the 
RBV point of view (Selling & Stickney, 1989; Arend, 2006; Newbert, 2008) and from 
TCE studies of asset specificity (Geyskens et al., 2006). Barney (1999) argued that 
TCE does not take account of capabilities, but some authors have equated “asset 
specificity” with the concept of “capability” or “competence” (Carter & Hodgson, 
2006; Argyres & Zenger, 2007) or at least posited that they are complementary 
(Wilson & Zhang, 2002). TCE meta-analyses have found empirical evidence for 
uniqueness, especially skills, as an indicator of vertical integration, although David 
and Han (2004) disagree with Geyskens et al. (2006) about whether or not it leads 
to performance, and Arend (2006) regarded the link to performance as very hard to 
measure.   
 
Critics suggest that the resource-based view is an incomplete explanation of 
competitive advantage, and one that lacks predictive strength (Priem & Butler, 
2001). Changes in the business environment can soon change strengths into 
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weaknesses (Priem & Butler, 2001).  It is clear that having rare resources is not 
enough, a firm must be able to exploit them (Newbert, 2008). Assets are only 
realised when they are well-directed (Phelan & Lewin, 2000). The strategic value of 
a resource is the way the company uses it with other firm-specific resources to earn 
rents (Phelan & Lewin, 2000). However, the arguments that better profits (“rents”) 
are the result of differential capabilities has been challenged by Coff (1999), who 
noted that “rents” in better performing companies might be appropriated by 
stakeholders (e.g. employees demanding more wages from a successful firm, or 
some customers demanding better prices). This phenomenon has been observed in 
the sales function, where better performing salespeople acquire better 
remuneration (Menguc & Barker, 2005).  
 
While there is a focus in RBV on owning capabilities (Wernerfelt, 1984), advocates 
of the networked firm would argue that almost everything could be outsourced 
apart from what determines the firm’s identity, such as intellectual property or a 
brand (Phelan & Lewin, 2000; Sucky, 2007). For example, in the pharmaceutical 
sector, assumptions about what is “core” have been fundamentally challenged in 
recent years, with significant growth in contract research organisations, contract 
manufacturing organisations and contract sales organisations, according to industry 
analysts CanBiotech (2005). Companies could at least enhance their portfolio of 
capabilities by designing unique combinations from resources available from 
specialist companies (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007).  
 
On balance though, the principles of RBV seem to lead managers to avoid 
dependency on external firms (Lonsdale, 1999). There are widespread indications 
from meta-analyses of both TCE and RBV that the more unique the resources 
deployed in a business activity within the firm, the less likely it is to be outsourced 
(Espíno-Rodriguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2006; David & Han, 2006). Studies of sales 
resourcing also indicate a tendency to insource where training of salespeople takes 
a long time because of the knowledge and skills needed to be effective (Anderson, 
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1985; Wilson & Zhang, 2002; Krafft et al., 1984). Barney (1991) defined resources as 
combinations of physical, human and organisational capital. Human capital 
encompasses training, experience, knowledge, insight and relationships. It is that 
human capital that has attracted interest in studies of sales, both from the TCE 
point of view, where the terminology used is human asset specificity (Anderson, 
1985) and the RBV point of view (Menguc & Barker, 2005).  “Human asset 
specificity” (Riordan & Williamson, 1985, p. 376) has also attracted attention in the 
outsourcing literature. For example, Watjatrakul and Drennan (2005) found in their 
study of e-mail marketing outsourcing that specific skills and tacit knowledge 
(acquired via work experience in the company) were major factors for insourcing 
decisions. When workers have firm-specific skills, both they and the firm lose value 
if they leave. In particular, the firm faces additional training costs for a new 
employee (Williamson, 2002).  
 
It has been argued that RBV over-focuses on current capabilities, which would leave 
a firm exposed to environmental change (Priem & Butler, 2001). However, the 
“dynamic capabilities” school of thought within the resource-based view (Teece, 
Pisano & Shuen, 1997; Lonsdale, 1999: Helfat & Peteraf, 2003) explains that a firm 
that can manage resources to innovate, respond to changing markets or close a 
skills gap, has a particular suite of competences associated with managing change. 
Competences have a life cycle (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003). Firms should not be 
constrained by what they have (Nooteboom, 1993; Kim &Mauborgne, 1997) and 
need not be since the acquisition of resources could accelerate strategy 
implementation (Ansoff, 1987). As the business environment changes, “selection 
events” occur to prompt companies to review and possibly redirect their 
capabilities (Helfat & Peteraf, 2003).   
 
The issue of responding to change is important to considerations of “make-or-buy”. 
It is not ignored by the resource-based view since dynamic capabilities explains that 
a resource-based approach can be taken to acquiring capability. However, 
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accommodating possible future change is addressed specifically by real options 
theory, which is discussed in the next section. 
 
Table 9: Differentation 
Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Differentiation leads to profit 
 
Selling & Stickney 1989 Empirical; 
22 
industries 
1977-1986 
ROA Differentiation and entry 
barriers do lead to higher 
profits. 
Porter  1996 Comment Business 
strategy 
Growth imperative is 
hazardous, differentiation 
through competencies and 
profitability more important. 
 
Sources of differentiation – TCE views 
 
Williamson 1985 Book TCE 6 elements of asset spec: 
Human (skills and knowledge) 
Physical assets; Site; Dedicated 
assets; 
Brand reputation; Time-specific. 
David & Han 2004 Meta 
analysis of 
63 articles, 
308 tests 
Review of 
evidence 
for TCE 
 Strong support for asset 
specificity as a predictor of 
vertical integration, especially 
skills. No obvious link between 
TCE predictions and 
performance. 
Geyskens et al. 2006 Quants 
meta-
analysis, 
200 articles 
1975-2003 
TCE and 
make-buy-
ally 
Strong support for asset 
specificity and it leads to 
enhanced performance. 
Carter & Hodgson 2006 Meta-
analysis of 
27 studies, 
12 on 
vertical 
integration, 
19 on 
hybrid 
1998-2002 
TCE and 
vertical 
integration 
Vertical integration studies are 
only partly consistent; hybrid 
very limited. Asset spec broadly 
interpreted. Human asset 
specificity could be 
reinterpreted as RBV. 
Recommend separate human 
asset specificity construct – 
alignment with competence. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Sources of differentiation – RBV 
 
Wernerfelt (1984); Barney (1991); 
Mahoney & Pandian, (1992); Hooley et 
al., (1998); Rugman & Verbeke, (2002); 
Ray et al., (2004); Kor & Mahoney, 
(2004); Hoopes et al., (2003); Holcomb 
& Hitt, (2007); Lockett et al. (2008); 
Safizadeh et al., (2008); Barney et al. 
(2011) 
Explanations 
of the 
resource-
based view 
Specialised capabilities are 
source of “rents” for firms 
Prahalad & 
Hamel 
1990  Theory 
building 
Firms should 
concentrate 
on 
developing 
core 
competences 
to be 
competitive 
Definitions of core competence 
and those who make them are 
“competence carriers”; core 
competences are collective 
learning in organisations, e.g. 
Sony and miniaturisation. 
Priem & Butler 2001 Opinion RBV Criticise RBV as incomplete 
explanation of competitive 
advantage. 
Espino-
Rodriguez & 
Padron-Robaina 
2006 Review of 
10 studies 
(8 
empirical) 
Summary of 
RBV 
empirical 
findings (and 
comparison 
with TCE) 
The more unique the resources 
in a business activity, the less 
likely it is to be outsourced. 
Arend 2006 Review of 
60 RBV 
studies 
Empirical 
strength of 
RBV 
Studies find for RBV, but he 
regards the evidence as fragile 
due to resources, performance 
and the link between being very 
hard to measure. 
Argyres & 
Zenger 
2007 Explorato
ry; 
Case 
study 
RBV vs TCE Specific assets are equivalent to 
capabilities. 
Newbert 2008 Empirical; 
664 
technolog
y firms 
RBV 
concepts 
Value and rareness of resources 
are associated with competitive 
advantage, but must be able to 
exploit them in order to 
improve performance. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Specific assets, competences, especially skills associated with insourcing sales  
 
Anderson 1985 Empirical; 
159 
responde
nts in 13 
companie
s, one 
sector 
Applicability 
of TCE to 
sales 
outsourcing 
Ten indicators of company 
“nature”, which was a 
significant contributor to 
insourcing. Other specifics were 
product or customer related. 
Wilson & Zhang 2002 Empirical; 
610 UK 
firms 
TCE/RBV 
comparison 
re: sales 
outsourcing 
in the UK 
Support for elements of firm 
specificity. 
 
 Nature of human asset specificity in general 
 
Battu et al. 2002 Empirical; 
Employee 
and 
employer 
surveys  
TCE and the 
nature of 
employment 
in the UK 
Workers, even with firm-specific 
skills, can be very mobile. 
Kulkarni & 
Ramamoorthy 
2005 Theory 
building 
Balancing 
commitment 
and flexibility 
in the 
employment 
contract 
There are two types of human 
asset specificity: usage specific 
can be easily transferred to 
another firm; firm-specific 
cannot. 
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2.2.2.3 Summary 
 
This section has reviewed the resource-based view approach to outsourcing.  
The resource-based view has a long history of theoretical development, and the 
terminology of RBV such as capabilities and competence has been widely adopted 
by practitioners. The association of differentiated capabilities with competitive 
advantage is a common theme in strategy. Whilst RBV is often seen as an 
alternative to transaction cost economics, it is also seen as overlapping with the TCE 
concept of asset specificity, and this is particularly true when considering “human 
asset specificity”. However, it has been criticised for lacking predictive power in 
times of change. Consequently, this review now considers a more recent theoretical 
approach to “make-or-buy” which has been examined in the context of uncertain 
business conditions. 
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2.2.3 The real options approach 
 
The previous sections have identified two perspectives on “make-or-buy” decisions: 
transaction cost comparisons and the relative value creation potential of resource 
options. When markets are changing rapidly, a firm might improve its ability to 
survive and thrive if it has access to a choice of resources which enable it to 
accelerate its implementation of strategy. None of the theories discussed so far 
have considered opportunity cost, which is the focus of the third theoretical lens for 
make and buy discussed in this review – real options.  A list of key studies is 
provided in table 10 at the end of this section. 
 
The arguments for real options theory are presented and critiqued in this section. 
While transaction cost theory suggests that, in an uncertain business environment, 
a company should insource to minimise the costs of control, many studies from the 
TCE perspective observe that this is the weakest of its assumptions. Real options 
theory would agree with TCE that adaptation is the central issue of organisational 
design, but real options theory suggests that uncertainty would lead to more use of 
third party resources, at least in the short-term, for situations such as market entry 
or new product introduction.   
 
2.2.3.1 Uncertain economic conditions 
 
“Strategic flexibility is the organization’s capability to identify major changes in the 
external environment, quickly commit resources to new courses of action in 
response to those changes, and recognise and act promptly when it is time to halt 
or reverse existing resource commitments.”  (Shimizu & Hitt, 2004, p. 44). 
Profitable growth is the expectation of virtually all investors (Hitt et al., 2006).  
Unfortunately, the real world is messy, confusing and complex, with too many 
variables to be predictable or controllable (Bryan, 2002), which means that 
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companies cannot assume a smooth continuity in meeting shareholders’ 
expectations. A high pace and degree of change in the external environment of the 
firm, encompassing economic, market, and technological change, can be perceived 
as high risk and could provoke defensive behaviour. However, even in transaction 
cost economics, Williamson and Ghani (2012) acknowledge the need for 
“disequilibrium contracting” in the case of “high velocity events” (p. 78). 
 
The logic of all company strategy assumes that an organisation must analyse the 
business environment, compare its capabilities to it, and formulate strategy to align 
business strengths to realise market opportunities, address weaknesses and 
minimise risks (e.g. Bowman, 1990). Where organisational capabilities are not 
aligned to the business environment, changes have to be made. Strategy is the 
process by which managers ensure the long-term adaptation of their firm to its 
business environment (Chakravarthy, 1986).  
 
For example, in a study of companies in Argentina during a period of dramatic 
economic change (including hyperinflation and deregulation) between 1989-1999, 
Hatum and Pettigrew (2006) found that analysing and using information about 
external change to design and adopt new models for processing was critical to the 
flexibility and adaptation needed in the times. In the healthcare sector, Illert and 
Emmerich (2008) and Ruzicic and Danner (2007) have highlighted the increasing 
influence of payers (insurance companies and government agencies) and patients, 
which is decreasing the buying influence of medical professionals, and demands 
new sales models from pharmaceutical companies. 
 
The effect of business uncertainty in the make-or-buy literature is divided between 
the assertion that it predicts insourcing and the equally plausible assertion that it 
predicts outsourcing. In conditions of uncertain demand, making the right choice 
might have to be balanced with keeping all options open. Díez-Vial (2007), 
Martinez-Sánchez et al. (2007), Miranda and Kim (2006), Rogers (2009) and Li et al. 
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(2010) suggest that business uncertainty is a predictor of more outsourcing rather 
than less, as managers will not make long-term cost commitments such as 
permanent employment in uncertain conditions. Indeed, volume flexibility appears 
to have a positive effect on firms’ competiveness (Jack & Raturi, 2002; Sawhney, 
2006). Although arguments for the value of variable costs date back to Stigler 
(1939), it is noticeable that since Sanchez (1993) argued for real options in strategy, 
a number of qualitative and quantitative studies have supported the value of 
flexibility and the role of outsourcing and out-tasking in achieving it. 
 
2.2.3.2 The TCE view: business uncertainty leads to insourcing 
 
Because when a person is employed, their activity is apparently directly controlled, 
Coase (1937) perceived that the firm provided a better environment for adaptation 
in uncertain economic times. In the market, agents are free to carry out tasks in 
their own way, and Williamson argued that uncertainty in the business environment 
would therefore be a source of contracting hazard, with agents opportunistically 
demanding more for adaptations and amendments (Williamson, 1979). Therefore, 
in uncertain economic conditions, adaptation through internal hierarchy should be 
cheaper to manage. Frequent changes in employment requirements should be 
easier to achieve than frequent adaptations in commercial contracts with suppliers 
(Williamson, 2008).   
 
This aspect of the transaction cost theory approach has support in agency theory 
which assumes that the owners of a firm should have more control over employees, 
even though agency theory allows for agent-style behaviour from employees 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Hart & Moore, 1990). From a Keynesian point of view, Dunn 
(2000) also argues that markets are inappropriate and too rigid to deal with 
unexpected change, therefore flexibility is more likely to be achieved within the 
firm.   
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In support of these theoretical assumptions, some practitioners have commented 
on the additional risks represented by outsourcing, and opine that by increasing 
risk, outsourcing may constrain a company’s agility (Downey, 1995; Whitmore, 
2006; Ketter, 2008). While business is supposedly steeped in risk-taking, balancing 
the upside risk and downside risk of outsourcing (and sales outsourcing) can be a 
very complex and judgemental exercise, which many organisations do not manage 
well (Lonsdale, 1999; Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007). 
 
There is empirical evidence that would suggest that flexibility in organisational 
design is not necessarily the answer to environmental uncertainty. For the 
manufacturing “make-or-buy” decision, Pagell and Krause (2004) present strong 
empirical re-tested evidence from  a study of 252 operations managers and 
purchasing managers that there is no evidence that operational flexibility or 
outsourcing helps with firm performance in environmental uncertainty. Ironically, 
Mpoyi and Bullington (2004) observed that while changes in vertical integration 
levels are associated with lower production costs, it is unclear whether more or less 
vertical integration delivers more improvement. The concept of uncertainty is broad 
and the relationship between it and organisational design is complex. There is no 
systematic relationship between demand variability and degrees of vertical 
integration (Krickx, 2000).  Sanchez (1993) explains that because of the many facets 
of flexibility, its performance benefits are difficult to examine. 
 
Given the availability of contradictory findings, care is needed to discern externally 
defined volatility from internal perceptions of unfamiliarity. It also raises the 
question of selective outsourcing. Williamson (2008) asserted that the overuse of 
any mode of contracting is to be avoided, and the idea of “real options” implies 
many viable choices. In practice, boundaries are “blurred” (King, 2006, p. 123); they 
evolve as uncertainty fluctuates. Multiple types of relationship reduce opportunism 
in all relationships (King, 2006). Mixing insourcing and outsourcing is a recognised 
way of reducing the risk of dependency on suppliers (Embleton & Wright, 1998; 
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Johnson, 2007), leading to networked organisations as a desirable organisational 
design (Snow et al., 2005). In particular, Williamson and Ghani (2012) noted that 
“real time responsiveness often trumps steady-state equilibrium considerations” (p. 
78).  
 
2.2.3.3   Real options theory and business uncertainty 
 
As observed by Krychowski and Quélin (2010), real options theory comes up with 
the opposite answer to transaction cost economics when it comes to structuring 
investment choices in times of business uncertainty. When uncertainty is high, the 
advantages of vertical integration are soon eroded by the costs of inflexibility (Li et 
al., 2010). Real options theory recommends a market arrangement rather than an 
integrated approach to projects such as new market entry. The less certain the 
outcome of an investment is, the more valuable it is to take an options approach 
(Brouthers, Brouthers & Werner, 2008). Ideally firms should accrue a portfolio 
approach to opportunities to ensure flexibility (Bryan, 2002; Brouthers et al., 2008). 
Real options theory provides a framework for decision-making that is tailored to 
uncertain economic environments. It is designed to reduce risk and maximise 
opportunity, and it is certainly intended to provide flexibility through postponement 
and reversibility of investments (Driouchi & Bennett, 2012).   
 
The origin of “real options” theory has been attributed to Stigler (1939) for his 
examination of the value of combining variable productive services in order to 
increase marginal productivity, although the term “real options” dates from Myers 
(1977) in his discussion of spreading risk in financial borrowing. Stigler’s idea that 
flexible resources would be advantageous in high-risk environments was modelled 
by Scott, Highfill and Sattler (1988) who concluded that, where prices or quantities 
are uncertain in a market, the higher cost of flexible resources would be offset by 
reducing the costs of excess capacity or excess demand. Sanchez (1993) adapted 
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“real options” for strategy, because in uncertain markets, the success of a firm 
relies on very different resources and capabilities than those required in stable 
conditions. Real options theory is future-oriented and explains how firms can build 
their capabilities (Foss, 1998; Anderson, T.J., 2000) and be responsive to their 
markets (Rese & Roemer, 2004). “When making resource-committing decisions, 
assets can be arranged to enhance alternative uses” (Anderson, T.J., 2000, p. 238).   
 
Real options theory has generated interest among business academics (Krychowski 
& Quélin, 2010). Business Source Premier lists 123 articles with “real options 
theory” in the abstract between January 2011 and June 2012. In practice, real 
options theory is associated with big projects such as mining, oil exploration and 
production systems, but it can also be applied to outsourcing (Antelo & Bru, 2010). 
It recognises that timing is important in investment decisions, and promotes the 
value of flexibility. It counteracts the classical cost-based business case using Net 
Present Value, which puts a figure on the cost of waiting. Real options theory puts a 
value on the rewards of waiting (Krychowski & Quélin, 2010). Despite its intuitive 
advantages, it has proved difficult to research. There is very limited empirical work 
linking RO to performance (Krychowski & Quélin, 2010; Driouchi & Bennett, 2012), 
and it has been suggested that it has not lived up to expectations as it is difficult to 
calculate and implement (Krychowski & Quélin, 2010).   
 
The essence of real options is that, in uncertain conditions, the firm should keep its 
initial investment in any project, such as new market entry or new product 
introduction, very low, while keeping open the option for higher levels of 
investment at a later date, or reversing the investment (Brouthers et al., 2008; 
Krychowski & Quélin, 2010). The initial investment may be a market test, or 
developing a prototype. The behaviour of pharmaceutical sales managers in using 
contract sales organisations on short-term contracts with the possibility of bringing 
them on headcount at a later date or curtailing the contract, as described in Rogers 
(2008), is entirely consistent with real options theory. International market entry is 
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one application of real options that has been empirically studied and has delivered 
consistent findings in favour of third party resource in cases of business uncertainty 
(Brouthers et al., 2008; Li et al., 2010).  
 
When value chains are configured, choices can be made between different types of 
input.  Choices about distribution and marketing are defined by Sanchez (1993) as 
implementation options. An extensive distribution system and access to a variety of 
markets are aspects of firm flexibility. However, although real options theory is 
associated with the concept of flexibility, care needs to be taken in examining it 
because there are various aspects of flexibility within a firm and across its networks. 
Also, the relationship between strategy and performance, when flexibility is 
pursued, may be indirect (Fantazy et al., 2009). 
 
Real options theory agrees with TCE that adaptation to market conditions is the 
primary role of strategy, but takes quite a different approach to organisational 
design. Flexibility is defined as the capability to adapt. It may have associated costs, 
but it is sought because of an expectation that it improves competitiveness (Golden 
& Powell, 2000). TCE’s assumption of opportunism means that internal contracts 
are preferred when frequent adaptations are needed. TCE stresses the value of 
contractual commitments, but in RO contractual commitments would limit 
flexibility and responsiveness (Rese & Roemer, 2004). In uncertain market 
conditions, firms should focus on options rather than obligations, and defer 
commitments if supply markets or networks enable that (Sanchez, 1993). The real 
options perspective is associated with reducing resource commitments to new 
ventures, increasing flexibility, adapting within time constraints, and considering 
uncertainty as an opportunity (Anderson, T.J., 2000). It does not assume that all 
suppliers will shirk and it does assume that managers may have some foresight 
when designing contracts (Foss, 1998).   
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Successful application of real options theory can become a source of value in 
dealing with risk and enabling a firm to evolve. It is certainly a remedy for 
“organisational inertia” (Driouchi & Bennett, 2012, p. 45). Sanchez (1993) 
anticipated that managers adopting a “real options” approach would optimise 
performance by internalising only a few resources that are difficult to obtain 
through markets or networks. In particular, using co-operative supply networks 
would increase a firm’s knowledge of markets, gain access to new markets, reduce 
costs and improve speed to market. Nevertheless, flexibility incurs adjustment costs 
and learning overheads, so it is not without its challenges. Too much flexibility 
might cause organisational stress, so managers should try to identify the trade-off 
required between commitment and flexibility (Driouchi & Bennett, 2012).  
 
2.2.3.4 Real options and outsourcing 
 
While some practitioners are wary of outsourcing in uncertain economic conditions, 
Kachaner (2009) has recently argued that variabilization of costs is clearly an 
effective strategy in a recession. Since the early 1990s, there has been a marked 
shift from vertically integrated firms to firms using various forms of outsourcing. 
Indeed, companies would not have survived the 1991-1992 recession with their 
1980s organisational structure; they had to downsize and outsource (Lonsdale, 
1999). Market volatility, the changing nature of competition and accelerating 
technological innovation all cause firms to “sharply adjust” in order to cope 
(Fredericks, 2005). In theory, the origins of a preference for variable costs in the 
short-term can be traced to Stigler (1939) who observed that it increased marginal 
productivity. However, it is also highly topical. Organizations’ commercial and 
financial performance improves where the importance of flexibility is increased 
relative to the importance of cost in their supply strategy (González-Benito, 2010). 
Flexibility has been observed as the third most important advantage of outsourcing 
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(out of 14) reflecting perceptions of managers that it facilitates frequent changes 
(Espíno-Rodriguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2005). 
 
Ansoff (1987) argued that the more instability there is in the business environment, 
the more it seems sensible to convert fixed costs (largely associated with internal 
hierarchy) to variable costs (usually associated with some types of outsourcing). 
Even Williamson (1979) argued that market exchange is always best for 
standardised transactions, regardless of uncertainty. Vertical integration has been 
used by firms to control their need for predictability and control, but when 
competitive and demand conditions become too difficult, firms tend to decrease 
integration (Harrigan, 1985).  
 
Researchers observe that outsourcing can be used to shift the risks inherent in an 
uncertain environment to suppliers (Downey, 1995; Whitford & Zeitlin, 2004; 
Conklin, 2005; Anderson & Trinkle, 2005; Marshall & Heffes, 2005; Rogers, 2009). 
The vendors (companies that perform tasks for clients) have a variety of customers 
with different risk profiles, so they can diversify the risks inherent in a particular 
function better than their clients could manage on their own (Espíno-Rodriguez & 
Padrón-Robaina, 2005). For example, large scale recruitment is risky when 
performance is uncertain, and it is subsequently difficult to reduce headcount. So 
the vendor’s customer portfolio acts as a “mutual fund” of resources (Mukherji & 
Ramachandran, 2007, p. 107).  
 
There is convincing evidence from recent empirical studies that firms avoid vertical 
integration when they are experiencing demand volatility because they perceive the 
need to stay flexible (Díez-Vial, 2007). Miranda and Kim (2006) noted that 
regulatory pressures and  budget cuts in the public sector make outsourcing more 
likely, and Schilling and Steensma (2002) concluded that, consistent with the real 
options perspective, commercial uncertainty decreases the likelihood of technology 
firms acquiring resources and creates a preference for licensing. However, these 
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findings can be mediated by observations that although environmental uncertainty 
is an antecedent of outsourcing, both the outsourcing of peripheral (non-core) 
activities and internal flexibility are both associated with better performance 
(Martinez-Sánchez et al.,  2007), so which way a company changes its organisational 
design may depend on its pre-existing conditions and well as the business 
environment.  
 
2.2.3.5 “Real options” in practice  
 
In practice, managerial behaviour is only partly consistent with real options theory 
(Tiwana, Wang Keil & Ahluwalia, 2007). Real options theory says that uncertainty 
increases option value, but this tends only to be taken into account when there is 
negative information about a project. Managers should, in theory, always look for 
options value beyond net present value (Tiwana et al., 2007). It is an approach that 
distinguishes managerial ability from luck (Sanchez, 1993).  
 
Firms can build their capabilities by exercising “real options” (Sanchez, 1993), but 
the challenge is to determine the optimal set of options to maximise returns for the 
firm (Sanchez, 1993). Foss (1998) hailed “real options” as the third theory of 
economic organisation, after transaction cost economics and the resource-based 
view. He criticised transaction cost economics for failing to accommodate 
organisations’ need to learn and innovate, and the resource-based view for being 
retrospective. “Real options”, he argued, brings a “dynamic dimension” to theories 
of the firm (Foss, 1998, p. 2).  
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Table 10: Real options, and comparisons with TCE 
 
Business uncertainty leads to insourcing 
 
Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
Coase 1937 TCE theory Why do firms 
exist? 
Employed person is 
directed/controlled; 
agent is free to carry 
out tasks in their own 
way. 
Williamson 1979, 
1988 
TCE theory Operationalising 
TCE  
Describes uncertainty, 
frequency and 
specificity as sources of 
contracting hazards; 
variables that will 
predict hidden 
transaction costs. 
(assumption – 
opportunism). 
Klein et al. 1990 Empirical; 375 
companies 
TCE in international 
markets with 4 
models 
Environmental 
volatility predicts a 
subsidiary rather than 
agent.   
Stapleton & 
Hanna 
2002 Empirical; 126 
responses from 
all 33 firms in 
sector 
Salesforce 
integration in 
steamship lines: 
impact of stack 
train 
The more 
unpredictable the 
business environment, 
the higher the 
likelihood of internal 
sales. 
Pagell & Krause 2004 Empirical; 252 
ops mgrs and 
purchasing 
managers 
Relationship 
between 
environmental 
uncertainty and 
operational 
flexibility 
No evidence that 
flexibility or 
outsourcing helps with 
environmental 
uncertainty or 
performance. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Business uncertainty leads to outsourcing 
 
Anderson E. 
& Coughlan 
1987 Empirical; 94 
overseas ops 
1955-1975 
TCE and export Difficulty in understanding the 
business environment leads to 
using agents. 
Schuster & 
Keith 
1993 6 case 
studies of US 
firms in Asia 
Integrated or 
agent sales 
force 
Some countries volatile and 
agents would be used to reduce 
risk. 
Schilling & 
Steensma 
2002 Empirical; 
127 
technology 
sourcing 
arrangement
s 
Acquire or 
licence 
technology 
Commercial uncertainty 
decreases the likelihood of 
acquisition. 
King 2006 Case study Uncertainty and 
outsourcing 
Manage uncertainty and share 
risk by outsourcing. Firms should 
be proficient in multiple sourcing 
methods. 
Miranda & 
Kim 
2006 Empirical; 
214 USA 
local 
authorities 
IT outsourcing Firms cope with uncertainty by 
outsourcing; regulatory 
pressures, budget cuts, make 
outsourcing more likely. 
Ngwenyama 
& Sullivan 
2007 2 case 
studies 
Risk 
management in 
IS outsourcing  
Combination of contract terms 
and risk management strategies 
can ensure outsourcing is 
successful. 
Martinez-
Sánchez et 
al. 
2007 Empirical; 
156 Spanish 
firms 
Workplace 
flexibility and 
performance 
Managers will not reduce their 
flexibility if they perceive 
increased environmental 
dynamism –  non-core 
outsourcing and internal 
flexibility both associated with 
better performance. 
Diez-Vial 2007 Empirical; 
155 firms 
(Spain) 
Vertical 
integration 
strategy 
Firms avoid integration when 
demand volatility present – need 
to stay flexible. 
Brouthers et 
al. 
2008 Empirical; 
160 firms 
(Holland and 
Greece) 
Real options in 
international 
market entry 
Real options indicates external 
solution in uncertain conditions. 
 
Rogers 2009 Quals; 12 
sales 
directors in 
UK pharma 
Use of CSOs Flexibility is normally “top of 
mind” when considering 
outsourcing sales. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Real options theory predicts “make-or-buy” in conditions of uncertainty 
 
Stigler 1939 Theory 
building 
Fixed versus 
variable costs in 
the short-run  
The ability to combine variable 
productive services should 
increase marginal productivity. 
Myers 1977 Theory 
building 
Financial 
borrowing 
Original source of “real 
options”. 
Sanchez 1993 Theory 
building 
Organisational 
design 
“real options” in strategy. 
Dixit & 
Pindyck 
1995 Comment Capital 
investments 
Real options spreads risk. 
De Leeuw & 
Volberda 
1996 Theory-
building 
Nature of 
organisational 
flexibility 
Flexibility is both a management 
task (variety of processes) and 
an organisational design task.  
Foss 1998 Book 
chapter 
Real options 
theory 
Future-oriented, explains how 
firms can build capability. 
Golden & 
Powell 
2000 Theory-
building 
Definition of 
flexibility 
Ability to adapt – in the s/t, m/t, 
l/t; in response to seen and 
unseen; proactively or 
reactively; internally or 
externally. 
Jack & Raturi 2002 3 case 
studies plus 
empirical; 
pilot of 25; 
140 
managers;  
Volume flexibility 
and performance 
s/t and l/t sources of volume 
flexibility  have positive impact 
on firm performance; large 
firms use outsourcing for l/t 
flexibility. 
Rese & 
Roemer 
2004 Theory 
building 
(real 
options) 
Managing 
commitments 
versus flexibility 
TCE stresses value of 
contractual commitments, but 
in fact these limit flexibility and 
responsiveness. 
Fredericks 2005 Theory-
building 
Building 
capability to be 
flexible 
Superior intra and inter firm 
flexibility proposed to achieve 
success in dynamic markets. 
Alvarez & 
Stenbacka 
2007 Modelling Real options and 
outsourcing 
(production) outsourcing should 
be partial and should increase 
with market uncertainty. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Limited evidence that exercising options should not just be a reaction to business 
uncertainty, but a source of competitive advantage (with some provisos). 
 
Scott et al. 1988 Theory 
building with 
calculated 
models 
Advantages of 
flexible 
resources in 
uncertainty 
Higher cost of production worth it 
for flexible resource as they can 
reduce costs of excess capacity or 
excess demand. 
Anderson 
T. J. 
2000 Theory 
building 
Real options 
theory in 
strategy 
decisions 
Options perspective associated 
with reducing resource 
commitments to new ventures or 
increasing flexibility; need to adapt 
within time constraints; 
uncertainty is opportunity as well 
as risk. 
Sawhney 2006 Quals; 
observations 
at 10 firms 
Flexibility in 
value chains 
and 
uncertainty 
Flexibility can be used to create 
competitive advantage. 
Tiwana et 
al. 
2007 Empirical; 88 
IT projects 
Test for 
options: 
Grow 
Stage 
(increments) 
Change scale 
(up or down) 
Switch use 
Defer 
abandon 
 
Real options 
and bounded 
rationality 
Managerial behaviour only partly 
consistent with real options theory; 
real options theory says that 
uncertainty increases option value, 
this tends only to be taken into 
account when there is negative 
information about a project. 
Managers should, in theory, always 
look for options value beyond NPV. 
Homburg 
et al. 
2007 Empirical; 
280 pairs – 
marketers 
and sales 
managers 
 Customer-related and competitor-
related responsiveness affect 
market performance; separate 
constructs. 
Fantazy et 
al. 
2009 Empirical; 
175 SMEs in 
Canada 
Strategy, 
flexibility and 
performance 
Some support for flexibility 
improving performance, but 
different elements are relevant to 
different strategies. 
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2.2.3.6 Summary 
 
This section has reviewed the real options theory approach to outsourcing. Real 
options predicts different organisational design outcomes from transaction cost 
economics in times of business uncertainty. Emerging from financial portfolio 
management, real options can be connected to both risk management and the 
desire for variabilisation of costs evident in firm’s outsourcing behaviour.  
 
There is some limited evidence that there are transaction cost, resource-based view 
and real options antecedents in “make-or-buy” decisions (Leiblein & Miller, 2003). 
Firms need to avoid contractual hazards, build on past expertise and seek the ability 
to respond flexibly in uncertain conditions.  
 
Having observed that there are three strong theories that each partially explain the 
antecedents of “make-or-buy” decisions in organisations, the next section of this 
literature review considers the influence of each in the design of sales functions. 
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2.3 Antecedents of sales outsourcing 
 
2.3.1 Introduction 
 
There are three strong theories that each claim to explain the antecedents of 
“make-or-buy” decisions in organisations. The constructs in these theories have 
been tested by indicators that can be easily understood by practitioners. When the 
literature about outsourcing, particularly sales outsourcing, is examined in 
practitioners’ terms, the link between theory and the practitioners’ rationale for the 
design of sales functions is not lost, but it needs some interpretation. 
 
2.3.2 Production cost  
 
Transaction cost economics has been positioned both as an alternative to 
production cost comparison and as a supplement to it (Williamson & Ghani, 2012). 
Although highly likely to be a primary consideration in practice, production cost 
comparisons are treated fairly briefly in most outsourcing theory. Tangible cost 
differences are still a dominant factor in the 21st century business case for particular 
types of organisational structure (Fan, 2000; Martinez-Sánchez et al., 2007; 
Anderson, S. & Dekker, 2009a). Notably, cost leaders in markets have a higher 
outsourcing intensity (Martinez-Sánchez et al., 2007).   
“Numerous writers conclude that the greatest benefit an enterprise can derive from 
outsourcing is cost reduction.” (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002a, p. 1). 
 
There is empirical evidence for cost-saving being a dominant driver of outsourcing 
initiatives. Individual studies from small single country samples (Moschuris, 2007), 
cross-sectoral samples (Smith, Morris & Ezzamel, 2005) and large international 
samples (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002b), find that cost saving is the most 
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important and most frequently quoted reason for outsourcing. While 60% of 
respondents in an international study did not mention policy reasons for 
contracting-out, only 5% failed to mention cost efficiency; a majority also reported 
cost efficiency as the main benefit realised (Ford et al., 1993). In the UK, high wages 
have been associated with outsourcing, and labour productivity improves with 
outsourcing intensity (Girma & Görg, 2004). Practitioner comment includes 
observations that most companies view outsourcing as a “pure cost play” 
(Biederman, 2004, p. 23).   
 
Most convincingly, Kremic et al. (2006) in a meta-analysis of 210 studies found that 
85% of them concluded that cost-saving was the main benefit sought. Buyers expect 
cost reduction from leveraging the economies of scale and experience curve of the 
supplier, making their own organisation “lean” (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002a). 
The most successful outsourcing providers achieve client satisfaction through being 
able to capitalise on experience, developed over a number of projects, to reduce 
marginal costs of service delivery (Levina & Ross, 2003).  Although some studies do 
find other motivations to be dominant when companies buy outsourced services, 
for example, improved quality and flexibility of services (Espíno-Rodriguez & 
Padrón-Robaina, 2005), cost is still part of the equation. 
 
“Efficiently using scarce resources to fulfil needs is a very important part of the 
prescription for good business.” (Groth & Kinney, 1994, p. 57).  
 
Cost management can make a considerable contribution to the value of a company, 
and thus shareholder satisfaction. Costs change over time for a variety of reasons, 
but modern information technology should enable acquisition of knowledge about 
costs. Companies should concern themselves with containing fixed and variable 
costs, eliminating costs where associated benefits are negligible and reducing the 
costs of essential activities. These things can all reduce financial risk (Groth & 
Kinney, 1994). 
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Certainly outsourcing appears to be empirically linked to firms that are successful 
with cost leadership strategies (Gilley & Rasheed, 2000; Martinez-Sánchez et al., 
2007). The substantial research base of Lacity et al. (2008) has reported reduced 
operating costs as the leading operational benefit achieved from IT and BPO 
outsourcing. Similar results have been reported for outsourcing production 
(Bardhan, Mithas & Shu, 2007). Jiang, Frazier & Prater, (2006) compared the 
published performance data of firms that have outsourced part of their operations 
versus their non-outsourcing competitors, and they found that outsourcing firms 
have “an obvious, significant advantage in cost efficiency” (p. 1296). 
 
However, objective financial performance criteria are limiting, as they focus on 
shareholder value, thus excluding the experience of some of the firm’s 
stakeholders, and they can only really be judged historically. While financial 
measures are assumed to be uniform, their usefulness varies by industry sector 
(Selling & Stickney, 1989) and published figures can be manipulated (Matthyssens & 
Pauwels, 1996). Besides these nuances, researchers should consider findings from 
Deloittes that 48% of large, global organisations had no standardised method for 
evaluating outsourcing (Marshall & Heffes, 2005). 
 
The cost of the misalignment of an organisation’s design with its business 
environment has not been widely explored either (Macher & Richman, 2008), but 
researchers have observed that the relationship between performance and 
outsourcing is not linear (Rothaermel et al., 2006; Kotabe & Mol, 2009). There is an 
optimal (and sometimes elusive) mix between vertical integration and outsourcing 
that maximizes financial performance. Recent claims for the cost-saving potential of 
partial outsourcing/“out-tasking” are significant (Krishnamurthy et al., 2009). Hybrid 
organisation also has support in the case of “downstream” outsourcing (including 
sales outsourcing) (Rangan et al., 1993). Return on investment can and should be 
measured, but it is difficult to identify the most profitable portfolio of contract 
types (vom Brocke & Lindner, 2004). Nevertheless, it is clearly important to explore 
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how sales managers make cost comparisons between their organisational design 
choices.   
 
There is comment, although little empirical confirmation, that firms which 
outsource sales activities do so for cost reasons. For example, Anderson and Trinkle 
(2005) comment that “This (cost reduction) is usually the first, second and third 
reason given to turn to a third party” (Anderson & Trinkle, 2005, p. 3,). In 1985, 
Anderson commented on the rising costs of making a sale and Taylor (1990) argued 
that rising selling costs were a reason to use manufacturer’s representatives rather 
than employing salespeople. Some commentators have pointed out the clear 
economic benefit of no sales expense until there is a sale (Landry & Pandrangi, 
2005; Anderson & Trinkle, 2005). Kaufman (1999) also noted that the multiple line 
sales call is more cost-effective for the customer. Equally, justification for directly 
employed salespeople is usually driven by breakeven analysis (Ross et al., 2005).  
 
Colletti and Chonko (1997) argued that sales performance should be judged in 
comparison with competitors; and one indicator of a superior sales function is to 
have sales costs less than the average for the sector. In the case of sales insourcing 
or outsourcing, straightforward calculations of sales potential less costs (e.g. 
Powers, 1987; Dishman, 1996) are a typical starting point. Outsourcing selling 
should be attractive in terms of economic efficiency, although visibility of the costs 
of the sales function are often disguised in the term “SGA” (sales and general 
administration) (Anderson et al., 2003). 
 
Aware of the continuing interest in the business case, the Manufacturers’ 
Representatives Educational Research Foundation focuses messages to potential 
clients on the cost-saving advantages, claiming that the cost of using MRs is 
considerably less that of an employed salesforce, offering not just lower costs but 
standardised and predictable costs (Kaufman, 1999).  Landry and Pandrangi (2005) 
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asserted that an in-house sales team of over 20 could be replaced with the full-time 
equivalent of ten from an agency who were paid only on performance factors. Even 
where cost is not the main driver for outsourcing, sales managers expect that using 
contract sales organisations should cost less than employing salespeople (Rogers, 
2009).  
 
2.3.3 Challenges to the cost-dominant approach 
 
Despite the evidence for cost as a primary antecedent of outsourcing in general and 
sales outsourcing in particular, competing motivations may mean that organisations 
are sometimes prepared to pay more to outsource an activity (Smith et al., 2005). 
The disproportionate attention paid to executional cost management may not 
result in the best make/buy or ally decisions (Anderson, S. & Dekker, 2009b). In 
addition, concerns about hidden costs and supply problems do affect managers’ 
perceptions about the long-term value of outsourcing (Kremic et al., 2006), and 
practitioner comment suggests that hidden costs have indeed been underestimated 
in the past (Marshall & Heffes, 2005). As Williamson (1996) argued, a combination 
of economics and organisational science is needed. Structural cost management is a 
factor in designing the best contractual mix (Anderson, S. & Dekker, 2009a). Even in 
studies confirming cost efficiency as the primary driver, respondents frequently 
mentioned “loss of control” (p. 211) issues as the main disbenefit of buying rather 
than making (Ford et al., 1993).  
 
When exploring strategies that manufacturers adopt towards using contracts sales 
organisations, Dishman (1996) argued that cost arguments will always be modified 
by a number of factors, especially the degree of control that companies wish to 
have over the relationship with the end-customer. The concerns about the hidden 
costs of control have also been observed in the sales outsourcing literature from the 
opposite position.  Traditional cost analyses can also underestimate the hidden 
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costs of employment contracts such as training and the time cost of money, and the 
hidden benefits of using agents such as better coverage of sales territories and the 
value of their existing customer relationships. (Ross et al., 2005; Landry & 
Pandrangi, 2005; Anderson & Trinkle, 2005).  
 
Contracts are the means by which clients of outsourcing providers will try to deal 
with anticipated future costs. Contracts are designed to ensure that gains are 
realised and conflict is minimised in an orderly way (Williamson, 2005b). Complex 
contracts can be used to cover more eventualities, but inevitably that incurs 
monitoring costs (Barthélemy & Quélin, 2006). This may be a minimal problem for 
large firms who can exert power over their agents (Shervani et al., 2007), or firms 
who may have developed a competency in managing suppliers (Leiblein & Miller, 
2003). The moderating effects of the ability to manage agents/suppliers will be 
examined in more detail in section 2.4.   
 
Nevertheless, there are strong arguments for the hidden costs of control to be the 
primary antecedent for organisational form, because they may exceed production 
cost advantages (Mukherji & Ramachandran, 2007). Coase (1988) argued that firms 
create value because they reduce the transaction costs that would occur in the 
market, and vertical integration appeared to be popular throughout most of the last 
century. The difficulty for managers is the measurement of the costs of control, and 
it is interesting to note how transaction cost studies are dominated by loosely 
defined constructs (Macher & Richman, 2008) which have been measured via a 
disparate variety of indicators (Grover & Malhotra, 2003).   
 
Managers’ perceptions of outsourcing are inter-related with their past experiences 
(Fowler & Jeffs, 1998; Feeny & Smith, 2008), which creates the framework for their 
bounded rationality. Nevertheless, since outsourcing is apparently influenced by 
strategy and managers are the strategy decision-makers, their perceptions are 
important (Espíno-Rodriguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2005). Certainly their perceptions 
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of the hidden costs of controlling outsourcing are probably highly relevant to 
whether or not outsourcing is even investigated as an option.  
 
2.3.4 Controlling the sales function 
 
Anderson (1985), whose work has been acknowledged by Williamson and Ghani 
(2012) as most influential in applying TCE to marketing issues, found that the 
strongest effect in predicting an internal or outsourced salesforce is difficulty in 
evaluating performance. This was reinforced by Krafft et al. in 2004. It was also the 
strongest indicator of vertical integration of channels in a large sample, cross-
industry study by Majumdar and Ramaswamy (1994) and it has broad support in 
major meta-analyses of transaction cost economics (David & Han, 2004; Geyskens 
et al., 2006; Macher & Richman, 2008; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).  
 
There are indications in marketing channels and sales literature that control issues 
are very relevant to decisions about “make-or-buy”. For example, they drive back-
sourcing or switching decisions in export markets (Benito, Pedersen & Petersen, 
2005). Better sales effectiveness has been observed when salespeople identify with 
their employer (Wieseke, Ahearne, Lam & Van Dick, 2009). Behavioural control 
makes sense when solutions are complex and sales cycles are long. These 
circumstances require considerable non-selling activities and customer support 
(Anderson, 1985). Differing reward systems for routine selling (agency or 
commission) and non-routine team selling (salary and bonuses) suggest an apparent 
transaction cost economics approach to sales resourcing is still widespread 
(Tremblay, Côté & Balkin, 2003).   
 
Channel members are selected based on their fit against criteria and their 
credentials (Mehta et al., 2002). But that does not necessarily mean that goal 
congruence is easy. There may be a considerable level of disagreement about 
109 
 
marketing strategy between manufactures and the dealers (Frazier & Summers, 
1984). Manufacturers use channel organisations to maximise market coverage and 
achieve market share, whereas the channel organisation is focused on its own 
profitability. Channel firms are not under the direct control of the manufacturer and 
do not automatically have to comply with their directions (Mehta et al., 2002). 
Despite this disconnection of control, there are also common interests such as sales 
volume and end-customer satisfaction (Mohr & Spekman, 1996).  
 
Channel relationships, like outsourcing arrangements, are characterised by high 
failure rates. Mohr and Spekman (1996) reported that 60% of channel alliances fail, 
not because of agent behaviour, but because manufacturers end up competing with 
their channels and tend to use the term “partnership” rather loosely. It is 
noteworthy that it is power imbalance or use of coercive power, i.e. opportunism 
on behalf of the principal, which can quickly cause selling relationships to 
deteriorate (Frazier & Summers, 1984; Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Brock Smith & 
Barclay, 1997). Non-coercive tactics such as rewards and incentives are most 
successful in achieving channel satisfaction (Mayo et al., 1998), but are, of course, 
expensive. 
 
Although co-operation and success have been observed in outsourced selling, it is 
not universally accepted that relational controls work with third parties. Duarte and 
Davies (2003), examining 496 relationships where the balance of power favoured 
the principal, found that there was no positive evidence of low levels of conflict 
being associated with higher performance. Research into the motivation for 
backsourcing may provide insight into what really needs to work in a principal – CSO 
relationship. Why would principals terminate an agreement with a manufacturers’ 
agent and bring sales in-house? Employing a salesforce involves new risks and 
responsibilities as well as set-up costs. The primary motives for change were 
dissatisfaction with rep performance, concern about opportunistic behaviour, and 
difficulties in evaluating performance (Weiss & Anderson, 1992). These problems 
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are predicted by transaction cost economics.  When control issues arise, sales 
managers would see vertical integration as preferable.   
 
2.3.5 Exceptions to control expectations  
 
2.3.5.1 The potential for co-operation with third parties 
 
Agent-style organisations who take on the customer interface for other companies 
may curtail their inclination to opportunism for a number of reasons. Firstly, they 
have their own reputation to consider (Mukherji & Ramachandran, 2007); secondly, 
they appreciate the interdependence of the supply chain in which they operate 
(Kaufman, 1999); thirdly, they may perceive mutual investment in the relationship 
or the value of behavioural incentives from the principal (Mehta et al., 2002); and 
fourthly, they observe that co-operative arrangements are better for performance 
reasons (Gassenheimer et al., 2007).  
 
2.3.5.1.1 Reputation 
 
Employed salespeople are generally perceived by sales managers to be more 
trustworthy than reps (Anderson et al., 2003). However, there seems to be little 
incentive for companies that manage the customer interface of others to be 
opportunistic, when they have a reputation to maintain with the end customers, 
and a supplier within their industry sector (Mukherji & Ramachandran, 2007). 
Mutual commitment to customer satisfaction is necessary for both principal and 
agent to achieve profitable growth (McQuiston, 2001). Buyers go beyond their 
immediate dyad in the supply chain when assessing the appeal of a purchase, and 
prefer co-operative ties between suppliers and the vendors/agents they buy from 
(Wuyts, Stremersch, Van den Bulte & Franses, 2004). CSOs are in their industries 
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and territories for the long-term and they have a wide perspective (Kaufman, 1999; 
Novick, 2000). Indeed, it is in the agent’s interest to develop special attributes in 
their relationship with end-customers in order to enhance their value to principals 
and prospects (Weiss & Anderson, 1992; Gulati & Bristow, 2005).  
 
2.3.5.1.2 Interdependence 
 
CSOs are “highly interdependent with their principals because their business model 
runs on context. The reps’ operations are necessarily intertwined with those of its 
principals, insofar as the customers’ needs are concerned.”  (Anderson & Trinkle, 
2005, p. 28). The Manufacturers Representatives’ Educational Research Foundation 
has suggested that the control issue with reps is not how much control the 
manufacturer needs, but how much they want. Contract sales organisations have 
more vested interest in their client’s success than some other categories of 
intermediary (Kaufman, 1999). Equally, principals need to be careful of market 
reaction to the way they treat their agents. Companies are wary of backsourcing 
because of industry perceptions and backlash from their reps’ networks (Weiss & 
Anderson, 1992). Reputational capital appears to have an interdependency effect 
constraining the opportunism of both parties. 
 
Since interdependence is inherent in supply chains, Mohr and Spekman (1996) 
argue that successful alliances focus on partnership and achieving joint goals. Sales 
alliances that achieved trust are able to co-operate to improve performance 
effectiveness (Brock Smith & Barclay, 1997). Narus and Anderson (1996) suggested 
that manufacturers need to be adaptive in channels and manage a web of extended 
capabilities. Fairness is particularly focused when a company uses multiple channels 
to sell the same products in the same territory. Double compensation (rewarding 
both channels, not necessarily equally) is expensive, but necessary in order to avoid 
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conflict and to maintain a reputation for treating complementary channels fairly (Sa 
Vinhas & Anderson, 2008). 
 
2.3.5.1.3 Mutual investment/behavioural incentives 
 
Although commission is the obvious “market governance” incentive that underpins 
CSOs’ existence, commission shows diminishing returns over time (Anderson, Lodish 
& Weitz, 1987). Managerial focus on outcomes is inevitable, but it is investments in 
the relationship such as marketing support, which recognises and reinforces the 
channel organisation’s efforts to achieve outcomes, that secure sustained 
performance (Frazier & Summers, 1984; Spriggs, 1994; Mehta et al., 2002). CSOs 
perception of what investment the client is making to make their businesses more 
successful is taken into account when they choose how to allocate their time 
(Anderson et al., 1987; Merritt & Newell, 2001). Supplier support such as end-user 
promotions, and joint calls are highly valued; and training has been particularly 
noted as a means of increasing commitment (Galunic & Anderson, 2000; 
Weinrauch, Stephens-Friesen & Carlson, 2001).  
 
2.3.5.1.4 Performance 
 
In the presence of stable and co-operative relationships between principals and 
CSOs, it is possible to find CSOs behaving strategically. For example, Jackson et al. 
(1999) observed that CSOs do engage in team selling, with their principal or with 
other players in the supply network where the customer situation requires it; for 
example, if it is a first time buy, the product is complex, or the customer has special 
characteristics or a large decision-making unit. Mutual commitments and 
information exchange increase the goal and role congruity of the agent with the 
principal, which in turn increases performance (Gulati & Bristow, 2005). Social 
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capital, trust and distributive fairness were all associated with higher performance 
within supply networks (Gassenheimer, Hunter & Sigauw, 2007). 
 
2.3.5.2 The potential for lack of control of employed salespeople 
 
In the case of selling, the lines between external reps and employed reps can 
sometimes be very blurred. If the actions of external sales agents are hard to 
monitor, how does employment solve the problems (James, 2000)? Is it the nature 
of the contract that matters, or the nature of the supervision?  
 
Just like external agents, salespeople will leave jobs where they perceive that the 
employer’s product is poor, they get put on small sales and spend too much time on 
cold calling (Jolson, Dubinsky & Anderson, 1987). Just like external agents, 
employed reps do not see, for example, why they should they sell new products 
when selling the old products is easier. Firms often lack direction and diffuse their 
sales effort because of rituals, in-company politics, systems that do not help anyone 
to do better and contradictory signals and reward systems that reinforce old ways 
(Bonoma, 1984).  
 
Just like external sales agents, there may be concerns about opportunistic 
behaviour. When 60% of sales managers have found a salesperson cheating in some 
way and 36% believe that bad behaviour is getting worse, it is not just opportunism 
that sales managers have to worry about, but anti-citizenship behaviour and even 
sabotage (Jelinek & Ahearne, 2006). Anti-citizenship behaviour they discussed 
included aggression, avoiding work, tweaking expenses and resisting rules.   
 
Salespeople have access to customer information, are costly to replace and will 
probably gain financially if they switch to competitors. They are not known for 
formal collective bargaining, but can act together in subtle ways to protect 
114 
 
privileges, such as expense accounts, or oppose management tools, such as sales 
force automation (Speier & Venkatesh, 2002). Only a minority of salespeople could 
be classified as positive towards change (Colletti & Chonko, 1997).   
 
Anderson (1985; et al., 2003) challenged the assumption that opportunism does not 
happen internally and highlighted the internal costs of monitoring salespeople. 
Outsourcing selling should reduce transaction costs as the manufacturers’ 
representative focuses on selling rather than internal organisational politics. 
Nevertheless, sales managers often perceive that it is desirable and legitimate to 
micro manage sales employees’ behaviour (Anderson et al., 2003). Sometimes the 
hidden costs of internal operations may be difficult to measure.  Most companies 
aim to have a hybrid between behavioural control and outcome control to optimise 
the performance of the internal salesforce, but poor co-alignment results in 
reduced performance (Onyemah & Anderson, 2009). Sales managers have to work 
just as hard with internal employees to generate trust in order to reduce 
dysfunctional behaviour (Choi, Dixon & Jung, 2004), and encourage better 
acceptance of change (McNeilly & Lawson, 1999).  
 
It has been observed that the internal salesperson has a different profile from the 
typical external agent. Internal salespeople lose job satisfaction if they suffer role 
conflict and ambiguity, which is common when senior managers are asking for 
change. They like high levels of structure to what they do. Organisational climate 
exerts 60% of variation in their job satisfaction. External representatives, although 
they would like to influence their principal’s policies affecting customer 
relationships, are not dismayed by role conflict and ambiguity (Mahajan, Churchill, 
Ford & Walker, 1984). They certainly do not blame their supervisor or even the 
senior management of the principal. Kaufman (1999) points out that CSOs employ 
high calibre sales professionals whose success is linked directly to their productivity 
and their contacts with customers, not with their friends in the corporate hierarchy. 
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All this suggests that companies may have something to gain from using external 
sales agents, at least to some degree, when it comes to achieving sustained 
performance. There will be control issues, but they are not necessarily worse, or 
more costly, than the challenges inherent in supervising employed salespeople. 
 
2.3.6 Resources within the sales function 
 
Anderson (1985) commented that only human asset specificity is relevant in selling. 
Although a sales function as a whole may have integrated resources and 
competencies beyond the skills of individual salespeople, Anderson’s study revealed 
an extensive portfolio of knowledge and skills held by individuals that has some 
predictive power for make-or-buy. Even though she posited that the sales function 
is rarely fully integrated with the rest of an organisation, and sales directors over-
estimate the uniqueness of the sales approach that they train into their 
salespeople, a high skill requirement is the one point on which Anderson et al. 
(2003) accept a rationale for sales insourcing. If salespeople need idiosyncratic and 
complex knowledge and relationships, and a supplier’s approach to selling is 
unique, salespeople should be employees. Overall, there is evidence in the sales-
related TCE studies for higher levels of skills development leading to insourcing 
(Anderson, 1985; Krafft et al., 2004; Brettel et al., 2011). 
 
Verbeke, Dietz & Verwaal, (2011), in a substantial meta-analysis, identified 
distinctive categories of skills significant to sales performance. Although adaptive 
selling skills were relevant, knowledge skills (the understanding of both products 
and the customer enabling the salesperson to propose a customised solution) were 
somewhat more important. It has been suggested that “usage specific” skills, such 
as selling skills, can be transferred easily to other firms, whereas product-specific 
knowledge (Riordan & Williamson, 1985) or firm-specific skills (Kulkarni & 
Ramamoorthy, 2005) cannot. Companies should avoid the risk of losing key skills via 
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outsourcing (McIvor, 2000) and in particular activities dependent on employee 
collaboration are best kept inhouse (Williamson, 1979; Safizadeh et al., 2008).  
Many studies have focused on human assets, perhaps because in many functions 
that might be outsourced, it can be the largest cost centre. For example, 
Watjatrakul and Drennan (2005) found in their study of e-mail marketing 
outsourcing that specific skills and tacit knowledge (acquired via work experience in 
the company) were major factors for insourcing decisions.  
 
When workers have firm-specific skills, both they and the firm lose value if they 
leave. In particular, the firm faces additional training costs for a new employee 
(Williamson, 2002). Governance (the employment contract) cannot specify all 
contingencies, but it should deter termination for both parties – e.g. severance pay 
as a cost to the employer, and loss of non-transferable benefits, such as promotion 
prospects, as a cost to employees. These contractual safeguards are designed to 
avoid employee opportunism (Battu et al., 2002), and employer opportunism. 
 
How do labour assets become specific?  Battu et al.’s (2002) empirical study of six 
(geographical) British labour markets found many complex variables relating to skills 
and tenure, but they concluded that specificity is developed within the firm, not 
outside it. If “learning by doing” is an occupational trait – specificity will develop as 
employment progresses. The quality of match between employer and employee can 
also develop over time. However, contrary to the predictions of both TCE and RBV, 
workers with firm-specific skills can still be very mobile (Battu et al., 2002). It is also 
possible to outsource “core” activities (Alexander & Young, 1996), even knowledge-
based activities, if they are granular and strategically integrated (Sen & Shiel, 2006) 
or embedded in inter-firm processes and routines (Dyer & Singh, 1998).  
 
In the case of sales, it has been argued on the basis of empirical findings that only 
the knowledge and skills of the salespeople are relevant to discussions about asset 
specificity (Anderson, 1985). The role of the salesperson as a “brand ambassador” 
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implies a great deal of idiosyncratic skills (Tanner, Fournier, Wise, Hollet & Poujol, 
2008). Even from the resource-based view, the skills of salespeople have been 
studied without associated resource integration. However, it is noticeable that their 
networking skills within their own organisation are the predominant generators of 
resource-based view “rents” (Menguc & Barker, 2005).  
 
2.3.7 Sales skills in detail 
 
Selling aptitude has, not surprisingly, been suggested as an important element of 
salesperson performance (Walker, Churchill & Ford, 1977), and skill is one of the 
few things, (the others being role congruity and motivation), that have consistently 
been observed to have a significant influence on an individual salesperson’s 
performance (Churchill et al., 1985). Unfortunately, one of the biggest problems 
that practitioners report about employing salespeople is that many recruits have a 
slow learning curve and many companies have a high turnover of salespeople, 
which means a constant loss of effectiveness and efficiency (Cummings, 2004).  
 
There is a problem in the UK with the skills of salespeople. 59% of sales managers 
reported a skills gap in 2008 (TBR for MSSSB, 2008), and a skills gap was still 
apparent in 2012 (CFA, 2012). In a recent survey of purchasing managers carried out 
by a large sales training company in the UK, 64% said that salespeople were “poor” 
or “fair”, a statistic in line with previous surveys in 2002, 2005 and 2007 which 
suggests that the skills gap in sales in the UK is persistent (Alford, 2010).  
 
The second most quoted reason given for outsourcing (in European companies) is 
aiming to achieve best practice; “improve service quality”, “focus on core 
competences” and “access to new technology/skills” ranked third to fifth 
(Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002b). This suggests that the resource-based view 
factors might be important in “make-or-buy” decisions. The dominant reasons for 
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choice of supplier were proven track record and industry sector experience, while 
future reasons aiming to outsource were dominated by the desire to achieve best 
practice and access to new technology and skills (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002b).  
 
With an outsourcing provider that is expert in its field, the potential of mutual 
strategic gain is generally recognised (Morgan, 2003). Hence, contract sales 
organisations are used by some of their clients for their selling expertise (Anderson 
& Trinkle, 2005). Aubert, Rivard and Patry (2004) found that, where impact is easy 
to measure, the higher the technical skills required, the more likely a firm would 
gain from outsourcing the task. The efficient accumulation of resource may include 
getting access to skills by buying in selectively to those that you want or do not have 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994). Activities that will drive future growth could benefit from 
outsourcing as it may lead to innovation that can then be integrated (Holcomb & 
Hitt, 2007).   
 
This suggests that CSOs should be an attractive option in a resource-based analysis. 
Third parties specialise, and specialisation equals competence, according to 
Anderson and Trinkle (2005), who described contract sales organizations as selling 
machines - wholly-contained field sales offices, where everything in them is done 
with the single purpose of generating sales. All CSO expenditure supports the selling 
effort. Practitioner O’Connor Vos (2003) argued that CSOs invest in sales process 
excellence and they are proficient with productivity tools such as Sales Force 
Automation (SFA).  
 
However, it is not selling skills per se that generate greater economic rent for firms 
(Menguc & Barker, 2005). It has been posited that it is the salesperson’s power 
within their own organisation, derived from inside knowledge and relationships, 
that determines their value (Wilson & Millman, 2003; Plouffe & Barclay, 2007), and 
there is convincing empirical evidence for this view (Liu & Leach, 2001; Tellefsen & 
Eyuboglu, 2002; Menguc & Barker, 2005; Steward, Walker, Hutt & Kumar, 2010).   
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Zoltners et al. (2006) argued that contract sales organisations cannot do complex or 
idiosyncratic sales tasks, such as the multi-step sell, even though there is a small 
collection of literature, much of it empirical, that find positive results for the 
integrative skills of contract sales organisations. Where principals and agents have 
exchanged long-term commitments such as training, joint marketing and integrated 
sales technology, customer satisfaction with both is high (Galunic & Anderson, 
2000; Weinrauch et al., 2001; Crittenden & Crittenden, 2004). Jackson et al. (1999) 
found that 76.4% of manufacturers’ representatives were engaging in some kind of 
team selling with their principals when the customer’s information needs were high 
or the solution particularly complex. Having sales in-house does not per se add 
value (Stapleton & Hanna, 2002; Guenzi & Troilo, 2007). Counterbalanced with the 
possible value of the internal power of employed salespeople is the market 
presence and selling efficiency of external agents (Ross et al., 2005) and their 
freedom from role ambiguity (Mahajan et al., 1984).  
 
Given the differing views on how sales skills might best be sourced, it is necessary to 
identify which specific skills have consistently been associated with the preference 
for employing salespeople in the few empirical studies in sales outsourcing. These 
are clustered around knowledge of a company’s unique culture (which enables 
power internal relationships), being able to customise solutions and customer-
specific knowledge and relationship-building skills (Anderson, 1985; Wilson & 
Zhang, 2002).  
 
2.3.7.1 Knowing the firm 
 
Some companies develop strong cultures. The organisational identity of customer-
facing staff, including salespeople, has been correlated with better performance 
and achievement of targets, together with clarity of identity for the customer 
(Wieseke et al., 2009). Both interorganisational trust and interpersonal trust are 
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important to purchasing managers (Zaheer et al., 1998), and can be personified in 
the salesperson – “it matters to me that (sales) people are committed to their 
company and position” (Alford, 2010, p. 4). It follows on from these findings that 
corporate identity, a feeling among both directors and employees about “who we 
are”, is relevant to “make-or-buy” decisions (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2005).  
 
Anderson (1985) was interested in the importance of company culture to sales 
outsourcing, and used a variety of indicators to test it; Krafft et al. (2004) also 
tested for the specificity of the company. Organisational climate has a significant 
effect on the motivation of sales representatives, but matters much less to 
manufacturers’ representatives (Majahan et al., 1984). Ultimately, both Anderson 
(1985) and Krafft et al. (2004) focused on the length of time it takes for a sales 
recruit to learn about the company as the strongest indicator that a company has a 
differentiated culture. Their findings suggest that, despite the problems that a slow 
learning curve might present, an idiosyncratic company is more likely to vertically 
integrate its salesforce.  
 
Inside knowledge of a complex, differentiated firm leads to internal influence and 
powerful relationships which make employed salespeople valuable to their 
customers, as well as their employers (Tellefsen & Eyuboglu, 2002). Strong 
collaborative working relationships with other departments to resolve problems, 
and the ability to engage in sales strategy discussion, are the “rare, valuable, socially 
complex and imperfectly imitable” (Menguc & Barker, 2005, p. 902) skills that lead 
to sales success. Based on Menguc and Barker’s (2005) empirical work from the 
resource-based view, it is not just learning about an employer that is important. 
Productive involvement with the company and colleagues is the rent-creating skill, 
and one that perhaps could not be outsourced. 
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2.3.7.2 Knowing the solution 
 
Practitioners have been advised to match their channels to product type (Friedman 
& Furey, 1999). The length of time and the cost to train a salesperson on the 
product/solution being offered to customers has been tested in the key studies of 
sales outsourcing as an indicator of channel type. Anderson (1985) and Krafft et al. 
(2004) found that the more training that was needed on a product, the more likely 
the firm was to have employed salespeople. An explanation is offered by a case 
study from Grønhaug and Haugland (2005) who observed that in the evolution of 
overseas sales channels, direct employment makes sense when the education 
needs of the customer are high, but exporters could switch to agents when the 
product is commoditised.  
 
Notably, in an empirical study of sales outsourcing in UK manufacturing which 
supported the resource-based view, Wilson and Zhang (2002) found that product 
complexity was associated with vertical integration of the salesforce, and Rogers 
(2008) observed in the UK pharmaceutical sector that contract sales organisations 
were predominantly occupied with tactical detailing to general practitioners, while 
employed salespeople built relationships with secondary health care organisations 
where more complex products were required. There is therefore some evidence 
that the need for extensive knowledge of complex solutions would indicate vertical 
integration of the salesforce, and no apparent argument or evidence for the 
opposite.     
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2.3.7.3 Knowing the customer 
 
A “core” skill makes a disproportionate contribution to customer perceived value, 
according to Hamel and Pralahad (1994). Intuitively, knowledge of the customer 
might be considered the most important for a salesperson, who is usually the most 
frequent interface between supplier and customer. A focus on customer value, to 
some theorists, is the most relevant driver of future firm performance (Slater, 1997; 
Reichheld, 2003). Specifically, the complexity of contact networks within customer 
relationships (multiplexity) has been correlated with improved sales growth and 
reduced sales volatility in a large longitudinal study (Tuli, Bharadwaj & Kohli, 2010), 
although the development of such networks is not without cost implications.   
 
It has been argued that sales channel choice should be influenced by the customer 
(Palmatier et al., 2007), hence it is becoming increasingly important for the 
salesperson to add value to the customer (Tanner et al., 2008). Where salespeople 
need to build relationships with customers because of complexity, innovation or 
strategic interdependency, customer knowledge is strongly associated with the 
vertical integration of the sales function (Anderson, 1985), and the more complex 
the customer, the more likely it is that sales will be insourced (Wilson & Zhang, 
2002). The importance of customer knowledge has been measured by the amount 
of time needed for training on customer specific knowledge. (Anderson, 1985; 
Krafft et al., 2004). However, this should not necessarily mean that all customers 
justify the investment in personal contact, or that they would want it (Wuyts et al., 
2004; Rogers, 2007). Purchasing managers in the UK are notably spending less time 
with salespeople and more time online (Alford, 2010). Guenzi and Troilo (2007) 
found that “a direct sales force per se does not contribute to the company’s 
capacity to create superior customer value” (p. 105). 
 
The difficulty in generalising about the value of customer knowledge and 
relationship building is the diversity of customers. Some require closer relationships 
123 
 
than others (Fiocca, 1982; Donaldson & O’Toole, 2000), or needs may vary 
according to the maturity of a business relationship (Jap, 2001). Consequently, it is 
not surprising to see particular categories of customer handled by contract sales 
organisations and others by employed salespeople (Rogers, 2008).    
 
2.3.8 A granular approach to skills-based resourcing 
 
Although empirical research gives mixed messages about the success of outsourcing 
in contributing to resource-generated “rents”, identifying resource gaps is a critical 
part of strategy formulation and any lack of resource can be made up by purchases 
or strategic alliances (Grant, 1991). But whenever something cannot be achieved 
through markets, because suitable suppliers do not exist, suppliers are not 
competitive or there is an imbalance in information available, then the firm exists to 
deal with such market failures and develop unique capabilities (Roberts, 2004).  
 
Whether to insource or outsource sales can be approached with the same analysis 
as “make-or-buy” in any other function. Empirical studies from the resource-based 
view have provided consistent arguments for insourcing sales when firm-specific 
capability is critical to value creation (Wilson & Zhang, 2002; Menguc & Barker, 
2005; Peng et al., 2006). Three aspects of firm-specific capability have been noted 
from various strands of the sales outsourcing literature: knowledge of the employer 
leading to an ability to get things done in the supplying organisation, 
product/solution specific knowledge and customer-specific knowledge and 
relationship building skills that enhance the supplier’s reputation. The role of these 
factors in predicting insourcing of the sales function has been particularly noted in 
Anderson (1985) and Krafft et al. (2004). It is perhaps because such skills might 
provide a better buying experience for the customer that they have been examined. 
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Nevertheless, there are instances where the skills of contract sales organisations 
can be more attractive. Non-specific, commoditised products might be best-
handled by a firm focused purely on selling skills. Where contract sales organisation 
have higher levels of selling skills than a firm, all or part of the sales function is more 
likely to be outsourced (Anderson & Trinkle, 2005). Also, in some market segments 
and geographical areas, contract sales organisations might have better knowledge, 
in which case the sales function is more likely to be outsourced (Peng et al., 2006). 
In US texts on sales outsourcing, there are references to the local knowledge of 
manufacturers’ reps in a geographical area - a state or even a county within a state 
(Novick, 2000; Anderson & Trinkle, 2005). When companies work across national 
boundaries, RBV in sales becomes even more important. Peng et al. (2006) found 
that in choice of new geographical market options, companies were more likely to 
use independent sales agents if the market was very distant and culturally different.  
 
There are many types of knowledge and skills that might be needed in specific sales 
roles in business-to-business sectors. The body of competences required in an 
individual in a role would be a significant consideration for a sales manager deciding 
whether to employ someone or to engage a contractor. Exploring the role of skills 
requirements in their “make-or-buy” decisions would be an indicator of the 
predictive value of the resource-based view in the sales function. 
 
2.3.9 Flexibility in the sales function 
 
A need to reduce costs or to gain particular sales skills might prompt resourcing 
decisions, but it is also the case that the sales manager has to consider timescales in 
realising opportunities. Porter (1996) argued that companies do have a flexibility 
imperative. They need to make rapid response to markets to achieve best practice. 
This could be particularly true when the business environment is volatile. 
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Transaction cost economics predicts that activities will be insourced when there is 
business uncertainty. In the case of sales channels, Klein et al. (1990) found that 
environmental volatility predicted a subsidiary rather than agent in export markets, 
although Schuster and Keith’s (1993) case study findings were contradictory and 
Klein’s study found the opposite for conditions of environment diversity. More 
recently Stapleton and Hanna (2002) found that the more unpredictable the 
business environment, the higher the likelihood of internal sales.   
 
In the case of sales outsourcing, sales agents may absorb considerable risk for their 
clients (Allegrezza, 2000). In the US manufacturers’ representative model, the rep 
assumes all selling costs and is only paid commission on revenue generated. The 
client incurs no up-front or fixed selling costs (Anderson & Trinkle, 2005). Therefore, 
using manufacturers’ representatives in business uncertainty has considerable 
advantages. However, when customer demand is uncertain, choice of channels has 
been suggested as a way of maximising opportunity (Sharma & Mehotra, 2007), and 
this is a better fit with the principles of “real options”. Notably Brouthers et al. 
(2008) explain that real options would recommend an external solution whenever 
the outcome of an opportunity is particular uncertain.  
 
In the UK, the increasing variety of outsourced options alongside in-house options 
include syndicated selling, dedicated “hot spot” teams, short-term contracts for 
individual “temps”, as well as outsourcing particular product lines or customer 
segments (Rogers, 2009); i.e. a mixed model. Companies are interested in the ability 
to turn sales resource on and off quickly. That flexibility, which is linked logically to 
the interest in avoiding hiring and firing costs and risks, is a driving force, especially 
for industries and companies undergoing rapid change (Downey, 1995). The “lock-
in” risk described by many observers of other types of outsourcing, such as IT (Bahli 
& Rivard (2003) is not necessarily relevant to sales outsourcing, since so many 
contracts are short-term (Rogers, 2009).   
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Reputational and governance risks are especially acute when companies enter 
markets with different cultures and laws (Kendrick, 2004; Whitmore, 2006), but 
there is strong evidence that where export markets are difficult for the principal to 
understand, sales agents or other types of third party alliances are used to reduce 
risk (Anderson & Coughlan, 1987; Klein et al., 1990; Brouthers et al., 2008; Li et al., 
2010). Implicitly, where agents are used principals can exit markets relatively 
quickly.   
 
In the pharmaceutical sector in the UK, companies have to be able to launch and 
withdraw products very quickly in response to listing or delisting by health trusts 
(Rogers, 2009), hence flexibility is described as the primary consideration in sales 
resourcing. Outsourcing selling leads to better understanding for the nature of 
demand and the relative strengths of competitors, which makes it desirable in 
volatile markets (Harrigan, 1985). However, achieving such benefits requires good 
management. Firms should be proficient in multiple sourcing methods, and manage 
uncertainty and share risk by outsourcing (King, 2006). Uncertainties can be 
reduced, risks minimised and flexibility improved through a combination of contract 
terms and risk management strategies (Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007) and 
information sharing (Chan, Wang, Luong & Chan, 2009). 
 
Real options is not necessarily the foundation for the flexibility concept which 
appears in the outsourcing and sales outsourcing literature as a desirable aspect of 
organisational design and a necessary element of management processes (de 
Leeuw & Volberda, 1996), but they are related. Options are needed if flexibility is 
regarded as a strategic imperative. “Firms increase their chances of success by 
having a range of options that enhance flexibility” (Fredericks, 2005, p. 563). 
Flexibility itself is defined as the ability to adapt, in the short-term, medium-term 
and long-term, in response to known and unknown events, proactively or reactively 
and internally or externally (Golden & Powell, 2000), and is a term used alongside 
“responsiveness” and “agility” (de Leeuw & Volberda, 1996, p. 121). Outsourcing or 
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out-tasking some activities on some occasions are options that managers capable of 
achieving flexibility might use in pursuit of better control of limited resources in 
uncertain conditions. However, managers may just perceive that they have learnt 
how to outsource because of an organisational need for “flexibility” (Rogers, 2009). 
 
Flexibility has been advocated so that firms can achieve success in dynamic markets 
(Fredericks, 2005). From model-building, partial outsourcing is a choice that should, 
in the case of market uncertainty, lead to better production performance (Alvarez & 
Stenbacka, 2007) and this has some empirical support in the case of volume 
flexibility in manufacturing (Jack & Raturi, 2002). As Scott et al. (1988) opined, the 
advantage of flexible resources is that although in the short-term there might be 
higher productions costs, they reduce the costs of excess capacity or excess 
demand. Mix and volume flexibility are also indicators of supply chain agility 
(Braunscheidel & Suresh, 2009), but the authors found that both internal and 
external integration contributed to that, along with a market orientation and 
learning orientation. 
 
Both customer-related and competitor-related responsiveness are needed in 
dynamic markets (Homburg et al., 2007), which in turn create the circumstances for 
flexible resources to be prepared (e.g. as Rogers (2009) explains for UK 
pharmaceuticals). Flexibility has also been examined, not just as a reaction to an 
uncertain business environment, but as a source of competitive advantage 
(Sawhney, 2006), which is the intention of the real options approach (Tiwana et al., 
2007). Depending on the discernment that different aspects of flexibility are 
relevant to different strategies, it has been demonstrated that flexibility can 
improve a firm’s performance (Fantazy et al., 2009).   
 
Just as it is important to discern between which aspects of flexibility are going to 
deliver the desired strategic output, it is also necessary to note that flexibility must 
be built in to the outsourcing model and/or contract. Flexibility is both an 
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organisational design decision and a management capability (de Leeuw & Volberda, 
1996). Organisations need to ensure that their arrangements with vendors are 
robust and modifiable. Ease of exit may not be significant to outsourcing success, 
but it is an essential aspect of risk management (Sia, Koh & Tan, 2008).   
 
Partial outsourcing, particularly on a short-term basis, is closer to “real options” 
thinking than long-term total service outsourcing. If it is successful and absorbed in-
house, it could also be perceived as building a dynamic capability. From the sales 
managers’ perspective, tactical use of contract sales organisations is perceived to be 
a response to a need for “flexibility” (Rogers, 2009). Ironically, Anderson et al. 
(2003) posited that sales managers were more likely to cope with an unpredictable 
future by exercising the option to employ salespeople, but business uncertainty 
since 2007/8 may have made that approach untenable.  
 
Just as contract manufacturers can do a variety of things for a variety of clients 
(Noonan & Wallace, 2004), contract sales organisations can be used in a variety of 
ways, and entry and exit is relatively straightforward (Rogers, 2008). The principles 
that Zoltners et al. (2006) attribute to a company’s start-up phase, when they need 
third party sales partners to enter markets quickly, but switch to employed 
salespeople when growth seems assured, can be assigned to many sales projects 
within established organisations.  
 
In marketing and sales functions, it is not uncommon to find multiple channels 
(Dutta et al., 1995), channels targeted at different customer segments (Gary, 2005), 
or sales activity contracted out for specific products, campaigns, process steps or 
geographical areas (Rogers, 2009). An example of the granularity of outsourcing 
decisions occurs in Watjakrakul and Drennan’s (2005) study of e-mail campaigns, 
where “make-or-buy” decisions occurred at each of seven steps in the process in 
the case study companies. Given the number of sales outsourcing consultants in 
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trade directories in the UK offering a variety of service levels, “real options” seem to 
be available to sales managers interested in optimising their resource allocation. 
 
Considered both complementary to the resource-based view and transaction cost 
economics by Lieblein and Miller (2003) in an empirical study, real options theory 
has more nuances on predictions of organisational form (Leiblein, 2003), and is 
more difficult to link to the broader literature on outsourcing and sales outsourcing. 
However, in a recent exploratory study, the quest for flexibility was the highest 
priority for sales managers who were outsourcing sales activities (Rogers, 2009), 
marginalising issues of cost and skill.  Although not specifically using real options 
theory to manage risk, the concept of flexibility seems to be the practitioners’ 
terminology for exercising options when responding to change. 
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2.3.10 Summary 
 
The cost of an activity, which is only part of the transaction cost equation, is clearly 
a discussion that a sales manager would expect to have when deciding whether to 
“make-or-buy”.  Recognition of the cost of control, which transaction cost 
economics regards as truly predictive, has been observed. Acquiring and retaining 
appropriate skills levels encompasses both transaction cost and resource-based 
view approaches to predicting “make-or-buy” preferences, and the desire for 
flexibility can be related to the predictions of real options theory. Elements of all 
three theories appear in discussions about sales outsourcing, and elements of all 
three should be considered in the design of exploratory research on this topic.   
 
However, given that outsourcing of sales activities has not been embraced as widely 
as outsourcing in other functions (Anderson et al., 2003), it is likely that there are 
moderating factors between a sales manager’s inclination to “make-or-buy” and 
outsourcing behaviour.  These are discussed in the next section.   
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2.4 Moderating factors 
 
In section 2.2, this review examined three theoretical perspectives which are 
focused on explaining why firms design the boundaries of their organisation in 
particular ways and in section 2.3 considered how these perspectives may play 
some part in a sales manager’s decision whether or not to use contract sales 
organisations within his/her resource plan.  Nevertheless, between the rationale for 
outsourcing and outsourcing behaviour, there may be a number of moderating 
factors (Espíno-Rodriguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2004). 
 
Based largely on the observations of Anderson (1985; 1988; et al., 2003), whose 
work on the outsourcing of sales is the most extensive in the literature, with 
evidence also drawn from the general literature on outsourcing, this section 
identifies some practical considerations that are likely to deter the use of contract 
sales organisations, even if there are good strategic reasons to do so. These reasons 
are: a constrained supply market, the lack of expertise in managing outsourcing, a 
desire not to stray too far from accepted norms in the industry, and concerns about 
the costs of switching in and out of contract arrangements and perceptions of 
performance/efficiency. These factors are chosen because Anderson recommended 
that they should be explored, and to date they have not been explored within the 
specifics of sales outsourcing. A summary of key studies is included in table 11 at 
the end of this section. 
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2.4.1 Identifying moderating factors 
 
It is interesting to note that although Erin Anderson did empirically test for the 
effect of industry norms on sales outsourcing in 1988, the moderating factors 
mentioned in her 1985 article were not pursued.  
 
Respondents in Anderson’s 1985 study reported that there should have been a 
question about the availability of good manufacturers’ representatives. She also 
raised the question of perceptions about the relative efficiency and performance of 
sales functions, whilst acknowledging that information might not be available or be 
closely guarded. Finally, she questioned what specific capabilities might be required 
to manage third party sales organisations effectively.  
 
In 2003, Anderson et al. published a paper discussing why sales outsourcing was not 
a common phenomenon in North America. The four forces that they posited as 
inhibitors included the nature of the sales function with its ambiguous standards of 
performance, the influence of the sales director, the lack of legitimacy of sales 
outsourcing and the nature of the supply market. It would be difficult to explore 
sales director’s perceptions of their own powerbase, but their perceptions of other 
inhibitors could be explored in a qualitative study. The 2003 paper returned to the 
issue of sales managers’ perceptions of a poor supply market inhibiting sales 
outsourcing, arguing that some of these perceptions are vested in reality. It 
revisited the question of the “norms” in sales resourcing (Anderson, 1988) and 
perceptions of the limited legitimacy of sales outsourcing raised by Weiss et al. 
(1999). It also observed that competency in managing outsourcing would be an 
important factor in sales managers’ perceiving that they could succeed with 
outsourcing in an environment where information about relative performance 
might be surprisingly difficult to access. Within the interviews, these perceptual 
factors may be explored across different sales managers with experiences of 
different industry sectors and types of company. 
133 
 
2.4.2 Constraints in the supply market 
 
Classical economics suggests that some specialist tasks do not generate enough 
demand to trigger the emergence of specialist firms to offer them, so other firms 
keep those tasks in-house until they become big enough to spin them off (Stigler, 
1951). To some degree, this explains some of the outsourcing activity of the past 
thirty years. In her early work on the “make-or-buy” decision in sales, Anderson 
(1985) suggested that some decisions were influenced by the “availability of “good” 
reps in a district at the time” (Anderson, 1985, p. 252). Sales managers have 
demonstrated persistent concern that the good reps are scarce or locked in to 
competitors (Anderson et al., 2003). Although that may be less of a problem with 
short-term contracts for particular activities versus outsourcing all the selling in a 
geographical area to a manufacturer’s representative, perceptions about quantity 
and quality in the supply market are relevant to the discussion of buying anything. 
 
Sourcing strategy has for a long time held risks in the supply market to be a 
constraining factor when choosing suppliers (Kraljic, 1983). Lonsdale (1999) argued 
strongly that some of the outsourcing failures of the 1990s could be attributed to 
firms becoming dependent on their outsourcing suppliers. “Managers must be 
careful about outsourcing into a limited supply market” (Lonsdale, 1999, p. 179). If 
there is a small quantity of suppliers in a market, or the suppliers in a market cannot 
deliver to the required quality, any prima facie case for outsourcing should be 
overruled because the potential for dependence will cause problems in the longer 
term (Lonsdale, 1999).  
 
The implications of supply market conditions are relevant to outsourcing decisions 
(McIvor, 2010), but there is relatively little discussion of the nature of supply market 
risk in the outsourcing literature. It has been observed that the “development of 
sourcing strategies is influenced by the availability of the service providers in the 
market” (Ventovuori, 2006, p. 263), and that managers would outsource more 
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services “provided that there are suppliers able to offer good services” (Espíno-
Rodriguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2004, p. 301). The best evidence for the importance 
of the supply market as a moderating factor comes from a scenario-based empirical 
study. Mantel et al. (2006) found that purchasing decision-makers are acutely 
aware of the strategic vulnerability inherent in supply risk. In particular, the number 
of suppliers in a market affects perceptions of vulnerability and purchasing decision-
makers are less likely to outsource in those circumstances (Mantel et al., 2006). In 
the case of manufacturers’ representatives in the USA, Anderson et al. (2003) noted 
that their narrow geographical focus was a weakness affecting sales managers’ 
perceptions of choice. 
 
2.4.3 Lack of expertise in managing outsourcing 
 
Although outsourcing may be driven by the desire to give up managing an activity, it 
does still have to be managed (Lonsdale, 1999). Anderson (1985) noted that sales 
managers might have concerns about the contractual arrangements and working 
arrangements with third parties. Directing a non-integrated sales function has 
particular challenges which might not suit the dynamics of the firm. It has recently 
been observed (Piercy et al., 2012) that sales manager control competences are an 
important moderating factor in the successful implementation of strategy where 
salespeople are employed, and it seems logical that the same should be true with 
contractors or a mix, although the competences may be different. 
 
Behavioural control and insourcing is perceived to be desirable when solutions are 
complex and sales cycles are long, since these circumstances require considerable 
non-selling activities and customer support (Anderson, 1985). Recently authors 
have argued that sales managers must “move people, not manage them” (Dixon & 
Tanner, 2012, p. 12). Coaching has taken precedence over performance 
management through monitoring outputs. Sales managers are urged to develop 
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strong relationships with salespeople, as high quality relationships in the leader-
member exchange (LMX) in the sales function have a direct effect on the 
salesperson’s performance - better relationships lead to better performance and to 
lower turnover (which reduces costs) (DeConinck, 2011).   
 
Better relationships, characterised by sales managers demonstrating consistent and 
supportive behaviour, also ensure better job satisfaction and organisational 
commitment (Flaherty & Pappas, 2000). Leadership qualities in sales managers, 
such as inspirational vision, setting challenges and instilling confidence, being a 
good role model and encouraging group goals are perceived to influence 
salesperson performance and organisational citizenship behaviour positively 
(MacKenzie, Podsakoff & Rich, 2001). Moreover, transformational leadership by 
sales managers has a positive effect on firm performance (Panagopoulos & 
Avlonitis, 2010). 
 
Where performance is associated with internal leadership, a sales director might be 
concerned about the firm’s capability to gain effectiveness and efficiency from 
outsourcing.  The capability to outsource has been proven to be a success factor in 
achieving superior results from outsourcing (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002a; 
Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Thorpe & Morgan, 2007). Even trivial outsourcing can go 
wrong if it is badly managed, so lack of this capability might well override a good 
case for outsourcing (Alexander & Young, 1996).  
 
Managing outsourcing arrangements is somewhat different from standard supplier 
management (Fan, 2000; Bartholémy & Quélin, 2006) and requires more effort than 
has been expected (Marshall & Heffes, 2005). Managing third party sales channels 
makes even more specific demands (Magrath & Hardy, 1987; Friedman & Furey, 
1999; Novick, 2000; McQuiston, 2001). There is a noted correlation between 
experience and success (Díez-Vial, 2007) and lack of experience and problems 
(Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007). The lessons of experience seem to be concentrated 
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in two strands of the literature – the importance of contract design and the 
importance of relationship management.  
 
Contract management is a competence that provides a foundation for all 
arrangements with outsourced service providers. If interfirm management 
structures and procedures are well-developed and aligned to deal with potential 
contractual hazards, performance problems will be mitigated (Conklin, 2005; 
Anderson S. W. & Dekker, 2005; Mayer & Salomon, 2006).  Although it requires 
specific procedures and interfaces, if a contract is thorough enough, many things 
can be successfully outsourced (Bartholemy & Quelin, 2006). Formalisation and 
measurement eliminates the ambiguities that cause business contracts to fail 
(Daugherty et al., 2006). In the case of short-term tactical arrangements with 
vendors, contract management competence may be enough for firms to realise 
success. Nevertheless, a considerable number of studies of outsourcing focus on the 
importance of relational skills in addition to process excellence. 
 
Since co-operative behaviours are associated with higher productivity (Faulkner & 
de Rond, 2000), it is reasonable to expect the pursuit of co-operative norms in 
firms’ relationships with their outsourcing vendors. External integration can be 
particularly important in conditions of intense competition and high levels of 
uncertainty (Braunscheidel & Suresh, 2009). A number of empirical studies have 
noted that pro-active relationship management improves the results from 
outsourcing (Brown et al., 2000; Judge & Dooley, 2006; Handley & Benton, 2009). 
Indeed, good relationship management has been observed to account for 25% of 
variance in outsourcing performance, since good relationship management drives 
down transaction costs and risk (Handley & Benton, 2009). Partnership quality 
delivers outsourcing successes such as achievement of cost savings, refocus on the 
core business and access to better capabilities (Sia et al., 2008). Benefits from 
relational approaches are also noted in channel management (Anderson & Weitz, 
1989; Jap & Anderson, 2003) and sales outsourcing in particular (McQuiston, 2001). 
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Even where there is geographical distance, such as export markets, if management 
of agents is good, campaigns to improve sales are more successful (Katsikea & 
Morgan, 2003).  
 
The characteristics of good relational management include appropriate rewards 
(Mayo et al., 1998), trust building (Judge & Dooley, 2006), mutual investments 
including training (Anderson & Weitz, 1992; Mayo et al., 1998; Jap & Anderson, 
2003; Gulati & Bristow, 2005), robust interfirm processes (Greenberg, Greenberg & 
Antonucci, 2008), information exchange (Mayo et al., 1998; Gulati & Bristow, 2005), 
good interpersonal relationships (Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Wynarchzyk & Watson, 
2005) and appropriate monitoring and measurement of results (Spriggs, 1994). 
 
Each of these can be complex. For example, trust consists of confidence that 
contractual terms will be respected, that each party has the confidence to do what 
they have promised to do, and goodwill between individuals and teams including 
the ability to engage in joint dispute resolution (Langfield-Smith & Smith, 2003). If 
supplier management is not well-resourced (Lonsdale, 1999) or the vendor is not 
involved in what their customer is trying to achieve (Ryals & Humphries, 2010), then 
problems can be expected. In particular, the use of coercive power or influence 
leads to channel partner dissatisfaction and exit (Mayo et al., 1998). Cox, Watson, 
Lonsdale & Sanderson, (2004) noted a “considerable gap in practitioner 
competence” (p. 369). Power imbalances and internal politics can mean that 
companies have problems with implementing effective relationship management in 
their supply chains (Cox et al., 2004; Shervani et al., 2007). Relationships are more 
likely to be misaligned and suboptimal, or even dysfunctional (Cox et al., 2004).  
 
Creative and consistent support is appreciated by the people trying to provide the 
outsourced service (Magrath & Hardy, 1987; Merrit & Newell, 2001). It enhances 
role salience for manufacturers’ reps (Gulati & Bristow, 2005), increases 
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commitment (Anderson & Weitz, 1992), ensures continuity (Anderson & Weitz, 
1989) and influences the sales agents’ resource allocation (Anderson et al., 1987).  
 
Ansoff (1987) suggested that all desirable change has to be followed by an 
assessment of the company’s chances of making a success of it. Choice of 
governance form should be influenced by how good managers are at leveraging the 
new capabilities, reducing risks and coordinating effort (Leiblein, 2003). Given the 
“need to continually and effectively manage” (Lonsdale, 1999, p. 181) outsourcing 
arrangements, if the management capability is lacking, a decision-maker could 
reasonably expect to defer outsourcing until some skills development has been 
done (Cox et al., 2004). Perceptions about the different skills required to manage 
employed salespeople versus contractors is a possible moderating factor that 
should be explored. 
 
2.4.4 The influence of industry “norms” 
 
“Firms will be more likely to take a particular strategic action if other firms have 
taken that same action” (Gimeno et al., 2005, p. 298). 
 
The theoretical underpinning for the resource-based view is that a firm’s 
competitive advantage comes from uniqueness. In reality, many firms appear to 
prefer similarity to competitors. It is possible that firms act independently but they 
just happen to have similar capabilities; or perhaps firms are acting similarly 
because they perceive the external signals in the business environment in a similar 
way. In contrast to the RBV view of independent strategic choice, mimetic theory 
notes that firms within industries often act in very similar ways (i.e. they 
demonstrate “clustering behaviour”) and therefore the behaviour of other firms 
influences a firm’s decision-making process (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Deephouse, 
1996; Dijksterhuis et al., 1999; Kock, 2005; Gimeno et al., 2005). Deephouse (1996) 
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found (with some caveats) that “organizations that conform to the strategies used 
by other organizations are recognized by regulators and the general public as being 
more legitimate than those that deviate from normal behavior” (p. 1033). 
 
The mimetic approach suggests that similarities between firms’ strategies are 
caused by interaction between actors (competitors and/or supply chain partners) 
within the industry. The extensive use of reference accounts in business-to-business 
marketing, together with the popularity of benchmarking as a means to raise 
standards of operational effectiveness (Guler, Guillén & MacPherson, 2002), 
suggests that decision-makers are comfortable with following others as a means of 
reducing business risk. For example, if one firm does something to improve its 
competitive position, its competitors will make a matching response to neutralize it 
(Gimeno et al., 2005). In a risk-averse environment, managers will copy other 
successful firms in order to avoid penalties for failure. A bad decision is not so bad if 
others make the same mistake. Follower firms are being defensive; they are trying 
to minimise risk through a defensive competitive response (Dijksterhuis et al., 1999; 
Gimeno et al., 2005).  
 
Mimetic clustering has been noted in organisational design, although it has been 
suggested that the “status quo” has to be delivering significantly bad outcomes 
before change is considered (Shimuzu & Hitt, 2004). Although it is not clear whether 
more or less vertical integration is better, changing organisational form to reduce 
costs is successful, and firms should follow the industry norm to achieve optimal 
performance (Mpoyi & Bullington, 2004).   
 
A standard response to the challenge of change is to look for legitimacy and success 
in the industry and try to imitate it (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Deephouse, 1996; 
Kock, 2005). This seems to apply in the case of outsourcing sales. Modelling 
suggests that in the case of adopting in-house sales or using a third party, if demand 
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is differentiated, firms might sustain different channel models, but if demand 
schedules are similar, firms will tend to imitate each other (Gal-Or, 1999). 
 
Mentioned briefly in her 1985 article, the influence of the behaviour of competitors 
was explored by Anderson in detail in 1988. In a study of the Darwinian economics 
of “make-or-buy” in the sales function, she found that prevailing practice guides 
sales managers’ choices.  She argued that competitive markets force optimal 
sourcing behaviour, especially in uncertain conditions, where efficiency appears to 
be correlated with industry norms.  However, in predictable conditions, conformity 
is not so necessary (Anderson, 1988).  
 
Regardless of the existence of manufacturers’ representatives with good 
reputations, a manufacturer may bring sales in-house if decision-makers believe 
that highly reputable firms only use in-house sales (Weiss et al., 1999). Copying 
based on the desire for approval (legitimacy) takes place even if companies have 
evidence that they should not follow the herd. It can have a negative effect on a 
firm’s profitability (Kock, 2005; Gimeno et al., 2005; Barreto & Baden-Fuller, 2006). 
Financial markets, legislators and the media may encourage firms to copy (Guler et 
al., 2002; Kock, 2005), or powerful players in a supply chain may encourage 
dependent companies to adopt certain behaviours (Guler et al., 2002; Grant, 2007). 
Novick (2000) refers to Wal-Mart trying to persuade their suppliers not to use 
manufacturers’ representatives. 
 
Obviously, firms in an industry will observe each other. Borrowing from rivals’ 
behaviours can be seen as a way of economising on searching for information. In 
case of doubt, mimicking successful role models is a way forward (Dijksterhuis et al., 
1999; Gimeno et al., 2005).  “Spillovers” between the actions of some organisations 
in a peer group increase the value of an action. E.g. adoption of total quality 
management in one firm is enhanced if all the firms in the supply chain adopt it 
(Guler et al., 2002; Gimeno et al., 2005). However, perceived best practice does not 
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always transfer well from one organisation to another. The comparability of 
exemplars may be weak and may not lead to similar results (Bretschneider, Marc-
Aurele & Wu, 2005; Kock, 2005). Nevertheless, firms face a trade-off between 
conforming and performing because of the expectations of influencers such as 
investment analysts and the media (Deephouse, 1996; Kock, 2005; Barreto & 
Baden-Fuller, 2006). 
 
Dijksterhuis et al. (1999) looked specifically at the need for companies to find new 
organisational forms to respond to a chaotic environment, and theorised that 
phenomena such as the trend for downsizing and drive for flexibility in the 1980s 
are evidence of “co-evolution” among firms. Particularly in uncertain situations, 
perceived best practice tends to be copied (Miranda & Kim, 2006). Managers 
construct a reality of shared values and assumptions in pursuit of survival in periods 
of rapid change (Dijksterhuis et al., 1999). For example, decision-makers at Hewlett 
Packard perceived that the company would not have been able to compete in the 
1990s if it had remained in its highly vertically integrated form of the 1980s.  
Outsourcing enabled the company to accelerate its time to market for new products 
(Lonsdale, 1999). 
 
The tendency of copying to reduce risk may be deeply endemic. In psychology and 
sociology, it is usually assumed that individuals have a predisposition to conformity. 
An individual will suffer less anxiety if they do things that are accepted. Senior 
managers of the key players in an industry may see themselves as some kind of peer 
group (Dijksterhuis et al., 1999; Guler et al., 2002; Gimeno et al., 2005). Given the 
“normative” approach to changes in the boundaries of the firm endorsed by 
Anderson (1988), even though they may be originally seated in perceptions of 
rationality, it will be necessary to explore whether sales insourcing or outsourcing 
behaviour is moderated by competitor activity.  
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2.4.5 Perceptions of switching costs 
 
Although there are indications in research about the boundaries of the firm that 
misalignment between integration and the market can lead to lower profitability or 
failure (Macher & Richman, 2008), companies do get “locked-in” to outsourcing or 
agency arrangements (Pederson, Petersen & Benito, 2002; Whitten, Chakrabarty & 
Wakefield, 2010), and vendors can get locked-in to particular clients (Heide & John, 
1988). Transferring between in-house and outsourced activities results in costs to 
change, such as recruitment and training of the new employees/ contractors, and 
termination of old contracts and creation of new ones (Weiss & Anderson, 1992; 
Pederson et al., 2002).   
 
Switching costs increase dependence between vendor and client, but do not 
necessarily increase commitment. Therefore companies are likely to try to extricate 
themselves from unbalanced relationships (Joshi & Stump, 1999). This partly 
contradicts Tjosvold’s (1984) findings that power imbalance could be overcome by 
co-operative governance. However, switching costs are multi-dimensional and their 
impact on management decisions is likely to constrain change (Whitten & 
Wakefield, 2006).  
 
Weiss and Anderson (1992) examined the effect of switching costs in sales 
outsourcing.  They found that companies had a realistic awareness of set-up costs, 
but their perceptions of the take-down costs, which include contract termination 
and the market reaction to it, were not as good. Fear of the reactions of individual 
reps and the rep network was a significant factor in their behaviour. Perceptions of 
switching costs deter sales managers from changing from agent to in-house (Weiss 
& Anderson, 1992; Pederson et al., 2002).  These findings suggested that due to 
misperceptions about switching costs, sub-optimal arrangements were tolerated. 
Logically, if costs sunk in agency arrangements deter conversion to in-house, there 
may also be circumstances where sunk costs in employed staff deter outsourcing.   
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The expectation of switching costs is a potential moderating factor. However, the 
research identified on this topic is based on all-or-nothing scenarios, i.e. total 
outsourcing of information technology services or total outsourcing of an overseas 
territory to a sales agent. It has already been noted that the use of contract sales 
organisations in the UK would be more accurately described as “out-tasking” of 
small-scale activities on a short-term basis.  This may reduce the impact of switching 
costs, although concerns about dependency can be explored in the context of the 
quality of the supply market and concerns about vendor behaviour.  
 
2.4.6 Ambiguous performance 
 
A consideration of moderating factors would not be complete without reference to 
Anderson et al.’s (2003) comments about the ambiguous nature of performance in 
the sales function. The advantage of studying the sales function ought to be that the 
performance measure of most interest is sales growth (e.g. Batt, 1999), and this is 
usually a figure that sales managers know very well. Despite expectations that sales 
revenue is a very visible indicator of performance, the difficulty of linking inputs 
with outputs has been used as an indicator for insourcing, equated with the 
transaction cost concept of “uncertain behaviour”. As such, whether the desire for 
control is an antecedent of insourcing or a factor moderating outsourcing is difficult 
to discern. 
 
Colletti and Chonko (1997) observed that there are several indicators of a high 
performing sales function. It is unlikely that these indicators are measured 
consistently across organisations. It may be possible to prompt sales managers for 
their perceptions of their company’s comparative performance on the Colletti and 
Chonko indicators, but it is subject matter that might not be available or that might 
be considered commercially sensitive (Anderson et al., 2003). If the indicators are 
not measured, guesses might be made, or respondents might repeat “folklore”. 
Managers may not know what is going on (MacDonald & Hellgren, 1999) or 
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managers may even create and manipulate perception errors (Mezias & Starbuck, 
2003). Logically, managers have to perform as well or better than competitors 
(Colletti & Chonko, 1997: Mezias & Starbuck, 2003), but in some firms a trend 
towards improvement is acceptable.   
 
Recent studies have suggested that the dimensions of sales performance, 
particularly in business-to-business sectors, are multi-faceted. Sales performance is 
integral to a company’s strategy, but the combination of outcomes and behaviours 
within internal and external contexts is very complex, and getting more complex. 
Extant studies have explained only minor aspects of it (Zallocco, Bohman Pullins & 
Mallin, 2009; Verbeke et al., 2011; Evans, McFarland, Dietz & Jaramillo, 2012). Both 
sales managers and salespeople find it difficult to articulate “effectiveness”. 
Salespeople in particular think that sales performance is intimately linked with the 
customer’s perceptions.  A breadth and variability in sales performance measures is 
found in practice, but relationship measures, adaptive selling behaviours and team 
selling are not among them, even where sales managers would like them to be 
(Zallocco et al., 2009).   
 
The extant literature on sales outsourcing focuses on the factors that predict the 
outcome of “make-or-buy” decisions, but do not give us any information about the 
outcomes of those decisions. A qualitative study has the potential to explore both 
antecedents and their perceived effect. However, given observations about the 
availability and confidentiality of “effect” information, qualitative responses about 
success in managing insourcing or outsourcing might be as close as a researcher can 
get to whether or not sales outsourcing improves performance. As Anderson et al. 
(2003) note: sales performance is multi-faceted, and because it has no real baseline, 
comparisons are difficult to observe. 
 
Even in the general outsourcing literature, no precise relationship has yet been 
established between outsourcing and measures typically used to judge the 
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performance of companies (Bustinza, Arias-Aranda & Gutierrez-Gutierrez, 2010), 
despite many studies of outsourcing looking for them. Some recent studies find that 
outsourcing does impact favourably on performance (Singh, 2009), others that it 
has a negative effect (Weigelt, 2009) or neutral effect (e.g. Bengtsson, 2008; 
Pentina & Hasty, 2009) or mixed effect (Bardhan et al., 2007).  Notably, a study of 
51 companies’ performance over four quarters after major outsourcing decisions 
presented neutral results (Jiang et al., 2006), and Mpoyi and Bullington (2004) 
found that changing from insourcing to outsourcing or vice versa improved 
performance and it was difficult to discern which was the better move. Kotabe, Mol, 
Murray & Parente (2012), focusing on market share performance, observed a 
negative curvilinear effect, suggesting that there is an optimum level of outsourcing 
beyond which negative effects are produced. 
 
There may be intervening factors. Gilley and Rasheed (2000) cited firm strategy and 
environmental dynamism as moderators. Bustinza et al. (2010) demonstrate a 
relationship between outsourcing and better competitive capabilities, which may be 
an indicator of better performance in the long-term. There may indeed be timing 
factors as well. Novak and Stern (2008) suggest that outsourcing is positively 
associated with initial performance in product development, but over the whole 
product life cycle, vertical integration provides better performance. Salimath, Cullen 
& Umesh (2008) found evidence that firms gain most from outsourcing when it is 
aligned to their growth configuration. 
 
In any event, some researchers have observed that the relationship between 
performance and outsourcing is not linear (Rothaermel et al., 2006; Kotabe & Mol, 
2009). There is an optimal (and sometimes elusive) mix between vertical integration 
and outsourcing that maximizes financial performance. Hybrid organisation also has 
support in the case of “downstream” outsourcing (including sales outsourcing) 
(Rangan et al., 1993). Hybrid models make the examination of real performance 
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metrics an extremely tricky mathematical exercise, and explain the variety of 
findings from empirical studies.  
 
As in the case of export performance, performance at the organisational level and 
at the venture level is multi-faceted. Matthyssens and Pauwels (1996) agree with 
Chakravarthy (1986) that financial performance criteria are limited, as they focus on 
shareholder value, thus excluding the experience of some of the firm’s 
stakeholders, and they can only really be judged historically. Even where 
researchers have been able to examine links between outsourcing and published 
performance metrics, some have observed that the perceptions or judgments about 
service performance may be different. Ramachandran and Gopal (2010) found 
managers’ subjective assessments of the process performance of outsourced IT 
services to diverge considerably from objective outcomes.   
 
Managers’ perceptions of outsourcing are inter-related with their past experiences 
(Fowler & Jeffs, 1998; Feeny & Smith, 2008), which creates the framework for their 
bounded rationality. It has been observed within transaction cost economics that 
difficulty in measuring performance of sales resources leads to a preference for 
insourcing, and it has been observed in a variety of outsourcing studies that 
perceptions of a lack of expertise in managing outsourcing to achieve superior 
performance with it will inhibit outsourcing behaviour. It is beyond the scope of an 
exploratory study to address Anderson’s 1985 question about the real performance 
outcomes of sales outsourcing, but it may be possible to identify if information on 
the link between resourcing decisions and performance is sufficient to provide an 
iterative loop in a perceptual model.   
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2.4.7 Moderating factors and sales outsourcing 
 
There is very little evidence about moderating factors in the sales outsourcing 
literature, but matters observed in the general outsourcing literature have been 
discussed in the light of inhibitors mentioned in Anderson et al.’s discussion paper 
in 2003. The benefit of an exploratory study is that potential moderating factors can 
be discussed with sales resourcing decision-makers, to establish whether evidence 
noted in other functions has any resonance with them. 
 
Table 11: Sources for moderating factors 
  
Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Nature of the supply market 
 
Kraljic 1983 Theory building Purchasing 
investment 
 The horizontal axis of 
this author’s model is 
focused on risk in the 
supply market. 
Anderson E.  1985 Empirical TCE in sales Factors not examined 
– availability of 
suitable CSOs. 
Lonsdale (most 
cited on this?) 
1999 Case study of 
HP 
Risk 
management in 
outsourcing 
Firms should not 
outsource into a 
limited supply market 
– it will result in 
dependency. 
Anderson et al. 2003 Theory-building Vertical 
integration in 
sales 
Perceptions that there 
are not enough good 
MRs. 
Ventovuori 2006 4 case studies FM outsourcing Supply environment 
must be taken into 
account. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Ability to outsource 
 
Anderson E.  1985 Empirical TCE in sales Factors not examined – 
ability to manage sales 
agents/MRs. 
Leiblein & 
Miller 
2003 Empirical; 469 
make/buy 
decisions in 
119 firms 
Comparing TCE 
with RBV and 
real options 
theory 
Moderating factors are a 
firm’s capabilities or 
experience and 
product/market diversity. 
 
Ability to outsource is associated with better performance from outsourcing 
 
Alexander & 
Young 
1996 Opinion Outsourcing 
management 
Even trivial outsourcing 
goes wrong if it is badly 
managed. 
Friedman & 
Furey 
1999 Book Channel 
management 
List prereqs for successful 
channel management. 
Faulkner & de 
Rond 
2000 Book Co-operation 
theory 
Associated with higher 
productivity, especially on 
complex tasks. 
Faulkner & de 
Rond 
2000 Book Co-operation 
theory 
Co-op behaviour more 
successful than cost/skill 
advantage in explaining 
long-term success of 
alliance. 
Fan 2000 Exploratory; 
based on 10 
UK companies 
IT outsourcing It is not standard supplier 
management – outsourcing 
needs to be bespoke. 
McQuiston 2001 Theory 
building 
Good 
relationships 
between 
principals and 
manuf reps 
List of quant and qual 
benefits including shared 
goals, good 
communications, mutual 
profitability, etc. 
Kakabadse & 
Kakabadse 
2002 Book, based 
on research 
(and article) 
Smart sourcing Best practice vendor 
management achieves 
better results from 
outsourcing. 
Marshall & 
Heffes 
2005 Commercial 
research 
Failure of 
outsourcing 
62% of respondents said 
there is more management 
effort than expected. 
Daugherty et 
al. 
2006 Exploratory Outsourcing 
success 
Collaboration pays off. 
Thorpe & 
Morgan 
2007 Empirical; 115 
marketing 
managers, EU 
Strategy 
implementation 
Degree of top-down 
imposition needed for 
success, alongside some 
fostering of co-operation. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Contract design is a competence 
 
Zhu et al. 2001 Comment Outsourcing 
process 
Excellence required in 
planning, developing, 
implementing and 
evaluation. 
Conklin 2005 Exploratory; 
case study 
Partnerships Strong interfirm 
governance important 
for risk mitigation. 
Anderson S. W. & 
Dekker 
2005 Empirical; 858 
transactions for 
IT 
Contractual 
hazards 
Management structures 
aligned with potential 
hazards mitigate 
performance problems. 
Mayer & 
Salomon 
2006 Empirical; 405 
service 
contracts 
Contractual 
hazards 
Ability to manage 
hazards can be a firm-
specific capability. 
Barthélemy & 
Quélin 
2006 Empirical; 82 
outsourcing 
contracts 
Outsourcing 
management 
Requires specific 
procedures and 
interfaces – anything can 
be outsourced if the 
contract is “dense” 
enough. 
Daugherty et al. 2006 Exploratory Outsourcing 
success 
Formalisation eliminates 
ambiguities; recommend 
list of metrics. 
Shervani et al. 2007 Empirical; 40 
firms 
TCE moderating 
factor – market 
power 
Larger firms may be able 
to exert more power for 
non-integrated 
contractors to conform; 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Relational skills are also a competence 
 
Magrath & 
Hardy 
1987 Opinion Channel 
management 
Creative and consistent 
support needed. 
Anderson & 
Weitz 
1989 Empirical  Outsourcing 
management 
Stable dyads characterised 
by cordial interpersonal 
relationships. 
Brown et al. 2000 Empirical; 395 
hotel 
managers 
Governance 
mechanisms 
Managers should focus 
effort on effective relational 
exchange.  
Wynarchzyk 
& Watson 
2005 Empirical; 211 
UK firms 1993-
1999 
SMEs and 
partnerships 
Marked preference for 
informal approach to doing 
business – trust in the 
network. 
Judge & 
Dooley 
2006 Empirical; 158 
healthcare 
orgs 
Strategic 
alliances and 
TCE 
Expertise in trust-building as 
important as contractual 
safeguards. 
Muehlberger 2007 Case study Outsourcing and 
dependency 
Hierarchical outsourcing is 
not very different from 
employment. 
Handley & 
Benton 
2009 Empirical; 198 
sourcing execs 
Outsourcing as 
a business 
process 
Performance is significantly 
influenced by proactive 
relationship management. 
Ryals & 
Humphries 
2010 Exploratory; 2 
in-depth case 
studies 
Manuf make-or-
buy 
Failure caused by not 
involving the vendor in 
strategy and poor rel 
management skills. 
 
Mutual investment is also important (part of relationship building) 
 
Ansoff 1987 Opinion Change 
management 
Opportunity identification 
must be followed by 
assessment of the 
company’s chance of making 
it successful. 
Lonsdale 1999 Exploratory; 
case study 
Outsourcing 
management 
Well-resourced supplier 
management; reduce 
switching costs by dual 
sourcing. 
Jap & 
Anderson 
2003 Empirical; 300 
buyers and 
suppliers 
Partnerships Goal congruence not the 
best indicator of 
performance, but mutual 
investment. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Experience also matters 
 
Frazier & 
Summers 
1984 Empirical; 184 
auto 
dealerships 
Interfirm 
influence 
Influence involves 
anticipating what is 
needed and when. 
Barthélemy & 
Quélin 
2006 Empirical; 82 
o/s contracts 
Outsourcing 
management 
Requires specific 
procedures and 
interfaces – anything 
can be outsourced if 
the contract is “dense” 
enough. 
Ngwenyama & 
Sullivan 
2007 Exploratory; 2 
case studies 
Outsourcing 
management 
Lack of experience 
causes problems. 
Díez-Vial 2007 Empirical; 155 
firms in Spanish 
meat industry 
Managing 
vendors 
Many years experience 
leads to successful 
management. 
 
Relational exchange capabilities of principals matter to sales agents 
 
Anderson et al. 1987 Empirical; 71 
MRs 
How do agents 
decide where to 
spend their time? 
Aspects of relationship 
also relevant to 
resource allocation. 
Anderson & 
Weitz 
1989 Empirical; 690 
dyads 
Continuity 
between manuf 
and mrs 
Importance of 
interpersonal 
relationships. 
Anderson & 
Weitz 
1992 Empirical; 378 
dyads 
Pledges between 
manuf and mrs 
Idiosyncratic 
investments increase 
commitment. 
Merritt & 
Newell 
2001 Empirical; 144 
MRs 
How do agents rate 
principals? 
Product, sales and 
relationship quality all 
important. 
Gulati & Bristow 2005 Empirical; 317 
MRs 
Investments that 
might enhance MR 
perceptions of 
importance of rel 
Information exchange 
and relationship 
specific investments by 
manu and rep enhance 
role salience. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
 “Industry norms” 
 
DiMaggio 
& Powell 
1983 Theory-
building 
Why are there 
homogenous org 
forms and 
practices? 
Coercive/mimetic/normative. 
Uncertainty encourages 
imitation. An industry 
model/benchmark is copied. 
Anderson 
E. 
1988 Empirical; 11 
firms with 92 
sales districts 
“Make-or-buy” in 
sales – is 
“prevailing 
practice” best 
decision? 
Most efficient to conform in 
uncertain environments, it 
may pay to be different in 
more stable environments. 
Deephouse 1996 Empirical; 
banking sector 
in one state, 
1985-1992 
Isomorphism Orgs that conform to what 
regulators and media expect 
are regarded as more 
legitimate.  
Weiss et al. 1999 Empirical; 258 
managers 
Reputation 
management and 
sales structure 
Perceptions of relative 
reputations of self, rep and 
“norms” affect choice. 
Guler et al. 2002 Empirical; 
1992-1998; 
ISO data 
sources 
Spread of ISO 
9000 
States and global companies 
are a coercive force for 
imitation. 
Shimizu & 
Hitt 
2004 Theory-
building based 
on examples 
Org barriers to 
strategic flexibility 
Status quo preferred until 
outcomes are really bad. 
Kock  2005 Computer 
simulations 
Influence of stock 
market on firm 
behaviour 
Learning from stock market 
encourages quasi-collusive 
behaviour that may be sub-
optimal; learning from 
product/market better. 
Gimeno et 
al. 
2005 Empirical; US 
telecoms 
1985-95; 43 
firms 
Clustering of 
internationalisatio
n moves 
Domestic rivalry leads to 
mimicry in 
internationalisation; to 
achieve competitive balance 
(imitation may have poor 
performance outcomes). 
Barreto & 
Baden-
Fuller 
2006 Empirical; 26 
Portuguese 
banks 1988-
1996 
Conform or 
perform 
Legitimacy-based imitation 
produced negative effect on 
profitability. 
Miranda & 
Kim 
2006 Empirical; 214 
USA local 
authorities 
IT outsourcing Uncertainty leads to copying 
best practice - outsourcing 
Grant  2007 33 supply 
chain 
partnerships 
Opportunism in 
co-operative exch 
cases 
In some market cultures, there 
is more opportunism than 
others. 
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Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Switching costs 
 
Heide & John 1988 Empirical; 199 
MRs 
Dependence in 
channels 
Not in MRs interest to 
be overly dependent on 
a principal. 
Weiss & 
Anderson 
1992 Empirical; 243 
manufacturers 
Sales 
outsourcing 
Manufacturers 
dissatisfied with reps 
will stay with them if 
they perceive high 
switching costs 
Pederson et al. 2002 Empirical; 214 
Danish 
exporters 
Export sales set-
up 
All switching costs 
inhibit conversion from 
agent to subsidiary, but 
especially 
recruitment/training 
costs. 
Whitten & 
Wakefield 
2006 Empirical; 160 
appl dev execs 
IT outsourcing Multi-dimensional 
construct – definite 
impact on management 
decisions – likely to 
constrain change. 
Macher & 
Richman 
2008 Meta-analysis TCE empirical 
research in 
social science 
Little consideration of 
the problems of 
misalignment of 
transaction and 
governance forms – but 
indications that it leads 
to lower profitability 
and/or failure. 
Whitten et al. 2010 Empirical; 163 
IT managers 
IT outsourcing Customers do indeed 
get “locked in”. SC high 
– stick with vendor, SC 
low – backsource, SC 
med – switch vendors. 
  
154 
 
Authors Date Type of 
research 
Context Relevant findings 
 
Ambiguous performance 
 
Gilley & 
Rasheed 
2000 Empirical; 94 
firms 
Effect of 
outsourcing on 
performance 
No relationship. 
Rothaermel et al. 2006 Empirical; 
longitudinal: 
3,500 IT product 
introductions  
Balance of 
vertical 
integration and 
outsourcing 
Importance of balance 
between insourcing 
and outsourcing 
throughout the value 
chain; value of taper 
integration. 
Jiang et al. 2006 Empirical; 
secondary data 
on 51 US firms 
Outsourcing and 
operational 
performance 
Outsourcing firms have 
a significant cost 
efficiency advantage. 
Bengtsson & 
Dabhilkar 
2009 Empirical; 267 
companies in 
Sweden 
Outsourcing and 
manufacturing 
performance 
No relationship. 
Weigelt 2009 Empirical; 132 
banks 
Outsourcing 
new technology 
and 
performance 
Outsourcing has a 
negative effect on 
performance. 
Pentina & Hasty 2009 Empirical; 
secondary data 
on 50 firms 
E-commerce 
outsourcing and 
performance 
No relationship. 
Singh 2009 Empirical; 426 
companies in 
India 
Market 
orientation, 
outsourcing and 
performance  
Positive relationship 
between outsourcing 
and 
performance/capabiliti
es/ managing risk. 
Bustinza et al. 2010 Empirical; 213 
services firms in 
Spain 
Outsourcing, 
capabilities and 
performance 
development of 
capabilities 
Outsourcing improves 
competitive 
capabilities. 
Kotabe et al. 2012 Empirical; 
19,000 items of 
data on 
manufacturing 
firms 
Relationship 
between 
outsourcing and 
market share 
Negative curvilinear 
effect between 
outsourcing and 
market share 
performance. 
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2.5 Summary of the literature review, problem statements and questions 
 
2.5.1 Introduction 
 
The literature discussed has provided a broad and deep portfolio of prior knowledge 
pertinent to the research aim of examining the perceptions of UK sales managers of 
factors influencing their resourcing preferences and behaviour. 
 
It has been observed from the literature that the sales function is an important part 
of companies in business-to-business sectors; it is a department which is given 
responsibility for achieving organic growth but where understanding of 
performance may be difficult.  Concerns about escalating costs, lack of skills and a 
need for new models have been observed from practitioner and researcher 
comment, and yet the use of outsourcing to reduce costs, gain access to skills or 
improve flexibility lags significantly behind the use of outsourcing in virtually all 
other parts of the organisation. Anderson et al. (2003) opined reasons why 
outsourcing has not been leveraged to improve the performance of the sales 
function; discussion of why it has been used and how are limited in scope (e.g. 
Rogers, 2009).  
 
This section summarises the themes from the literature within the framework of 
the research aims and objectives, and presents the research questions which will be 
pursued in the primary research.  
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2.5.2 Research Objective 1:  To explore sales managers’ perceptions of the 
antecedents of outsourcing. 
 
“Antecedent” in the outsourcing literature (e.g. Mol et al., 2005) commonly 
indicates a reason for outsourcing – an event or pre-existing condition. As discussed 
in the literature review, there are theoretical frameworks for predicting the 
outcome of “make-or-buy” decisions. However, in exploring the perceptions of 
decision-makers, the events or conditions that prompt “make-or-buy” decisions are 
of most help, although they are likely to illuminate the value of theoretical 
assumptions.  
 
2.5.2.1 Proposition 1:  Comparative cost of resource options will be an antecedent 
in “make-or-buy” decisions in the sales function. 
 
There is empirical support for the dominance of cost/price considerations in 
motivating outsourcing of activities (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002b; Kremic et al., 
2006). Cost management does matter to firm performance and can make a 
considerable contribution to the value of a company (Groth & Kinney, 1994). 
Outsourcing appears to be positively related to the performance of firms aiming to 
achieve or maintain cost leadership (Gilley & Rasheed, 2000) and notably, cost 
leaders consider that production cost comparison is more important than 
transaction cost in determining outsourcing intensity (Martinez-Sánchez et al., 
2007).  A focus on executional cost is not necessarily best practice (Anderson S W & 
Dekker, 2009b), but the strength of empirical evidence suggests that it should not 
be overlooked as an antecedent for outsourcing. 
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Companies that provide outsourced sales usually promote their cost advantage. For 
example, a pro forma spreadsheet is supplied by the Manufacturers' 
Representatives Educational Research Foundation so that sales managers can 
calculate cost comparisons. Commentators on sales outsourcing seem to expect 
considerable cost advantages (Ross et al., 2005; Anderson & Trinkle, 2005). The 
escalating cost of selling has been highlighted as a reason for firms to consider 
outsourcing (Anderson et al., 2003), and it may be anticipated from the exploratory 
work associated with this study that sales managers certainly expect contracting out 
to simply cost less than employment of salespeople (Rogers, 2009), even if they 
have another primary motivation. Cost/price comparisons are likely to be made 
when outsourcing sales activities, and are highly likely to be part of the ongoing 
measurement of success (Spriggs, 1994).  
 
Given the evidence that cost must at least be part of the “make-or-buy” decision, it 
is important to explore the following research questions: 
 
1. Do sales managers perceive that it is cheaper to employ salespeople rather 
than use agents/contractors or vice versa?  
2. How do sales managers compare costs between recruiting or deploying 
salespeople to do a task or engaging with a third party supplier? 
3. Are the costs of selling a cause for concern? 
4. Do sales managers feel that there is enough information available to them 
on which to base cost comparisons between employment and contract 
options? 
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2.5.2.2 Proposition 2: The ease with which resource options can be controlled will 
be an antecedent in “make-or-buy” decisions in the sales function. 
 
Cost comparisons are made at a given time, and contracts are designed accordingly. 
However, the parties to a contract cannot anticipate all possible circumstances that 
may arise post-contract. Williamson (1975) suggests that suppliers will seek to shirk 
from their contracted obligations. Consequently, the administration of contracts 
introduces a monitoring overhead for the client (Barthélemy & Quélin, 2006). A core 
principle of transaction cost economics and agency theory is that an employed 
person is more easily controlled than a contracted agent (Coase, 1937; Hart & 
Moore, 1990). Coase (1988) argued that the value created by the firm, and the 
reason firms exist, is the reduction in transaction costs of employing people versus 
contracting with suppliers. 
 
In the case of outsourcing, both in theory-building (Ouchi, 1980; Wathne & Heide, 
2000; Bahli & Rivard, 2003) and meta-analyses of empirical studies (Rindfleisch & 
Heide, 1997; David & Han, 2004; Geyskens et al., 2006), transaction cost economics 
has convincing support. The argument for employment where the performance of a 
contract is difficult to measure is also widely supported by studies of relationships 
with contractors that suggest that they must be highly structured, which is 
expensive (Daugherty et al., 2006), or that relationship stress is probable over time 
(Holmlund-Rytkönen & Strandvik, 2005; Halldórsson & Skjøtt-Larsen, 2006; Jap & 
Anderson, 2007).   
 
If sales managers share the perceptions of transaction cost economists that 
contractors are more likely to demonstrate opportunism than employees, thus 
creating contractual hazards they would rather not have to manage, then the 
indicators that have been used in previous studies to test for costs embedded in the 
nature of contract should be helpful. Indeed, studies of sales outsourcing have 
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found support for behavioural uncertainty, i.e. difficulty in measuring the link 
between activity and performance, as a predictor of both a preference for 
employing salespeople and a preference for salary-based rewards rather than 
commission (Anderson E., 1985; Tremblay et al., 2003; Krafft et al., 2004).   
 
Although some support for behavioural uncertainty as a driver for insourcing is 
recent, there is also widespread theoretical challenge from co-operation and 
relational theorists and behavioural economists (Tjosvold, 1984; Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Lunn, 2009). Evidence of trust between principals and agents to contracts, 
and of a link between trust and performance can be found (Mohr & Spekman, 1996; 
Zaheer et al., 1998; Brock Smith & Barclay, 1997; Wynarczyk & Watson, 2005; 
Conklin, 2005; Judge & Dooley, 2006). Indeed, Brown et al. (2000) concluded from 
their findings that managers should focus their effort on relational exchange 
because only this governance mechanism limits opportunism. The capability of 
companies to develop co-operative relationships will be explored later on as a 
moderating factor. Initially, it is necessary to check for the sales managers’ 
perceptions about the ease with which contractors can be controlled. 
 
Coase (1937) contrasts the challenges of managing relationships with suppliers with 
the ease of managing employees, drawing analogies with the master-servant 
relationship. This attitude seems dated when compared to more recent opinions 
about the incongruence of goals between employers and employees (Ouchi, 1979; 
Coff, 1999; Sliwka, 2007). In some cases of IT outsourcing, the decision has been 
driven by concern about internal opportunism (Fan, 2000; Miranda & Kim, 2006). It 
is productive for customer-facing staff to identify with their employer (Wieseke et 
al., 2009), but this cannot be taken for granted. Loss of control occurs in the sales 
function (Phillips, 1982). Indeed, salespeople may be particularly difficult to manage 
(Jelinek & Ahearne, 2006). Poor co-alignment of internal control approaches can 
result in reduced sales performance (Onyemah & Anderson, 2009). The difference 
between employed people acting like agents and contracted out salespeople is 
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blurred (James, 2000). There may be a balance between the expectation of external 
opportunism and internal opportunism, as found by Miranda and Kim (2006). It is 
part of the contribution to knowledge of this study to check for sales managers’ 
perceptions concerning this condition. 
 
Given the wide range of theoretical and empirical studies in the literature about the 
importance of adopting an organisational design that minimises the cost and effort 
of control, with a number of meta-analyses finding broad support for TCE 
assumptions, the following research questions will be explored: 
 
1. Do sales managers perceive that employed salespeople are easier to 
manage than third party contractors or vice versa? 
2. How do sales managers compare management effort between recruiting 
or deploying salespeople to do a task or engaging with a third party 
supplier? 
3. How important do sales managers think it is it to monitor the behaviour of 
salespeople or contractors? 
4. Comparing the legal framework in the UK for employment contracts versus 
normal commercial contracts, which do sales managers perceive to be the 
easiest to change? 
 
2.5.2.3 Proposition 3:  The comparative skill level of resource options will be an 
antecedent in “make-or-buy” decisions in the sales function. 
 
This is the most wide-ranging of the antecedents to be explored, with the literature 
spanning the asset specificity construct within transaction cost economics and the 
core competences construct encountered in the resource-based view. The more 
unique the resources a company utilises in a specific activity, the less likely it is to 
be outsourced (Espíno-Rodriguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2006). 
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Carter and Hodgson (2006) recommended that human asset specificity should be a 
separate construct, aligned with competency. Skills/knowledge has been described 
as the only thing that is specific about salespeople (Anderson, 1985). Skills are also 
recognised as rent generators in the resource-based view (Newbert, 2008), and 
some sales skills have particular value (Menguc & Barker, 2005). Some studies have 
focused on the importance of which skills must be kept within the firm to defend its 
differentiation (Watjatrakul & Drennan, 2005; Safizadeh et al., 2008), since even 
workers with very specific skills can be mobile (Battu et al., 2002). Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990) refer to the importance of “competence carriers”. 
 
Whether or not selling skills in their own right have particular value is a matter for 
debate (Stapleton & Hanna, 2002; Menguc & Barker, 2005), but many firms might 
wish to access what they perceive to be specialist and focused selling skills from 
third parties (Novick, 2000; Weinrauch et al., 2001). Some studies have identified 
that it is firm-specific skills of salespeople that accrue highest value (Galunic 
&Anderson, 2000; Menguc & Barker, 2005).  These may be associated with 
knowledge of the nature of the company, its products and customers, or they may 
be more specific to the individual’s relationships within the firm.  Therein lays a 
challenge, that a number of sub-factors may be identified as critical sales 
competences. 
 
Previous studies from both TCE and RBV viewpoints have identified a number of 
specificities or competences that seem to restrict a firm’s likelihood to do much 
outsourcing. Whether it is called company nature (Anderson, 1985), collective 
learning (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990), identity or essence of an organisation (Santos & 
Eisenhardt, 2005), firm characteristics (Oh, 2005), or strategic orientation (Rapp, 
2009), some companies have strong cultures.  Relevant studies have tested the 
length of time that a salesperson would need to get to know “the way we do 
things” as an indicator of the relevance of brand ambassadorship in a salesperson’s 
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skill set. The complexity of the product/service portfolio is also an indicator of 
skills/knowledge value (Anderson, 1985; Wilson & Zhang, 2002; Krafft et al., 2004). 
 
The degree to which organisations value customer relationships is a factor which 
has a particular resonance for the outsourcing or otherwise of customer-facing 
activities. The major studies of sales outsourcing found that knowledge of 
customers and relationship-building ability are strongly associated with sales 
insourcing (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984; Anderson, 1985; Wilson & Zhang, 2002; 
Krafft et al., 2004). It is necessary to test the perceptions of sales managers about 
the importance of customer relationship management skills in sales resourcing 
decisions. 
 
Both the studies of manufacturers’ representatives and employed salespeople have 
acknowledged the value of the integration of sales activity with the rest of the 
organisation, sometimes identified as team selling (Jackson et al., 1999; Tellefsen & 
Eyuboglu, 2002). Menguc and Barker (2005) found that the collaborative skills of 
the salesperson within his/her own company was the most significant and direct 
relationship with sales performance and it is therefore interesting to pursue this 
aspect of sales skills, especially as Williamson (1979) posited that most skills are 
transferable apart from inside knowledge and team dynamics. This aspect of a 
salesperson’s skills has attracted specific theoretical comment (Wilson & Millman, 
2003; Plouffe & Barclay, 2007) and some empirical support (Liu & Leach, 2001; 
Tellefsen & Eyuboglu, 2002). Nevertheless, knowledge-based activities are 
increasingly being outsourced (Sen & Shiel, 2006) in other functions, and contract 
sales organisations are involved in team selling (Jackson et al., 1999). 
 
Because skills, competency and asset arguments seem to focus on defending 
current differentiation, it is also necessary to explore whether access to external 
skills is a more attractive proposition when looking to the future. Acquiring new 
skills through outsourcing has been advocated (Ansoff, 1957; Biederman, 2004; Kim 
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& Mauborgne, 1997; Ruzzier, 2009) and observed (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002a; 
Ghodeswar & Vaidyanathan, 2008).  Contract sales organisations do have desirable 
skills (Ross et al., 2005) which companies may wish to access as a growth option. 
 
Competency arguments appear to be popular with practitioners, and it will be 
important to explore: 
 
1. Do sales managers perceive that employed salespeople are more 
skilled than third party contractors, or the other way round? 
2. How do sales managers compare the skills of employed salespeople 
with the sales skills that are available from third parties? 
3. How does the training investment in salespeople and contractors 
compare, and in particular how much comparative investment is made 
in training about company culture, products and customers? 
4. How do sales managers perceive that customers would identify “the 
way you sell” as part of their differentiation as a supplier?  
5. Do sales managers perceive that personal relationships between 
salespeople (whether employees or contractors) and customers have a 
lot of influence on sales success? 
6. Do factors about the integration of selling, such as team-based selling 
and salesperson involvement in non-selling activity such as post-sales 
support and problem-solving, play some role in the sales skills 
portfolio? 
7. Which skills are most important and do they vary between employed 
salespeople and contractors, especially: selling skills, product 
knowledge, knowledge of company culture and procedures, knowledge 
of the customer and working relationships with colleagues? 
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2.5.2.4 Proposition 4:  The comparative speed and flexibility in deployment of 
resource options will be an antecedent in “make-or-buy” decisions in the sales 
function. 
 
One assumption of transaction cost economics is that in an uncertain business 
environment, activities should be insourced. Theorists from other schools of 
thought have also considered the market to be too rigid to deal with change 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Dunn, 2000). From a practitioner view, outsourcing and 
particularly offshoring, can increase risk and constrain agility (Downey, 1995; 
Whitmore, 2006; Ketter, 2008). Klein et al. (1990) find support for this view in a 
study of export markets and Stapleton and Hanna (2002) find support for it in the 
shipping industry.   
 
There is a broader selection of literature that finds evidence for the opposite of this.  
Qualitative studies (Schuster & Keith, 1993; King, 2006; Rogers, 2009), a modelling 
study (Alvarez & Stenbacka, 2007) and quantitative studies (Schilling & Steensma, 
2002; Miranda & Kim, 2006; Díez-Vial, 2007; Martinez-Sánchez et al., 2007; Li et al., 
2010) suggest that an uncertain business environment will lead to companies 
outsourcing more activities to reduce risk. Indeed, managers should be concerned 
with building flexibility as a capability (Scott et al., 1988; De Leeuw & Volberda, 
1996), as it can lead to improved competitiveness (Sawnhey, 2006; Fantazy et al., 
2009). The pursuit of flexibility has been associated with real options theory, which 
Foss (1998) argues is future-oriented and explains how firms can build capacity.   
 
Early studies of sales outsourcing found insignificant results for business uncertainty 
as a predictor of outsourcing (Anderson, 1985) and the single sector qualitative 
study preceding this thesis noted sales managers quoting flexibility as a primary 
rationale for outsourcing sales (Rogers, 2009). Although flexibility is a relatively 
under explored rationale for outsourcing, it is worthy of exploration here: 
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1. Do sales managers perceive that employed salespeople, contract sales 
organisations or a combination of both, give them more flexibility? 
2. To what degree do sales managers perceive that competitiveness depends 
on being able to increase or decrease volume of activity without 
disproportionate increases in costs? 
3. How do they perceive the relative contribution of employed salespeople 
and contractors to speed of change? 
4. How do they perceive the relative behaviour of employed salespeople and 
contractors in obstructing change? 
 
The discussion of all these antecedents should create a picture of sales managers’ 
perceptions of the reasons why the outsourcing or insourcing of sales activities 
should be preferred, but it has been observed in the literature that there are also 
moderating factors in “make-or-buy” decisions. In the case of sales outsourcing, 
some suggestions have been made about conditions that would inhibit the 
outsourcing of sales activities. 
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2.5.3 Research Objective 2:  To explore sales managers’ perceptions of factors 
moderating their resourcing choices.   
 
Cause and effect are not always linear, as decisions can be moderated by 
intervening circumstances. The desire to outsource or insource an activity can be 
established but the preferred sourcing model may not be feasible. Espino-Rodríguez 
and Padrón-Robaina (2004) distinguished between the desire to outsource and 
outsourcing behaviour. Moderating factors are worthy of exploration.  
 
One of the contributions to knowledge of this study is an examination of the 
moderating factors involved in the “make-or-buy” decision for sales activities. A 
moderating factor is defined as a variable that interacts with an antecedent. Its 
presence or level is expected to vary the effect of the antecedent (Wang, Badley & 
Gignac, 2006), rather than it being a link in the causal chain. The factors explored 
have similarities with factors that have previously been described as moderating the 
level of outsourcing in organisations (Espino-Rodríguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2005). 
 
Anderson et al. (2003) proposed a number of inhibitors to the outsourcing of sales 
activities, most of which were contextual, but some were perceptual. In particular 
three important themes were mentioned which linked back to Anderson’s original 
work in 1985: perceptions of an imperfect supply market, perceptions of different 
competences in managing third parties and perceptions that sales outsourcing is in 
some way not legitimate.   
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2.5.3.1 Proposition 5: The availability of suitable suppliers will be a moderating 
factor in “make-or-buy” in the sales function. 
 
A simple and obvious inhibitor to outsourcing is a manager’s perception of the 
availability of suitable contract sales organisations (Anderson, 1985). Lonsdale 
(1999) is widely quoted for advising that firms should not outsource into a limited 
supply market, and purchasing theory devotes considerable attention to calculating 
and minimising exposure to supply market constraints (Kraljic, 1983). Since a choice 
of suppliers is likely to reduce the perceived risk of lock-in to a contract, it is 
presumed that this factor will be considered alongside the need to control resource.  
 
Although not always explicit to outsourcing, there is sufficient indication from the 
literature that business decision-makers will limit their exposure to supply markets; 
therefore it is important to discuss: 
 
1. How do sales managers perceive the supply market for recruiting 
salespeople, compared to the availability of contract sales 
organisations/sales agents? 
2. How do sales managers perceive the implications of becoming dependent 
on particular employees or contractors? 
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2.5.3.2 Proposition 6:  The ability to manage resource options will be a 
moderating factor in “make-or-buy” in the sales function. 
 
Anderson pointed out in her seminal study in 1985 that the ability to manage 
manufacturers’ representatives may be a moderating factor in sales outsourcing 
activity, and there is empirical support that the capability of managers to manage 
outsourcing is a moderating factor for a variety of outsourcing categories (Leiblein 
& Miller, 2003). There is some evidence that the ability to outsource delivers better 
performance from outsourcing (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002a; Daugherty et al., 
2006), and lack of it may certainly contribute to failure (Alexander & Young, 1996). 
It has recently been observed (Piercy et al., 2012) that sales manager control 
competences are an important moderating factor in the successful implementation 
of strategy where salespeople are employed, and it seems logical that the same 
should be true with contractors or a mix, although the competences may be 
different. 
 
Outsourcing capability could be broken down into two sub-themes, contract 
management and relational exchange management. The detailed management of 
contracts is identified as a necessary prerequisite for success from outsourcing in 
some studies, as formalisation reduces ambiguities and aligns management focus 
with potential hazards so that performance problems can be minimised (Conklin, 
2005; Anderson S. W. & Dekker, 2005;  Barthélemy & Quélin, 2006; Daugherty et 
al., 2006; Mayer & Salomon, 2006). The power balance between the principal and 
agent may be relevant to the principal’s ability to achieve compliance (Shervani et 
al., 2007).   
 
However, relationship-building is needed as well, or perhaps instead of, contract 
management. There is a body of evidence indicating that trust-building may offer 
more return as a governance mechanism (Anderson & Weitz, 1989; Brown et al., 
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2000; Wynarchzyk & Watson, 2005; Judge & Dooley, 2006; Handley & Benton, 
2009). It may take some learning by experience for such a capability to be 
demonstrated (Díez-Vial, 2007).  Sales agents seem to value the relational exchange 
capabilities of their principals, which may also encompass mutual investment (e.g. 
training) (Anderson et al., 1987; Anderson & Weitz, 1989 and 1992; Merritt & 
Newell, 2001; Gulati & Bristow, 2005). It is relationship-building that seems to 
ensure better results over time within long-term outsourcing arrangements (Ryals & 
Humphries, 2010). Within the literature, it is relational theory that dominates the 
theme of outsourcing capability, but in practice, a combination of both may be 
expected. 
 
Since capability is most likely to reduce the perceived risk of losing control of a 
contract, it is anticipated that the ability to manage outsourcing would be 
considered alongside the challenges inherent in control. It could be very difficult to 
pose direct questions about the managerial ability of respondents. Although the 
composites of outsourcing competency are varied, there is evidence that being a 
competent outsourcer leads to more outsourcing. It will be valuable to discuss: 
 
1. What do sales managers perceive to be the implications for their skills in 
managing employees versus contractors (or vice versa)? 
 
2.5.3.3 Proposition 7: The perceived “legitimacy” of resourcing options will be a 
moderating factor in “make-or-buy” in the sales function. 
 
Even with the capability to outsource and a choice of suppliers, companies may still 
be constrained by “industry norms”, which may be reflecting what is assumed to be 
possible or perceptions of what “best practice” companies do. Even though 
misalignment of activities and governance forms are likely to lead to lower 
profitability and failure (Macher & Richman, 2008), firms will tolerate their “status 
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quo” organisational design until outcomes are really unacceptable (Shimizu & Hitt, 
2004). Uncertainty in the business environment seems to encourage imitation of 
perceived industry benchmarks (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Kock, 2005; Miranda & 
Kim, 2006).    
 
In the case of sales outsourcing, Weiss et al. (1999) found that perceptions of the 
relative reputational capital of their own employer versus competitors was relevant 
to sales managers’ decisions about using manufacturers’ representatives. They 
would not outsource if they perceived that “best practice” companies did not 
outsource. More recent research provides evidence that agents can provide equal 
or better value to customers (Guenzi & Troilo, 2007; Palmatier et al., 2007), the 
agent has a reputation to consider as well (Mukherji & Ramachandran, 2007) and 
the customer may not necessary want direct contact with a manufacturer (Wuyts et 
al., 2004). Nevertheless, the reputational risk of outsourcing customer relationship-
handling has still attracted practitioner comment (Johnson L K, 2007). 
 
Given the evidence for the influence of industry norms in resourcing decisions, it is 
anticipated that it will be valuable to explore: 
 
1. Do sales managers perceive that it is important to conform to the norm for 
their industry/supply chain in terms of how much they use employed 
salespeople versus contractors?   
2. Do sales managers perceive that their company’s reputation in the 
industry influences their use of employees versus contractors? 
3. Do sales managers perceive any differences between employed 
salespeople and contractors in the observance of their business conduct 
guidelines or ethical code?   
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2.5 4 Research Objective 3:  This study will also consider which sales activities are 
considered most suitable for outsourcing. 
 
Although there is no discernible guidance in the literature about which sales 
activities might be seen as suitable for outsourcing, it is important to take a granular 
approach, as in Watjatrakul and Drennan (2005). The primary research will prompt 
not only for the proportion of contracted activities (Gilley & Rasheed, 2000), but 
also for the activities that are actually outsourced. On the basis of preliminary 
discussions with the companies that provide outsourced sales, the following are 
expected to feature: lead generation, lead qualification, end of life products, desk-
based support for key accounts, merchandising, product launch, non-strategic 
customer segments, difficult to serve locations, new market segment entry, after 
sales follow-up and sales temps (e.g. maternity leave cover). 
 
Empirical examinations of sales outsourcing to date have focused on all-or-nothing 
outsourcing to manufacturers’ representative or sales agents. However, there are 
many in-between states that are observed in other functions, such as IT and FM, the 
“hybrid governance” state described in transaction cost economics (Gilley & 
Rasheed, 2000; Martinez-Sánchez et al., 2007; Krishnamurthy et al., 2009). This may 
be described as partial outsourcing or out-tasking. This study contributes to 
knowledge by exploring how sales managers divide up sales activities to realise 
opportunities to use contractors, or to mix contractor expertise with in-house 
expertise.   
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2.5.5 The role of theory in sales outsourcing 
 
It has been observed from the literature that for “make-or-buy” decisions in 
general, and for “make-or-buy” within the sales function, that there are three main 
theoretical models that aim to explain the conditions which predict whether 
something should be insourced or outsourced:  transaction cost economics, the 
resource-based view and real options theory (Leiblein, 2003). Transaction cost 
economics is focused on the cost of controlling an activity; the resource-based view 
is focused on relative competences internally and externally and how they generate 
“rent” for the firm; real options theory is focused on the need for choice in an 
uncertain business environment, and therefore favours the replacement of fixed 
costs with variable costs.   
 
It is possible that constructs from each of these theoretical perspectives play some 
role in the outsourcing of sales activities, although each would claim a dominant 
role. Translating theoretical constructs into terminology commonly used by sales 
managers can be challenging, but the adoption of a qualitative approach enables 
exploration of the relationship between the subjective view of the respondent and 
the predictions of theory. The questions posed in this study do have their roots in 
previous studies, some of which have taken a particular theoretical stance. As it is 
an exploratory study, there is no intention to prove or disprove a particular theory, 
but there may be indications of the relative resonance of particular theories with 
sales management practice.  
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2.5.6 Exclusions 
 
Some possible moderating factors have not been included in this study. 
 
Switching costs have been observed to lock companies into external vendors (Weiss 
& Anderson, 1992; Pederson et al., 2002; Whitten et al., 2010), and may be 
therefore a moderating factor for backsourcing when it may be desirable. It does 
not seem to be considered as an inhibitor to outsourcing. However, switching costs 
are most relevant where the agent has some exclusivity over a function or territory. 
Since this study anticipates partial outsourcing or out-tasking, which may include 
dual sourcing and will certainly include some very short-term contracts, no 
hypothesis will be made about the effect of switching costs. However, the issue of 
dependence on suppliers or employees will be explored in the discussion of control. 
 
Anderson E. et al. (2003) have also flagged up the power of the sales manager to 
decide on the basis of his/her preference is a way that might not be possible for 
other line managers, e.g. in IT or logistics. Given that this study focuses on the 
perceptions only of sales managers, it would be difficult to test any difference.  
 
The complex nature of sales performance has been discussed (Zallocco et al., 2009; 
Verbeke et al., 2011; Evans et al., 2012), and it presents a challenge in discussing 
whether or not sales outsourcing is perceived to lead to better performance. Each 
company and sales manager may have very different expectations, and 
expectations of performance will depend upon the motivation for the use of 
contract sales organisations; for example, if flexibility is the primary motivation 
(Rogers, 2009), CSOs are primarily expected to deliver speed in ramping up and 
shutting down activity. Perceptions of a good ability to control CSOs may influence 
perceptions of objectives being achieved. Questions will be posed about 
perceptions of performance versus competition (as advocated by Colletti & Chonko, 
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1997), but linking aspects of perceived superior sales performance with approaches 
to the outsourcing of sales activities may prove elusive for this study. 
 
2.5.7 Summary 
 
This section has summarised the themes explored in the literature review and has 
presented the questions prompted by the literature for an exploration with sales 
managers of the perceptions that affect their consideration of “make-or-buy” 
decisions. The coverage of antecedents, moderating factors and the type of 
activities outsourced should give an in-depth understanding of sales managers’ 
perceptions of why sales outsourcing is or is not an organisational design option in 
their resource allocation decisions. The next section explains the methodological 
approach taken to explore these factors in primary research. 
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Chapter 3: Philosophical foundations, research methodology and research design 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the philosophical approach to the primary 
research in this study, and to justify the choice of research methodology, the design 
of the research instrument and choices made concerning its analysis.  
 
The debate about the nature of knowledge between positivism and interpretivism is 
discussed, followed by consideration of why intepretivism was considered the most 
suitable approach to this study. Given that there is a limited amount of previous 
literature about the use of contract sales organisations in the UK, there is still room 
for theoretical development.  Exploring sales managers’ perceptions enables some 
progress in developing a conceptual model of “make-or-buy” in the sales function. 
 
The research instrument chosen is a semi-structured interview, following 
quintamensional design (Gallup, 1947), which includes specific questions about 
behaviour and context as well as open questions to elicit the respondent’s 
perceptions in their own words. To enhance the reliability and validity of the 
method and reduce bias in data collection, a team of specialist interviewers were 
used, working under the supervision of, and in collaboration with, the main 
researcher.   
 
The difficulties of accessing robust sample populations for sales research has been 
noted by previous researchers (Carter et al., 2008) and therefore this method is 
suitable because it can provide insight into alternative viewpoints of sales managers 
about outsourcing with a purposeful sample of 29, and it takes up relatively little of 
the respondent’s time. 29 interviews for 55-75 minutes generated a considerable 
body of data, which was analysed using Nvivo software. 
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3.2 Philosophical foundations 
 
3.2.1 Review of philosophical positions 
 
Any researcher must reflect on their approach to the nature of knowledge before 
designing their research instrument. In the social sciences, the question is whether 
to adopt the philosophical stance of positivism, which is regarded as dominant in 
the field (Deshpandé, 1983; Marsden & Littler, 1996; Nodoushani, 2000; Chung & 
Alagaratnam, 2001; Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005; Karami, Analoui & Rowley, 2006; 
Morgan, 2007; Rod, 2009), or to defend the minority, interpretivist view. This may 
be seen as a dilemma, or the luxury of choice (Rod, 2009). Each approach has been 
described as a paradigm - shared beliefs among a group of specialists. Adherents to 
one paradigm may suggest that it is “incommensurate” with the other; in other 
words, if you accept a bit of one, you have to reject all of the other (Morgan, 2007). 
Increasingly, academics writing about this choice (e.g. Wood & Welch, 2010) are 
eschewing polarisation, identifying overlapping paradigms (Arbnor & Bjerke, 2009) 
and opening up the potential of mixing research methods (e.g. Cresswell, 2003; 
Burke Johnson et al., 2007). 
 
The traditional view is that logical positivism and interpretivism are philosophical 
opposites, and most books and articles on research methods contain tables to 
illustrate this: 
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Assumptions about: POSITIVISM INTERPRETIVISM 
Ontology : 
• What is being studied 
• The relationship 
between the researcher and 
reality 
Researcher and reality are 
separate (objectivity) 
Researcher and reality cannot 
be separated (subjectivity); the 
search is for meaning 
Epistemology: 
The nature of reality 
Reality exists, (beyond the 
mind) and is there to be 
discovered 
Reality is subjectively 
experienced and interpreted; 
it is context-dependent; shaped 
by multiple variables 
Axiology: 
Goals of the approach 
Explanation, verification, 
confirmation; 
verifiable results can enable 
prediction 
Exploration and understanding 
Research object The qualities of the research 
object exist independently of 
the researcher (analysis can be 
done without influencing it) 
The researcher interprets the 
research object according to 
their experience 
Relationships between objects Objects are independent Objects can be influenced by 
each other 
Granularity 
 
The whole is the sum of its 
parts 
The whole is socially 
constructed 
Validity Research statement can be 
mapped to reality; data 
measures reality 
Richness and depth of data - 
credibility 
Reliability Replicability – results can be 
reproduced 
Researchers address the 
implications of their subjectivity 
Tools Quantitative (statistics) Qualitative (linguistic) 
Instruments Experiments, observation, 
surveys 
Case studies, in-depth 
interviews, participation 
Population for research Large Focused 
Direction Hypothesis – Deduction - 
Testing (analytical) 
Inductive – establish 
motivations that may lead to 
patterns 
Practical constraints Sampling Time-consuming and costly 
 
Table 12: Assumptions about Positivism and Interpretivism - based on Deshpandé 
(1983); Baker (2001); Shankar & Patterson (2001); Mingers (2003); Weber (2004); 
Cepeda & Martin (2005); Arbnor & Bjerke (2009). 
 
This table summarises a variety of views about the juxtapositioning of positivist and 
interpretivist approaches to the creation of knowledge. Positivism, also known as 
empiricism or objectivism (Marsden & Littler, 1996), assumes that it is possible to 
achieve objectivity in research; interpretivism embraces subjectivity. In positivism, 
reality exists, and the objective researcher can discover it; in intepretivism truth is 
perceived by the people involved in a phenomenon and the researcher should 
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search for meaning. In positivism, research objects are independent of each other 
and the researcher; whereas in interpretivism they can be influenced by each other. 
In positivism, general laws can be established when propositions about reality have 
been tested; with interpretivism research establishes possibilities and may be 
transferable, but context is always variable. 
 
The sequence of scientific enquiry (the positivist stance), begins with the discovery 
of flaws in existing theory. A new theory is proposed, propositions are derived and 
tested, and a decision can be made as to whether the new theory is a better 
explanation of reality than the old theory. Notably, the tests focus on seeking a 
refutation of the new theory. 
 
A number of studies have identified the dominance of positivism in management 
and marketing research. Karami et al. (2006) noted only a few studies based on 
interpretivist methods in twenty leading management journals from 1991-2000. In a 
study of the Strategic Management Journal, Ketchen, Boyd and Bergh (2008) noted 
that that there were significantly more positivist studies in the journal in the period 
2000-2003 than in the 1980s. Chung and Alagaratnam (2001) examined the three 
top marketing journals between 1970 and 1997, and found that only one 
interpretivist study had been published in them from 1956-1986, and despite some 
incursion from 1987-1997, interpretivist studies were still very much in the 
minority. They commented that marketing is preoccupied with being recognised as 
a science. The perceived quality of sales research also relies on large high-quality, 
highly reliable samples (Carter et al., 2008), although it is getting more problematic 
to find them. Studies characterised by inferential statistics, hypothesis testing, 
mathematical design, careful sampling, precise measurement and cautious 
generalisation (Nodoushani, 2000) are clearly critical to academic careers. The 
dominance of positivism in social science has been described as at least hegemony 
(Nodoushani, 2000) and even a “tyranny” (Lowe, Carr, Thomas & Watkins-Mathys, 
2005). 
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Of the few extant studies of sales outsourcing, most have adopted a positivist 
approach.  However, these studies have focused on total outsourcing or total 
insourcing and it might be difficult to adapt their methods to enable responses 
about complex hybrids. “The history of science has shown that little if any 
knowledge is sacrosanct.” (Weber, 2004, p. vi). Much evidence may suggest that 
incremental logic drives knowledge; yet some of the most famous scientific theories 
have come from the researcher being immersed in the problems and making 
inspired guesses (Wood & Welch, 2010). It is also worth considering that, if there is 
more theory verification than discovery, it could cause an imbalance in the nature 
of knowledge about a topic (Deshpandé, 1983). The alternative to achieving 
knowledge through objectivity is interpretivism, also known as subjectivism or 
social constructionism (Marsden & Littler, 1996). This school of thought asserts that 
reality is subjectively experienced and contextual. Therefore, whilst the researcher 
must address the implications of their subjectivity, they should engage with the 
people he/she is researching in order to interpret their experience.  In some social 
sciences, e.g. social anthropology, interpretive studies are still very important 
(Morgan, 2007). Arguably, the viewpoint of sales managers concerning their 
resourcing challenges is a suitable topic for an interpretivist approach. 
 
Complex topics are not easy to test with a wholly positivist method. For example, in 
a study of entrepreneurial motivations, Kirkwood and Campbell-Hunt (2007) found 
that a positivist survey revealed no significant gender differences on any motivation 
factors, whereas in-depth interviews revealed that women and men had very 
different constructions about family-related motivations. They concluded that 
complex topics are better-served by a research instrument that allows the 
participants to extend their discussion and allows the researcher to extend and 
develop theory. This is likely to be the case with decisions about sales organisation 
design. 
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Interpretivism addresses the practical objections to natural science methods being 
used in studies involving behaviour in complex social systems (Morgan, 2007). Social 
scientists are dealing with people – not natural phenomena – and therefore cannot 
predict outcomes with the same accuracy as natural science (Baker, 2001). Weber 
(2004) gives competing examples – the reality of being hurt by falling from a 
window is not dependent on perception, but how people work in a team might be. 
Human interventions modify the most rational of things, such as the application of 
technology (Longshore-Smith, 2006). The scientific method will not provide 
mechanisms for solving complex problems (French, 2009).  Complex, self-adapting 
systems such as companies (and their sales departments) are non-linear. A 
company would be in danger if it were in equilibrium. It should be learning and 
innovating. Applying scientific methods can result in disparate contributions based 
on narrow aspects of reality (Deshpandé, 1983). 
 
Over-reliance on measuring what happened in the past does not necessarily help to 
predict the possibilities of the future (Wood & Welch, 2010). Although 
businesspeople are as interested as philosophers in certainty and the relationship of 
mind and worlds, what business knows about the world calls non-existent things 
into being (Weinburger, 2006). Managers seem to be more interested in identifying 
best practice via case studies than in developing generalisable laws for small aspects 
of their reality. Researchers need to recognise context before generalising, as 
businesspeople such as sales managers are always working in the context of 
immediate commercial constraints (Bryman, 2004; Karami et al., 2006; Rod, 2009). 
Research needs flexibility as well as discipline (Wright, 1996).  
 
Measurement can be a particular challenge in the scientific approach to researching 
business topics. Controlling for sampling bias is a “significant hurdle” (Ketchen et al., 
2008). Constructs such as motivation, can only be measured indirectly 
(Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005) which questions validity. Reliability estimates can 
vary with application of the same instrument (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2005) - 
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statistical significance is not always significant in practice (Chung & Alagaratnam, 
2001). Lastly, statistical results cannot be generalised to different contexts, 
especially where research is narrow, e.g. employees in one UK county (Wood & 
Welch, 2010). Although the UK is a sizeable economy, achieving statistically 
significant samples in a particular category of business decision-maker can be 
challenging. 
 
To claim that society can be studied like nature, is in itself, an ideological position 
(Nodoushani, 2000). The very fact that the positivist/interpretivist debate takes 
place suggests that interpretivists have got a point. Subjectivity may itself be in 
some way measurable (Arbnor & Bjerke, 2009). 
 
3.2.2. General philosophical positioning of this study  
 
It is the search for subjective facts – the perceptions that sales managers have 
about their resourcing choices and resulting outcomes – that drives this research. 
The philosophy most likely to facilitate this enquiry is interpretivism, and the 
research design most likely to help in this respect is qualitative.   
 
By using a research instrument associated with interpretivism, there is no 
philosophical intent in this study to support the rigidity of incommensurability. 
Language and meaning are important as well as quantifiable findings (Morgan, 
2007). Human organisations are open, adaptive, varied systems with tensions and 
conflicts. Any study can only be a limited picture of reality and one partly 
dependent on the interpretation of the researcher (Arbnor & Bjerke, 2009).  
 
Knowledge creation is a continuum in which different methods are needed at 
different stages. To some degree it has its own truths in terms of research 
philosophy and method, which have been outlined by Morgan (2007). Inductive 
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results feed the deductive objectives of quantitative studies and vice versa 
(abduction). Business knowledge cannot be completely unique or completely 
general and replicable. Nevertheless, judgements can be made about the 
transferability of research findings, since decision-makers always have to consider 
how much of existing knowledge can be used when new circumstances occur 
(transferability) (Morgan, 2007).   
 
Kirkwood and Campbell-Hunt (2007) proposed “a cycle of inter-paradigm influence 
in theory development” (p. 235) in which theory derived from case interpretations 
can be followed by empirical testing, which may reveal errors and inconsistencies 
which then need to be explored in more cases. The extant literature on sales 
outsourcing has been described as “modest” (Rapp, 2009). That leads to an 
expectation that in-depth qualitative research would yield most insight. It was 
expected that this topic would be an emotive one for sales managers (Anderson et 
al., 2003); therefore the subjective truths of perceptions are its focus. Explanation is 
necessary, and since it is difficult to access objective reality, exploration of 
perceptions will be the closest that can be achieved. The problem is the main focus 
rather than the method. The optimum reliability and validity is sought through 
applying what safeguards can be used for interpretivist studies. Therefore this study 
adopts the philosophical approach summarised below: 
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Assumptions 
about: 
POSITIVISM INTERPRETIVISM THIS STUDY 
Ontology : 
• What is 
being studied 
• The 
relationship between 
the researcher and 
reality 
Researcher and 
reality are separate 
(objectivity) 
Researcher and reality 
cannot be separated 
(subjectivity); the 
search is for meaning 
Assistance from a third 
party to mitigate  
researcher subjectivity 
Epistemology: 
The nature of reality 
Reality exists, 
(beyond the mind) 
and is there to be 
discovered 
Reality is subjectively 
experienced and 
interpreted; 
it is context-dependent; 
shaped by multiple 
variables 
Reality is subjectively 
experienced and 
interpreted; 
it is context-dependent; 
shaped by multiple 
variables 
Axiology: 
Goals of the 
approach 
Explanation, 
verification, 
confirmation; 
verifiable results can 
enable prediction 
Exploration and 
understanding 
Exploration and 
understanding 
Research object The qualities of the 
research object exist 
independently of the 
researcher (analysis 
can be done without 
influencing it) 
The researcher 
interprets the research 
object according to 
their experience 
Research objects must 
be interpreted in order 
to solve problems 
Relationships 
between objects 
Objects are 
independent 
Objects can be 
influenced by each 
other 
Objects can be 
influenced by each other 
(e.g. mimetic 
isomorphism) 
Granularity 
 
The whole is the sum 
of its parts 
The whole is socially 
constructed 
The whole is socially 
constructed 
Validity Research statement 
can be mapped to 
reality; data 
measures reality 
Richness and depth of 
data - credibility 
Rich and deep data is 
the source of credibility 
Reliability Replicability – results 
can be reproduced 
Researchers address the 
implications of their 
subjectivity 
The researcher 
addresses the 
implications of her 
subjectivity 
Tools Quantitative 
(statistics) 
Qualitative (linguistic) Qualitative (linguistic) 
Instruments Experiments, 
observation, surveys 
Case studies, in-depth 
interviews, participation 
In-depth interviews 
Population for 
research 
Large Focused Focused 
Direction Hypothesis – 
Deduction - Testing 
(analytical) 
Inductive – establish 
motivations that may 
lead to patterns 
Inductive – establish 
motivations that may 
lead to patterns 
Practical constraints Sampling Time-consuming and 
costly 
Access to respondents 
Table 13: This study’s philosophical approach - sources as in table 12. 
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Given the researcher’s previous experience of the topic and involvement with 
contract sales organisations, the use of a semi-structured interview as a method 
with third party assistance reduced the possibility of researcher bias. The objective 
reality can only be accessed via the subjective reality of the actors involved, but to 
gain knowledge it is still important to engage with respondents from a neutral 
position. Alongside the expectation of a relatively small sample, respondents may 
influence each other outside of the context of the research and the whole of the 
topic may not be the sum of its parts, which necessitates caution in the choice of 
analysis techniques. Results may not be predictive, but may be transferable, 
especially since the use of qualitative inquiry within the research instrument may 
enable perceptions of cause and effect to be identified.  
 
3.3 Research method 
 
3.3.1 History of the research design for this topic 
 
The seminal articles on the topic of the use of CSOs (Anderson, 1985; Krafft et al., 
2004) are both transaction cost focused and positivist in philosophy. Anderson’s 
study (1985), which is widely cited, was based on results from the sales districts of 
sixteen companies in the electronic components sector in the USA. The basis for 
analysis was 159 usable responses.  Thirteen constructs were tested within eight 
hypotheses; seven were aspects of asset specificity.   
 
Krafft et al. (2004) added agency theory into their considerations, and built on 
Anderson’s study and four intervening studies based on the proportion of salary: 
commission paid to sales representatives, which they regarded as an analogous 
research issue. Using two dependent variables (kind of salesforce and proportion of 
salary to total pay) and twenty constructs, they surveyed 270 large firms in 
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Germany, from five sectors. Most other studies on aspects of sales outsourcing, 
from Anderson and Coughlan (1987) to Rapp (2009) adopt a positivist approach.  
 
Re-using constructs from these studies to inform interview design clearly has some 
benefit, but there are analogous outsourcing studies that have been based on 
different hypotheses and their constructs also need to be accommodated in any 
study that updates and extends knowledge about outsourcing. Also, the researcher 
has experience of a previous qualitative study on the topic, which has informed the 
linguistic expression of theoretical concepts for practitioners. 
 
3.3.2 Semi-structured interviews 
 
Quantitative studies are unhelpful where there is “a general lack of knowledge 
about the topic to be researched” (Hassenzahl & Wessler, 2000, p. 442). However, 
open interviews can be difficult and timely to analyse, and are criticised for lack of 
objectivity and reliability, so the researcher has a challenge in designing rigour into 
the artefact.   
 
Qualitative studies can help researchers to shed light on situations that would 
otherwise be unclear (Golafshani, 2003). A qualitative research methodology is 
“used when a research question asks for meanings of a phenomenon with the 
purpose of understanding the human experience” (Crist & Tanner, 2003, p. 202). 
Researchers need to access a target group’s experiences and the meaning they 
make from them (Knox & Burkard, 2009). In-company fieldwork or extensive 
interviewing, both of which are social processes as much as technical processes 
(MacDonald & Hellgren, 1999) are commonly used in the interpretive paradigm 
(Golafshani, 2003).  
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Semi-structured interviews are believed to be the best way to access the norms and 
values of respondents, who can express themselves through their own words and 
meaning in response to a limited number of open-ended questions (Knox & 
Burkard, 2009), while the interviewer prompts and probes for detail and 
explanation of things that the respondent takes for granted (Stephens, 2007).  
 
“…we interview when we want to know something about what another person has 
to say about his or her experience of a defining event, person, idea or thing” 
(Nunkoosing, 2005, p. 698). The best way to get at that is to prompt the person to 
think about, and then to talk about their needs, attitudes, experiences, expectations 
and understanding.  
 
Comparison across cases is sought (Knox & Burkard, 2009). Practical acts, accessed 
through narratives, reveal meaning and can increase understanding and identify 
patterns. The size of the sample is adequate when interpretations are clear and new 
informants reveal no new findings (Crist & Tanner, 2003). 
 
Nevertheless, the qualitative approach has many challenges, and researchers need 
to be aware that “stories are authentic rather than true” (Nunkoosing, 2005, p. 
701). What the interviewee chooses to tell is what they can contribute as an 
understanding of their experience. It is not possible to push the interviewee to 
reveal something they do not want to share, but the interviewer can prompt to get 
beyond immediate reactions to questions (Nunkoosing, 2005). There is a detailed 
discussion of reliability and validity later in this chapter. 
 
3.3.2.1 Interviewing elites 
 
Qualitative research seems particularly appropriate when the researcher needs to 
access high level decision-makers, also known as organisational elites. It is 
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extremely difficult to achieve reasonable sample sizes for quantitative research 
when the number of qualified respondents is small. However, the challenge of 
conducting interviews with corporate elites has received relatively little attention in 
the methodology literature (Welch, Marschan-Piekkari, Pentinnen & Tahvanainen, 
2002; Harvey, 2011). An elite interviewee can be described as “an informant 
(usually male) who occupies a senior or middle management position; has 
functional responsibility in an area which enjoys high status in accordance with 
corporate values; has considerable industry experience and frequently also long 
tenure with the company; possesses a broad network of personal relationships and 
has considerable international exposure” (Welch et al., 2002, p. 613). 
 
There are barriers in place within organisations to reduce access to their senior 
managers (Mikecz, 2012) and there may also be a lack of interest among business 
elites in interacting with academics (Welch et al., 2002). Organisational elites are 
extremely busy people (Delaney, 2007). It is costly and time-consuming to 
overcome these barriers, in fact it may take up to five months, and the individual or 
their organisation will almost always impose restrictions on the interaction (Welch 
et al., 2002). Tactics for gaining access and consent are quite specific, such as 
personalised introductory approaches (Delaney, 2007); leveraging institutional 
affiliation (e.g. if the elite is a graduate of the same university); leveraging 
credentials as an expert in their field; using personal connections or research 
sponsor links (Welch et al., 2002). In the UK, networking is particularly noted as 
useful (MacDonald & Hellgren, 1999). As a result, most studies of elites use 
cascading or snowball sampling (Welch et al., 2002). Because access to elites is so 
difficult, researchers must conduct each interview at a time and within a time 
convenient to the interviewee (Delaney, 2007; Harvey, 2011). Using the telephone 
as a medium can improve convenience for interviewees.   
 
Some degree of imperfection in sampling and data gathering seems unavoidable 
when trying to access organisational elites. The researcher is dependent on who is 
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willing to give time for interviews and what they are prepared to discuss 
(MacDonald & Hellgren, 1999; Harvey, 2011; Mikecz, 2012). Nevertheless, if the 
challenges are recognised and accounted for, it is still possible and important to 
study how elites form attitudes and how they are reflected in the activities of their 
organisations (Delaney, 2007). Issues that arise in gathering data from elites include 
the reversal of the normal assumption about the power balance between 
interviewer and interviewee, leading to concerns about the openness of responses 
and control exerted over feedback loops (Harvey, 2011; Mikecz, 2012).   
 
When interviewing elites, the power and status balance favours the respondent 
rather than the interviewer, so it is likely that the interviewee will attempt to 
dominate the interview, and challenge the questions (Mikecz, 2012). The 
interviewee is a “privileged knower” (Nunkoosing, 2005, p. 699) and therefore the 
researcher or interviewer can be patronised or cast in the role of “supplicant”. 
Equally, the researcher may suspend judgment because of respect for the 
interviewee, or overestimate the importance of what elites have to say (MacDonald 
& Hellgren, 1999; Welch et al., 2002). Delaney (2007) argues that there is 
“something seductive about interviewing those with great wealth, power and 
success” which can dilute the interviewer’s or researcher’s objectivity. This can be 
overcome by using interviewers who have a lot of experience of interviewing elites. 
It is important for interviewers to be well-prepared, and to observe the protocol of 
few questions with good probes and follow-up (Delaney, 2007; Harvey, 2011). An 
experienced interviewer can use status subordination to their advantage when 
probing for further explanation of the interviewees’ comments (Delaney, 2007).  
 
Openness is important to the researcher, but elite interviewees are expert in 
fielding questions and getting across company policy, rather than what they think as 
an individual (Welch et al., 2002; Mikecz, 2012). In fact an “organisational elite” is 
likely to assume that a researcher wants the company’s position on a topic 
(Delaney, 2007). It is necessary to probe for personal attitudes (Delaney, 2007; 
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Mikecz, 2012). Academic neutrality may help the interviewees to regard interview 
as intellectual discussion.  
 
Polar opposites may emerge from studies of elites, with some being very guarded in 
their comments and others being excessively frank. Those who are guarded may be 
concerned about comments being used against them (despite all assurances of 
anonymity).  Alternatively, elite interviewees may see the interview as a means of 
channelling their personal views. “Some elite comments are so frank they are 
unusable” (Welch et al., 2002, p. 622). In addition, contradiction is common, even 
within individual narratives, which makes aggregation of data very difficult 
(MacDonald & Hellgren, 1999). 
 
Post-interview co-operation with elite interviewees is important. Verification of 
their data may be essential to participation, but then they might censor it post-
interview (Welch et al., 2002). Giving the managers control over the details of data 
used in management studies gives them control over the research, which 
undermines the reliability of results (MacDonald & Hellgren, 1999). Nevertheless, 
Nunkoosing (2005) argues that it is necessary to on the basis of ethics to allow 
respondents to take out anything that they do not want to be used in the analysis. 
Summary reports are successful in confirming findings and gaining additional 
perspectives and reflective comment from interviewees (Welch et al., 2002; Mikecz, 
2012).  
 
3.3.2.2 Telephone interviews 
 
“Telephone interviews with elite and ultra-elite respondents are a valid and useful 
methodological tool that can provide important data for geographically dispersed 
samples” (Stephens, 2007, p. 203). As has been mentioned, telephone interviews 
are likely to maximise convenience for busy organisational elites such as sales 
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managers. Businesses were quick to discover the value of the telephone when it 
became an accessible invention (Groves, 1990). Given the social and technological 
change in recent years, use of the telephone is now widespread, acceptable and 
could even be considered to be the primary form of interpersonal communication in 
the modern world (Carr & Worth, 2001). 
 
Telephone interviewing has been neglected in many texts about qualitative 
research, or treated as less attractive than face-to-face interviews (Novick, 2008). 
An early comparative study of quantitative surveys with consumers found that 
telephone interviews were more likely to suffer from missing data, acquiescence, 
evasiveness or contradiction compared to face-to-face interviews, and therefore 
the data gathered was not as good (Jordan, Marcus & Reeder, 1980). Since then, 
and sometimes attributed to improving skills in telephone interviewing, there are 
comparative studies that report that telephone interviewing results in comparable 
quality of data and has some specific contextual advantages (Fenig, Levav,  Kohn & 
Yelin, 1993; Wilson, Roe & Wright, 1998; Greenfield, Midanik & Rogers, 2000; 
Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004; Musselwhite, Cuff, McGregor & King, 2007; Stephens, 
2007).  Much advice about telephone interviewing is based on the assumptions that 
quantitative data is being gathered, but there are also a small number of helpful 
texts about qualitative interviewing by telephone, especially from researchers in 
healthcare. Telephone interviewing can provide rich narrative and shed light on 
stakeholder views (Holt, 2010). Qualitative interview techniques enable 
respondents to express their views in their own terms and introduce their own 
ideas (Sobo, Simmes, Landsverk & Kurtin, 2003). 
 
While telephone interviews have some advantages for the researcher and the 
respondent, care must be taken to ensure that respondents have some 
sophistication and experience in use of the medium (Herzog et al, 1983). There are 
some specific disadvantages to be taken into account. Telephone interviewing is 
synchronous communication in a virtual space (Opdenakker, 2006).  This means 
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that the interviewer cannot pick up visual cues, such as body language, nor can the 
interviewer be aware of factors in the respondent’s environment that may be 
distracting them or affecting their responses.  Sometimes respondents volunteered 
information about their environment, such as being in an airport departure lounge, 
or having been kept awake all night by their new baby, but in most cases neither 
interviewer nor researcher could discern possible distractions.  This places a burden 
on the interviewer to create a good ambience for the interaction, requiring more 
concentration (Opdenakker, 2006).  Using professional interviewers was a means of 
enabling good ambience creation. 
 
De Vaus (1991) argued that the decision about telephone or face-to-face needs to 
be decided on basis of achievable response rates, the ability to produce 
representative samples, its effects on interview design, the quality of data gathered 
and with consideration of implementation problems.  All these factors were 
considered and managed (see below) but access and ease of implementation were 
probably the most critical factors in favour of telephone interviewing for this study. 
 
3.3.2.2.1 Response rates and sampling 
 
Both telephone interviewing and e-mail facilitated reflective dialogue offer the 
benefit of broadening a sample population. Respondent reluctance or difficulty in 
accessing respondents is a common problem in all types of research. Wilson et al. 
(1998) noted no significant differences in response rates or representativeness of 
samples in face-to-face or telephone modes, and some researchers have 
experienced improved response rates and completion rates using telephone 
interviewing (Carr & Worth, 2001; Sobo et al., 2003; Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004).  
 
Among the advantages of telephone interviewing is the potential to reach an 
extended scope of respondents across large geographical space, or in hard to access 
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places (e.g. prisons, war zones), or who otherwise might be constrained by time or 
location due to their work schedules or lifestyle (e.g. shift workers, frequent 
travellers) or a reluctance to undertake face-to-face interviews (Fenig et al., 1993;  
Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004; Opdenakker, 2006; Novick, 2008; Glogowska, Young & 
Lockyer, 2010; Trier-Bieniek, 2012).  The researcher can offer the respondent 
greater flexibility in timetabling the interview, which is particularly valuable when 
the respondent is very busy (Stephens, 2007; Wäppling, Strugnell & Farley, 2010; 
Trier-Bieniek, 2012). Telephone conversations can be easily terminated (Groves, 
1990), but since telephone interviewing minimises the time imposition on the 
respondent (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004; Harvey, 2011), non-completions are not a 
significant problem compared to e-mail interviewing where it is easy for 
respondents to ignore difficult questions through non-response (McAuliffe, 2003).   
 
Wilson et al. (1998) observed that there was no tendency on behalf of their 
respondents to rush telephone interviews, although interviewers need to maintain 
the balance needed between focusing on the topic and enabling respondents to 
control the pace of the interview. 
 
3.3.2.2.2 Interview design 
 
E-mail interviews may be the easiest to administer in terms of securing the 
structure of an interview (McAuliffe, 2003). Both face-to-face and telephone 
interviewing require significant skills on the part of the interviewer. Because of the 
differences inherent in telephone interviews, care has to be taken to develop 
strategies for the nuances of them (Stephens, 2007). It is particularly necessary for 
interviewers to be very clear in telephone interviews, even when interviewing elites 
(Stephens, 2007). Telephone interviewing requires good verbal communication 
skills (Wilson et al., 1998) and specialist techniques such as prompts when 
respondents stay silent, echo probes and dealing with counter-questioning (Sobo et 
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al., 2003; Cook, 2009). With these skills in place, a telephone interview should take 
about the same or less time to administer compared to a face-to-face interview 
(Wilson et al., 1998). Timing of 35-60 minutes is considered desirable for telephone 
interviews (Wäppling et al., 2010; Harvey, 2011). With a target time of 35 minutes, 
seven focused open-ended questions can be covered (Sobo et al., 2003).  
 
The structure of qualitative telephone interviews may not differ particularly from 
face-to-face, although there are some minor specifics. For example, respondents 
cannot remember long lists of options, so that should be avoided (Wilson et al., 
1998). 
 
One advantage of telephone interviewing is that computer-assisted telephone 
interviewing (CATI) software may be used. This reduces the potential for missing 
data and improves the accuracy of data capture (Carr & Worth, 2001); it also 
ensures less interviewer variance and higher productivity because of reduced 
editing and record-keeping (Groves, 1990). Recording the responses also improves 
the quality of data captured, as tapes/.wav files pick up irregularities of speech 
(Cook, 2009). Verbal cues such as hesitation or intonation are captured by the tape 
and therefore are more likely to be carried forward and used in the data analysis 
than visual cues that a researcher might miss while taking notes in a face-to-face 
interview (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004).   (See interview guide for this study – 
Appendix A) 
 
3.3.2.2.3 Quality of data  
 
The quality concerns about telephone interviewing include the loss of visual cues 
from the respondent and whether or not the conversation is considered private 
enough to ensure open and honest communication. 
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Clearly, telephone conversations lack face-to-face cues such as looking puzzled or 
nodding in agreement (Groves, 1990). Without the visual cues in a conversation, 
such as facial expression and body language, there could be loss of rapport leading 
to less disclosure of information and emotion, and the potential for distraction 
(Musselwhite et al., 2007). In discussions of post-operative pain, researchers felt 
that not being able to observe patients’ faces limited the quality of data, but 
nevertheless had used telephone interviews to avoid the lack of depth achieved in a 
prior face-to-face study (Carr & Worth, 2001).  
 
A telephone interviewer may not see distress (or joy), but they may hear it. There 
are a smaller set of emotive messages over the phone versus face-to-face but it 
does not necessarily create errors in the quality of interaction (Groves, 1990). It is a 
comparatively better medium than e-mail for observing the respondent’s strength 
of feeling. McAuliffe (2003) noted in an e-mail study with social workers as 
respondents, that reading emotive language is quite different from experiencing it 
face-to-face. However, an interviewer’s visual cues are also a feature of face-to-face 
interviews, and their potential to influence the respondent is not considered to be 
desirable (Opdenakker, 2006). It has been suggested that respondents are less likely 
to give socially desirable responses in telephone interviews (Hill et al., 2005). 
 
Rapport between interviewer and interviewee is regarded as central to qualitative 
research, but it is possible for experienced telephone interviewers to establish 
rapport quite quickly (Tausig & Freeman, 1988). They are also aware of auditory 
cues and can respond to them and they know to allow pauses and tolerate silence 
so that the respondent can reply in their own way (Wilson et al., 1998; Sturges & 
Hanrahan, 2004; Hill et al., 2005; Novick, 2008). Spontaneity is not necessarily less 
via the telephone than in person (Opdenakker, 2006).   
 
Advocates of telephone interviewing question the relevance of visual social cues, 
and whether lack of them actually results in lower quality data (Novick, 2008). 
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Visual cues can be misinterpreted by an individual interviewer, whereas verbal cues 
such as hesitation and tone of voice are captured on the tape and are saved for 
analysis (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004). In assessing the mood of respondents, Fenig et 
al. (1993) (who were using a demoralisation scale) noted specifically that 
respondents were not more cheerful on the telephone and concluded that “the 
greater psychological distance of the telephone interview may have facilitated 
symptom expression” (Fenig et al., 1993, p. 897). Overall, in their psychiatric survey, 
groups interviewed by telephone and face-to-face were highly correlated. Concerns 
about telephone interviewing increasing the likelihood of missing data, deceptive or 
contradictory replies, have not been realised in significant comparative studies 
(Tausig & Freeman, 1988; Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004). Even when there might have 
been some social differences in telephone usage, telephone interviewing did not 
appear to introduce systematic bias into aggregated responses (Herzog, Rodgers & 
Kulka, 1983). Of course, it is important to gather some information about context, 
to improve reliability (Sobo et al., 2003).  
 
Telephone interviewing can also be favourably compared with the complete 
absence of social cues and lack of spontaneity inherent in electronic interviews 
(Opdenakker, 2006). To get the desirable depth in electronic messaging can take 
twice as long as in a face-to-face interview (Opdenakker, 2006), while telephone 
interviews can achieve depth and richness in much less elapsed time than either a 
face-to-face interview or electronic interview.   
 
Social cues are not necessarily important when a researcher is interviewing an 
expert about ideas (Opdenakker, 2006). In particular in the case of interviewing 
elite groups, such as Stephens’ study of economists, they are articulate and free-
speaking individuals who may not need much prompting (Stephens, 2007). The 
relevance of locational cues is also minor. Face-to-face interviews in the 
respondent’s environment may offer contextual relevance to an anthropological 
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study, but has little relevance where a respondent group reside in similar office-
style environments (Novick, 2008).  
 
The telephone interview also allows the respondent to be relaxed in a space of their 
choosing, and they are likely to feel that they have more privacy and anonymity 
with telephone interviews rather than with face-to-face interviews (Hill et al., 2005; 
Opdenakker, 2006; Novick, 2008; Knox & Burkard, 2009; Holt, 2010). Particularly 
when a topic is sensitive, telephone interviewing minimises the imposition of the 
research on the respondent in terms of emotional demands and reduces anxiety 
about participation (Sturges & Hanrahan, 2004; Trier-Bieniek, 2012). It can even 
encourage frankness that improves data quality (Carr & Worth, 2001; Glogowska et 
al., 2010). Thus, health researchers have been able to recruit telephone 
respondents for subjects such as incontinence (Wilson et al., 1998) and mental 
health (Fenig et al., 1993).  
 
To summarise this discussion of quality, it is useful to return to the seminal 
comparison study conducted by Sturges and Hanrahan (2004). They noted no 
significant differences in the themes and depth of content in telephone and face-to-
face interview transcripts they obtained from two different respondent groups. The 
quantity of data gathered was similar and there was no discernible difference in 
content or depth. They concluded it was an acceptable and valuable method of data 
collection, yielding good quality data while maximising response rate.   
 
3.3.2.2.4 Implementation issues 
 
Telephone interviews are, by and large, easier to administer and control, together 
with cost and time advantages. Telephone researchers note the value of telephone 
interviewing in ensuring interviewer safety (Wilson et al., 1998; Sturges & 
Hanrahan, 2004). Although that is rarely an issue in business research, travel and 
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elapsed time involved in face-to-face interviews can create stress for an 
interviewer, particularly if it interferes with other pressing duties in a busy life. 
Equally, in research institutes concerned about their carbon footprint, an 
alternative to travelling may be desirable. Telephone interviews may be conducted 
by a number of people to maintain a good pace of data gathering, while being 
overseen by the researcher (Novick, 2008). Specialist training in telephone 
interviewing is desirable (Wilson et al., 1998) or access to trained interviewers. An 
advantage of telephone interviewing is that it can facilitate the researcher 
supervising and support of the interviewing team, and improve uniformity of 
delivery of the questions, reducing the interviewer effect (Knox & Burkard, 2009). 
 
Interviewing by telephone is considerably cheaper than face-to-face and involves no 
travelling time, enabling the researcher to increase the quantity of respondents 
within a constrained budget, avoid wasted visits, and focus time available on 
businesslike accumulation of data (Fenig et al., 1993; Wilson et al., 1998; Sturges & 
Hanrahan, 2004; Hill et al., 2005; Opdenakker, 2006; Musselwhite et al., 2007; 
Stephens, 2007; Novick, 2008). 
 
In all considerations posed by de Vaus (1991), the advantages of telephone 
interviews outweigh their disadvantages (Wilson et al., 1998). Despite concerns 
about their drawbacks, they can be favourably compared with the practical 
limitations of face-to-face interviews (Opdenakker, 2006). 
 
High standards of care are needed in gathering data via telephone, as they would be 
with any other mode. For example, there should be training specific to the research 
project for the research team, including understanding the research protocol and 
practising interviews in role-plays, supervised interviews and debriefing (Knox & 
Burkard, 2009; Glogowska et al., 2010). Some pilot interviews should take place 
before the questionnaire is finalised (Glogowska et al., 2010). 
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3.3.3 Research ethics 
 
Science may strive to be value-free, but in the pursuit of that, it may become value-
laden (Longshore-Smith, 2006). Making business studies a “science” has been used 
to avoid or even deny the importance of moral considerations in practice (Ghoshal, 
2005). This study accepts that business knowledge is not separate from ethics and 
morality (Arbnor & Bjerke, 2009), and that ethics “are an essential part of rigorous 
research” (Davies & Dodd, 2002, p.281).  The idea of researchers being objective 
and research objects being passive is not helpful and could lead to researchers 
trying to use findings to manipulate cause and effect (Marsden & Littler, 1996).  
 
Some philosophers believe that people do have moral standards, free will and 
conscience (Cooper, 2007). Lowe et al. (2005) also argue that there should be a 
healthy balance between knowledge and other virtues, particularly wisdom. It is a 
person’s soul that enables their access to knowledge. Sales managers may indeed 
have ethical concerns about the lack of benefits given to contract staff or the impact 
of redundancy on permanent employees, and a researcher must be sensitive to the 
implications of their topic. In the case of outsourcing, one implication is that the 
permanent jobs of loyal long-serving members of the sales team may be lost.  
 
  
Figure 3: The fourth hermeneutic
This diagram illustrates the view that knowledge, represented by structure, pattern 
and process, needs to be connected by values and virtues.
Source: Lowe et al., 2005.
 
The principles of ethical research include voluntary participation, informed consent, 
doing no harm to respondents and ensuring their anonymity and confidentiality and 
privacy (de Vaus, 2002; Saunders 
respondents must not be put at risk. In the qualitative paradigm, it has also been 
argued that authenticity of the research depends on the process being empowering 
for respondents, rather than using them as research objects (Lincoln & Guba, 1986). 
Although primarily designed for vulnerable interviewees, the themes of negotiated 
consent, sensitivity to respondent’s emotions, rapport and follow
Irvine, 2008) were considered in the design of this study.
 
An overview of this study was appro
Committee in November 2008
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design of the interview guide and invitation letter, which were tested initially with a 
group of expert researchers and sales trainers. During the pilot interviews only one 
question had to be adjusted.  
 
The third party that conducted interviews (see Appendix B) was chosen because of 
its experience in interviewing business decision-makers over the telephone, and its 
adherence to the Market Research Society’s Code of Conduct. In the briefing and 
training provided to interviewers, they were prepared for potential questions from 
interviewees (Glogowska et al., 2010) and made aware that excessive probing might 
be regarded as a violation of privacy and therefore discretion must be applied (Carr 
& Worth, 2001). 
 
Refusals in telephone surveys often happen before any argument can be presented 
for participation (Groves, 1990), hence it is important to use other forms of 
introduction. Potential respondents were approach in advance via the researcher’s 
or the research company’s networks, seeking their involvement in the study (see 
Appendix C for invitation letter). Full information about the study and the questions 
that would be posed were included (Nunkoosing, 2005; Glogowska et al., 2010; 
Harvey, 2011). The respondents were invited to take part and informed about the 
nature of research and its possible benefits, the process of the research, the 
requirements from respondents and how the data would be used and stored 
(Saunders et al., 2003).  Advice was given about the time involved in answering the 
questions, which had been checked in the pilot. Advice was also given about the 
process of computer-assisted telephone interviewing. They were also advised about 
how their anonymity would be preserved by the dissociation of contact information 
from responses during coding, as recommended by Creswell (2003).  
 
At the time requested by the respondent, interviewers phoned and clearly 
introduced themselves. They reminded the respondent about the research 
objectives (Carr & Worth, 2001). They also reminded the respondent that the 
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interview would be taped, and how information would be stored and kept 
confidential (Glogowska et al., 2010) (see Appendix A). The interviewers negotiated 
for extra time if the conversation was over-running (Glogowska et al., 2010), but 
also ensured that time was offered at the end of interview for the interviewee to 
ask questions (Glogowska et al., 2010). 
 
Summary reports of each interviewee’s responses were sent to them to provide an 
opportunity for them to check accuracy and provide reflective comment (Carr & 
Worth, 2001) (See Appendix F). In addition to ensuring that the interviewee was still 
happy for the data to be used, this step also contributed to the interpretive validity 
of the data, and was a conduit for post-research support from the researcher. 
Subsequent interim reports and an invitation to discuss the modified model of 
resourcing decisions provided valuable verification for both researcher and 
respondents (see Appendix G). 
 
3.4. Research design 
 
3.4.1 Sampling 
 
In this study, the unit of analysis is sales managers, and the output will be the 
viewpoint profile of sales managers. The correct respondents for this study are 
managers with responsibility for the effectiveness and efficiency of the sales 
function in their organisation, or part of it. These managers are the primary 
decision-makers when it comes to employing salespeople or contracting out. Some 
consideration may be needed for the influence of other decision-makers, but the 
purpose of this study is to focus on the perceptions of sales managers about “make-
or-buy” in sales. 
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It is therefore necessary to establish the population of sales managers in the 
geographical scope of the study, the UK. Finding a suitable sampling frame is not as 
easy as it might be for other professions. According to the 2009 Labour Market 
Information report conducted by the Marketing and Sales Standard Setting Body in 
the UK (TBR for MSSSB, 2009), 7% of the UK’s population are involved in sales-
related jobs and 328,670 of them are sales managers.  Only 149,000 full-time 
marketing and sales directors were recorded by the Office for National Statistics in 
the second quarter of 2011 (ONS, 2011a). It is also worth noting that, of the 2.6 
million business enterprises registered for VAT or PAYE in the UK in 2010, only 0.5% 
are enterprises with more than 250 employees (11,815) (ONS, 2010) and only 5% 
had more than 50 employees. This suggests that there are a limited number of 
companies with sales managers supervising significant numbers of sales staff. 
 
Controlling for sampling bias is one of the most significant hurdles in strategic 
management studies (Ketchen et al., 2008). Where bias is likely to occur, the 
researcher can only aspire to ensure that the bias works in favour of transferability 
rather than against it. It is not a requirement of qualitative methodology that the 
sample of the population should be random, but it should be purposeful (Hoepfl, 
1997). Small samples are acceptable in qualitative studies, since quality and depth 
of data is a primary consideration, but the sample must not be too small, or it will 
be difficult to achieve saturation, or too large to make deep analysis difficult 
(Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007).   
 
“Qualitative power analysis” is recommended (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007, p. 105), 
but the unit of analysis is not necessarily just the number of respondents. Care must 
be taken to ensure that a large number of words are gathered from each 
respondent in order to “capture the voice” (Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007, p. 107). It 
is acceptable to adjust numbers of respondents during a qualitative study if 
saturation has not been reached, but it should also be considered beforehand on 
the basis of prior literature, since textbooks disagree and do not offer formulae 
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(Onwuegbuzie & Leech, 2007). The qualitative studies referenced in this thesis vary 
in sample size from the single case study (e.g. Halldórsson & Skjøtt-Larsen, 2006)  to 
33 cases for a UK cross-sectoral study of attitudes to opportunism (Grant, 2007)  to 
85 in-depth interviews with sales managers across three countries on the changing 
role of sales (Tanner et al., 2008). On the basis of the examples available to the 
researcher, 30 in-depth interviews lasting 35-60 minutes was considered a suitable 
target to achieve data saturation. 
 
Onwuegbuzie and Leech (2007) describe 19 non-random sampling methods. 
Maximum variation sampling is one suggested approach, involving the selection of a 
wide range of individuals so that all or most types will be represented in the study. 
This ensures that multiple perspectives are captured and that any shared patterns 
across very different cases would be valuable findings (Hoepfl, 1997). It was a 
concern that there should be some breadth in this study across industry sectors, 
since notable empirical studies have been in manufacturing (e.g. Anderson, 1985, 
Wilson & Zhang, 2002).  The respondents in this study were employed in seven 
broadly different industry sectors: four in healthcare, four in information 
technology, seven in various sub-sectors of manufacturing, six in business-to-
business professional services, three in the business-to-business divisions of utility 
companies, three in the business-to-business divisions of financial services 
companies and two in technical service providers.  They were asked about their 
career experience which in some cases encompassed other sectors.  Their 
employers were mostly industry leaders in their sub-sectors, with ten being in the 
top two and another fourteen being in the top ten. 
 
Purposefully selecting a cross-sectoral sample for a qualitative study was intended 
to enhance the richness of the data and the potential usefulness of the emerging 
themes, but it had to be carefully considered. As Wilson and Zhang (2002) found 
contextual variations within the manufacturing sector in the UK which could predict 
sales resources choices, it is notable that Anderson and Schmittlein (1984) 
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examined the integration of the salesforce in only 16 firms in a sub-sector of 
manufacturing (electronic components).  They did so on the grounds that while it 
limited generalisability, it enhanced internal validity, as industry-specific variations 
had been excluded.  Nevertheless, Anderson (1985) suggested that her work should 
be tested in other industries, and Krafft et al (2004) included five sectors in their 
study, without drawing specific attention to any sector-related variations.  Cross-
sectoral samples have been used in qualitative studies before, such as Glancy et al 
(1998) in a study of entrepreneurial dynamics, and notably Rangan et al (1993) who 
chose different firm characteristics within manufacturing to study distribution 
channels (sample size 15). They argued for it on the basis that it ensured adequate 
variation in the topic of interest.  However there is a risk that selecting a small 
number of firms from each sector in a study of resourcing options means that 
“industry norms” might be overlooked as an influencing factor.  Since this study 
specifically asked about the role of “industry norms” in resourcing decisions, every 
effort has been made to minimise this risk. 
 
The key sampling criterion for respondents was that they had relevant experience 
of significant resourcing decisions.  All had more than five years’ experience of 
running sizeable sales departments.  A reasonable balance of different sectors was 
intended to ensure variety of experience. Most respondents, even if they were not 
currently outsourcing, had notable experience of outsourcing or channel 
management in their career. It was considered reasonable to interview respondents 
who admitted having very little experience of outsourcing or an aversion to it, as 
their perceptions could particularly illuminate the inhibitors of outsourcing. 
 
Building up a sample through personal contacts reduced the likelihood of non-
response, and maximised the opportunity to examine non-response. Management 
studies are characterised by high levels of non-response. Between 1992 and 2003, 
the average (mean) response rate for mail surveys was 33% with a 17% standard 
deviation (Cycyota & Harrison, 2006) and at the observed rate of decline a survey 
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conducted in 2010 would attract a 28% response rate. A study of 532 samples 
between 1990-2005 (Carter et al., 2008) suggested that in marketing and sales 
research, average response rates dropped from 30% to 18%. Response rates in sales 
studies were lower than those in marketing by 3%.   
 
In this study, of 231 sales managers invited to participate, 34 volunteered to do so 
and 13 explained their reasons for non-response, being lack of time, company 
policy, or that the study was not relevant to them (See Appendix D). The sales 
managers who were initially approached were the alumni network of a 
postgraduate course in sales management and the Sales Leadership Alliance. This 
perhaps suggests a bias towards a self-selecting “elite” within the sales profession, 
but the sample was supplemented by contacts of members of these groups, and 
contacts of the research organisation, who were not involved in professional 
development or professional bodies.  
 
Due to a technical problem, three interviews were lost and two others were 
excluded for quality problems (one respondent was running a non-UK micro-
business; one was running a CSO, rather than being a client of one). 
 
Cycyota and Harrison (2006) noted that executives have less time to respond at the 
same time as requests are increasing and company policies are increasingly limiting 
responses.  They discovered that the usual best practice for conducting research, 
such as advance notice, follow-up and personalisation, do not particularly increase 
the likelihood of participation, whereas the perceived importance or value of the 
topic or sponsorship by the employer or a social network did have some effect (also 
noted by Saunders et al., 2003).  
 
Social exchange theory is relevant to the motivation of sales managers to 
participate in surveys (Carter et al., 2008). Response rates can be improved where 
the respondent feels that they are getting something out of it. Carter et al. (2008) 
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found that researchers in the sales field can positively affect response rates and 
sample size by the judicious use of facilitators. The researcher must reduce the cost 
to participate, or raise the benefits of participation. As previously observed by 
Cycyota and Harrison (2006), Carter et al.’s (2008) study found that co-operation 
with employers or social networks was the single best facilitator, but co-operation 
with an incentive could increase response rates by 58%. Familiarity with promoters 
or sponsors of the research can increase trust, but participants are also motivated 
by returns, especially if paid in advance. Desirable though it is to maximise non-
material reward such as the sense of contributing to something important, 
incentives create a sense of obligation (de Vaus, 2002). In addition to association 
with their existing networks, respondents were offered a donation to a charity of 
their choice of £20. (See Appendix I for list of charities supported). Although 
pragmatic in terms of increasing response rates, incentives add another dimension 
to the possibility that volunteers may possess qualities that non-responders do not 
have (Baker, 2001). However, given the exploratory nature of the research design, 
this is not a major concern. 
 
3.4.2 Interview guide design 
 
Respondents are active rather than passive in the research situation. The theory of 
symbolic interaction suggests that humans usually try to take one another’s 
viewpoint into account in discussions, and respondents may try to assume the role 
of the researcher unless the researcher explains their motivation in asking a 
question and setting a framework for the respondents to answer it (Foddy, 1993). 
Topics are multidimensional, and although there will be some similarities in 
business culture and experiences for a population such as UK sales managers, but 
they are still individuals who may interpret questions differently. If answers are to 
be compared, researchers must take care to ensure that the topic is closely defined, 
that the relevance of the topic to the respondent is established, and that the 
 respondent is advised about the perspective they should take in answering the 
questions (the TAP paradigm) (Foddy, 1993). 
 
The researcher has to aim to
the question and the respondent’s decoding of the question.
 
Figure 4: Encoding and decoding of communications
Source: adapted from Shannon and Weaver, 1949.
(See  Appendix A for interview guide for
 
 
3.4.2.1 Question design
 
Gallup (1947) suggested that too much attention is given to sample design and not 
enough to question design. Resul
how well-informed respondents are, because ambiguous words are used, complex 
issues are over-simplified or intensity of
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 minimise the “noise” that affects both the encoding of 
 
 
 
 this study). 
 
ts can be criticised if research does not establish 
 opinions is overlooked.   
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Respondents do try to answer all questions, but will be influenced by a variety of 
contextual clues within the research situation (Foddy, 1993). Clues are gleaned from 
the wording of questions, adjectives used and verbal stress, and the positioning of a 
question within the interview. Indeed, it is very difficult to eliminate bias or ensure 
that qualitative research might be repeatable. The TAP paradigm has been applied 
to maximise the validity of this research.   
 
It is recognised that words can have different nuances in meaning. In English, a “fat” 
chance is very similar to a “slim” chance and “wicked” can mean very bad or very 
good. Wording has been checked for usage within the population of UK sales 
managers in a pre-pilot expert review. Questions avoid qualifying clauses, negatives, 
evaluative adjectives, abstract concepts or implications. Respondents were offered 
the option of giving no opinion or declining to answer particular questions, to avoid 
forcing opinions (de Vaus, 2002). 
 
Overall, Gallup’s (1947) quintamensional question design was followed where 
feasible in a qualitative interview, guiding the questionnaire overall and some 
individual questions (See Appendix A). The first dimension involves filtering to 
establish whether a respondent has thought about an issue (e.g. have you, within 
the past five years, been involved in a decision to…?). In this study, it was 
considered appropriate to include this filtering question in the recruitment of 
respondents, to establish whether or not the sales manager has recently been 
involved in a situation where a sales activity was considered for “make-or-buy”.  
This was done on the basis that a sales manager who had not been involved in such 
a decision within the past year might find the interview boring or difficult. 
 
Gallup’s second dimension involves questioning to establish their familiarity with 
the topic (e.g. what do you think are the pros and cons of x?). In this study, each 
section begins with an open question about a possible factor in “make-or-buy” 
decisions (full details in Appendix A).   
209 
 
 
Gallup’s third dimension involves specific questions. In this study, there are two 
sections asking specific questions, and specific questions to back up each open 
question. Section A asks contextual questions about the nature of outsourced sales 
activities in the respondent’s company, which are designed to provide more detail 
(in addition to the filtering question) about the experience of the respondent 
relevant to the research topic.  Section A asks contextual questions about the 
respondent’s firmographics and general experience. This data is necessary for 
analysis purposes. Also, in each of sections B-E there are questions about facts 
which may provide specific context for the respondent’s views of a particular 
approach to “make-or-buy” decisions. Respondents may not immediately recall 
circumstances, so very simple parameters have been used (e.g. less or more) and 
interviewers were advised to say “take your time if you need to” (Foddy, 1993). 
 
The fourth dimension concerns the respondent’s reasons for holding an opinion, 
and the fifth ensures that the interviewer establishes how strongly an opinion is 
held. Both these dimensions need to be covered in the prompts that interviewers 
use as follow-up to the second level open question. Although it is unlikely to occur 
in a semi-structured interview, care was taken to legitimise a “no opinion” 
response. It is important to establish direction of feeling and intensity, but also 
where there is no preference (de Vaus, 2002). Certainly, the respondents were very 
confident about expressing their strength of opinion, which was useful in analysis. 
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3.4.2.2 Theoretical underpinning of questions and prompts 
 
Although this qualitative study is not testing hypotheses, the primary data-
gathering is anchored in the literature on “make-or-buy”. To this extent, all 
questions and prompts are linked to particular theories and prior research findings 
(see Appendix AA). First of all, there are some key contextual questions to include: 
propensity to outsource and firmographics. 
  
3.4.2.2.1 Propensity to outsource 
 
In this study, the main behaviour of interest is outsourcing sales activities. The 
respondents were prompted about how much of the sales function in their current 
employer was outsourced, and which activities were outsourced. They were also 
prompted to describe their experience of outsourcing in previous jobs.  This 
preceded discussion about their perceptions of sales outsourcing. 
 
3.4.2.2.2. Firmographics 
 
Although not found to be particularly significant in other studies, “firmographics” 
are common sources of differences in business behaviour. From Anderson (1985), 
company size was included. In addition, as this is a cross-sectoral study, industry 
sector is a useful contextual factor, as it is possible that there are different 
characteristics for sales outsourcing in different sectors. Geographical location of 
the company was not considered relevant in a small country such as the UK. In fact, 
many of the respondents had experience of working in other countries and gave 
national comparisons, e.g. on employment law. 
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Sections B-E include questions based on the theoretical approaches examined in the 
literature review. 
 
3.4.2.2.3 Cost comparison 
 
Although overlooked by previous studies, at the core of transaction cost economics 
is a calculation of the comparative costs of doing a task internally or externally. In 
the researcher’s qualitative study (Rogers, 2009), all respondents were aware of 
cost comparisons and considered it very relevant to their decision-making. Due to 
the respondents’ likely familiarity with this issue, multiple prompts were not used 
to avoid irritating them. 
 
3.4.2.2.4 Control factors 
 
In both transaction cost economics and agency theory, incongruent goals on behalf 
of contracting parties mean that there is a risk of opportunistic behaviour. In studies 
of the sales function, difficulties in linking activity to outcomes have been of interest 
not just in ascertaining the likelihood of employing salespeople, but also whether 
internal salespeople are paid largely by salary or commission. Krafft et al. (2004) re-
used four constructs and nine indicators from John and Weitz (1989) to test this 
construct; Anderson (1985) used 7 for difficulty in evaluating performance, 3 for 
timespan to feedback (length of sales cycle) and 5 for the importance of non-selling 
activities.   
 
It has been argued in the literature review that unpredictability and lack of control 
may also manifest itself with employees, and care has been taken to prompt the 
respondents to compare sources of opportunism from within as well as from 
contractors. The potentially moderating factors of the availability of good contract 
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sales organisations and internal competences in managing contractors are also 
covered here. 
 
3.4.2.2.5 Skills 
 
The resource-based view suggests that some of the skills of salespeople are the 
critical capability at the customer interface (Menguc & Barker, 2005) and that skills 
comparison must be at least a part of the “make-or-buy” decision. The skills of a 
salesperson, by implication from Anderson (1985) and Krafft et al.’s (2004) 
questions about the length of time to train for certain characteristics, include 
knowledge of the nature of the company, its products and its customers, or they 
may be more specific to the individual’s relationships within the firm. Because of 
the variety of aspects of specificity in skills, including knowledge of the firm, 
products, customers and team working, this section requires the most prompts. The 
focus of this section was on the rent-generating knowledge and skills of salespeople 
or other staff within the sales function, as individuals. It is recognised that there 
may be “capabilities” within the sales function that are broader. There were 
prompts to elicit the value of internal relationships and teamwork. The potentially 
moderating factor of industry norms was explored in this section, alongside 
reputational issues. 
 
3.4.2.2.6 Flexibility 
 
There is contrary evidence in the literature about the role of uncertainty in the 
business environment and its effect on “make-or-buy” decisions in sales. There is 
also contradictory evidence for the value of flexibility as a response to a volatile 
business environment.  Although flexibility is a relatively under-explored rationale 
for outsourcing, it is worthy of examination here. The researcher’s preliminary 
discussions about this research topic and qualitative study in the pharmaceutical 
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sector (Rogers, 2009) suggest that flexibility is a critical factor in “make-or-buy” in 
the sales function. 
 
3.4.3. The expert panel and pilot testing 
 
First of all, the questionnaire was reviewed by an expert panel, who were asked to 
consider the meaning of questions and how they might rephrase the questions in 
their own words, and also how they arrived at their answers (Foddy, 1993; de Vaus, 
2002). They also commented on the likely length of interview and the logical flow.  
 
Importantly, the third party research company was able to add their expertise in 
telephone interviewing. For example, they recommended that firmographic 
questions were asked first rather than last, as in their experience it was a useful 
means of establishing rapport. 
 
In stage 2, the undeclared pilot of 5 interviews, the researcher was involved with 
monitoring the progress of all calls and checking for problems experienced either by 
respondents or the interviewers. One question, about breaches of trust, was 
regarded as too sensitive and was expressed differently using the less personal 
angle of ethical codes in the remainder of the interviews. 
 
3.4.4 Reliability  
 
In qualitative studies, the words of the respondent are used to understand the 
perceptions of the individual that may shed light on the reality beyond their point of 
view (Healy & Perry, 2000).  For example, the relationship between “make-or-buy” 
decisions and sales function effectiveness may be a real thing, but it would be 
impossible to measure objectively. As Colletti and Chonko (1997) observed, there 
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are a number of factors associated with a high performing sales function. It is 
unlikely that these factors are measured consistently across organisations. Even if 
they are, guesses might be made, or respondents might repeat “folklore”. Managers 
may not know what is going on (MacDonald & Hellgren, 1999) or managers may 
even create and manipulate perception errors (Mezias & Starbuck, 2003). Logically, 
managers have to perform as well or better than competitors (Colletti & Chonko, 
1997: Mezias & Starbuck, 2003), but in some firms a trend towards improvement is 
acceptable. In two studies conducted by Mezias and Starbuck (2003) there was a 
low correlation between perceptions and objective measures, but managerial 
practice still relies on the accuracy of managers’ perceptions. However, the 
assumption that managers need to perceive issues accurately in order to solve them 
should be challenged. Variables that ought to be considered in strategic decision-
making are often difficult to perceive accurately. Moving things broadly in the right 
direction might be more practical than solving a problem only when equipped with 
an accurate and detailed knowledge of it. Misperceptions do cause errors, but 
feedback should enable adjustment (Mezias & Starbuck, 2003).   
 
Research certainly has to recognise that managers’ views of reality differ from fact 
(MacDonald & Hellgren, 1999). By focusing on sales managers’ perceptions of 
“make-or-buy” constructs, this study recognises that these perceptions are relevant 
to sales managers resolving their resource allocation challenges on an operational 
as well as strategic basis, i.e. the way they move things in what appears to be the 
right direction.   
 
In the field of organisational change, research needs to capture the substance of the 
change, internal and external contexts, the actions taken to achieve change, the 
criteria for change and reactions to change (Armenakis & Bedeian, 1999). A change 
in the boundary of the sales function requires organisational change. Defining and 
measuring attitudes may enable predictions of reactions and behaviour (Baker, 
2001). It is also important to capture what the respondent has done, under what 
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circumstances. A longitudinal study would overcome the weakness of the snapshot 
(Baker, 2001), but since that would not be possible given the timeframe of this 
study, respondents must be prompted for information about previous behaviour 
and future intentions.    
 
In-depth interviews have been chosen for this study as a recognition of the 
possibility of participant error (Saunders et al., 2003), because perceptions will 
undoubtedly vary according to recent events or anticipated events. Despite the 
reliability risk, studies of strategic management should tap into the motives and 
preferences of managers, as well as their decisions (Ketchen et al., 2008).  The 
research is undertaken with awareness that sales managers may express 
themselves in value-laden terms and that the researcher needs to be aware of her 
own values in conducting the analysis (Healy & Perry, 2000). 
 
The reliability of a study’s results depends on whether they would be replicated in a 
retest (Creswell, 2003). This is a particular challenge for qualitative studies, but 
efforts can be made to ensure transparency that would enable another researcher 
to replicate the method. The trustworthiness of qualitative research depends on 
whether it can be audited (Healy & Perry, 2000). In addition, the authors of seminal 
works on rigour in qualitative research (Lincoln & Guba, 1986) suggest a number of 
other criteria that should be addressed. 
 
3.4.4.1 Confirmability 
 
Confirmability is defined as the degree to which findings are determined by 
respondents rather than researchers (Lincoln & Guba, 1986; Baxter & Eyles, 1997). 
Researchers should make their original data available (within the confines of 
confidentiality), describe their method and provide an audit trail of decision-making 
(Lewis, 2009), and explain their position on the research topic.   
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In accordance with the requirement for a PhD, the analysis tables (See Appendix J), 
quotes (see Findings chapter) and description of method (this chapter) will be in the 
public domain. The role of the researcher’s own position on the topic of a 
qualitative study has attracted comment, much of which is relevant to validity (see 
below). Certainly a researcher should declare their position (Lewis, 2009). This study 
was undertaken by a researcher whose early career experience of IBM’s value 
added resellers and software agents was very mixed, but who has recently 
produced articles indicating advantages in using contract sales organisations in the 
pharmaceutical sector. It was considered desirable to use third party interviewers 
as well as the researcher to minimise the degree to which the researcher’s 
experience and knowledge could influence data collection and interpretation. As 
recommended by Sin (2010), the researcher recognised her own preconceptions 
and took deliberate measures to minimise their influence on the research process. 
 
3.4.4.2 Repeatability 
 
Seale and Silverman (1997) placed particular emphasis on tracking the degree to 
which another researcher could use the method and/or data in a qualitative study. 
They advocate quasi-statistics, i.e. using counts of events where they are applicable 
and using both open and closed questions to support any possible generalisations. 
In order to counter possible bias, the researcher was particularly careful in analysing 
cases which deviate from observed “norms”. Data was recorded comprehensively, 
and Nvivo software was used to assist analysis (See Appendices J and K). Given that 
the interview guide was informed by the literature review (see Appendix AA) and 
coding has been electronically captured, repeatability seems feasible. 
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3.4.4.3 Dependability/consistency 
 
The degree to which objectivity can be achieved and the minimisation of 
idiosyncrasies is a constant challenge for qualitative studies. Dependability refers to 
the “plausibility of accounts” (Baxter & Eyles, 1997, p. 516) and may be undermined 
by weak concepts and limiting the scope of the study by finalising themes too soon. 
Where concepts are weak, they may be interpreted differently. Qualitative 
researchers need to use value-neutral language and be consistent in asking 
questions, probing and following-up.   
 
A pilot test is the first step in ensuring that meanings are clear. This may involve 
asking a group of experts (used in this study) and/or by testing the questionnaire on 
a small number of respondents (also used in this study). In the case of an expert 
review, respondents can also comment on how long the questions took to 
complete, the clarity of the instructions and questions, and any flawed logic, 
potential risks or topic omissions (Saunders et al., 2003). The expert panel review of 
the questions in this study was achieved by individual discussions with three other 
academic researchers (one a former marketing manager), and three very 
experienced sales managers currently in teaching/training roles. Although this was a 
convenience sample, it was a relevant group, able to make informed comment 
about the nature of the questions and their meaning. Further improvements to the 
wording of questions/prompts were also made during the briefing of the 
interviewing team, who all had extensive experience of conducting telephone 
interviews with organisational elites.  
 
Using multiple researchers has been advocated as a means of focusing on 
consistency in implementing the study, because they all need to work to a 
standardised guide (Baxter & Eyles, 1997). This standardisation in the interview 
guide maximised the consistency of the interviewing team in terms of asking the 
same questions, asking questions in an unbiased tone, using probes consistently to 
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ensure rich data is collected and avoiding leading the respondent (Lewis, 2009). The 
automatic recording of interviews also provides a means of checking on 
consistency, and the researcher had the opportunity to check with respondents in 
case of queries. This study has observed these protocols. 
 
3.4.4.4 Authenticity 
 
Authenticity is usually a key concern for qualitative research; the researcher must 
demonstrate that they have captured an “authentic understanding of people’s 
experiences” (Seale & Silverman, 1997, p. 380). In doing so, they will find different 
constructions and conflict, so what can be done to ensure that the voices of 
respondents are represented fairly in the interpretation of findings and conclusions 
of the researcher? (Lincoln & Guba, 1986). Negotiation with stakeholders is 
advocated, offering the opportunity for respondents to become educated on the 
topic and action ideas that occur during the negotiation. This study has ensured a 
number of feedback loops with respondents, including verification of a summary of 
their interview (See Appendix F), inviting responses to two interim reports and 
inviting comments on the revised model of sales resource decision-making (See 
Appendix G). However, the researcher does not claim to have engaged in full 
negotiation, which might have been a burden on respondents’ time. 
 
3.4.5. Validity 
 
3.4.5.1 Contingent validity 
 
One specific aspect of qualitative research is the importance of understanding the 
context in which a respondent expresses a particular view. The social world of the 
respondent is not a laboratory. “Causal impacts are not fixed but are contingent 
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upon their environment” (Healy & Perry, 2000, p. 123). Instead of direct “cause and 
effect”, this research is designed to identify “broad, generative mechanisms” that 
exist (Healy & Perry, 2000, p. 123), i.e. a number of answers related to particular 
contexts. In order to ensure that these answers are valid, the research process must 
ensure that the respondent’s meaning is captured by in-depth questioning focusing 
on “why” they perceive what they perceive, and establishing contextual issues. 
Meaning must be framed by the people whose meaning is in question, and in the 
terms that they use (Maxwell, 1992).  
 
3.4.5.2 Construct validity  
 
Studies linking constructs are usual in strategic management research. 
Unfortunately, many of these constructs are theoretical and cannot be observed 
(Boyd, Gove & Hitt, 2005). Construct validity in qualitative research requires the 
researcher to ensure the validity of the concepts applied to the phenomenon being 
researched by use of prior theory and research findings, which has been the case in 
this study.  
 
Researchers need to avoid concluding that a relationship exists when it does not. 
The study must also take care to search for disconfirming evidence (Frankel & 
Devers, 2000). Concluding that a relationship does not exist when it does is equally 
problematic. In a qualitative study, the direction of causation can be explored 
through the responses of the interviewees. So, for example, where key account 
management had been outsourced (which was the exception to the rule) it was 
possible to find out from the contextual information given that this occurred 
because of constraints in accessing skills for a new venture, and the temps were 
subsequently employed. It was therefore consistent with the generalised view of 
key account management as a competence companies would prefer to keep in-
house. 
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3.4.5.3 Descriptive validity 
 
Due to concerns about the potential for interviewer/researcher bias in what they 
take note of in interviews, Maxwell (1992) highlighted the need for qualitative 
researchers to ensure that data is recorded accurately. The obvious tool for 
achieving this is recording of interviews, which, in the case of this study, was 
achieved automatically using computer-assisted telephone interviewing. A more 
pertinent concern in descriptive validity is the possibility of omitting something in 
analysis that the respondent intended to be important (Maxwell, 1992), but 
feedback loops with the respondents should have avoided that. 
 
3.4.5.4. Transcription quality 
 
The spoken word of the respondents usually has to be transcribed, for use in 
manual or computer-assisted analysis. Davidson (2009) drew attention to the need 
for transcription validity, since the recording of speech can reflect the transcriber’s 
bias. In effect, transcription can become a translation, with the transcriber applying 
some judgement and interpretation to the respondent’s words. However, it is 
equally inappropriate if words are transcribed in a way that makes the data difficult 
to use. There is a debate about whether a transcription should naturalise the 
spoken word into the written word, e.g. assuming punctuation and paragraphs, or 
whether the spoken word should remain denaturalised, with all its “ums” and “ers” 
and lack of punctuation.   
 
Particularly with telephone interviewing, it is desirable to capture how words were 
said (hesitations, emphasis) as well as what was said. In this study, professional 
transcribers were briefed to take the denaturalised approach, and the researcher 
took care to listen to the audiotapes while using the text (See Appendix E). Also in 
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line with Davidson’s (2009) comments about the ethics of hired transcribers, these 
professionals were bound by the code of conduct of the Market Research Society. 
 
3.4.5.5 Internal validity/causal validity/credibility 
 
A qualitative study must concern itself to some degree with whether or not, and to 
what degree, cause and effect can be interpreted from the data, whilst recognising 
the multiple viewpoints of the respondents. Lincoln and Guba (1986) recommend a 
number of procedures to enable qualitative studies to contribute to the 
understanding of cause and effect concerning a research topic, while ensuring that 
respondents are the judges of its plausibility. They argue that researchers should 
have extensive and intensive contact with respondents, although that would have 
an impact on how many cases could be studied. They also advocate some form of 
triangulation, which again may have an impact on the scope of the study. Baxter 
and Eyles (1997) mentioned the importance of purposeful sampling to ensure a 
wide variety of cases are considered; Lincoln and Guba (1986, p. 77) emphasise 
“active search for negative instances”. In this study, the search for multiple cases 
has been emphasised more heavily than extensive contact, in recognition of the 
limited time available to organisational elites to contribute to research, and 
exceptions to the rule were examined. 
 
The researcher should also seek feedback from respondents about their 
reconstruction of their words.  Baxter and Eyles (1997) argue that this “member 
checking” is “one of the most important strategies for enhancing credibility” (p. 
515). With telephone interviewing, it has been suggested that respondents will only 
want to see summary information, rather than checking full transcripts (Welch et 
al., 2002), which introduces some translation issues, but the respondent has the 
opportunity to correct them.  Summaries, written by the researcher, were used as 
the first feedback loop in this study (See Appendix F). All the respondents either 
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confirmed or corrected the summaries, so that meaning could be checked before 
analysis of transcripts. 
 
 
3.4.5.6. External validity 
 
Researchers need to take care in claiming to what degree their findings can be 
applied to contexts other than the study situation, and this is particularly true of 
qualitative studies.  Although in qualitative studies meaning is assumed to be bound 
to the scope of each particular study, aspects of research produced in one context 
may be transferable or be meaningful in other contexts (Baxter & Eyles, 1997). 
Previous research on the topic of “make-or-buy” in the sales function has been 
small-scale, but has advanced knowledge.  This study uses the techniques of 
purposeful sampling and the collection of “Thick, descriptive data” (Lincoln & Guba, 
1986, p. 77) which may enable others to judge the relevance of the findings to other 
contexts. 
 
This study has its limitations and does not claim to have generalisable results. The 
limitations of the sampling frame, sample size and response rates have been noted 
above.  Nevertheless, efforts have been made to introduce sufficient rigour into the 
study to assume that a reasonable addition to knowledge has been made. 
 
3.4.5.7 Analytical generalisation 
 
As advocated by Healy and Perry (2000) in discussing the rigour of qualitative 
studies, the focus of this study is on theory-building rather than theory testing.  The 
interview protocol was based on previous literature (see Appendix AA) and provides 
a framework for collecting data that may support, refute or modify particular 
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theories, with information about the contextual dependencies for those cases. In 
this study, an initial model has been defined and modified in accordance with the 
data gathered, to refine it into a form suitable for testing at a later stage. 
 
The approaches to reliability and validity are summarised in the table below: 
 
Table 14: Quality criteria for qualitative methods 
 
Major criterion Sub criterion Description Technique 
to address 
(generic) 
Technique to 
address – this 
study 
Ontological 
appropriateness 
(Healy & Perry, 
2000) 
 Research 
problem deals 
with complex  
phenomena 
Definition of 
research 
problem 
Breadth of 
enquiry: 
antecedents, 
contexts and 
nuances; sales 
managers’ 
perceptions 
Epistemology 
(Healy & Perry, 
2000) 
 Value aware 
rather than 
value free or 
value laden 
Number of 
interviews; 
other 
evidence; 
probes; state 
values; peer 
review 
Target of 30 
interviews from 
variety of 
contexts; open 
and closed 
questions; 
professional 
interview team; 
PhD viva; and 
research to be 
published 
Reliability/ 
trustworthiness  
Confirmability 
(Lincoln & 
Guba, 1986; 
Baxter & 
Eyles, 1997) 
Research 
worker/s 
reliability 
(Lewis, 2009); 
Findings 
determined by 
respondents 
rather than 
researchers 
Availability 
of original 
data, 
description 
of method/ 
audit trail; 
statement of 
position of 
researcher 
Availability of 
original data, 
analysis tables, 
quotes; 
description of 
method; 
statement of 
position of 
researcher 
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Major 
criterion 
Sub criterion Description Technique 
to address 
(generic) 
Technique to 
address – this 
study 
Reliability/ 
trustworthiness 
Repeatability 
Seale & 
Silverman 
(1997) 
Degree to 
which another 
researcher 
could use the 
method 
and/or data 
Quasi-
statistics; 
qual/quant; 
deviant case 
analysis; 
using 
software to 
assist 
analysis; 
recording 
data 
comprehensi
vely 
Quasi-statistics 
(counts of events, 
some statistical 
analysis; open and 
closed questions; 
deviant case 
analysis; using 
software to assist 
analysis; recording 
data 
comprehensively 
(computer-assisted) 
Reliability/ 
trustworthiness 
Dependability/ 
consistency 
(Baxter & Eyles, 
1997) 
Degree to 
which 
objectivity can 
be achieved; 
minimisation 
of 
idiosyncrasies 
Multiple 
interviewers; 
consistency 
in asking 
questions, 
probes, 
follow-up, 
transcription
, follow-up 
Pilot testing, use of 
professional 
interviewers and 
transcribers; 
computer-assisted 
interviewing 
Reliability/ 
trustworthiness 
Authenticity 
(Lincoln & 
Guba, 1986) 
Fairness in 
negotiating 
evaluation 
with 
stakeholders 
Discussion 
with 
stakeholders 
throughout 
Feedback loops; 
appreciation of 
respondents as co-
creators of 
knowledge 
Validity Contingent 
validity (Healy 
& Perry, 2000)/ 
Interpretive 
validity 
(Maxwell, 1992) 
Generative 
discussion 
rather than 
direct cause 
and effect; 
ensure 
respondent’s 
meaning is 
captured 
In-depth 
questioning 
focusing on 
“why”; 
contextual 
issues 
In-depth questioning 
focusing on “why”; 
contextual issues 
Validity Construct 
validity (Healy 
& Perry, 2000); 
theoretical 
validity 
(Maxwell, 1992) 
Validity of 
concepts 
applied to the 
phenomenon 
being 
researched 
Use of prior 
theory 
Use of prior theory 
Validity Descriptive 
validity 
(Maxwell, 1992; 
Lewis, 2009) 
Accurate data 
collection 
Audio/videot
ape and 
“member 
checking” 
Interviews recorded 
and summaries 
checked with 
respondents 
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Major criterion Sub criterion Description Technique 
to address 
(generic) 
Technique to 
address – this 
study 
Validity Transcription 
quality 
(Davidson, 
2009; Sin, 
2010) 
Transformatio
n from sound 
to text 
Brief for 
transcribers: 
record how 
things were 
said 
Brief for 
transcribers: 
record how things 
were said; 
Use of tapes as 
well as transcripts 
in analysis 
Validity Internal or 
causal 
validity/credib
ility (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1986; 
Baxter & 
Eyles, 1997) 
Degree to 
which cause 
and effect can 
be established 
Purposeful 
sampling; 
extensive 
contact, 
triangulation
, peer 
checks, 
deviant case 
analysis, 
member 
checks 
Purposeful 
sampling; 
optimised 
contact, open and 
closed questions, 
interviewing team 
reviews, deviant 
case analysis, 
member checks 
(check summaries 
with 
respondents) 
Validity External 
validity. 
Transferability 
(Lincoln & 
Guba, 1986) 
Can be applied 
to contexts 
other than the 
study situation 
Purposeful 
sampling; 
“Thick, 
descriptive 
data” 
enabling 
others to 
judge 
Purposeful 
sampling; “Thick, 
descriptive data” 
enabling others 
to judge 
Validity Analytical 
generalisation 
(Healy & 
Perry, 2000) 
Focus on 
theory-
building rather 
than theory 
testing 
Interview 
protocol 
based on 
prior 
knowledge 
that provides 
framework 
for 
supporting 
theory (or 
not) 
Interview 
protocol based on 
prior knowledge 
that provides 
framework for 
supporting theory 
(or not) 
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3.4.6 Implementation process 
 
In accordance with the advice offered by Burke and Miller (2001) on the basis of 
their exploration of intuitive decision-making via telephone interviews, careful steps 
were taken in the administration process. 
 
Before the survey was started, considerable care had to be taken in planning and 
pre-testing. The questions had been designed to reflect the constructs derived from 
the literature review (See Appendix AA). To ensure the robustness of the interview 
guide (See Appendix A), an expert panel were consulted to check the clarity of the 
questions, the logical flow of the questions and the amount of time that would be 
required to answer them.   
 
Introductory letters (see Appendix C) were sent via e-mail to potential participants 
in the networks of the researcher and research company, with a view to ensuring a 
wide variety of company type across business-to-business industry sectors. For 
those who responded expressing interest, questions were sent in advance to allow 
the respondent a certain amount of time to gather their thoughts (as per Wäppling 
et al., 2010). This was recommended by Burke and Miller (2001) as a means of 
obtaining more in-depth data.  Incentives were discussed with the research 
company on the basis of their experience, and they recommended donations to a 
limited choice of charities (£20 per respondent) (See Appendix I). 
 
From a technical angle, it was important to ensure that the equipment and software 
for telephone interviewing and data capture was working correctly. The advantage 
of using a professional company to assist with data collection was that their 
equipment was already in situ and robust, and interviewees trained to use it. Other 
logistical considerations included the scheduling of interviews at a time to suit the 
interviewee and to enable the presence of the researcher as well as the interviewer 
if possible. Burke and Miller (2001) noted the problem of rescheduling by 
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participants, which had to be minimised via reminders, and this did occur on a 
number of occasions.   
 
Although time is always at a premium for busy executives, a summary of the 
introductory information about the study and a reminder about anonymity and data 
confidentiality was given at the beginning of each interview, as the respondent 
might have forgotten these details (Burke & Miller, 2001). The researcher was 
taking notes while the tape captured the responses.  
 
Interviewing styles did differ per interviewer, but all had undertaken training and 
briefing, and there was no apparent loss of data as a result. Prompts and probing 
questions had already been planned to overcome any superficial answers. Of more 
concern was the possibility for the respondents to adopt the role of teacher of 
technicalities, as described by Stephens (2007), and for the interviewer to defer to 
the respondent and fail to prompt. The combination of open questions and closed 
questions was designed to provide variety for the respondent and connectivity 
within the data. Inevitably some respondents offered more detail than others, and 
some questions got better quality responses than others (See Appendix E). 
 
Burke and Miller (2001) advocated speedy data analysis to maximise the integrity of 
the data. Members of the interviewing team were frequently discussing progress 
with the lead researcher. Systematic analysis of comments into themes was 
conducted. Summaries of interviews were sent to the respondents to check for 
accuracy and to provide additional reflective comment. Although Nvivo coding is 
best done when all data has been gathered, the researcher was loading data and 
reviewing transcripts/tapes as soon as possible after interviews took place. 
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3.5 Data Analysis 
 
3.5.1 Overview 
 
The world of management is complex (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004).  Due to the 
complexity of “make-or-buy” in the sales function and the variety of explanations 
and contexts, this study seeks to analyse the words of respondents to ensure that 
concepts and their inter-relationships are identified correctly.  
 
Respondents have been asked to explain in their own words how they perceive 
cause and effect. The purpose of asking an open question is to establish whether 
the answer is related to an already established possibility, or whether it represents 
a new possibility (Christy & Wood, 1999).  As previously described, both audio files 
of the original interview and transcriptions were available to the researcher as data. 
These had to be heard and read “to obtain a general sense of the information and 
to reflect on its overall meaning” (Creswell, 2003, p. 191).  Notes were necessary at 
this stage, partly due to the commitment to summarise each interview for 
respondent confirmation. 
 
3.5.2 Directed content analysis 
 
Content analysis has a long history and was initially focused on studies involving 
secondary sources, such as media reports. The application of content analysis to 
qualitative research methods involves the interpretation of text data through 
systematic coding and identifying themes. Directed content analysis was the chosen 
data analysis method for this study.  Compared to conventional content analysis, 
where codes and categories are derived only from the primary data, and summative 
content analysis, where keywords and synonyms are counted and compared, the 
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directed approach starts the coding system from the theory and prior research 
findings (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). However, the theoretical framework at the 
beginning may well be modified during the coding process. Care was taken to 
ensure that contexts per unit of text and the latent sense of it were analysed, and 
that text negating theory and non-textual signals were not overlooked (Kohlbacher, 
2006).   
 
Conventional content analysis was put aside because, although the existing 
literature on the specifics of sales outsourcing is small, the literature on “make-or-
buy” offers a rich variety of theories and concepts. Conventional content analysis 
can distract the researcher from broad and deep understanding of the data, leading 
to missed categories. It can also be confused with grounded theory or a “naïve 
perspective” (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1283).  Summative content analysis starts 
with the counting of words or content, but does include consideration of latent 
content or context (Stemler, 2001). For example, in the case of terminally ill 
patients, a researcher might count the occurrence of “death/die/dying” and 
subsequently look for euphemisms for death and analyse the context for using 
direct or euphemistic terms (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1283). Although this is a 
reasonable and objective approach, the focus is on terms of description which 
might distract from understanding of attitudes and behaviour. By the time data has 
been transcribed, a researcher is, to some degree, distanced from it, even if 
personally involved in the interviews, thus the text can lose its context. A great deal 
of moving between the face value of words and understanding meaning, involving 
feedback loops with respondents would be necessary to gain interpretive depth 
(Tan, Wilson & Olver, 2009).   
 
Directed content analysis has been described as a deductive approach, as theory 
precedes and guides analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005; Kohlbacher, 2006). The 
researcher seeks to add evidence to existing theory, or extend understanding of the 
relationships between variables in a theory. The starting point for the coding system 
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is theory and existing theoretical constructs. For example, a researcher might use 
Kübler-Ross’ five stages of grief as a framework for the initial analysis of interviews 
with terminally ill patients (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005, p. 1281). Open-ended questions 
accompanied by targeted closed questions are associated with directed content 
analysis, and the two data types should be reinforcing, or will throw up 
contradictions worthy of exploration. The directed approach was adopted in this 
study, and first level coding reflected theoretical models, although gathering 
evidence for each from wherever it occurred in the interviews, using text searches 
and other Nvivo queries to support manual coding (See Appendixes J and K). 
 
One disadvantage of the directed approach to content analysis is that the structure 
of the questionnaire and the nature of probing questions might give cues to 
respondents about what the researcher is looking for (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). 
However, given Anderson et al.’s (2003) observation of the minimal attention to 
“make-or-buy” among sales management practitioners, it seems unlikely that 
respondents were anticipating a particular agenda.  
 
3.5.3 Coding Process 
 
The first step in the content analysis process is familiarisation or immersion in the 
raw data, i.e. reading of all transcripts and listening to all tapes to gain an overall 
understanding of the data, at which time, notes may be taken about recurring 
themes (Pope, Ziebland & Mays, 2000).  
 
After immersion in the interview data via the creation and validation of summaries, 
the researcher underwent Nvivo training in a group and one-on-one with an Nvivo 
specialist.  The data was imported into Nvivo, and re-read, dividing it into “meaning 
units”, also called content units or coding units, which were coded into first level 
themes. A meaning unit is a collection of words related to the same meaning, which 
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should not be too long (several paragraphs) or too short (a few words) (Graneheim 
& Lundman, 2003). These coded units were then sorted into categories and sub-
categories, with some concepts requiring five levels of sub-coding (See Appendix J). 
The coding process and outcomes were discussed with the trainer (via online and 
telephone link) as they emerged. 
 
Using software such as Nvivo enables an interpretivist researcher to organise and 
code large quantities of textual data. It provides tools for recording coding decisions 
and concept-building, and provides an audit trail from the data to the model 
(Bringer et al, 2004).  Textual data can be analysed through matrix coding to 
provoke new thinking and provide new opportunities for identifying additional 
patterns of perceptions, which may reveal new dimensions in the data, such as 
identifying exceptional cases (Bazeley, 2006).  Indeed, it is valuable to compare data 
using attributes to clarify if contextual variations occur or not, if there is co-
occurrence of themes across categories and if there are divergent views that 
challenge the themes (Bazeley, 2009).  
 
Nvivo provides extensive query options. After manual coding, these queries were 
used to extend the analysis of the data. Queries enable the researcher to explore 
subsets of data. In this study, text searches (finding all occurrences of words or 
phrases) were used to ensure that all mentions of particular concepts had been 
captured in the coding.  Word frequency queries were used to check for the 
commonality of particular concepts.  Matrix and compound coding queries, which 
enable exploration of patterns in the data were also used. Matrix queries are used 
to find combinations, typically nodes and attributes. Compound queries enable 
searching for text within responses with particular attributes, or searching for two 
items of text in a specified context.  
  
For example, respondents were asked about their challenges early in the interview, 
and an Nvivo test searches helped to identify additional references for this theme in 
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other parts of the transcripts. Similar searches on “cost”, “control”, “skills”, and 
“flexibility” ensured that the first level of coding was thorough.  At deeper levels of 
coding, text and matrix searches enabled clustering of concepts across categories, 
such as connections between “reputation” and “ethics”. Compound matrix searches 
helped to identify exceptional cases in the sample, such as only respondents 
reporting their employers to be differentiated on service appeared to be 
consistently reporting a cautious approach to outsourcing and only respondents 
reporting their employers to be cost leaders were reporting high levels of 
outsourcing and high levels of success with growth and reducing sales costs.  They 
also helped to confirm anachronisms in the respondents’ words, such as customer 
knowledge being regarded as a most important skill, but not appearing to be 
connected to a resourcing preference or to training effort.    
 
“Creating categories is the core feature of qualitative content analysis.” (Graneheim 
& Lundman, 2003, p. 107). A category is a collection of content with something in 
common, which must be internally the same and different from other categories. It 
is not always feasible to assume that no data falls between categories and sub-
categories or could not fit in more than one, but a researcher should ensure that all 
data finds a place in a category.   Any units that do not fit the structure must be 
allocated to new categories (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005). This process is reflexive, in 
that the researcher may return to past data to re-classify it in the light of 
subsequent data sorting, and the final categories may be different from the original 
framework (Sandelowski, 2000). Categories should be refined and reduced if 
possible (Pope et al., 2000).  
 
The intention was to identify perceptions about different theories concerning 
“make-or-buy”, and to hypothesise about which concepts seemed to have  the most 
explanatory value for “make-or-buy” decisions in the sales function, what their role 
was (antecedent or moderator), in which contexts, so that those theories could be 
adjusted, refined or extended. Because of this, broad statistical measures such as 
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frequency of codes within categories were used to identify themes, a theme being 
“a recurring regularity developed within categories or cutting across categories” 
(Graneheim & Lundman, 2003, p. 107). Themes are associated with identification of 
meaning in text data. 
 
The themes were used to map the scope of the findings and modify the model 
derived from the literature review (Pope et al., 2000). The revised model is 
explained in the summary to the findings chapter. 
 
 
Figure 5: The analysis process followed in this study  
Source: the author. 
 
  
Familiarisation
Condensing and coding
Sort into categories
Identify themes
Mapping and 
interpretation
Revise theory
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3.6 Summary 
 
This chapter has presented the philosophical approach to the primary research in 
this study (interpretivism), justified the choice of research methodology (qualitative 
telephone interviews), explained the purposeful sampling of sales managers, the 
design of the research instrument (semi-structured interviews) and choices made 
concerning the analysis of the data generated (directed content analysis). The 
efforts made to ensure the robustness of the research have been explained, and the 
data analysis process using Nvivo software has been discussed. 
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Chapter 4: Findings and discussion 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter presents and discusses the findings from the primary research 
undertaken with experienced sales managers in market leading companies. It 
explores the contexts of sales outsourcing through section 2 on the nature of the 
sample, including their challenges and attitudes, the antecedents of sales resourcing 
decisions through the sections on cost, skills and flexibility, and the nuances 
through the section on moderating factors. The relationship between outsourcing 
and performance is also considered. A revised model of the sales resourcing 
decision is proposed, along with suitable indictors for testing it. 
 
4.2 The nature of the sample and contextual considerations 
 
4.2.1 Firmographics 
 
The sample was intended to be cross-sector, and the healthcare (4), information 
technology (4), manufacturing (7), professional services (6), utilities (3), financial 
services (3) and technical services (2) sectors were represented in the sample. In 
this respect, the sample was structured to include all sizable sectors in the UK. The 
manufacturing companies were from separate sub-sectors, and this was also true in 
utilities and technical services. Professional services included consultancy and 
promotional services. 
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Only two of the respondents described their companies as cost leaders; in all other 
cases, respondents described their companies as differentiated on service (9), 
quality (4), innovation (2) or other (12) characteristics. 
 
Twelve (41%) of the sample described their customer portfolio as one where 20% of 
customers deliver 80% revenue. This is sometimes considered the “norm” for 
business-to-business, where a small proportion of customers are categorised as key 
accounts, worthy of separate resourcing focus (McDonald, Millman & Rogers, 
1997). Another twelve had more broadly spread customer portfolios and five were 
predominantly supplying to government departments. 
 
The sales directors/managers in the sample were working for substantial 
companies; only five were working for companies outside the top ten in their 
industry sub-sectors. This is by no means a representative sample of sales 
managers, but it does indicate that the respondents might be considered as opinion 
leaders in their profession. The sample included six fellows of the Sales Leadership 
Alliance and six with a postgraduate qualification in a sales topic. 
 
Not surprisingly, given the market position of these companies, most reported their 
performance to be better than competitors on most of the factors of successful 
sales organisations identified by Colletti and Chonko (1997).  Across eleven 
categories and the 29 respondents, there were only 38 (12%) mentions of 
performance being worse than competitors. There were comments about lack of 
benchmarking information, and the discussion about variations in performance has 
to be considered very carefully.  Discernible differences were limited. They are 
discussed in a later section. 
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4.2.2 The business environment 
 
Fifteen (51%) respondents described the intensity of competition in their industry 
sector or sub-sector as high, the remainder described it as moderate or low.  
Sixteen (55%) respondents described market conditions in their sector as volatile.  
Twelve (41%) described high intensity of competition and highly volatile markets. 
Suffice to say that most respondents observed difficult conditions for selling, the 
sort of “business uncertainty” predicted by transaction cost economics to increase 
vertical integration (Williamson, 1991).  
 
4.2.3 Role, autonomy and experience of respondents 
 
Although it would be expected that most sales managers in large organisations 
make resourcing decisions within qualifying parameters or consultative decision-
making, thirteen (45%) respondents described their control of sales resourcing 
decisions as full autonomy. This is consistent with Anderson et al.’s (2003) 
expectation that sales managers wield considerable power in organisations, 
especially over their own resourcing.  
 
Twenty (68%) respondents had over ten years’ experience of sales management, 
and so were able to compare current conditions for resourcing decisions with pre-
recession conditions. 
 
The extensive experience of the respondents in this sample also underlines why 
they can be considered as opinion leaders in their profession, and a suitable sample 
for the research question. 
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4.2.4 Propensity to outsource 
The attribute of most interest about the sample is the experience of outsourcing 
sales activities. Propensity to outsource has been measured as the percentage of 
activity in a function that is managed by contracted third parties (Gilley & Rasheed, 
2000).  Eight (28%) respondents were not currently outsourcing any activities; 
nevertheless, those respondents had prior experience of outsourcing and were able 
to comment on it.  Seven (24%) respondents were extremely selective about 
outsourcing ( propensity to outsource of 1-5%).  Of these, three expected to be 
doing more outsourcing in the near future; three explained that they had recently 
been reducing outsourcing.  
 
Twelve (41%) respondents reported positive experiences in using contractors, seven 
(24%) described the degree of success as mixed; three (10%) were neutral (success 
“About the same”) and two (7%) had notably negative experiences. Analysis of the 
narrative comment to the prompt about degree of success reveals that tight control 
is sometimes perceived to be a qualifying factor in success (see later section). 
Comments made by respondents include: “If it's been very tightly defined” (R22); 
“Because it’s been specific... it’s been very focused” (R15); “Because you can 
technically define (what) the limits are, what you are paying for and what should be 
delivered” (R11). 
 
The sample reflected three roughly equal scenarios: no outsourcing of sales 
activities (28%), limited outsourcing of sales activities (propensity to outsource 1-
10%) (34%) and some outsourcing (propensity to outsource 11-100%) (38%). 
 
Oh (2005) reported an average of 17% outsourcing intensity in the IT sector. The 
cases explored in this study suggest a lower mid-point. However, an average would 
not say much about the range of outsourcing intensity in the sample.  
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4.2.5 Sales activities outsourced (Research Objective 3) 
 
Respondents were asked about which particular activities were being outsourced. 
Two (8%) focused on outsourcing lead generation and qualification, for example: 
“Running short term three month lead gen(eration) projects into different vertical 
(market)s” (R15).  Most (55%) of respondents reported outsourcing particular 
customer segments, product types or geographical territories (or mixes thereof): 
“The only time I’ve used a third party is to cover a particular territory” (R17); “We 
use them for what we would call the small and medium accounts” (R21). There is 
much evidence in the sample of a pattern called “out-tasking” by Krishnamurthy et 
al. (2009), “granularity” by Watjatrakul and Drennan (2005) or “chunkification” by 
Aron et al. (2005). As described by Novick (2000), in the case of sales outsourcing, 
hybrid or partial arrangements are the norm.  
 
There were only three mentions of outsourcing key accounts, generally they were 
not considered suitable for outsourcing. As one respondent put it: “Relationships 
matter – I have never felt obliged to outsource a relationship” (R6), and another: “In 
the long-term from a key account, or key client management point of view, it’s 
better to employ” (R15).  However, an interesting minority did outsource key 
accounts in response to the challenge of accessing relevant skills. 
 
These answers are consistent with a resource-based view approach to resourcing 
the sales function, i.e. that specialist skills would be contracted to cover activities 
that would not get sufficient focus in-house. Twenty-one (72%) respondents 
preferred to have a choice of resourcing options when asked about achieving 
flexibility; on the other hand, five argued that employees offer enough flexibility. 
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4.2.6 Resourcing challenges and priorities 
 
Sales managers were asked in the early stages of the interview about the biggest 
challenges they had experienced in recent years. It was clear that there was 
considerable resonance with the themes from the literature that seek to explain or 
predict resourcing decisions. Towards the end of the interview, respondents were 
asked for their priorities in sales resourcing. Skills were again dominant, followed by 
cost and flexibility. Control was not a priority, which was the first indication that it 
might be playing a somewhat different role in the resource decision-making 
process, which is discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Respondents provided a great deal of detail about the consideration of costs, skills 
and flexibility in sales resourcing decisions, which is discussed below. Whether sales 
managers prioritise skills, cost or flexibility seems to be contextual, e.g. cost 
leadership companies have a cost-driven approach, and from the respondents’ 
comments on prioritising resourcing considerations, it seems that there will always 
be some trade-offs between costs, skills and speed. The next sections explore the 
findings for the propositions explained in Chapter 2. 
 
4.3 Respondents’ perceptions of the role of costs in resourcing decisions 
 
Proposition 1: Comparative cost of resource options will be an antecedent in 
“make-or-buy” decisions in the sales function 
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4.3.1 Introduction - a significant driver for a significant minority 
 
“The cost of sale, has generally risen faster than inflation.... certainly in the UK” 
(R13). 
 
For six (21%) respondents in this study, cost advantage was the key antecedent in 
sales resourcing decisions, and for different six (21%) it was the least important 
consideration in sales resourcing decisions.  In difficult economic times, when 
competition is intense, a debate about the relative costs of employees and 
contractors is likely to be accompanied by a debate about the relative value that 
they deliver. Cost control is a real challenge to sales managers in a way that it might 
not have been when earlier studies were undertaken. The open question about 
resourcing challenges revealed that cost control or reduction was a significant issue 
for a significant minority of respondents. 
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Category 
of 
challenge 
Number 
of 
mentions 
Fit to 
main 
themes 
Typical quotes 
Cost 
control 
12 Costs “In this year our budget challenge was to reduce 
internal headcount, but maintain sales 
performance, so we obviously have to look at 
external agencies to bridge that gap.” R26 
“Competition is driving - is challenging the 
amount of money we spend on every customer 
now.” R3 
“Very, very tough, it’s almost like a restructuring 
every two years and unfortunately usually ends 
up in redundancies because of the pressure on 
the industry.” R4 
“Not necessarily the cost of goods ... but the cost 
of sale, has generally risen faster than inflation.” 
R13 
“You’re asked to deliver much more with much 
less resource... I’m sure that trend (is) set to 
continue.” R25 
“The biggest challenge is getting sufficient access 
to customers to be able to justify the expense of 
sales team.” R27 
 
Table 15: Comments on cost control 
 
In 1985 Anderson referred to the “the exploding cost of personal selling” (p. 234), 
Jones et al. reported in 2004 that 73% of companies were reporting that the cost of 
making sales was increasing, and in 2005 Anderson and Trinkle estimated that field 
sales can cost up to 40% of revenue in some industries. Not surprisingly, pressures 
to reduce costs were mentioned by eight (28%) respondents as a key challenge, and 
eighteen (62%) reported frequent discussion of sales costs. This is consistent with 
Groth and Kinney’s (1994) assertions about the importance of cost control in 
company performance. Nevertheless, as will be discussed shortly, eleven (38%) of 
the respondents reported that they had the luxury of working in organisations 
where the cost of selling was not a major cause for concern. 
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4.3.2 Do sales managers perceive that it is cheaper to employ salespeople rather 
than use agents/contractors or vice versa?  
 
Fifteen (51%) respondents perceived sales employees to be more cost effective 
than contractors, seven (24%) regarded contractors to be cheaper and the 
remainder explained that they thought there were contextual variations. Two 
reporting that they were being used less because of cost concerns, and six 
commented that they were likely to be used more. Structural cost management 
should be relevant in designing the resource mix (Anderson S.W. & Dekker, 2009a), 
but context can make a lot of difference to the right resource mix. Of course, finding 
the right resource mix can be very difficult, as observed by vom Brocke and Lindner 
(2004). 
 
Of the respondents who made favourable comments about the relative cost of 
contract sales or agents, most commented on their direct cost comparisons.  There 
were also four mentions of headcount control policy, two mentions of the 
comparatively higher efficiency from third parties and two mentions of speed of 
deployment. These views are consistent with Ross et al. (2005), Landry and 
Pendrangi (2005) and Anderson and Trinkle (2005) who argued that contractors 
could provide better territory coverage than employees.   
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Perceptions that contractors are cheaper 
 
Direct cost comparison 
 
“There is high unemployment in some areas which drives down the cost.” 
(outsourced telesales); “Our third party agents are paid at a much lower rate.” “Cost 
recently has started to decrease...based on the fact that we have recently out-
sourced some of our activity.” R3 
“I would struggle to employ a sales person or sales people of the same number 
directly on what we are charged.” R21 
“Salaries would be relatively similar but the add-on costs, pensions and all that sort 
of good stuff, I weasel out of if I contract out.” R13 
(we are) “Getting more income from the deal than previously we would have done.” 
R10 
Headcount concerns 
 
“To keep costs off our balance sheet, and head count off our balance sheet, we've 
always employed external agencies.” R26 
“We might put together a nine or twelve month contract for a particular area, it 
would be very difficult to do that if it were a headcount position.” R2 
“There is quite a strong view on keeping head count down, and not taking on direct 
employees.” R21 
Speed of deployment 
 
“You need to accelerate your sales within a certain time frame.” R2 
“From a short-term point of view, it’s probably cheaper to outsource in my 
experience of lead gen and lead qualification purposes.” R15 
Efficiency 
 
“They are more efficient on the amount of customers they can speak to per day.” 
R3 
 
Table 16: Comments on perceptions that contractors are cheaper 
 
It is interesting to see the contexts in which contractors are perceived as cheaper, 
and arguably they have an underlying logic, portraying the contractors as lean, 
focused selling machines, rather like the image conveyed in Anderson and Trinkle 
(2005).  
245 
 
 
In the case of respondents perceiving employees as cheaper, the reasons given 
were more evenly spread. Three respondents did have detailed cost comparisons in 
favour of employees, on the basis of the margin taken by the contract sales 
organisation being higher than saved employment costs. They also provided 
evidence of employees being more efficient (for example, less drop-out of 
customers during the sales cycle, indicating better sales qualification at an early 
stage).   
 
Six (21%), although being prompted to comment on a cost comparison, talked 
about the greater control over employees resulting in lower costs. This argument is 
consistent with transaction cost economics, where the cost of controlling a contract 
is the main predictor of organisational type. Williamson (1996) argued that 
economics must be combined with organisational science. Respondents with this 
view offered no specific evidence of the costs of control, and this perhaps reflects 
some comments about the academic study of transaction costs, i.e. that they are 
loosely defined and measured by disparate indicators (Grover & Malhotra, 2003; 
Macher & Richman, 2008). Equally, the respondents who argued that the skills 
investment in employees made them cheaper in the long run were not specific 
about evidence.   
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Perceptions that employees are cheaper 
 
Cost comparison 
 
“The reason it’s cheaper is because the day rate is cheaper, their base salary is less 
than you would have to spend on an external sales agency, that’s simply the 
reason.” R8 
“I have just done the analysis literally with HR this afternoon...if you employ a sales 
person you do not have to build in a profit margin.” R27 
“What we ended up with was a sales team that we just had to pay more for because 
we were also paying the overhead of a third party and I feel fairly strongly about 
that.” R28 
Efficiency 
 
“The value you get from an employed person, the number of leads that they 
convert into sales, I’d say the ratio is higher for the employed person.” R29 
“In general I get a better return on an internal guy.” R13 
“It probably falls slightly in favour internally, based on the better realisation rate we 
discussed...” R26 
Control leads to less cost 
 
“It is cheaper to employ (because) you’ve got much greater control over the 
resource.” R7 
“If you have internal resource and then of course you can ask them to change 
whatever they are doing at any point in time.” R11 
“It’s more measurable, I have more accountability, a bit more control on my return 
on investment.” R18 
Quality leads to less cost 
 
“If you have employed somebody, you tend to have them for a longer period, so 
that the effort you put into training people...lasts a lot longer.” R19 
“Because what I’m buying is someone that can establish a relationship and sustain a 
relationship.” R6 
“If you are building a long-term business, with a long-term strategy, then having 
your own sales force will end up being cheaper provided you’ve got the right 
people, you’ve got the right training, you’ve got the right resource levels.” R10 
“Investment required to get the training and the induction needed would mean I 
would rather they were in-house.” R12 
 
Table 17: Comments on perceptions that employees are cheaper 
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4.3.3 How do sales managers compare costs between recruiting and deploying 
salespeople to do a task or engaging with a third party supplier? 
 
“What is a cynic? A man who knows the price of everything and the value of 
nothing.” (Oscar Wilde, 1892). 
 
One respondent commented, when asked to explain how he compared costs 
“There’s price and there’s value” (R1).  The literature on outsourcing suggests that 
cost comparison is a primary antecedent (Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002a; Kremic et 
al., 2006). Powers (1987), Dishman (1996), Kaufmann (1999) and Landry and 
Pendrangi (2005) all found manufacturers’ representatives to be considerably 
cheaper than employed salespeople on a cost versus price comparison, but the 
calculations used by respondents in this study seemed to favour employees. 
 
22 (76%) respondents explained their cost comparisons, with varying degrees of 
detail. The critical component of timing was raised: “If it was a short-term thing 
then it means the cost of recruitment will be higher than going for a third party but 
if was over a long period say two to three years then the cost of recruitment still 
makes the internal recruitment cheaper than going with third parties...” (R27).  
Another caveat raised by a respondent was to make sure that a business case 
included “Any additional costs that would be caused by a third party” (R19), i.e. 
structural costs, as identified by Anderson S. and Dekker, (2009a). 
 
Some compared costs per person or other variations on the cost of selling effort, 
such as the costs to serve a particular segment or territory. However, there are 
limitations to comparisons at this level. One respondent, who was able to quote a 
large amount of cost detail, explained: “We can do like-for-like comparisons on 
individual tasks....it costs around (number given) per cent less to employ contract 
sales to work on the same tasks, however to offset that my experience has been 
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that they haven't been as successful, so whilst the costs are lower, the results are 
not equal to or higher, so I'm not getting the benefit.” (R13) Others also focused on 
the cost of making the sale: “The acid test is... their conversion (rate).” (R8) 
 
Of course, some contract sales organisations/sales agents work on a business model 
that ensures a relationship between costs and sales, which is closer to the sales 
outsourcing model assumed in the literature (e.g. Ross et al., 2005), and was more 
likely to give contractors a cost advantage. “They get paid quite highly for any sales 
they do make, so it's in their interest to make more sales: and if they're not making 
any sales they're not getting paid” (R26).  Nevertheless, on the basis of the 
price/value argument, this model should take into account (and assign a cost to) the 
risk of discounting and a poor quality buying experience for the customer. The 
variabilisation of costs, while an advantage, does not necessary minimise sales costs 
overall.  
 
4.3.4 Are the costs of selling a cause for concern? 
 
Eighteen (62%) respondents reported that the cost of the sales function was a 
frequent topic of discussion within the company, some in quite strong terms: 
“Huge” (R15, R25, R27); “Always” (R18, R7); “A hot topic” (R19) and “To the point of 
it being a challenge to the way that we operate.” (R26) These sales managers might 
look in envy at the eleven respondents (38%) who reported that sales costs were 
not a matter of great concern: “Not a big issue” (R9); “Not a huge amount” (R10); 
“Not enough” (R22). 
 
Although twenty-seven (93%) respondents classified their organisations as 
differentiated, rather than cost leaders, twenty-three (79%) reported that cost 
control in general was very important.  Despite the recession, there still seems to be 
a mismatch in some companies, where cost control is important to the company 
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overall, but the sales function has been buffered to some degree from expectations 
to reduce costs.   
 
There is not much clarity about this anomaly, but two comments suggest that there 
are contextual reasons. “Costs of selling is generally only discussed once a year 
when we look at budgets, and that's because our cost to sales/selling is, as a ratio, 
low” (R13) is a clear rationale. Perhaps less objective, but indicating the dominance 
of skills over cost in a differentiated company, one respondent explained that 
“We’ve got to get the right people before we worry about the costs” (R9). The latter 
comment in particular has resonance with Anderson et al.’s (2003) views that the 
sales function has not been as pressurised as other functions to reduce operational 
costs.   
 
However, for most sales managers, cost management is firmly on their agenda. The 
following comments are typical of the demands made on the majority of 
respondents: 
 
• “Cost control is much more on the agenda than it has been or certainly was 
four or five years ago when things were good.” (R10) 
• “Competition...is challenging the amount of money we spend on every 
customer now.”; “we’ve gone through a number of opex challenges 
(operational expenses challenges) recently to reduce costs.” (R3) 
• “Very very tough, it’s almost like a restructuring every two years and 
unfortunately usually ends up in redundancies because of the pressure on 
the industry.” “I just think there’s a constant downward spiral on prices and 
then obviously the prices keep falling your margins are dropping and we 
have to keep within a strict cost structure so we have to adapt to that 
structure, it’s not just us, it’s everybody.” (R4) 
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• ”We had our massive market slump so we cut our cost by (number given) 
percent.”; “The market ...has suddenly gone from an all-time high to an all-
time low.” (R11) 
 
4.3.4.1 How are sales costs monitored? 
 
Colletti and Chonko (1997) argued that one indicator of a sales function that is 
superior in performance is that it has sales costs less than its competition. One 
respondent commented: “Everything at the minute...just seems to be the bottom 
line and...restricted budgets” (R25). Nevertheless, there seemed to be few 
examples of systematic benchmarking of costs. 
 
Twelve respondents reported that the relative cost of the sales function as a 
proportion of revenue was decreasing; eight said that their costs were increasing 
and seven reported that their costs were static. Not many respondents elaborated, 
but the opinion that more outsourcing decreased costs and that less outsourcing 
decreased costs were both observed.  This seems to have resonance with the 
findings of Mpoyi and Bullington (2004) who found that changing the degree of 
vertical integration of a company seemed to improve productivity, but it was not 
clear whether more or less vertical integration was better. Each company’s context 
can be very different. 
 
Two respondents commented that that they had reduced the number of 
salespeople employed in recent years. Another commented that the cost of the 
sales function was decreasing but the cost of making a sale was going up, reflecting 
the effect of the recession on buyers’ behaviour. Another pointed out that while 
overall sales costs were decreasing, the cost of employing an individual salesperson 
was still rising. This might be a reflection that the skills gap in sales means that a 
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successful salesperson can still attract a premium reward, consistent with Coff’s 
(1999) views that groups other than shareholders can accumulate “rent”. 
 
4.3.4.2 The relationship between pressure on costs and outsourcing 
 
The literature would lead observers to conclude that that cost pressure would lead 
to outsourcing, with Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2002b) and Kremic et al. (2006) 
noting that cost reduction is the main benefit sought from outsourcing, and Jiang et 
al. (2006) observing that firms who make extensive use of outsourcing have a 
significant cost advantage. Although this study involved a small sample, it was the 
case that the two cost leaders had relatively high levels of outsourcing, consistent 
with the findings of Martinez-Sánchez et al. (2007) that cost leaders have a higher 
outsourcing intensity. (E.g. “To keep costs off our balance sheet, and head count off 
our balance sheet, we've always employed external agencies.” R26). 
 
Anderson et al. (2003) and Ross et al. (2005) expected companies outsourcing sales 
to be able to reduce costs. Among these respondents, those with higher levels of 
outsourcing seem to be somewhat more likely to perceive contractors as cheaper. 
This might be because they have bargaining power with their suppliers (Shervani et 
al., 2007). One extensive user of outsourcing mentioned that the contract sales 
organisations liked working with his brand.  Alternatively, they may have developed 
superior skills in managing contract sales organisations (Leiblein & Miller, 2003) (see 
moderating factors below).   
 
Respondents were asked fairly early in the interview about their perceptions of 
their relative performance on sales productivity, and towards the end of the 
interview, they were asked about control of sales overheads. These are separate 
things. Productivity was interpreted as a “Return on investment”, whereas control 
of sales overhead was only part of that. Arguably, excessive attention to executional 
252 
 
cost may not result in the best management of resources (Anderson S. W. & Dekker, 
2009b). Only eleven (38%) respondents rated themselves better than competitors 
both on control of sales overheads and sales productivity. It was the case, as 
anticipated by Anderson et al. (2003) that some respondents preferred not to 
discuss productivity. 
 
Labour productivity would be expected to improve with outsourcing intensity (Gilley 
& Rasheed, 2000; Girma & Görg, 2004; Martinez-Sánchez et al., 2007), however, all 
that can be noted from this study is that most respondents’ perceptions of their 
performance relative to competitors on sales productivity does not seem to vary 
with outsourcing intensity.   
 
Overall, there was far more confidence about control of sales overheads, perhaps 
because of the visibility of such a measure internally, although how much 
benchmarking really is being done with competitors is questionable. One “No 
comment” respondent pointed out that there is no reasonable way to access the 
data that would be necessary: “We don't ever get visibility of what our competitors 
are spending on sales activity”. R26  
 
Although the pressure to address the costs of selling seems to be less acute than in 
other functions, the impetus to find a lower cost business model was significant in 
some cases. Comments such as “Our sales target will stay in place, with a reduced 
headcount” R3; “We are having to work a lot harder for probably a lot less than we 
are used to” R5; and “You’re asked to deliver much more with much less resource, 
much less expenditure” R25, suggest that the pain of the recession is still affecting 
sales resourcing decisions.  
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4.3.5 Do sales managers feel that there is enough information available to them 
on which to base cost comparisons between employment and contract options? 
 
“I’m just basing that on gut feeling, I’ve got no hard data for saying that.”  (R9). 
 
It has been claimed by Ross et al. (2005) that imperfect information about resource 
costs will lead to flawed decisions in favour of in-house, and there is evidence in this 
study that lack of information was a problem. In most cases, perceptions about 
relative cost advantages (in favour of contractors or employees) were just that, as 
only eight (28%) respondents felt that they had enough information on which to 
make cost comparisons. Twenty (69%) respondents said that they did not have 
enough information on which to base a cost comparison of employees versus 
contract sales organisations. Of those who were positive that they did have enough 
information on which to compare the costs of different resourcing options, half 
were using contract sales organisations extensively but not all of them perceived 
contractors to be cheaper. Arguably, firms who have developed competences in 
managing third parties have fewer problems with monitoring costs (which is 
consistent with the findings of Lieblein & Miller, 2003). 
 
It is surprising to uncover a situation where 69% of respondents were admitting lack 
of information while 62% of respondents were reporting that the cost of the sales 
function was a frequent topic of discussion within the company. This should be a 
matter of concern. As Macher & Richman (2008) argued, the costs of a business 
function’s design being potentially misaligned with the business environment 
should be explored and the potential solutions evaluated. Without sufficient 
information, hidden costs remain hidden.    
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4.3.6 Summary of respondents’ perceptions of the role of cost in “make-or-buy” 
decisions 
 
It is worthy of note that 20 (69%) respondents said that they did not have sufficient 
information with which to make cost comparisons, even in a climate of concern 
about costs of making sales and sales productivity. In many cases, perceptions 
rather than facts are driving decisions. There are no clear indications from these 
respondents that contract sales organisations are perceived to have a generally 
recognised cost advantage over employed salespeople. The evidence from both the 
outsourcing literature (e.g. Jiang et al., 2006) and the sales outsourcing literature 
(e.g. Ross et al., 2005) that contractors offer a cost advantage is challenged by the 
perceptions of the sales managers in this study.  
 
Nevertheless, the two cost leaders in the sample did focus on cost and did observe 
a cost advantage in using third parties. Arguably, they have developed a 
competence in managing contract sales organisations, a moderating factor which is 
discussed in a later section. The development of a production cost construct is 
discussed at the end of this chapter. 
 
4.4 Respondents’ perceptions of the role of control in resourcing decisions 
 
Proposition 2: The ease with which resource options can be controlled will be an 
antecedent in “make-or-buy” decisions in the sales function 
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4.4.1 Introduction 
 
Transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975; 1985) and agency theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989) clearly expect hazards in contracting-out, caused by the diffusion 
of control. Ford et al. (1993) noted that “loss of control” (p. 211) was the main 
disbenefit of buying-in resources rather than employing salespeople, even where 
cost calculation suggested that outsourcing was desirable. Concern about loss of 
control was evident in this study, with respondents discussing concerns about “lock-
in” and dependency, and expressing agreement with the view of some researchers 
that relationships with contractors have to be highly structured to be successful 
(Barthélemy & Quélin, 2006; Daugherty et al., 2006).  However, concerns about 
dependency on employees weakening internal control were also evident, consistent 
with Phillips (1982) and Onyemah & Anderson (2009). 
 
Attitudinal 
comments about 
third 
parties/contractors 
Fit to main 
themes 
Typical quotes 
Negative Six 
respondents 
specifically 
mentioned 
“control”; five 
others used 
control-
related 
expressions. 
“More monitoring required of a contractor than 
someone who has a long-term interest within the 
company.” R1 
“The tail wags the dog, eventually.” R13 
“You lose a degree of control when you outsource 
to an agent. Quite often they're small companies, 
and they will do (what) suits them.”  R16 
“I’m not a fan of using third parties just on account 
of accountability.” R18 
Table 18: Comments on third parties/contractors 
 
Despite concerns about control factors when using contractors, in one of many 
contradictions discovered in the course of discussing control issues, when 
respondents were prompted to comment on whether or not control issues had any 
impact on their use of contractors, the answers were generally neutral (only one 
respondent described it as a priority in sales resourcing). This pattern seems 
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inconsistent with transaction cost theory, and in particular with Anderson’s (1985) 
and Krafft et al.’s (2004) studies which found that performance control factors 
would predict whether a sales function was insourced or outsourced. It is also 
noticeable, given the comments made when discussing challenges (see below), that 
controlling/motivating internal teams is not necessarily any easier.  
 
Category 
of 
challenge 
Number 
of cases 
Number 
of 
mentions 
Fit to 
main 
themes 
Typical quotes 
Motivation 12 15 Control “Maintaining morale in the face of a 
softening market and lowering condition 
levels and therefore lower income, 
maintaining the morale and keeping people 
motivated I would think was the most 
difficult part.” R1 
“...personal issues that you have to deal 
with, being a manager.” R29 
“It’s about getting the right kind of 
productivity from people and also trying to 
develop people.” R10 
“Getting people to perform the way you 
would like them to perform is very 
challenging,” R12 
“It’s a lot more difficult to...actually coach 
and train people that are...remotely 
based.” R19 
“The bonus structure can cause difficulties, 
in that it can send people off or motivated 
in the wrong direction.” R21 
Table 19: Comments on motivation or control 
 
The distinction between motivating employees and controlling contractors seems to 
emerge in detailed discussions, and this is explored later in the exploration of 
organisations and individuals’ ability to manage third party resources in the section 
on Proposition 6. 
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4.4.2 Do sales managers perceive that employed salespeople are easier to manage 
than third party contractors or vice versa? 
 
Respondents were asked about their general views on control of salespeople versus 
contractors, and specifically about controlling behaviour, which seemed to prompt 
more comment about the contrast between measuring inputs and outputs. In the 
sales literature, there is evidence that behavioural control of salespeople yields 
better results than outcome control (Baldauf et al., 2005). In the case of studies of 
sales outsourcing (Anderson, 1985; Krafft et al., 2004), there is an indication that 
work that is easily measured, i.e. measured by short-term outputs, is most suitable 
for outsourcing. The users of contractors in this research had a similar approach. 
They mentioned a number of measurements such as call rates, appointments made, 
conversion rates, sales volume and gross margin. One respondent mentioned key 
performance indicators which encompassed outcomes and behaviours, but most 
CSO users focused on outcomes, which are easy to measure. Respondents who 
made extensive use of contractors perceived contract performance as a fairly easy 
mechanism: 
 
• “We contract for a certain level of performance and they have to deliver it.” 
R8 
• “We always have in an allotted timescale with a clear objective, whereas 
sometimes within a (internal) sales function, I don’t believe objectives are, 
well, set correctly.” R15 
• “I have....us(ed) an outside sales source, for a very short time, but only on 
the basis that we get a strict return on investment.” R17 
• “The contract sales people, I have to say they are generally focussed on 
activity, hitting the numbers.” R2 
• “If they are not performing then they take a proportion of that risk.” R3 
• “With a third party I would tend only to enter into contracts where it’s 
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payment by results.” R10 
• “Every contractor would....do a monthly review, and that's a very rigorous 
performance review.” R14 
• “I would say it’s usually successful because you can technically define what 
the limits are, what you paying for and what should be delivered. The 
expectation is clear and probably easier to evaluate and measure.” R11 
• “I would always make sure that any third party I was going to be utilising 
would actually have systems in place to... give me metrics of what they've 
achieved, what value for money they've achieved and communicate that to 
me.” R13 
• “The quality of information and reporting I get out of our third parties, 
because this tends to be the bread and butter of what they do, it seems to 
be far better than I would get internally.” R26 
 
The indications here are that if contracts are tight (as advocated by Barthélemy & 
Quélin, 2006; Daugherty et al., 2006) and they are tied to output performance 
which can be easily tracked and measured, relationships with outsourcing vendors 
are more likely to be positive; i.e. contract performance is a key element in building 
trust and commitment (as observed by Goo & Nam, 2007).   
 
Nevertheless, monitoring is not always enough. A few respondents indicated that 
even with robust contracts, third parties do not always deliver. Comments such as: 
“They’ve been heavily monitored in terms of performance and the outcomes have 
been mixed” (R6) and “There's a slightly lower degree of realised sales” (R26) can be 
associated with a perception of a more formalised management approach: “The 
difficulty of managing a contractor is...dealing with performance issues and things 
like that. So I think it requires greater process.” (R27) Pro-active relationship 
management is necessary for better performance (Brown et al., 2000; Handley & 
Benton, 2009), and it seems for some sales managers that it is time-consuming and 
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irritating. Difficulties in evaluating performance were observed by Weiss and 
Anderson (1992) to be a primary motive for insourcing sales. 
 
The examples of solid long-term relationships with particular sales channel partners 
were exceptional, although those relationships were clearly delivering mutual 
benefits. As observed from the resource-based view, coalitions can be effective 
(Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Dyer & Singh, 1998). However, very few respondents 
talked about the positive effects of interdependency that has been observed with 
manufacturers’ representatives in the US (e.g. Kaufman, 1999). 
 
The implication could be drawn that management of internal salespeople is more 
open-ended. As Coase (1988) put it: “Integration creates a different institutional 
setting” (p. 31). One respondent perceived ease of control internally, asserting that 
“I have performance planning and improvement models to deploy should a sales 
person not be performing” (R18); another perceived that “It's like herding cats” 
(R26). It is interesting to note that many respondents seemed to find that 
generating performance from employed salespeople was rewarding, and the hub of 
their management skills: “It’s fundamental that we get the best performance as 
possible and that they are hugely motivated and fulfilled” (R6); “You are looking to 
improve people’s performance and develop them as individuals” (R10). 
 
The fact that managers perceive employed salespeople to be easier to control 
suggests that the nature of the written contract is not necessarily the main issue for 
sales managers in different managerial relationships. Therefore the “lens of 
contract” which is the focus of transaction cost economics (Williamson, 2005a; 
2005b) must encompass something broader. The “psychological contract” (Schein, 
1979) that has been observed between employees and their employers may be very 
relevant in the sales function, although more has been written about the 
salesperson’s trust in the manager (e.g. Flaherty & Pappas, 2000) than the sales 
manager’s perceptions of the contract. 
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4.4.3 How do sales managers compare management effort between recruiting and 
deploying salespeople to do a task or engaging with a third party supplier? 
 
Start-up costs in resource acquisition are bound to be variable (Hooley et al., 1998). 
Respondents commented on the significant amount of time and effort in recruiting 
salespeople, and the difficulties in finding the right skill set and personality fit to 
work in their organisation. The cost of recruitment fees was also mentioned a few 
times as an inhibitor to employment. This can be compared with comments about 
setting up contracts with third parties. Where comparisons were made by 
respondents who regularly used contract sales organisations, some mentioned the 
advantages of using them to increase resource quickly, a condition noted by 
Holcomb & Hitt (2007). 
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Recruiting individual salespeople 
 
Setting up contract with third parties 
“That's quite a lengthy process, to get a  
decision made on bringing in new 
heads.” R26 
“There is a great deal less management 
effort in deploying external third 
parties.” R8 
“It would take three months to get a 
head count position.” R2 
“It’s a lot less management effort when 
(supplier name) are employing people.” 
R21 
“The majority of our management team 
would be involved in that process for 
recruiting internal candidates.” R3 
“They've typically got better training 
teams, better recruitment teams.” 
R26 
“There’s a lot of my time and 
management team’s time goes into 
making sure we’re getting the right 
people.” R7 
“We would be expecting them to 
manage that recruitment process - 
obviously it would take a lot less time 
from our side.” R3 
“You've got to define a job description, a 
scope, a role. Get that signed off. You've 
got to go through the interview process, 
the selection process. It's a lot longer, 
and deeper, activity.” R22 
 
“When I employ people I have to pay the 
recruitment agency fee up front.”; “To 
train a salesperson from recruitment to 
when they’re a hundred per cent 
productive - seven-and-a-half months.” 
R13 
 
Table 20: Comments on recruitment or contracting 
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Nevertheless, there is management effort involved in identifying suitably qualified 
contract sales organisations to be on an approved supplier list, ready to be 
deployed. Ten (34%) respondents described an extensive formal process. A business 
case is needed, due diligence must be performed, and senior management time is 
involved. Instead of working with the Human Resources department, the sales 
manager is working with Procurement. Companies that have a strategic approach to 
using contractors have preferred suppliers in place to accelerate deployment: 
 
• “We evaluate third party organisations, we have over the years evaluated 
them several times, but we have consistently used one company.” (R8) 
• “If we want to take a new one on we do a due diligence on them, we enter 
into a formal agreement signed by both parties which sets out the 
parameters of what we expect, what the obligations are, what commission 
levels will be paid and that’s reviewed on an annual basis.” (R10) 
• “We will approach maybe six shortlisted vendors. ...some of those vendors 
would have been proposed by ...people on the selling side of the company... 
Some will be known to the procurement side and ... there will be a technical 
evaluation, a commercial evaluation.” (R11) 
• “We’d appoint an internal project manager, we'd go and ....do the research 
on who the players are, we’d hold beauty parades, and then we'd see which 
two or three we could work with.” (R13) 
 
In addition to the effort involved in identifying preferred suppliers, there is still an 
element of matching the supplier to the task:  
 
• “(We) design a brief, based on what targets we want to achieve, who we 
want to speak to, what type of person within the organisation we want to 
talk to, so there would certainly be a bit of pre-work on our part.”  (R22) 
• “We'd start talking detail about what we actually are looking to do, what our 
objectives may be, what our expectations would be from them, and 
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therefore their expectations from us. And then we'd take it through our 
procurement processes to put together a deal and a contract.” (R13) 
 
As suggested by Bartholémy & Quélin (2006), it seems that setting up a systematic 
process for engaging with contract sales organisations makes sense either for 
organisations for whom they are a regular proportion of sales resource, or for those 
who might wish to use them task by task, one respondent flagged up, that for him, 
there is still a human element to explore: “I’ve either actually requested myself or 
my senior management to meet with the individuals.” (R15) 
 
All those activities have to be undertaken before the deployment of contract sales 
resource. There are also different activities after contractors are deployed, which 
are discussed further in the section on proposition 6.  
 
4.4.4 How important do sales managers think it is to monitor the behaviour of 
salespeople or contractors? 
 
Although there are widespread perceptions that it is more difficult to monitor the 
behaviour of contractors than employees (see comments in the table below) it is 
also clear that companies who have a lot of experience with contractors have 
relational and behavioural controls in place, as suggested by Brown et al., (2000) 
and Handley & Benton (2009). These are also illustrated in the table below.  
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Concerns about contractors’ behaviour Approaches to behavioural control of 
contractors’ staff 
“I think with a contract sales person you 
have to make sure that they actually are 
working.” R2 
 
“We try to encourage them to use the 
same kind of process as with our 
internal staff so that we can benchmark 
it and it might mean that they have the 
same kind of score card.”: 
“Contractually we put in place call 
monitoring processes so that they have 
to listen to x amount of calls and 
provide us with a copy and summary of 
comments at the end of each month on 
what’s gone well, what needs to 
improve and how they would go about 
doing that.” R3 
“We have much more understanding of 
what they’re doing (employees) and 
what we expect them to do, and we can 
(put) the systems in place to do things 
about it.” R13 
“We're a heavy compliance-led 
industry, and we have some strict 
criteria ...we've just got rid of an agent 
recently who failed to meet their 
compliance standard.”: “Clear 
objectives, joint visits, joint control, 
joint call tasks...there’s very little that 
they can get away with on their own.” 
R15 
“I just think in general you have just got 
much more control throughout the 
whole sales process of what an 
employed sales person is doing as 
opposed to a contractor.” R10 
 
“We monitor and record all of the 
telephone calls both from our internal 
and our external sales people; all of 
those calls are recorded and from time 
to time we will listen to them.” R8 
“Trying to exert the control over third 
parties, depending on the relationship, 
and how it’s set up, can be much more 
difficult and less transparent.” R20 
“We are...starting to introduce a more 
formalised review of customer 
satisfaction.”  
R21 
Table 21: Comments on contractors’ behaviour 
 
Perhaps as a result of the tough economic times recently, no respondents 
mentioned specifically bad behaviour by salespeople as described by Jelinek and 
Ahearne (2006). 
 
Indeed, there was widespread faith in employees’ ability to identify with their 
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employer and to become a “stakeholder” in the business, as demonstrated in the 
comments in the table below. As observed by Wieseke et al., (2009), there was a 
perception that identification with their employer would be associated with better 
sales performance. 
 
Salespeople as organisational 
citizens 
Contractors as independent agents 
 
“My perception is that it’s ...easier 
to manage someone who actually 
has a stake within the company, 
who feels they are part of the 
company...” R1 
“One problem with sales agencies is quite 
often they've got their hands in many 
baskets...so you don't get a hundred per cent 
share of their minds.” R16 
“There is no doubt that the people 
who are employed by the company 
directly...feel a greater sense of 
belonging and a greater sense that 
they are part of the 
company....going to a third party 
contract does have a price to pay in 
so far as perhaps losing people that 
have got strong value bonds with 
the organisation.” R27 
“There’s no loyalty with these organisations. 
They have a ... very high churn rate, which 
doesn’t enable a company to become 
culturally aligned as much as a directly 
employed individual.” R18 
 
 
“The industry itself favours head 
count sales people rather than 
contract sales because they feel 
that they are a lot more 
committed.” R2 
 
 
“The problem that I foresee, I suppose, with 
the third party contractors is that they might 
not be sold into the company fully and might 
not be prepared to...take on board the ethics 
of the company fully.” R19 
“When you are fully employed by 
one company you work all kinds of 
hours.”  R11 
 
 
“I think the fact that we are two companies 
can sometimes enable them...to be more 
outspoken about anything they disagree with 
or don’t want to do....because they...are 
employed by another party.” R21 
Table 22: Comments on perceptions of employed salespeople as “stakeholders” 
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4.4.5 Comparing the legal framework in the UK for employment contracts versus 
normal commercial contracts, which do sales managers perceive to be the easiest 
to change? 
 
There are frequent references in transaction costs economics to “the lens of 
contract” (Williamson, 2008), so respondents were asked specific questions about 
the ease of working with employment contracts versus commercial contracts to 
supply. Commercial contracts (i.e. working with contract sales organisations) 
certainly seem to be considered more adaptable contracts than employment 
contracts. This is predictable given that most respondents were only using contract 
sales organisations on short-term contracts. This is consistent with the model 
described as “out-tasking” (Krishnamurthy et al., 2009) which is intended to 
minimise the negative compromises of outsourcing. 
 
Opinions about the nature of contracts seem to contradict the managers’ overall 
perceptions, and the assumptions of transaction cost economic theory, that vertical 
integration is the most adaptable organisational form (Williamson, 1991) (See 
details in 4.6.5). Eight respondents qualified their answers to this question with 
expressions of frustration with employment law. Although three mentioned 
employment law being more constraining in France, Germany and Holland, of 
course the UK is subject to EU law as well. Incumbents defending the status quo and 
resisting change were phenomena known to the sales managers in this study, and 
these narratives support the expectations of Ansoff (1987), Hambrick & Cannella 
(1989) and Sliwka (2007) that, contrary to transaction cost theory, employee 
compliance cannot be assumed. 
 
Two also commented on how employment law affects contractors. One respondent 
explained how his preference for contractors had been constrained by employment 
law. There are a number of criteria under which contractors can quickly accrue 
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employment rights; for example, if they are perceived to be managed by a manager 
in the client rather than a manager in the contract organisation. Employment law 
creates very visible imperfections in the power/control relationship between 
managers and employees, but it can also constrain the potentially desirable 
contract business model of a contractor working within an internal team. Suffice to 
say that employment law distorts sales managers’ views about contracts per se, so 
that it does not reflect their views about performance control in general. 
 
A critical consideration with either type of contract is whether or not there is 
performance to contract. As one respondent put it: “Getting people to perform the 
way you would like them to perform is very challenging” (R12). Outsourcing in other 
functions has often failed to deliver performance improvements (Bahli & Rivard, 
2003), and channel relationships in particular have a high failure rate (Mohr & 
Spekman, 1996). Particularly if performance is difficult to measure, the insourcing of 
sales activities is likely to be preferred (Anderson & Schmittlein, 1984), and there is 
support for that view in this study. 
 
4.4.6 Summary of findings concerning control 
 
In discussing relative experiences of managing employed salespeople versus 
contractors, there is a likelihood of self-fulfilling prophecies; i.e. sales managers 
who perceive or expect control problems with contract organisations might not 
investigate the availability or quality of suppliers. Nevertheless, it is fair to conclude 
that, for the most part, the comments of the respondents in this research are 
consistent with transaction cost economics’ explanation that the expectation of 
contractual hazards leads to a preference for insourcing (Williamson, 1975; Mayer 
& Salomon, 2006). However, this preference is not necessarily an antecedent for a 
“make-or-buy” decision, and it might be offset by the ability to manage different 
resourcing options.  
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4.5 Respondents’ perceptions of the role of skills in resourcing decisions 
 
Proposition 3:  The comparative skill level of resource options will be an 
antecedent in “make-or-buy” decisions in the sales function 
 
4.5.1 Introduction – a resourcing priority 
 
“There’s no shortage of supply; it’s quality that’s the problem.” (R7). 
 
Most respondents considered skills a priority when making resourcing decisions. In 
both the transaction cost economics view, and the resource-based view, the skills of 
salespeople is an important influence on “make-or-buy”. Skills are rent generators 
(Newbert, 2008), and the seminal empirical RBV study on sales (Menguc & Barker, 
2005) focused on particular skills which deliver “rent”. Anderson (1985) commented 
that the only asset specificity in the sales function is the salesperson’s skills, and 
from the transaction cost economics point of view, uniqueness of skills should lead 
to insourcing (Geyskens et al., 2006). Nevertheless, the literature indicates that just 
having a directly employed salesforce does not create superior value (Guenzi & 
Troilo, 2007).  
 
Access to skills can also be an argument for outsourcing; Kakabadse and Kakabadse 
(2002a) noted that access to skills was expected to be an important reason to 
outsource in the future, Safizadeh et al. (2008) suggested that access to skills should 
override transaction cost considerations and Anderson and Trinkle (2005) argued 
that it was the second-most important reason to outsource sales (after costs). With 
this particular sample of sales managers, a large proportion (52%) regarded skills as 
the priority in making resourcing decisions, and 83% regarded employees as more 
highly skilled than contractors. However, tactically and cautiously, some were using 
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outsourcing as a means of accessing skills and enabling better coverage of particular 
customer segments, as recommend by Ansoff (1987). 
 
4.5.2 Perceptions of a skills gap 
 
Consistent with findings on asset specificity (David & Han, 2004) and the resource 
based view (Wernerfeld; 1984; Prahalad & Hamel, 1990; Barney et al., 2011), 
respondents in this study appeared to be making competency-based judgements 
about which sales activities to outsource. A typical split was employment 
preference for key account managers and contracting out tactical sales. The 
thinking process seemed to be without prejudice in many cases, just a matter of 
contracting out: “Where we have got an internal skill gap” (R27); “Where we 
identify areas where we don’t have the skill set internally” (R20). 
 
Category of 
challenge 
Number 
of 
mentions 
Fit to 
main 
themes 
Typical quotes 
Availability 
of skills 
13 Skills “It’s been more difficult to get the right 
calibre of sales person in that period than I 
have ever experienced before. It’s been high 
volume in the market place, but low quality.” 
R7 
“It’s pretty much been trying to find the right 
people with the right experience and 
qualifications to match the roles and skills 
that we want.” R18 
“Sometimes it can be challenging to get the 
right level of professionalism.” R21 
Table 23: Comments on perceptions of a skills gap 
 
Availability of skills was the most frequently quoted challenge that respondents 
faced. Perceptions of a “skills gap” were evident, and 19 (66%) respondents 
commented on the impact of sales skills (or lack of them) on the business. As one 
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respondent put it: “Skills and aptitude, it’s what I’m looking for first, because that’s 
got the highest impact on our reputation.” (R7) The MSSSB findings in 2008 of a 
significant skills gap in sales might have been moderated in some sectors by the 
recession, but a number of respondents still reported that the impact of skills 
availability on their resourcing was still difficult in 2011. One commented: “The 
practice of hiring senior sales people or indeed any salesperson, is not something 
that is easy” (R6); similarly: “If you need to change and build a skill set, that’s going 
to take probably a year or two.” (R27) As Ansoff (1987) noted, there is a time lag in 
developing new skills internally. 
 
 Observations were made that that selling has become more complex, with 
“solutions” being required more than products, a trend identified in the key account 
literature (e.g. Ryals & Holt, 2007).   One respondent explained: “ten years ago, 
people would go out and buy a simple box to do a test. Now they are looking for 
solutions to improve the process” (R9). In some cases, skills would override other 
important criteria: “The right skill set will breed the right results and ultimately then 
will pay for itself” (R15). The topic of skills evoked some strong statements from 
respondents, such as: “Essentially it is the promotion of our added value 
proposition and I feel very strongly about it” (R21); “If you haven’t got the right 
person, and you haven’t got the right skills, then the rest of it is irrelevant, and all 
your costs will go through the roof and you wouldn’t end up getting what you were 
wanting (strongly felt)” (R29).  The view of Holcomb and Hitt (2007) that specialised 
capabilities create value for firms has support in this study. 
 
4.5.3 Respondents’ views on filling the gap 
 
Some mentioned perceived skills deficiencies in contractors being the reason for 
not outsourcing, but a few took a different view – the difficulties inherent in 
accessing skills was a reason to outsource, albeit to “plug some holes.” (R24) One 
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respondent said: “(I’m) a great believer in moving activities out of the organisation’s 
main control where it’s non-core or could be provided better by somebody else” 
(R20).  Outsourcing non-core activities is a common them in the resource-based 
view (Espino-Rodríguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2004), but three cases of outsourcing 
“core” sales activities, such as key account management, were also observed: 
“There are some things where we just intellectually even don’t have the capability 
internally (which is not a skill that we have within our employee base) so that would 
sometimes go out...to the agency” (R27). These were sound examples of selectively 
acquiring good practice, as advocated by Hamel and Prahalad (1994). There were 
extensive users of outsourcing who appeared to have been doing so to access skills, 
and this is consistent with the view that access to external talent can overcome 
internal constraints to growth (Kor & Mahoney, 2004).  
 
4.5.4 Do sales managers perceive that employed salespeople are more skilled 
than third party contractors, or the other way round? 
 
Overwhelmingly, regardless of patterns of usage of contractors, 24 (83%) 
respondents felt that employees were more skilled than contractors. This was the 
case in a number of instances where respondents had substantial experience of 
both, and data to compare. This suggests that respondents tended to agree with 
the resource-based view that if a resource is firm-specific or unique, in-house gives 
better results (Espino-Rodríguez & Padrón-Robaina, 2006). Where companies are 
outsourcing sales activities, it is usually the case that those activities are perceived 
to require less skill and knowledge. For example in healthcare, where detailing new 
treatments to General Practitioners is frequently outsourced, while relationship-
building with large decision-making units in hospital trusts is usually insourced 
(Rogers, 2008).  
 
“With an employee you have higher aspirations, and expectations, and standards 
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for that employment, for that task. I think it's just the nature of the tasks, and the 
sophistication of the tasks, that you're expecting people to do. In our instance it's 
often the more sort-of higher intensity and sort-of lower skilled tasks that get 
outsourced” (R22); “(Our) employed people are more skilled, yes, definitely... there 
are more senior types (employed) sales persons - our key account management or 
industry sector management, whereas our third party guys are....more of a general 
sales force.” (R21) Implicitly, these sales managers appear to be avoiding 
outsourcing where there is a risk of learning loss, as found by Park, Lee & Morgan, 
(2011). 
 
In the literature, the view that selling skills per se are a commodity is found 
(Kulkarni & Ramamoorthy, 2005), but they should not be dismissed as lesser skills as 
they have a significant influence on sales performance (Churchill et al., 1985; 
Verbeke et al., 2011).  However, in many business-to-business contexts, the sales 
role requires in-depth knowledge about the firm and its products (Wilson & Zhang, 
2002; Verbeke et al., 2011), or selling depends on teamwork with or influence with 
other departments (Williamson, 1979; Menguc & Barker, 2005; Safizadeh et al., 
2008; Evans et al., 2012); in these cases salespeople should be employed. This 
pattern appears to prevail in this study. 
 
Another factor to be taken into account is that respondents were clear that 
employed salespeople usually got more training and development, so they would 
be expected to have better skills: “I do feel quite strongly that they are much more 
competent because of the level of investment I make in them” (R7); “The clinical 
knowledge or the technical knowledge of the in-house guys, it probably tends to be 
greater... a product of the fact that the in-house guys have probably had a longer, 
more in-depth training programme” (R25); and one respondent put it bluntly: 
“Directly employed sales people, get more training, they’re more accountable, 
versus the third party which in my experience tend to be less experienced – they’re 
just bums on seats.” (R18) Sales outsourcing studies (Anderson, 1985; Wilson & 
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Zhang, 2002 and Krafft et al., 2004) all found that where a high level of training is 
needed, sales would be insourced, and respondents in this study tended to follow 
that trend. 
 
There was some acknowledgement that outsourcing was a means of acquiring skills 
that would be difficult to develop internally, or it could be used to create a mix of 
internal and external that would be beneficially dynamic, which is consistent with 
Hamel and Prahalad (1994).  In particular, there was a view that if something had to 
be done very quickly, contractors were preferable, consistent with Holcomb and 
Hitt’s (2007) view that companies could enhance their capabilities by leveraging 
other companies’ resources. Respondents who felt that they were better than 
competitors on revenue growth or winning new customers appeared to be using 
higher levels of outsourcing, suggesting that accessing selling skills from third 
parties appeared to be working for them. “Recently winning a contract and then 
selecting... a contract sales organisation to fill two territories. The business came in 
very, very quickly” (R2).  There is evidence here of building “dynamic capabilities”, 
as advocated by Helfat and Peteraf (2003).  
 
For the most part however, companies were not in a growth phase, and sales 
managers’ preference for employed salespeople could be discerned, in line with 
Anderson et al.’s (2003) expectations, and Zoltners et al.’s (2006) view that contract 
sales organisations cannot be used for complex sales situations where a high level 
of skills and knowledge is required.   
 
Nevertheless, respondents who had no outsourced activities were not exclusively 
wedded to the idea that employees were inherently better skilled. One had been 
working on a “temp view to perm” basis with contractors and they had all recently 
been transferred to permanent employment; the other was planning to outsource 
to gain access to some specific skills. Similarly, those companies who were 
employing a large proportion of contract sales resource were not wholly wedded to 
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the idea that contractors were more skilled, but opted to explain contextual 
differences.    
 
Other nuances were explored. Developing differentiation is, according to the 
resource-based view, the route to better competitive performance (Selling & 
Stickney, 1989; Hooley et al., 1998; Hoopes et al., 2003), and it would most likely be 
supported by firm-specific selling skills, as observed by Wilson & Zhang (2002).  27 
(93%) of the respondents involved in this study said that they were working for 
companies who differentiated their value proposition. The cost leaders (2) were 
undertaking substantial outsourcing, but so were nine companies who were 
differentiated. Only where service was the key differentiator was outsourcing 
particularly eschewed: “The key thing that we have is this unique relationship with 
our customers where we deal direct and we’re able to offer a higher level of 
customer support than other manufacturers within the industry” (R19). 
 
Another possible variation by context was the nature of the customer portfolio. It 
might be expected that a concentration of very complex customers would be 
associated with higher levels of specific sales skills and therefore a tendency to 
consider that only employees could develop the desired skills. Indeed, where 
respondents were managing a key account-style mix (up to 20% of customers 
deliver 80% of revenue) the perceptions that employees are more skilled was 
strongest. “I will only ever employ people directly, because what I’m buying is 
someone that can establish a relationship and sustain a relationship, and that’s not 
something I’m prepared to outsource....it is very important, the trust 
element…somebody is betting their career or their pension on a solution, or 
promise of value that’s being offered.” (R6)   
 
This is consistent with the key account management literature, where there is an 
underlying assumption that key account managers are highly skilled employees 
(McDonald et al., 1997; Wilson & Millman, 2003). Most respondents made 
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favourable comments about employees’ skills, while opinions about the skills of 
CSOs were mixed. In justifying a preference for employees, some respondents had 
objective criteria, such as: 
 
“We generally see that our internal staff come out graded higher when compared 
against our third parties”; “We would typically operate with about (x)% realisation 
from our internal teams, against about (x-10)% with an external agency”. (R3) 
 
Just as there are defenders of contract sales organisations in the literature 
(Anderson et al., 2003; Ross et al., 2005), there were defenders of CSOs in this 
study, who made broadly supportive statements such as: “A third party agency is as 
effective as our internals are, typically. They're as enthusiastic, they're at least if not 
better trained, their product knowledge is always very good, and they operate as if 
they are part of an internal team.  There is very, very little difference between the 
two.” (R26); “The pool of resources they had available to them matched the 
requirements... I have to say the organisation that we used matched our 
requirements very closely, and I feel relatively strongly about that.” (R28) Although 
a minority view, sales managers can get what they want out of contract sales 
organisations to fill some specific skills gaps. 
 
4.5.5 How do sales managers compare the skills of employed salespeople with the 
sales skills that are available from third parties? 
 
There is no consistent approach when it comes to skills comparisons. Context is very 
important. Respondents were asked how they make skills comparisons. Context can 
make comparison difficult, as one respondent explained: “How I would go about 
comparing them? I’m struggling because I would never employ contractors and 
externals to do the same as I’m employing internals (employed people) to do and 
therefore a comparison would be more difficult”. (R7)  But there were some specific 
examples of comparisons. These included both informal/unstructured such as “(I) 
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requested (that) myself or my senior management meet with the individuals…” 
(R15); “I would be keen to find out about what plans or ideas they would 
bring...maybe do a dummy presentation” (R19).  There were also examples of more 
formal processes involving evaluation criteria, competency-based questioning and 
skills assessments such as role plays and business case scenarios. In one case, 
contract staff would go through the same assessment centres as full-time 
employees. The literature offers little guidance on comparisons other than the 
quest for uniqueness. It seems that, consistent with the expectations of researchers 
such as Porter (1996) and Newbert (2008) the sales managers in this sample are 
trying to access, combine and exploit internal and external resources within the 
sales function, in order to achieve competitive advantage. They are implicitly or 
explicitly aware of the importance of good selection and direction of resources, as 
recommended by Phelan & Lewin (2000).   
 
Where both employed and contract sales teams are in place, which is often the case 
in telesales, comparison can be much more detailed on the basis of performance. 
Metrics might include number of calls made, number of customers they've spoken 
to, conversion for each stage of the sales cycle, output in terms of the volume of 
sales against the target that's been set and calls can also be reviewed for quality 
and compliance to industry or company ethical codes. Complaints and level of 
dropout throughout the customer lifecycle would also be tracked. Where impact 
can be measured, resourcing decisions are more straightforward, as expected by 
Aubert et al., (2004). 
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4.5.6 How does the training investment in salespeople and contractors compare, 
and in particular how much comparative investment is made in training about 
company culture, products and customers? 
 
Probably the messiest answers on the tapes came when respondents were asked to 
explain how much training employees and contractors got. Their answers, 
comparing training given to employees and training given to contractors, are 
summarised in the table below: 
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Employees Contractors 
Company 
culture 
Products Customers Company 
culture 
Products Customers 
1 week 2 weeks 2 weeks 1 week Not clear 2 weeks 
20 days per year 2 days per assignment 
3 weeks initially then 2 days per month 3 weeks initially, on-going coaching is up to 
the contractor 
2-3 days 5-6 days per 
year 
On-going Minimal due to resistance to “time off the 
road” 
20 days per year One week per assignment 
21 days initially Not applicable 
30 days 3 days 
Team already very experienced Few days 
2 days per 
year 
2 weeks per 
year 
1 day per 
year 
Probably similar due to compliance 
requirements 
3-4 days 3-4 days Three weeks 3 days per year 
12 days, plus updates Not known 
Half day Two weeks  Half day Not applicable 
It takes several months for a salesperson to 
get up to speed. 
Four weeks Two weeks ? 
40 hours per 
year 
40 hours per 
year 
40 hours per 
year 
Probably about the same 
2 weeks 
induction 
2 weeks 4 weeks 2 weeks 
induction for 
team leader 
2 days 
(specific 
product) 
2 days 
(specific 
segment) 
3 months One week 
6 months overall to get up to speed. Not known 
6 week induction and on-going coaching Not applicable 
90 day induction and regular updates (nine 
days per year on product and 2 on 
customers) 
None Four days Two days 
On-going Three weeks 
per year 
On-going 2 days per 
year 
Three weeks 
per year 
? 
Two days Seven days None Five days per 
assignment 
Seven days Ten days 
Two to three weeks per year Seven to ten days 
Two days One week 
plus 
distance 
learning 
One week One day One week 
plus 
distance 
learning 
One week 
Five days  Ten days Few days Five days  Ten days Few days 
Seven weeks Three weeks 
 
Table 24: Summary of training given to employees and contractors 
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It seems that contractors get less training than employees, which may reflect the 
type of tasks or the length of contracts. One respondent admitted: “I think we 
support the in-house guys better than we do the outsourced guys, which is a 
terrible shame but that’s just the reality sometimes” (R25). So there may be an 
unfortunate reinforcing loop - contractors have fewer skills because they get less 
training and vice versa. Generally, highly skilled sales jobs such as Key Account 
Management require more training and are generally the domain of employees 
(McDonald et al., 1997). The findings of Anderson (1985) and Krafft et al. (2004) 
that the more training is needed for a sales role, the less likely it is to be 
outsourced, seems to have support in this sample.  
 
There are some comments about the regularity of training and coaching, so some 
companies have a focus on keeping knowledge up to date, recognising perhaps that 
competences have a life cycle and need renewing, as suggested by Helfat and 
Peteraf (2003). 
 
It was the case that respondents who used contractors most, and were successful 
with them were the clearest in their answers about training. While quantity of 
training might still have been less than that afforded for employees, there was 
some investment. There may be some support here for a reinforcing loop between 
training and success, consistent with the findings of Anderson et al. (1987) that 
companies that invested in training contractors were more attractive customers to 
the contractors than those who do not.   
 
One interesting finding from this table is that product training usually longer than 
training about customers. This does not seem to be consistent with respondents’ 
discussions about the criticality of customer knowledge (see below), and their 
service-led and consultative selling approaches. It begs the question whether 
companies persistently try to “buy in” customer knowledge when they recruit, or as 
some purchasing managers anecdotally claim, they expect the customer to train the 
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salesperson. 
 
4.5.7 How do sales managers perceive that customers would identify “the way 
you sell” as part of their differentiation as a supplier?  
 
It would be logical if the importance that most sales managers in the sample placed 
on skills were reflected in their confidence that their way of selling would be 
recognised by their customers as different from competitors. It was interesting to 
note that three respondents described their channel as their differentiation (in two 
cases, working through third parties, in one case, selling direct).  
 
Twenty (69%) described a service-driven approach to selling, and saw themselves as 
offering a superior way of selling based on understanding customer needs and 
presenting suitable solutions. The way customers are treated, the way the company 
responds to customers and the way salespeople understand customer needs were 
considered important, as was giving advice or a consultative approach. For example: 
“We don’t rush to a sale.  We focus on customer processes and practices. We start 
with an analysis of what they do, and how they do things, and give them a choice 
(at) each stage of the process.” (R13). 
 
 Given that needs-based selling was identified in the 1980s as best practice 
(Rackham, 1987) and consultative selling has been with us since 1999 (Rackham & 
DeVincentis, 1999), this approach ought to have become the norm across all 
organisations. The fact that respondents felt that it gave them a point of 
differentiation over the competition indicates that there may still be a lot of 
mediocre selling going on in the UK, evidenced by the reported skills gap (MSSSB, 
2008; CFA, 2012).   
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4.5.8 Do sales managers perceive that personal relationships between salespeople 
(whether employees or contractors) and customers have an influence on sales 
success? 
 
Respondents were prompted to comment on their perceptions of the importance of 
personal relationship-building in sales success. Some very strong words were used 
to convey respondents’ perceptions that personal relationship-building was 
important. This is consistent with empirical evidence that personal relationships 
affect professional purchasers, as observed by Zaheer et al. (1998) and Anaza & 
Rutherford (2011), but it is the strength of feeling that is noticeable: 
 
• “That old adage that people buy people first is very true.” R1 
• “I think it’s key, absolutely key.” R4 
• “I think that’s crucial for us.” R5 
• “Huge, huge. I’m not going to use the term trusted advisor, because it’s 
overworked, but people still do buy from people, even when there is quite a 
rigorous procurement process in place.” R6 
• “I think personal relationships mean everything in our business.” R11 
• “I have got clients I have been dealing with for fifteen/sixteen years and it 
helps enormously.” R12 
• “People still buy from people, it’s a very social world.” R15 
•  “It’s very, very influential.” R18 
•  “I would say that was very high now. To what degree? A very high degree.” 
R21 
• “I'd say it was critical.” R22 
•  “The relationships are essential (to) be able to get access to the customers.” 
R27 
•  “People like buying from people and I think if you can start to build a 
relationship with your customer then it certainly helps the sale, it’s as simple 
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as that.” R29 
Consistent with Peng et al. (2006), respondents did not consider it impossible for 
third parties to have better relationships with customers than they could, for 
example, where there were company size, territory, or cultural factors in favour of 
the contract sales organisation.  Nevertheless, the desire for long-term relationships 
with customers was a reason not to outsource selling activities. The fact that 
employees could provide consistent contact over the long-term was evident even 
within one company balancing both internal and external sales resources: “The 
internal people are permanently employed, have been here for years and therefore 
they are able to generate relationships with potential customers which could easily 
last for two, three, four, five years before we actually get these companies as 
clients. That is not possible for an external sales operation to do that because they 
don’t have consistency of staff and the whole management of the campaigns they 
operate is different.” (R8) Long-term relationships with customers have been 
empirically associated with better firm performance (Kalwani & Narayandas, 1995), 
although a more recent practitioner study (Dixon & Adamson, 2011) has achieved 
popularity by questioning the value of relationship building. 
 
Five respondents, while not disagreeing with the idea that personal relationships 
are part of sales success, pointed out that, at least in some sectors, the focus on the 
individual salesperson is changing, because there are some “pragmatic” buyers, and 
there are “arm’s length” tendering procedures: 
 
• “If you are speaking to a customer that is typically an analytical or pragmatic 
customer they would want to just be looking at the numbers and wouldn’t 
really want to enter into much of a conversation....” R3 
• “We go through EU procurements - it’s probably more difficult to do 
personality, I would say it’s gone down. So ten years ago it would have been 
80% now it’s probably about 50%.” (R9) 
 
283 
 
As Homburg, Müller & Klarmann (2011) reported, customer orientation in 
salespeople is not always effective or desired by the customer.  Where a personal 
relationship is preferred, it does not always mean that the salesperson has to be 
employed by the brand that is bought. One respondent with a large proportion of 
third party sales resource commented that: “They can speak to a lot more 
customers in a smaller part of time, so the amount of information they can gather 
from customers is more than what we would get internally” (R3). Another pointed 
out that since it is generally smaller customers who are looked after by third parties, 
there are more to lose: “(The third party) might (have) 70 of them so we lose 
knowing where all those small customers are” (R4). Sometimes, sales agents have 
been in territories for a long time and consequently: “They train us about the 
customers because they're closer to the customers than we are in those areas” 
(R16). As Palmatier et al. (2007) discovered when looking at manufacturer’s 
representatives in the USA, their customers can be more loyal to the reps than the 
brands they sell. A third party may have expertise in trust-building with their clients 
and their client’s customers (Pillai & Sharma, 2003; Perks & Halliday, 2003; Judge & 
Dooley, 2006). 
 
In the 21st century culture of team selling and corporate ownership of customer 
information, as one respondent explained: “It shouldn’t be the case that if they 
disappear... you suddenly haven’t got access to customers anymore...” (R11). 
However, another commented that: “I think in our industry....the knowledge tends 
to be with the individual rather than shared across a wider team” (R10). In a recent 
study it has been observed that the relationship a buyer has with a salesperson 
directly impacts their relationship with the supplier (Anaza & Rutherford, 2011). 
Despite indicators of change from respondents, it seems that relationship-building 
skills are still highly valued, despite their tendency to create dependence. 
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4.5.9 Do factors about the integration of selling, such as team-based selling and 
salesperson involvement in non-selling activity, such as post-sales support and 
problem-solving, play some role in the sales skills portfolio? 
 
Both Anderson’s 1985 study and Krafft et al.’s 2005 study found that the higher the 
proportion of non-selling activity, the more likely the sales function would be 
insourced.  Both studies showed strong relationships between non-selling activities 
and in-house sales.  Many respondents reported that their salespeople had 
considerable involvement in non-selling activities. As one respondent put it “If you 
(are) selling equipment that should last twenty–five years to customers who are 
repeat customers in a small market, they don’t expect you to disappear after they 
have signed the contract” (R11). 
 
Contract sales organisations, where they are used, are not immune from a 
requirement to do some non-selling activities. A significant user of CSOs said: “The 
customer will be working with you on an on-going basis so whether head-counted 
or contracted, post-sales follow up is constant” (R27). Although Zoltners et al. 
(2006) argued that contractors cannot do complex sales, extensive users of contract 
sales resources may find ways of extending their scope. 
 
Although “working relationships with colleagues” was hardly mentioned as a “most 
missed” when employees leave, respondents seemed to be noting something that 
was strong in Menguc and Barker’s (2005) and Steward et al.’s (2010) findings about 
the significant value of a salesperson’s influence with colleagues:  
 
• “People who are on the headcount know how to understand and work and 
operate within the organisation”; “You need the established team members 
who have been around, who know the company.”  R2 
• “They know the product intimately and if they work closely with other in-
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house resources to ensure they have all the skills and knowledge that they 
need and back up, I would be very surprised if any external agencies could 
deliver that level of skill and competency in the same sort of time frame...”; 
R12 
• “It’s quite a technical sale that we’re involved with and if they are internal 
sales people, they will have access to our engineers and training programme 
and so on and so forth and over time they will be more skilled than bringing 
a contractor on board”;  R14 
• “The internal people have access to the internal knowledge and resources of 
the wider team fairly easily and I guess they typically will have been longer 
involved in that area”; R20 
 
Respondents were asked whether their sales activities were team-based. Once 
again, the more selling is team-based, the more likely it is expected to be that 
salespeople would be employees (Menguc & Barker, 2005). Most respondents 
mentioned that their approach to selling was team-based.  The team approach was 
occasionally qualified to indicate that it was most prevalent with key accounts: 
 
• “With...larger accounts we will set up specific account plans involving a 
much broader subset of the functions within our different teams.” R14 
• “Where we get most activity nowadays is from what we call applications, 
which is a team-sell where we use engineers, project managers and 
salespeople together.” R13 
 
The majority of respondents reporting team-based selling had fairly low levels of 
outsourcing. One who did use contractors extensively pointed out that he could use 
contract staff for specific tasks within a key account team.  A case study of team 
selling by manufacturer’s representatives has occurred in the prior literature 
(Jackson et al, 1999). 
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These views are consistent with the evidence that it is a salesperson’s relationships 
within their own organisation that determines their value (Liu & Leach, 2001; 
Tellefsen & Eyuboglu, 2002; Wilson & Millman, 2003; Menguc & Barker, 2005; 
Plouffe & Barclay, 2007; Steward et al., 2010). It is also consistent with transaction 
cost views of the need to employ when team selling is part of the job (Anderson, 
1985; Krafft et al., 2004). In a wider context, the more that success in an activity 
depends on employee collaboration, the more impetus there is to keep it in-house 
(Williamson, 1979; Safizadeh et al., 2008). It is possible for contractors to be used 
successfully within selling teams (Jackson et al., 1999), but among these 
respondents, that was a rarity. 
 
 
4.5.10 Which skills are most important and do they vary between employed 
salespeople and contractors, especially: selling skills, product knowledge, 
knowledge of company culture and procedures, knowledge of the customer and 
working relationships with colleagues? 
 
The transaction cost concept of asset specificity and the resource-based view 
concept of competency may be very close (Argyres & Zenger, 2007). The idea of 
something unique to the firm which salespeople need to know was recognised by 
respondents in this study. The skills sets noted in Anderson’s (1985) study as 
indicators of insourcing (company culture, product knowledge and customer 
knowledge) were relevant to these sales managers.   
 
4.5.10.1 Company culture 
 
Santos & Eisenhardt (2005) posited that “Who we are” is relevant to “make-or-buy” 
decisions. A key construct in Anderson’s 1985 study of contracting-out sales, which 
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was tested by the most indicators, was the importance of salespeople 
understanding company culture. This study prompted respondents to talk about the 
value of employed salespeople (and contractors) understanding company culture. 
Some respondents felt strongly about the importance of salespeople “buying into a 
particular culture we have” (R1). Respondents noted that company values were 
easier to convey via an employed salesperson: “How the company culture is and the 
message that they are taking to the market, it’s easy to instil in the sales person 
who is working directly for you” (R17); “They would understand the company 
culture – they’re more loyal to the company culture” (R24). Sometimes there is a 
“chicken and egg” situation. If “it’s our company culture to ...employ direct sales 
people” (R17) - then clearly culture will matter to the salespeople.  
 
The role of a salesperson as brand ambassador (Tanner et al., 2008) tends to 
indicate insourcing is advantageous. Even advocates of wholesale outsourcing argue 
for things that determine the company’s identity to be insourced (Phelan & Lewin, 
2000; Sucky, 2007).  As one respondent put it: “I would question the ability or the 
experience of the sales person from the sales agency to be able to... have a feeling 
for the company culture as much as one of our own sales people would.” (R17).  
Another respondent mentioned negative results from trying to induct contractors 
into company culture... “A week (training) on the culture, although to an extent 
how much that would be ingrained is questionable because they see themselves as 
temporary anyway” (R1), but a regular user of contractors argued it was possible to 
get contractors to “Want to be an extension of our sales floor and adopt our 
culture” (R3). This is consistent with empirical findings that salespeople working for 
an agent or contract sales organisation can develop an affinity with a particular 
supplier’s brand, which increases the effort that they put into that brand (Hughes & 
Ahearne, 2010). 
 
Significantly, a few respondents perceived an advantage in contract salespeople not 
being entrenched in company culture: “They don’t tend to have the baggage of 
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previous company culture or wanting to keep things the way they are” (R27); 
“Contract sales team...can....understand what’s going out there in the environment 
and they are not so cocooned in terms of the organisation, so they can bring extra 
qualities....(they are) a bit more entrepreneurial” (R2). This minority view is 
consistent with Mahajan et al. (1984) who noted that there were advantages in 
contractors being divorced from organisational climate. 
 
Given that cultural affinity takes time to develop, there is still a risk with employing 
salespeople, with one advocate of employees noting that some sales recruits only 
last about a year. As noted by Battu et al. (2002), even employees who have 
developed firm-specific skills can be very mobile. Notably, however, knowledge of 
company culture was not quoted by any respondent as the skill most missed when 
an employee leaves, even though it might be an aspect of training that takes a long 
time to instil and needs constant reinforcement. 
 
4.5.10.2 Product/solution 
 
Unique products are correlated with employed salespeople, according to Anderson 
(1985), Wilson and Zhang (2002) and Krafft et al. (2004). Some of the respondents 
in this study were specific about this factor in their decision-making. “When it 
comes to the specifics of our product and our industry then I would certainly expect 
our own employed people to be superior” (R12); ”We are in a very technical 
environment ....We take the approach of employing (people) who are technically 
adequate and then training them to be sales people” (R9). 
 
Most comments centred on the asset specificity of skills: “When you have got a 
dealer he might have to deal with a multitude of products so he can’t possibly be as 
skilled as (dealing with) one and my opinion’s really strong on that..” (R4); “Third 
parties...are usually very keen and enthusiastic, but lacking some of the product 
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knowledge, so we have to train them up in the first instance, but although they are 
very willing to do new things, they don’t necessarily have the ability to do that” 
(R14). The asset specificity of product knowledge is still relevant in sales resourcing 
decisions. 
 
Product knowledge was second most important when respondents were prompted 
for “the skills that are most missed when a salesperson leaves”. According to TCE 
studies, where highly technical products are being sold, it is less likely that sales will 
be outsourced (Anderson, 1985; Krafft et al., 2004) and this theme is also suggested 
in the resource-based view (Wilson & Zhang, 2002). A number of companies defined 
themselves as technology companies, in which case technical knowledge is clearly 
important. Sales managers in services companies also emphasised product 
knowledge, perhaps because professional and technical services are very specific 
and sometimes regulated. 
 
4.5.10.3 Customer knowledge and relationships 
 
Another of Anderson’s (1985) aspects of “asset specific” skills was knowledge of the 
customer. This attracted relatively little comment until respondents were asked to 
comment on the skills that would be missed if employees left or contractors were 
terminated and eleven (38%) rated it most important (see paragraphs below). This 
is interesting given the focus in the literature on the increasing importance of 
salespeople adding value to the customer (Tanner et al., 2008) and even the 
suggestion that sales channel choice should be influenced by the customer 
(Palmatier et al., 2007), since interpersonal trust is important to purchasing decision 
makers (Zaheer et al., 1998). Nevertheless there was some mention of it when they 
were asked for how they compared the skills of employees and contractors. 
Consistent with Anderson and Coughlan, (1987) and Peng et al. (2006), in markets 
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where the contractor might know the customer better than the brand owner, 
contractors were valued. 
 
“We are able to employ very high quality sales people, because we can offer them 
consistency of employment and they can develop relationships with...(customers) 
over the years, so they in fact do a better job” (R8); “Our people pay off in a 
relationship management aspect, and their skill-sets and competences are very 
much around that” (R13). The association of relationship-building with employed 
salespeople is relevant in this study as it was in Anderson (1984) and Krafft et al., 
(2004). 
 
From the choices “selling skills, product knowledge, working knowledge of the 
company culture or procedures, knowledge of the customer or working 
relationships with colleagues”, knowledge of the customer was most important to 
38% of respondents. It was relevant to note that respondents were generally talking 
about in-depth knowledge of long-term (probably key) customers: “Key account 
management is a skill set that’s built in-house because it requires buyers’ market 
knowledge” (R15). One respondent, commenting on the nature of his company’s 
success explained (with strong emphasis): “We do that by focusing on long-term 
relationships. It helps maintain our margin, our market share, it’s in line with the 
model ...within the group, and we find it’s been very effective” (R13).  Respondents 
in this sample appeared to agree with Zoltners et al. (2006) that contractors cannot 
handle complex sales or customer relationships. The need for long-term 
relationships with customers is associated with in-house sales (Anderson & 
Schmittlein, 1984); the more complex the customers, the more likely that selling 
activity will be kept in-house (Wilson & Zhang, 2002). As previously noted, this 
finding is also consistent with the assumptions of the key account management 
literature (e.g. Mcdonald et al., 1997). 
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Unprompted, thirteen (45%) respondents also made comments about the value of 
knowledge of particular industry sectors and markets, e.g. “I have some high need 
for some deep domain knowledge” (R6) and while many companies develop this in-
house, it was a relevant consideration for seeking third parties: “We would look to 
use contractors that would give us an extra avenue for sales in a given industry, 
geography or for language capability” (R14). This is consistent with the literature on 
use of agents in overseas markets (Anderson & Coughlan, 1987; Peng et al., 2006) 
and the resource-based view. Notably, use of contractors for target segments was 
one context where respondents perceived success. 
 
4.5.10.4 Selling skills 
 
Sales aptitude is an important element of a salesperson’s performance (Walker et 
al., 1977), but it is selling skills that have been identified as most transferable 
(Kulkarni & Ramamoorthy, 2005). Since contract sales organisation have been 
described as selling machines (Anderson & Trinkle, 2005) it is predictable that it is 
here where some respondents note the contract advantage:  
 
• “Lead-gen and the different territories and the lead qualifications. I think 
contractors tend to be more focused in that area and they tend to have that 
experience, whereas internal people, that’s definitely an area that they 
dislike”;  R15 
• “The kind of bedrock of the sales function in terms of being able to access, 
negotiate and being able to run good productive sales calls...the outsourced 
guys are as good as the in-house… I’ve seen it in role play/benchmark 
scenarios, where the outsourced guys have performed better. It’s that 
classic, they’re really keen to demonstrate that... they can sell…”; R25 
• “A very time-consuming part of what we do is trying to get people to say 
‘yes’ to a meeting, because it takes quite a lot of phone calls before they can 
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get through to people, before you get your chance to secure a meeting, so I 
think that has been the thing that has appealed to us to an extent about 
outside contractors... giving them the time consuming task”; R12 
• “(A) contract sales organisation probably lives and dies by its results a lot 
more than we do”. R13 
 
Therefore support for contract sales organisations on the basis of their selling skills 
can be observed in this study. This is consistent with claims for the selling efficiency 
of sales agents and the view that it is their focus on selling which is valuable to their 
clients (Mahajan et al., 1984; Novick, 2000; Ross et al., 2005; Anderson & Trinkle, 
2005). This is important given key works such as Churchill et al. (1985) which 
associate selling skills closely with sales performance.  
 
Contractors attracted some admiration for their focus on selling skills. It was 
perceived that “They have to have built generic sales skills in order to earn a living” 
(R10) and therefore “External sales people are probably more skilled in a pure sales 
sense” (R8) . Users of contractors said: “The contract sales people, I have to say they 
are generally focused on activity hitting the numbers” (R2).  
 
 Practitioner books such as Anderson and Trinkle (2005) and Novick (2000) have 
mentioned a focus on selling as one advantage of using third parties, and there is 
some support here from respondents that sales skills are what they expect 
contractors to do well to the extent that those skills would be missed most if 
contracts were terminated. 
 
The admiration for contractors’ selling skills was not universal. For sceptical 
respondents, it was not so much a case of being pro-employee, but anti-contractor. 
Sometimes this was a case of bitter experience: “The limited times I have used third 
party sales agencies to do my lead generation/qualification, the results have been 
very, very poor, based on the lack of experience of their employees” (R18). 
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Consistent with transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975) and the finding in 
the section on control, concerns about “lock-in” and “shirking” were expressed: “In 
the first place they might give you the best people to work on a particular project, 
but over time, as ...you change from being a new customer to being an existing 
customer, sometimes the quality can be dropped off...” (R19).  
 
Contract sales organisations were defended on grounds of some specific contextual 
skills, some of which explained their value when flexibility is necessary: “ I think in 
certain environments, the third party would probably be more skilled, because 
they’ve been exposed to a lot of different companies and different ways of 
working” (R19); “Contract sales teams are better, or more aligned to the changes (in 
the customer/s)” (R2); “If you suddenly have a merger or acquisition or you go onto 
new territory or products they (employed salespeople) know nothing about, that 
maybe a good reason to look externally and try even for an interim period to bring 
in somebody who knows more about all those areas” (R11).  
 
Gaining access to specific skills in order to generate value is at the heart of the 
resource-based view (Holcomb & Hitt, 2007), and to do so to facilitate change has 
resonance with the dynamic capabilities aspect of RBV (Lonsdale, 1999; Helfat 
&Peteraf, 2003). It is clear from this sample that some sales managers will turn to 
contractors to accelerate strategy implementation, as advocated by Ansoff (1987), 
Nooteboom (1993) and Kim and Mauborgne (1997). Flexibility is discussed in more 
detail in the next section. 
 
It was notable in some industry sectors (pharmaceuticals and finance) that 
perceptions about the specific skills of contractors were most favourable: “The 
(third parties) we use are time-served, skilled… at the moment I think there are 
much more skilled contractors available rather than people available for 
employment.” (R10); “There are more experienced staff in the market who we 
contract with” (R24);  “If you go back maybe ten years, there was a bit of a quality 
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mark so sometimes the price you have to pay for going with third parties was that 
the quality was less. I think that over the last 10 years the quality has improved 
significantly...with third parties...today I think you can get people of the same 
calibre as in-house staff...There are some people who now work for the contract 
companies because actually there is more security (with them)” (R27). Clearly in 
these sectors, the supply market is well-developed enough to have experience and 
reputation that are valuable to their clients (Mukherji & Ramachandran, 2007; 
Jaramillo & Grisaffe, 2009). (See also 4.7.2). 
 
4.5.11 Summary of respondents’ perceptions of the role of skills in “make-or-buy” 
decisions 
 
While reinforcing findings from previous literature about the role of skills in 
deciding sales resourcing types (Anderson, 1985; Tanner et al., 2008), the findings 
of this study also reflect the weakness of the market for sales skills in the UK (CFA, 
2012). They are very important and the availability of them is limited. At the same 
time, using contract sales organisations to fill gaps is not widespread. The desire for 
salespeople immersed in the company culture (Tellefsen & Eyuboglu, 2002) and 
with specific technical knowledge (Wilson & Zhang, 2002) is not surprising in most 
business-to-business sectors.  
 
Consistent with the findings of Tuli et al. (2010), customer knowledge, leading to 
the development of strong relationships with customers, is important for both 
employed and contracted salespeople, according to thse respondents. It is 
contradictory that formal training about customers is limited. Also, although 
customer information is the property of the company, a lot of customer knowledge 
seems to be developed by and left with the individual salesperson or contractor. 
This suggests that more could be done to systematically put customer insight at the 
heart of sales expertise.  
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Given the preference for developing the skills of employees over using contractors, 
another significant finding is that although the literature identifies influence with 
colleagues as an important rent-generating skill among salespeople (Menguc & 
Barker, 2005), it is not widely recognised by the sales managers in this study. It is 
not necessarily picked up, even when discussing team-selling and non-selling 
activities.  
 
Last but not least, the respondents seemed to be most impressed with the pure 
selling skills of contract sales organisations, as anticipated by key authors (e.g. 
Anderson & Trinkle, 2005). It is perhaps an irony that as employed salespeople 
acquire breadth of skills and knowledge, their sales skills get overshadowed and 
become what they least want to do. Hence why some respondents were combining 
contractors and employees in the sales process with a view to getting the best 
productivity. 
 
Overall, it seems that most respondents took a resource-based view approach to 
“make-or-buy”, but at a granular level, looking at skills per customer segment or 
process step, an approach observed by Watjatrakul & Drennan (2005). All the 
skills/competences noted in previous studies are relevant to their approach to 
resourcing of the sales function. There is further consideration later in this chapter 
of the indicators of a skills antecedent for resource decisions.   
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4.6 Respondents’ perceptions of the role of flexibility in resourcing decisions 
 
Proposition 4:  The comparative speed and flexibility in deployment of resource 
options will be an antecedent in “make-or-buy” decisions in the sales function 
 
4.6.1 Introduction  
 
Among the challenges faced by the respondents, there were a significant number of 
references to the need to change resourcing models, consistent with assumptions 
made in the literature that changing resource patterns to respond to environmental 
change is the most important role of strategy (Venkatraman & Prescott, 1990; 
Noble, 1999; Snow et al., 2005; Shimizu & Hitt, 2004). Although not always a priority 
to the respondents, the issue of resource flexibility was frequently mentioned 
outside of the prompted questions.  
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Category 
of 
challenge 
Number 
of 
mentions 
Fit to 
main 
themes 
Typical quotes 
Changing 
resource 
model 
15 Flexibility “The products we deal with and the 
marketplace we operate in shifts very quickly. 
Our competitors are very disruptive in the 
marketplace, as are we, so you have to react to 
that very quickly.”  R26 
“The whole way that we do things is changing 
and what will happen is that more of our 
business will come from internet-based 
marketing activities.” R8 
“You need to sell this way now, if we’re going 
to move forward, but we’re cutting back the 
number of salespeople and giving people extra 
work to do.” R17 
“Being able to redeploy or reduce a workforce 
in a country.... where you have works councils, 
and quite a high degree of regulation... requires 
a huge amount of cost and effort and time.” 
R20 
   “It’s that culture of dealing with a transactional 
sale rather than building up a relationship with 
the customer base is the biggest challenge.” 
R23 
Table 25: Comments on the issue of resource flexibility (1) 
 
Some respondents were also turning to contractors to help with short-term surges 
in demand, consistent with literature suggesting that volume flexibility positively 
affects a firm’s competiveness (Jack & Raturi, 2002; Sawhney, 2006), and specifically 
the view that resourcing options help to build a firm’s capabilities (Ansoff, 1987; 
Foss, 1998).  
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Category of 
challenge 
Number 
of 
mentions 
Fit to 
main 
themes 
Typical quotes 
Growth-
related 
5 Flexibility “There's also a challenge of the volume of 
heads we've required within our telesales 
teams....we would struggle to get the 
volume of people in a single area.” R26 
“Our challenge was if this takes off the way 
we anticipate we won’t be able to cope…” 
R25 
Table 26: Comments on the issue of resource flexibility (2) 
 
The researcher’s previous work on this topic in the pharmaceutical sector (Rogers, 
2009) indicated that flexibility was an important antecedent for use of contract 
sales organisations. Flexibility consists of a number of related factors, including the 
variabilisation of costs (Stigler, 1939), the ability to change quickly (Golden & 
Powell, 2000) and the spreading of risk while maximising opportunity realisation, as 
explained in Sanchez’ (1993) real options theory. Flexibility was considered by some 
respondents in this sample to be their priority in making sales resourcing decisions, 
but more regarded it as least important.   
 
4.6.2 Do sales managers perceive that employed salespeople, contract sales 
organisations or a combination of both, give them more flexibility? 
 
Some of the theoretical works on the nature of the firm discuss integration or 
market organisation as “either/or” decisions. In particular, empirical work testing 
the transaction cost economics view has examined 100% employed versus 100% 
contracted-out samples (e.g. Anderson, 1985). Williamson (1991) noted that hybrid 
forms of organisation are possible. The challenge, in the case of sales, is the 
multiplicity of choices if the sales function is approached in a granular way as 
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advocated by Watjakrakul and Drennan (2005). Among this limited sample, a great 
variety of arrangements with third parties have been noted, from extremely short-
term to long-term renewable contracts, from small scale (1-5% of activities) to 
much larger proportions of activities. Usually, just one part of the sales process, a 
limited number of territories/market segments or a limited number of products are 
outsourced, which is expected in the literature (Kleeman, 1994; Dutta et al., 1995; 
Gary, 2005; Rogers, 2009; Krishnamurthy et al., 2009). Many sales managers 
supported the desirability of hybridisation, perceiving the ability to optimise the 
benefits of both in-house and outsourced resources (Fredericks, 2005; King, 2006; 
Parmigiani, 2007).   
 
When prompted to discuss flexibility, most of the respondents mentioned the 
desirability of having resourcing choices. As seen above, this was largely to enable 
experimentation or speedily address new markets: 
 
• “So you might pick a little sub-segment of a segment and have a quick go at 
that – just to see if your proposition resonates.” R6 
• “Because we have more options on the table, we can reach out to more 
customers”; “The more options we have, the more flexibility we have, and 
the more we are able to move to different industries, different geographies, 
different languages, the more success we’ll have.”  R14 
• “There’s a base load of demand that should be, and is best filled using 
internal resources, but where that requirement flexes over time I think 
peaks and troughs can be better managed using an out-sourced model.” R20 
• “Do (we)... have a huge recruitment drive...or do we speak to a 
partner...who already has that in place...”  R21 
 
Apart from the growth angle, there were some generally favourable comments 
about the advantages of choice: 
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• “Having the availability of external options to compare with internal options 
would always be useful in my view.” R10 
• “Having the option of looking externally gives me greater flexibility.” R13 
• “We need as many options as possible.” R24 
• “Be prepared to change from the way you have always done it.” R4 
• “It is critical to us that we operate with both internal and external teams.” 
R21 
 
One respondent summed up the hybrid advantage: 
“I think you need a good mixture of both. Because I think the external gives you the 
flexibility and the internal is what gives you the company identity.” R25 
Although accommodated in transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1991), hybrids 
are assumed to be long-term relationships rather than granular mixes. It appears 
that the “real options” approach where short-term change in dynamic markets is 
advocated (Sanchez, 1993), has more resonance with these respondents. 
 
4.6.3 To what degree do sales managers perceive that competitiveness depends 
on being able to increase or decrease volume of activity without disproportionate 
increases in costs? 
In unprompted comments about the challenges that they faced in their roles, 
twelve (41%) respondents mentioned changing resource models and five (17%) 
specifically mentioned the need to ramp up resourcing quickly for new 
opportunities. These could broadly be interpreted as a need to “flex” sales 
resources as market conditions change, which is the classic strategic challenge 
(Noble, 1999; Shimizu & Hitt, 2004). Williamson (1991) argued that adaptability was 
crucial, but assumed that employment contracts were easier to change than 
contracts with third parties. 
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However, the pattern between respondents’ descriptions of the market conditions 
they were dealing with and their pattern of use of third party resources was not 
consistent. 
16 (55%) respondents perceived their current market conditions to be volatile, but 
very variable levels of outsourcing are observed. From this sample, the view of 
Krickx (2000) that there is no systematic relationship between demand volatility and 
degrees of vertical integration seems to be supported. Since 72% of respondents 
were only partially outsourcing, there may be some indication here that 
respondents were using “real options” to be nimble to improve competiveness 
(Sanchez, 1993; Golden & Powell, 2000; Alvarez & Stenbacka, 2007).  
 
 
4.6.4 How do sales managers perceive the relative contribution of employed 
salespeople and contractors to speed of change? 
 
4.6.4.1 Employed salespeople and flexibility 
 
When prompted to discuss flexibility, twelve respondents defended employed 
salespeople’s ability to adapt and to improve their productivity, and apparently 
agreed with Coase (1937) that employees are the most adaptable organisational 
form. Some mentioned that crisis conditions in the economy had been instrumental 
in recent evidence of employed salespeople behaving as a flexible resource. 
Examples given were office moves and accepting pay cuts: 
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Comments about employee flexibility Examples 
“An employee would be able to 
accelerate change quicker because 
(employment is) a much greater 
commitment.” R22 
“They have been prepared to change 
locations and accept restructuring.” R1 
 
“...receptive to change...very quickly got 
on board with the vision and the change 
was implemented very quickly.” “Where 
you have got the right team they can 
massively help you to accelerate 
change.” 
 R10 
“Bonus plans have significantly altered 
downwards and people have accepted 
that.” R10 
 
“You can handle it (with a small team) 
and still control it and fight back spins in 
the market activity.” R11 
“There was a pay freeze for about two or 
three years....appreciating the fact that 
the market was in such a bad state and 
the general economy...” R11 
“We have quite a high tolerance to 
change, which does happen quite 
regularly.” 
R13 
 
“We’ve had pay freezes in the past, and 
it’s never a pleasant experience but it’s 
been absorbed and taken on board by 
the sales team.” R14 
“Employed people are more willing to 
chip in to enact or accelerate change.” 
R21 
“During the downturn, we were able to 
reduce our sales overheads. We had to 
shut a couple of our sales offices...move 
people to other countries.” R17 
“They buy in to the company.” R1 
 
“Pay freezes and pension freezes have 
been accepted.” R12 
Table 27: Comments on employee flexibility 
 
Like others in the labour market, salespeople have adjusted to the fall in output in 
2008 and 2009 through slower (or negative) earnings growth (ONS 2010/11). One 
respondent commented, in connection with pay cuts: “You have to question the 
voluntary nature of it” (R13), but nevertheless, many of the sales managers in this 
study have experienced co-operation from their employed salespeople when they 
have had to change the sales operations to adjust to market downturns, or in a few 
cases, growth. The respondents were career sales directors/managers with a great 
deal of experience, and therefore there might have been high levels of trust from 
reporting staff, who would therefore be more willing to accept change (McNeilly & 
Lawson, 1999; Choi et al., 2004).  
303 
 
4.6.4.2 Contractors and flexibility 
 
When discussing general attitudes towards the use of contractors for sales tasks, 
fourteen (48%) respondents focused on the contribution that they can make to 
achieving rapid change.  
 
Attitudinal 
comments about 
third 
parties/contractors 
Fit to main 
themes 
Typical quotes 
Positive Flexibility “In terms of flexing themselves round the 
changes that take place out there... I often 
find that some of the contract sales teams are 
better.” R2 
“...experience is a positive one, in that working 
with third parties, contractors, does give us a 
very quick change anyway.” R14 
“They have got a big role to play where either 
we want to have flexibility or where we cannot 
justify getting someone on headcount.” R27 
Table 28: Comments on third parties/contractors’ flexibility (1) 
 
Getting something done quickly seems to be a frequent antecedent for the use of 
carefully pre-selected contract sales organisations. Most respondents had 
experience of short-term contracting out of particular tasks. Difficulties in acquiring 
resource to address new opportunities might be a strong incentive to using a third 
party/contractor. Choice of resourcing options, as advocated in real options theory, 
can be a way of maximizing opportunity (Sanchez, 1993; Foss, 1998; Anderson T.J., 
2000; Sharma & Mehotra, 2007).   
 
There are comments in the study that suggest some admiration for the speed and 
capability of some contract sales organisations in recruitment and deployment of 
salespeople. This could be one of their capabilities that a manager of a recently 
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downsized or stable sales function could feel was worth utilising. The increase in 
marginal productivity is worth having (Stigler, 1939; Scott et al., 1988), and the need 
to adjust very quickly should be covered by resourcing options (Fredericks, 2005).  
 
It should be noted that regular users of contract sale organisations mentioned that 
they had a few pre-selected suppliers for such campaigns and that they knew there 
might still be a trade-off in terms of effectiveness. 
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General comments about third 
parties/contractors and flexibility 
Examples 
“You can terminate the external 
resource much easier than you can make 
changes to an internal resource...” R12 
“A nine or twelve month contract for a 
particular area... it would be very 
difficult to do that if it were a headcount 
position.” “Recently winning a contract 
and then selecting... a contract sales 
organisation to fill two territories. The 
business came in very, very quickly.” R2 
“There’s a lot more flexibility (with) the 
third party, because you can switch the 
resource on and off a lot quicker, and 
control the investment to a level which 
you're more comfortable with.” R22 
“An example of that is when we look at 
recruiting, they can generally do that in 
a two week period and have them up 
and ready and speaking to customers, 
whereas it would take us a couple of 
months to get people in the door and 
everything set up.” R3 
“One of the main benefits of outsourcing 
is being able to react and flex in times of 
uncertainty and volatility.” R25 
 
“If we wanted to run a product 
campaign to promote an existing or new 
product, and we could turn that on 
probably within two weeks using 
external telemarketing.” R20 
 
“They are typically moving people 
between campaigns more frequently 
than we do. Their rotation of staff on 
both of those counts tends to mean that 
they are geared up better to 
accommodate change than we are 
internally.” R26 
“If we have had to react to a particular 
competitor activity ...we can usually 
enact or put in place a sales campaign 
very quickly, within a week in fact.”  R21 
“Third party sales people are more used 
to change; they...embrace change and 
(are) more used to do(ing) as they are 
told.” R27 
 
 
Table 29: Comments on third parties/contractors’ flexibility (2) 
 
A few respondents also commented on the ability of third parties to help them to 
minimise their financial risk in tough economic times, mentioning similar sacrifices 
to those offered by employed staff: 
 
• “We changed the payment terms from an upfront schedule...we paid them 
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in arrears.” R25 
• “I think it’s much easier with third parties to get into discussions about 
variablising their costs, because in lots of cases that’s why you are working 
with them in the first place.” R20 
• “Some of them have historically not looked at having an increase in payment 
(with) inflation.” R3 
• “We have implemented some changes in terms of redressing the balance in 
terms of us getting more income from the deal than previously we would 
have done, and they have accepted that.” R10 
 
These comments are consistent with observations in the literature; financial risk can 
be shifted to contractors (Downey, 1995; Whitford & Zeitlein, 2004; Anderson & 
Trinkle, 2005).  This is a key benefit predicted by real options theory, where the risk 
of addressing an opportunity is minimised by choosing a resource where 
commitment can be postponed (Anderson, T.J., 2000). 
 
In a number of cases in this sample from different sectors, the need for flexibility 
still comes across as a reason to use third parties/contractors, and as a deliverable 
that should be expected. Although sales employees may have been adaptive in 
economic hard times, respondents seemed to have more experience of resistance 
to change from their directly reporting staff than resistance to change from 
contractors. 
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4.6.5 How do sales managers perceive the relative behaviour of employed 
salespeople and contractors in obstructing change? 
 
Thirteen (45%) respondents mentioned inhibitors to flexibility with an employed 
salesforce, consistent with the position of Bonoma (1984), Hambrick and Canella 
(1989), Colletti and Chonko, (1997), Corner and Rogers (2005) and Sliwka (2007). 
Most of their comments about the reluctance of employees to embrace change 
were in response to a question about resistance to change.Typical comments were: 
 
• “We get resistance to change all the time.”  R3 
• “Employed sales people can take a while to adjust.” R5 
• “In the main people don’t like change, and that includes sales people, so 
that’s always a challenge.” R6 
• “Employed sales people will always resist change.” R9 
• “Change is a four letter word to most sales people.” R15 
• “We have struggled with getting the buy in....a fairly stable sales 
team....don’t always see the benefits of changing what they have done in 
the past.” R20 
• “They like the status quo.” R22 
• “People either don’t see the need for change or don’t think the change 
applies to them.” R27 
 
Besides the human nature aspect of resistance to change, eight (28%) respondents 
commented on the regulation involved in change. When specifically prompted to 
compare commercial and employment contracts, during the discussion on control 
of sales resource, 20(69%) respondents said that they thought commercial contracts 
were easier to change and 22 (76%) said that they were easier to terminate. Three 
respondents specifically mentioned some EU countries where the problem is seen 
to be worse than in the UK as examples. “Being able to redeploy or reduce a 
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workforce in a country such as France or Germany or Holland where you have 
works councils, and quite a high degree of regulation...requires a huge amount of 
cost and effort and time” (R20).  Krafft et al. (2004) also found that EU law 
negatively affected the way that German sales managers viewed the adaptability of 
sales employees. 
 
Although responses were more evenly matched on whether employment or 
commercial contracts were easy to set up, for companies enjoying growth, time 
factors were an inhibitor to employment. For example: “That's quite a lengthy 
process, to get a decision made on bringing in new heads” (R26). 
 
Although there were fewer comments about contractors resisting change, 
respondents who had experience of long-term relationships with third parties 
mentioned that they could also be “political” (R4, R21). It is the companies who 
specialise in short-term assistance to clients who seem to be most admired for 
flexibility, which is consistent with the view in the literature that “out-tasking” is a 
desirable model (Krishnamurthy et al., 2009). 
 
4.6.6 Summary of respondents’ perceptions of the role of flexibility in “make-or-
buy” decisions 
 
Prioritising flexibility in supplier choice has been observed to have a favourable 
impact on performance (González-Benito, 2010). Both outsourcing of non-core 
tasks and internal flexibility are associated with better performance (Martinez-
Sánchez et al., 2007). Similarly, respondents seem to have coaxed flexibility from 
employed salespeople and built more flexibility into their resourcing model with 
tactical use of contract sales organisations.  Although recent economic 
circumstances have meant that employed salespeople have adjusted to change, it is 
unlikely that these conditions will be sustained indefinitely. Some respondents who 
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did not use contract sales organisations acknowledged the need for options, which 
suggests that the “real options” approach to resourcing decisions does have 
resonance among senior practitioners. How a construct of “flexibility” might be 
measured is discussed at the end of this chapter. 
 
4.7 Moderating factors 
 
Research Objective 2:  to explore sales managers’ perceptions of factors 
moderating their resourcing choices.   
 
4.7.1 Introduction 
 
In line with previous literature, primarily Anderson (1985) and Anderson et al. 
(2003), it was expected that there would be moderating factors in the relationship 
between independent variables and the dependent variable of propensity to 
outsource, or as Espíno-Rodriguez and Padrón-Robaina (2004) put it, in between the 
desire to outsource and outsourcing behaviour. It was expected that sales managers 
would moderate “make-or-buy” decisions if there were imperfections in the supply 
market, if there were industry “norms” which it would be risky to ignore, or if there 
were limited skills within the company to manage the outsourced resources.   
 
Proposition 5: The availability of suitable suppliers will be a moderating factor in 
“make-or-buy” in the sales function 
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4.7.2 How do sales managers perceive the supply market for recruiting 
salespeople, compared to the availability of contract sales organisations/sales 
agents? 
 
Lonsdale (1999) argued against outsourcing into a market with few suppliers, and 
Anderson (1985) suggested that some sales outsourcing decisions were influenced 
by the availability of suitable manufacturers’ representatives. It was therefore 
relevant to ascertain what respondents knew about the availability of contract sales 
organisations, agents or equivalent services. Respondents were prompted to 
comment on how easy it was to find contractors, and also how many companies 
they could name.   
 
Six (21%) respondents said that they had never been approached by an organisation 
offering contract sales and/or they could not name any; five (17%) made negative 
comments about availability or choice. Sixteen (55%) respondents commented 
favourably about the availability of contract sales suppliers or similar options. There 
was some contextual detail worth noting, such as two commenting that quantity 
was not a problem, but quality of supply was a problem. Both the availability of 
suppliers (Ventovuori, 2006) and quality of suppliers (Espíno-Rodriguez & Padrón-
Robaina, 2004) is relevant to propensity to outsource. 
 
Although an increase in number of contract organisations was noted, the nature of 
supply is still considered flawed in most sectors, as most suppliers are very small 
and do not have the scope to help larger firms. However, there were a few very 
positive comments about available contractors, in particular three respondents 
praising the speed with which contractor organisations deployed staff on their 
projects. 
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19 (66%) respondents said that they could name at least one third party sales 
organisation that they were using or would be willing to use.  Among the other ten, 
some respondents were a bit defensive about the prompt, commenting that they 
knew of suppliers but would not name them; others mentioned having notes about 
potential suppliers, but not remembering their names. Only two respondents said 
that they were aware of more than five suppliers (organisations) that they had used 
or would be willing to use. One respondent referred to a large number of 
individuals (freelancers) that were available in his sector.   
 
Although respondents seemed to suggest that the availability of contractors was at 
least as good if not better than the availability of candidates for permanent 
positions, the supply market in some sectors still seems weak and underdeveloped 
compared to the financial and pharmaceutical sectors. In pharmaceuticals, where 
there are some sophisticated multinational contract sales organisations as well as 
small suppliers; the resilience of larger suppliers enables the possibility of them 
partnering with large customers to manage sales resource fluctuations (Rogers, 
2009).   
 
 4.7.2.1 Supply market problems in recruitment 
 
The market for contract sales organisations might be weak in most sectors, but the 
market for permanent employees is also perceived to be imperfect, which is 
something rarely discussed as a factor in the outsourcing literature. Sixteen (55%) 
respondents mentioned difficulties finding candidates for permanent positions. The 
reasons for difficulty were varied, including geographical constraints (the size of job 
market in particular localities), the quality of candidates available, the constraint of 
needing industry-specific knowledge and the pay expectations of candidates. Only 
two respondents commented that things were easier now compared to before the 
financial crisis (October 2008).   
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Regardless of market conditions, eleven (38%) respondents commented about the 
amount of management effort involved in recruitment. Typical comments included: 
“There’s a lot of my time and management team’s time goes into making sure we’re 
getting the right people” (R7); “I think matching and recruiting current staff is 
extremely time consuming” (R12); “You've got to go through a much more detailed 
interview process, selection process” (R22); “Recruiting is hard work and very time 
intensive” (R27). One respondent broke down the effort involved: “That's quite a 
lengthy process - to get a decision made on bringing in new (salespeople)... (The) 
internal recruitment process after that is quite slow...and then it's quite a disruptive 
activity...to go through that interview process, to go through that training, 
induction...” (R26). 
 
Although it is by no means universally challenging, elsewhere in the interview 
twelve respondents reported access to skills as their biggest challenge, with 
comments such as “It’s been more difficult to get the right calibre of 
salesperson...than I have ever experienced before. It’s been high volume in the 
market place, but low quality” (R7). Availability of suitable sales staff may not be 
particularly better than access to suitable contractors. Arguably, there is just a poor 
market for sales skills. The severe sales skill gap in the UK noted by the Marketing 
and Sales Standards Setting Body in 2008 and may have eased to some degree as a 
result of the recession, but some symptoms persist (CFA, 2012). Insourcing from a 
limited supply market (quality and quantity) may be just as problematic as out-
sourcing into a limited supply market. 
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4.7.3 How do sales managers perceive the implications of becoming dependent on 
particular employees or contractors? 
 
As described in transaction cost economics, regardless of contract terms it is 
possible for an organisation to become dependent on a supplier such as a contract 
sales organisation. It has been noted in the literature that a buyer of services would 
wish to avoid “lock-in” or opportunities for the third party to “shirk” (“moral 
hazard”) as assumed by transaction cost theory (Bahli & Rivard, 2003; Wathne & 
Heide, 2000). It has also been argued from the resource-based view that avoiding 
dependency on external firms leads to better results (Lonsdale, 1999). All 
respondents were asked to express their feelings about potential dependencies, 
and the answers were broadly consistent with transaction cost economics theory. 
Nine (31%) respondents made comments about wishing to avoid “lock-in”, 
expecting that third parties would increase prices or change contract terms in their 
favour if that occurred. Typical comments included: “They’d have you over a barrel” 
(R8); “You become unable to control your own destiny” (R9); “The tail wags the dog, 
eventually” (R13).   
 
Although a minority view, one respondent in a long-term arrangement pointed out 
that the dependency can cut both ways. His organisation and its partner selling into 
different market segments were interdependent, so neither would be likely to try to 
upset the balance in the relationship. Inter-organisational trust is possible, as 
observed by Zaheer et al. (1998) and Judge and Dooley (2006). Williamson (1991) 
would have categorised this example as a hybrid organisational form with relational 
governance. Such forms are not excluded by transaction cost economics 
(Williamson, 1996). 
 
The other angle, which also attracted significant comment, was the possibility of the 
third party switching to competitors, taking resource away from the contract and 
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losing customers for the client or undermining something like pricing strategy in 
pursuit of their own short-term interests. Some of these problems are more acute 
with dealer/reseller channels rather than contract sales organisations. Five 
respondents gave specific examples of “moral hazard” style problems they had 
experienced with third parties. Mantel et al. (2006) observed that perceptions of 
vulnerability are more influential in sourcing decisions than the desire to access 
third parties’ capabilities.   
 
Does this make contractors much more risky than sales employees? Hart and Moore 
(1990) commented that you can sack an individual but it is more difficult to sack a 
whole company.  The respondents’ attitude to employment law suggests that there 
is already a type of quasi “lock-in” with employees because it is not that easy to 
sack an individual in the UK in the early 21st century (Moules, 2008).  Seventeen 
(59%) respondents commented on the impact of dependency on particular sales 
performers. The feeling about dependency on sales employees does not sound 
much different from the expressions used to describe dependency on contract sales 
organisations: “Being held to ransom” (R4), “Stuffed” (R7) and “Quite dangerous” 
(R16). As Battu et al. (2002) noted, it is difficult for employers to challenge 
employees who might be difficult to replace. 
 
It would not come as any surprise to practitioners that eleven (37%) respondents 
commented about the risk of salespeople leaving to join competitors and that 
causing disruption to customer relationships, if not the loss of them. Nine 
commented about their fear of losing sales volume and two expressed concern 
about loss of knowledge and the amount of time it takes to re-fill knowledge gaps. 
Salespeople who gain ownership of knowledge may be over-rewarded, consistent 
with Coff’s (1999) views about employees appropriating “rent”. If salespeople act 
like agents, even though they are employed, the hazards of an external contract are 
not resolved (James, 2000).  
 
315 
 
Respondents explained their approach to managing the risk of dependency on 
employees.  Nine respondents (31%) were specific about their succession, transition 
or contingency plans which involved job rotation; development of junior staff; 
account teams and personal motivation. Two mentioned that the use of a mix of 
employees and contractors avoided a dependency on either.  
 
Perhaps as a result of the tough economic times recently, no respondents 
mentioned specifically bad behaviour by salespeople as described by Jelinek and 
Ahearne (2006). 
Indeed, there was widespread faith in employees’ ability to identify with their 
employer and to become a “stakeholder” in the business. As observed by Wieseke 
et al., (2009), there was a perception that identification with their employer would 
be associated with better sales performance. 
 
On the whole, however, the supply markets for contract sales resource and 
employed sales resource are both imperfect. The risk of dependency exists when 
negotiating in either market. These conditions should be taken into account when 
making resourcing decisions. 
 
Proposition 6:  The ability to manage resource options will be a moderating factor 
in “make-or-buy” in the sales function 
 
4.7.4 What do sales managers perceive to be the implications for their skills in 
managing employees versus contractors (or vice versa)? 
 
Respondents were prompted to comment on differences between the activities 
involved in managing employed salespeople versus contractors. This topic 
generated both quantity and quality of discussion, with respondents holding some 
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clearly emotive views about the nature of their job as coaches and leaders. 
Anderson noted in her 1985 article that sales managers might have concerns about 
working arrangements with third parties, and this concern was found in this sample. 
A number of studies have identified that managing outsourcing is a particular 
capability, and without it, outsourcing is unlikely to succeed (Kakabadse & 
Kakabadse, 2002a; Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Thorpe & Morgan, 2007).   
 
As has been already discussed, eighteen (62%) respondents thought that employed 
salespeople were easier to control than contract sales organisations. “An employed 
sales person who is given appropriate purpose and direction and is motivated will 
do what you want them to” (R6). One respondent was more direct: “If you have 
internal resource and then of course you can ask them to change whatever they are 
doing at any point in time ...basically it’s their job to do it” (R11). With employees: 
“The chain of command is much shorter and clearer” (R20).  These views are 
supportive of a key assumption within transaction cost economics that insourcing 
offers the best environment for adaptability (Williamson, 1991). Nevertheless, 21st 
century sales management is a far cry from the master-servant assumptions of 
Coase’s original 1937 article. 
 
Respondents explained the challenges involved in motivating salespeople to achieve 
targets: “Maintaining the morale and keeping people motivated... I would think was 
the most difficult part” (R1); “Internal sales people are much more difficult to 
manage and motivate” (R8) and “We have struggled with getting the buy-in” (R20). 
One noted the frustration of motivation when external factors are difficult: 
“Fluctuations in demand ... really caused me my greatest problems around 
motivation, morale and changes” (R28). Another noted internal difficulties: “I would 
also say that the bonus structure can cause difficulties, in that it can send people off 
or motivated in the wrong direction” (R21). (Sales managers are not always 
empowered to adapt the remuneration of their reporting staff.) Bonoma (1984) 
noted how sales effort can be diffused, and problems such as bonus systems that 
317 
 
send contradictory messages are still present. These findings seem to support the 
prediction that when circumstances make motivation difficult, there is an increased 
likelihood of insourcing in sales (Anderson, 1985; Krafft et al., 2004),  
 
Although motivation was clearly a challenge for a significant minority of 
respondents, systematic infrastructures for dealing with people management were 
helpful to most, consistent with Mahajan et al. (1984) who observed that employed 
salespeople like high levels of structure. One respondent explained: “We don’t 
define the best sales person as the person who has generated the most sales, we 
create a matrix of different KPIs, with a different weighting” (R3) and “We have 
much more understanding of what they’re doing and what we expect them to do, 
and we (have) the systems in place to do things about it; motivators and how 
people are rewarded and what they're looking for out of their career path rather 
than just job performance - with an employee you can help manage that, and give 
them directions, give them some indication of where the 'jam tomorrow' is coming 
from” (R13). The long-term approach to motivating employees is expected to 
reduce the risk of them behaving opportunistically (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). 
 
Direct control and system support implies speedy responsiveness to managers’ 
requirements. Nevertheless, the amount of time spent in monitoring behaviour and 
performance, and improving it through coaching and development, are not trivial. 
Just as companies do not often have accurate measures of the real transaction costs 
of dealing with third parties, Anderson (1985) argued that the hidden costs of 
internal operations are difficult to measure. As observed by McNeilly and Lawson 
(1999) and Choi et al. (2004), 
sales managers have to work very hard with salespeople to establish trust. 
 
• “I will spend time out on the road with them...visiting customers and getting 
a feel for them, and how they are presenting in front of the customers and 
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then also looking at the opportunities they’re generating and whether or not 
they’re bringing in the level they need to.” R19 
• “We’ll make sure a number of calls are listened to, depending on the sort of 
activities they are doing, a certain ratio of calls will be listened to and 
monitored and make sure continual coaching is going ahead.” R3 
• “It's a high level of effort and commitment from the management, first-in-
line, second-in-line managers in sales who look after their salespeople.” R13 
 
The nature of the tasks involved in operational management of contractors is 
similar in some ways, but some respondents noticed: “The relationship is much 
more commercial, it’s much more contractual” (R8). Although there are a number 
of empirical studies examining the advantages of co-operative approaches to 
relationships between organisations in supply chains (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Zaheer et 
al., 1998; Brown et al., 2000; Jap &Anderson, 2003; Judge & Dooley, 2006; Handley 
& Benton, 2009), most of the respondents in this study had experience only of 
short-term arrangements that were focused on contract performance.  
 
Monitoring and measurement can be integrated with long-term partners, (“We try 
to encourage them to use the same kind of process as with our internal staff so that 
we can benchmark it” R3) or where there is an independent quality assurance 
mechanism, such as “detail follow-ups” in the pharmaceuticals sector. In the cases 
where longer-term arrangements were in place, relational management was still 
underpinned by detailed performance metrics, consistent with the findings of 
Barthélemy and Quélin (2006). Well-developed processes reduce the potential for 
performance problems (Conklin, 2005; Mayer & Salomon, 2006). 
 
In most sectors, contracts with CSOs are based on performance: “It’s based on risk 
and reward; you would expect that that third party would be looking to deliver the 
best possible results because obviously the better they perform the more money 
they take… if they are not performing then they take a proportion of that risk” (R3). 
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However, respondents still observed the moral hazard of shirking: “Some of these 
contractors are very clever generally in leaving open ends…you agree things in a 
contract which is for everyone to follow but once business comes in, then they start 
saying that wasn’t in the spirit of what we were talking about” (R11). The main 
frustration noted when discussing the management of contract sales organisations, 
was lack of direct control of salespeople. As noted by Frazier & Summers (1984) and 
Mehta et al. (2002), sales channel firms are independent organisations and there 
may well be disagreements.  
 
As one respondent explained: “You don’t necessarily have first person contact with 
the front line staff; you are building a relationship with their management 
structure” (R3), and put another way: “You might have to go through another 
couple of layers of management and communication before it (a requirement) goes 
to the salesforce” (R25). Consequently, “If you (are) managing contractors then you 
need to be much better at managing through others” (R27).  For some, that meant: 
“Trying to exert the control over third parties, depending on the relationship, and 
how it’s set up, can be much more difficult and less transparent” (R20). As noted in 
the literature, managing third party sales channels is a specific skill, different from 
standard supplier management (Magrath & Hardy, 1987; Friedman & Furey, 1999; 
Novick, 2000; McQuiston, 2001).  A lack of capability is likely to lead to problems 
(Alexander & Young, 1996; Cox et al., 2004; Ngwenyama & Sullivan, 2007). 
 
Concern about managing third parties was apparent: 
 
• “Quite often they're small companies, and they will do what suits them”; “It 
represents an additional challenge to actually control a third party company, 
and it's hard to define that, but I see that as a risk, quite a key risk.” R16 
• “I wouldn’t have direct influence over their sales floor, only in terms of 
guidance and opinion.”  R17 
• “It’s obviously more difficult to keep an eye on everything that’s going on.” 
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R3 
• “There (are) less immediate consequences for a lack of direction or a lack of 
activity.” R14 
• “I think some of the more complex (requirements) sometimes require more 
effort than perhaps is worth doing – it normally ends up falling back with 
us.” R5 
 
There is an indication here of strong opposition to third parties on the grounds of 
diluted control, which is consistent with transaction cost economics (Williamson, 
1975), and a perception that managing third parties is a different and difficult skill 
set, as observed by Fan (2000).   
 
Consistent with Handley and Benton’s (2009) findings, where good relationship 
management had been achieved, there was support for contract sales organisations 
reducing transaction costs and risks, such as saving time for sales managers: “If 
you’ve got good partners externally and they run a tight ship, it can be very easy; it 
can be a very smooth process” (R26) and “We currently work with around a 
hundred different (third parties) across the country, and we couldn’t manage a 
hundred sales people” (R10). Nevertheless, monitoring and motivation was still 
perceived to be an issue, and advocates of contract sales organisations mentioned 
that listening in on calls and seeking customer feedback was still necessary. The 
consequences of following up on it with an individual, however, would be devolved. 
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4.7.4.1 Sales managers’ job satisfaction 
 
Although Guenzi and Troilo (2007) found that the quality of sales management was 
more important than the type of salesforce in delivering customer value, this study 
suggests that different types of salesforce require different management 
competences. From a theoretical point of view, the characteristics of good 
relational management outlined by Mayo et al. (1998), including appropriate 
rewards, training, and information exchange, do not sound so different from the 
characteristics of good management of salespeople. However, the difference 
between working with individuals, and working with other firms, mattered to many 
respondents. 
 
There is a noted correlation between experience and success in the literature (Díez-
Vial, 2007), and with the respondents who were as happy managing contract sales 
organisations as managing employed salespeople. One commented: “When I first 
came into management I felt it was very difficult to control contract organisations, 
but having more experience it’s just as easy really” (R2). There were some 
reservations: “You have to have a lot of patience dealing with a third party.... more 
than you do with your own people” (R4); “It’s a bit more of a dark art than 
traditional line management” (R25). It was noticeable that some companies 
employed different people to manage contractors:  
 
• “We always have to employ a resource to manage a relationship with a 
contract sales organisation as well, which is always an additional cost.” “We 
know that a Field Sales Manager or an Area Sales Manager above them 
aren't the right people to manage a contract sales organisation, because 
they come at it from two different philosophies and approaches.” R13 
• “We have a team of people set up to manage our external contractors.” R26 
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Larger companies can afford to appoint specialised channel managers/agent 
managers to ensure that the unique competence needed is developed and applied 
in order to realise the potential benefits (Katsikea & Morgan, 2003). 
 
One sales manager summed up his feelings about the different skills needed to 
manage third parties: “If our sales force in Europe got replaced with an outside 
sales agency then I would feel that I was more of a supply manager rather than a 
sales manager” (R17). 
 
There is an implication in many of the comments about sales managers’ “control” of 
employed salespeople that their job satisfaction is at least in part associated with 
leading and motivating other people. One respondent said: “I have always seen my 
role as a sales leader to be deployed as a coach” 9R6). Another explained: “Looking 
to improve people’s performance and develop them as individuals...that’s very key 
to managing an employed sales force” (R10). 
 
Anderson et al. (2003) suggested that one of the reasons for limited outsourcing of 
sales activities was the power that sales managers hold in organisations. An 
alternative possibility emerging from this research is that there is a reverse 
psychological contract at work – the sales manager feels a bond to his/her reporting 
staff and enjoys managing their development, something which does not appear to 
have been explored in previous literature. 
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Proposition 7: The perceived “legitimacy” of resourcing options will be a 
moderating factor in “make-or-buy” in the sales function 
 
4.7.5 Do sales managers perceive that it is important to conform to the norm for 
their industry/supply chain in terms of how much they use employed salespeople 
versus contractors?   
 
21 (72%) respondents said that they were not influenced by industry norms. Indeed, 
some respondents were scathing about the suggestion that they would conform to 
an industry norm: 
 
• “I don’t give a *** to industry norms.” R7 
• “I don’t think we care about what the norm is.” R15 
• “It’s not important at all; we make our own way and do what’s best for us.” 
R18 
 
Overall, it appears that the sales managers in this sample believe that they would 
not moderate their outsourcing behaviour for the sake of industry norms, which 
contradicts DiMaggio & Powell (1983) and Barreto & Baden-Fuller (2006). It seems 
unusual to find a collection of respondents so strongly opposed to behaviour 
observed in the literature, but when the expected norms of customers were 
discussed, the findings of Weiss et al. (1999) are supported – where it is perceived 
that highly reputable firms use in-house sales, in-house sales will be preferred. 
Therefore legitimacy does appear to be playing a role. 
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4.7.6 Do sales managers perceive that their company’s reputation in the industry 
influences their use of employees versus contractors? 
 
19 (66%) respondents held the view that reputation was an important influence on 
“make-or-buy” decisions. In most cases, these were respondents with a preference 
for employees: 
 
• “Having employees you’ve got a better chance of protecting brand and 
reputation.” R7 
• “Clients have always recognised us for having really good quality staff.” R12 
• “Our clients would be looking for us so they would expect the (company 
name) card-carrying person rather than an external person.” R15 
•  
Some explained their rationale in more detail: 
 
• “Our position within our marketplace is of an expensive product also a high 
quality product... if we change… to contractors...then I would imagine that 
will be perceived negatively by our customer base.”  R17 
• “The nature of the multi-year contract means that you need a more stable 
employee base with that experience and knowledge within the business, I 
think. And I think our customers would want and expect that, and make that 
part of the procurement activity, in fact, to know how long people have 
been around, what they've worked on...” R22 
 
Companies want their brand to mean more to the customer than their relationship 
with the salesperson (Andreassen & Lanseng, 1997; Lamminmaki, 2005; Jeng, 2008) 
but having the salesperson as brand ambassador who closely identifies with the 
firm is regarded as desirable (Tanner et al., 2008; Wieseke et al., 2009). The risk of 
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loss of control of the customer interface is recognised, consistent with Le Bon and 
Hughes (2009). 
 
Users of contractors were not always deterred by reputational factors, but knew 
that they had to be pro-actively managed: 
 
• “We don’t want to see that our company reputation is *ed by using 
contractors.... we have a team that works solely on the NPS (net promoter 
score) score of customers through their whole journey and if we ever felt 
that that NPS score was going down due to it being a contractor we would 
look at how to resolve that.” R3 
 
Overall, it seems that respondents would moderate resourcing behaviour in order 
to avoid customer concern. Two specifically mentioned that they believed that their 
customers set the norm. For example: “If our customers found out that we were 
using a higher degree of contract resource than others, I just sort-of get the sense 
that they … would think of our offering as "We have less confidence in it".”  R22 
 
Although the literature on reputational comparisons of in-house and outsourced 
salespeople is rather limited, this comment is consistent with the conclusion of 
Palmatier et al. (2007) that sales channel choice should be influenced by customers. 
Although this respondent is expressing perceptions rather than anything reported 
by customers, that perception would obviously limit his use of contractors. 
 
There seems to be a fairly clear message here, that while sales managers are 
probably not concerned about what competitors do vis á vis sales resourcing, they 
are concerned about customer expectations, and protecting the company’s 
reputation in the way that selling is done. However, there was little indication that 
perceptions of success in customer advocacy, which might be considered an 
indicator of reputational capital, were associated with a lower degree of 
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outsourcing. Respondents were confident about their success with customers, 
regardless of outsourcing pattern, which means that outsourcers had confidence in 
their control mechanisms, as expected by studies of relational governance (Mohr & 
Spekman, 1996; Brock Smith & Barclay, 1997; Judge & Dooley, 2006). 
 
4.7.7 Do sales managers perceive any differences between employed salespeople 
and contractors in the observance of their business conduct guidelines or ethical 
code?   
 
A very specific moral hazard for companies using third parties to work with their 
customers is whether or not they can influence the ethical behaviour of indirect 
salespeople. Twelve comments were made expressing concern that a third party 
might be less motivated to observe an ethical code. Five respondents gave specific 
examples of contractors’ staff failing to observe ethical codes.  At the direct 
interface with the customer, supplier opportunism has widespread implications 
(Weiss & Anderson, 1992). 
 
Although some industries are highly regulated, such as pharmaceuticals and 
financial services, in other sectors there is no formal standard that is compulsory for 
all salespeople.  There are general business codes (such as the Caux Round Table) 
and individual companies have robust codes which form part of their sales training 
for both employees and contractors. In follow up to the interviews, one respondent 
emailed the researcher to mention the problem of reward mechanisms not lining 
up with desired behaviour towards customers. Novick (2000), Anderson and Trinkle 
(2005) and Mukherji and Ramachandran (2007) all argue that contractors have their 
own reputation to consider. In the UK, contract sales organisations are not as 
geographically limited as manufacturers’ representatives in the US, and many are 
predominantly telesales operations operating on short-term contracts. In this 
context, reputational capital may not be so precious.  
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Reputational risk is likely to moderate the production costs advantages expected in 
buying rather than making. It is also likely to shut off the outsourcing option when 
the intention is to acquire new skills or difficult to develop skills (such as selling 
skills) or where the antecedent is the desire to achieve financial or operational 
flexibility. The desire for control that sales managers often expressed, and which is 
considered a key inhibitor to outsourcing by Anderson et al., 2003, may be 
motivated by the visibility of sales resourcing choices to customers. Respondents 
did express concern about customers not perceiving sales outsourcing in a good 
light, and would make resourcing decisions in line with customer preferences, as 
predicted by Weiss et al. (1999) and Palmatier et al. (2007). 
 
Customers have a big stake in how the interface with them is resourced, and while 
sales managers have few concerns about how competitors do things, they are 
concerned about the perceptions of customers and the company’s reputation with 
customers, as predicted by Weiss et al. (1999).  The mimetic isomorphism of 
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) was rejected by respondents as a moderating factor, but 
clearly reputational risk did prompt thoughtful discussion, and seemed to be a 
foundation for concerns about control and a preference for employment.   
 
The discussion of reputational risk seemed to be strongly linked and associated with 
the preference for behavioural control. Respondents wished to avoid the 
contractual hazards (Mayer & Salomon, 2006) and vulnerability (Mantel et al, 2006) 
predicted by transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975; 1985). Rather than a 
moderating factor in its own right, reputational risk may be the principle at the core 
of control as a construct in “make-or-buy” decisions about the sales function. 
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4.7.8 Summary of findings about moderating factors 
 
Developing the necessary skills to manage contractors may not appeal to sales 
managers. There is recognition that different skills are required to be successful 
with contractors, so if the company does not have them or the incumbent sales 
manager prefers the direct coaching relationship with employees, outsourcing is not 
going to happen. The availability of suitable suppliers is also an issue, although it 
has to be considered alongside the difficulty of finding suitable employees. 
Unfortunately, in the UK market for sales resources where both the availability of 
contract sales organisations and the availability of skilled salespeople are seen to be 
constrained, sales managers are more likely to manage existing dependencies than 
risk disruption.  This seems to be consistent with Anderson’s (1988) findings that 
conformity is more efficient in an uncertain environment, but it is inconsistent with 
the view that business models should change when the business environment 
changes (Snow et al., 2005). 
 
Legitimacy did matter to respondents, but they were apparently not concerned by 
the type of expectations that might come from the stock market, regulators and the 
media, as described by Deephouse (1996) and Kock (2005).  Respondents appeared 
to be much more concerned about legitimacy driven by customer expectations, in 
line with Weiss et al. (1999).  Once reputational risk was discussed and analysed, its 
relationship with the desire for behavioural control became apparent.  
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4.8 Findings concerning perceptions of performance 
 
4.8.1 Areas of better and worse performance 
 
Most respondents reported their performance to be better than competitors on 
most of the factors of successful sales organisations identified by Colletti and 
Chonko (1997). These sales managers regarded themselves as high performers on: 
customer retention (83%); share of wallet i.e. having a greater share of customers’ 
category spend (76%); customer advocacy (69%); control of sales overheads (66%); 
salesperson retention (62%); responding to change (59%); and winning new 
business (59%). 
 
On some other factors of high performing sales functions, there was more variation 
among the respondents. For product launches, 55% of respondents rated 
themselves as about the same or worse than competitors; 55% also described 
themselves as about the same or worse than competitors on revenue growth. Meer 
(2005) argued that top quartile performers in industry sectors are associated with 
above average organic growth, but in a recession, it would not be unsurprising to 
find concerns.  
 
There were some concerns about sales productivity, with 52% of respondents 
describing themselves as about the same or worse than competitors. Notably 45% 
of respondents described themselves as about the same or worse than competitors 
at utilising third parties, while 31%, those reporting advantages from using third 
parties, said that they were better than competitors on this factor.  This is 
consistent with the literature suggesting a relationship between experience 
managing third parties and success (Frazier & Summers, 1984; Díez-Vial, 2007). The 
remaining 24% remarked that they did not have enough experience to be able to 
comment. 
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There are some areas of ambiguity here. For example, to be good at controlling 
sales overheads but not so confident about sales productivity might initially seem 
confusing. However, several respondents described market conditions in which 
considerably more effort was needed to achieve sales. Therefore, even with 
redundancies and rigorous cost control, sales productivity was perceived to be an 
industry-wide challenge.  
 
Similarly, why should revenue growth be a factor where less success is perceived, 
when winning new business was not? Economic conditions might also provide the 
answer to this. Companies have clearly focused more on customer retention and 
defending their share of those customers’ category spends, as would be expected in 
a recession. However, they are probably defending their share of a declining spend, 
and the acquisition of new customers has not necessarily made up for that, 
resulting in concerns about revenue growth.  Users of contractors were more 
confident about revenue growth and winning new business. Given that organic 
growth and the leveraging of external resources to achieve it are key indicators of 
company health (Kazanjian et al., 2006), there is some limited evidence here that 
the respondents using contractors were being more proactive about addressing the 
challenges posed by the recession. 
 
4.8.2 The relationship between outsourcing and performance 
 
It was very difficult to discern any differential patterns of performance among this 
sample.  83% of the companies in the sample were in the top ten if not the top two 
in their industry sub-sector, and respondents were confident about their 
organisation’s performance on most of Colletti and Chonko’s (1997) criteria. 
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The possible exception was that those companies making extensive use of 
contractors, and confident about their performance in using contractors, were also 
very confident about their success in revenue growth and winning new business, 
which is very important to shareholder value (Favaro et al., 2012). Arguably, the use 
of contractors for lead generation and addressing target segments seems to work 
for those respondents who have committed to it. Equally, cost leaders using 
contractors to reduce costs report success in doing so. There is very little in the 
sales managers’ ratings of their relative strengths and weaknesses to give a clear 
picture of the effect of resourcing preferences on performance, other than that 
benefits that are planned from the use of contractors appear to be realised where 
sales managers believe that they are better than competitors at managing third 
parties.   
 
Whilst this study cannot make any contribution to understanding the connection 
between resourcing models and real performance, the limited data gathered on 
performance supports Proposition 6 and the literature that predicts that the ability 
to manage third parties is a factor in success in realising the benefits of outsourcing 
(Kakabadse & Kakabadse, 2002a; Leiblein & Miller, 2003; Daugherty et al., 2006). 
Desirable outcomes from the use of contractors do appear to be associated with 
perceptions of superior skills in managing them to successful outcomes. 
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4.9 Summary of findings 
 
The discussion of sales manager’s priorities when making resourcing decisions gave 
the first indication that control might not be an antecedent. Skills were dominant, 
followed by cost and flexibility. Therefore, a picture soon emerged during the 
analysis of three dominant antecedents, each associated with a particular school of 
thought, transaction cost economics, resource-based view and real options theory: 
 
 
Figure 6: Three dominant antecedents 
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Control was not a priority, which was the first indication that it might be playing a 
somewhat different role in the resource decision-making process.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Reputational Risk 
 
The concern with behavioural control noted in the literature suggests that the 
desire to control sales resources, be they employees or contractors, is prompted by 
something more than observance of contract terms. Where reputable contract sales 
organisations have been managed well, it appears that contract terms have been 
met. It is qualitative aspects of performance that are the most difficult to measure. 
Respondents were prompted to talk specifically about ethical behaviour. In a 
separate section, respondents were prompted to discuss their attitudes to industry 
norms and their reputation with customers, and a link between the two themes 
emerged. It is therefore proposed that the degree of behavioural control required, 
which might be measured by perceptions of reputational risk, is a primary 
moderating factor in the “make-or-buy” decision. However, other moderating 
factors emerging from the literature are also relevant. 
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Figure 8: Moderating Factors 
 
Both the ability to manage outsourcing, which seemed to be associated with 
expectations of good performance from outsourcing, and perceptions about the 
supply market for both contract sales organisations and direct recruits, were 
relevant to respondents. 
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4.9.1 A conceptual model 
 
The model below (see Appendix G) was circulated to all respondents for 
consideration: 
 
 
Figure 9: Model of the Resourcing Decisions in the sales function (1) 
 
This model is the end result of this research study. Like Busi and McIvor (2008), the 
researcher perceived a need to compare, contrast and possibly combine theories. 
The study set out to achieve a model of the use of contract sales organisations 
based on the experiences of senior sales managers. By exploring the comparison of 
contract sales organisations with employed salespeople, it has discussed the factors 
which may affect all resourcing decisions in the sales function.   
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The model starts with antecedents to seek new or alternative resources. 
Respondents to this study saw either the pursuit of lower costs, the acquisition of 
particular skills or the need for speed in deployment or retrenching as the most 
important factor/s for them in sales resourcing. Any of these might trigger a 
comparison between resourcing options. In some cases, a combination of factors 
may occur. Depending on context, direct employment, contracting out or a new 
model (e.g. on-line) could be the appropriate answer to a resourcing need. 
 
Control of resourcing was not expressed as a priority, leading the researcher to the 
conclusion that its real role in the decision-making process is as a moderating 
factor. The roots of the control construct were difficult to discern. Performance to 
contract was clearly discussed, but the ability to manage contracts was also 
observed. Since respondents were concerned about behavioural control, relative 
ethical standards, and the attitudes of customers towards contracting out sales, it 
seemed that reputational risk might reasonably precede concerns about 
operational management. 
 
Reputational risk might often factor out contractors, but even if it does not, there 
were two other factors. One was the availability of suitable contractors versus 
employees, and the other was whether the skills set of sales managers was geared 
towards coaching employee performance or managing through third parties, which 
was distinguished as a very different skill, often undertaken by a dedicated person. 
After these are taken into account, a pragmatic solution emerges. It is drawn above 
to explain a model for considering outsourcing, but it could also explain some of the 
exception cases that were discussed with respondents, such as the desire to employ 
key account managers, but taking the decision to engage contractors because the 
“supply market” for employees was poor. 
 
The engagement of respondents with the research study had tailed off after the 
initial validation of the researcher’s summaries. Twelve of the original respondents 
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sent comments on this model. Most were reinforcing, with comments such as: “It 
does make sense”; “This is an accurate model in my experience”; “This reflects my 
experience”; “Reputational risk is the major obstacle”; “You might have caught 
some of those issues I expressed”; “Exceptional model in my view”. Three 
commented on the importance of reputational risk being explicit as a major 
moderating factor. Two mentioned the constraints of headcount policy, although 
since sales managers in the pharmaceutical sector side-step that issue by the use of 
contract sales organisations, it could be argued that is an indicator within the 
speed/flexibility construct. One mentioned that the business environment was 
relevant, including market conditions, competitor activity and recent internal 
performance. Market conditions and competitor activity could certainly be 
elements of the flexibility construct based on prior literature, although recent 
internal performance might be more difficult to accommodate. On the basis of 
Wood and Welch’s (2010) continuum of research findings, it can be argued that this 
is a model that reflects the state “something has happened” (in the experience of a 
few sales managers), and due to the extent of the experience of those sales 
managers, it is worthy of further testing.   
 
It is necessary to emphasise the outcome of this decision-making process. The 
model is representative of an analytical thinking process that leads a sales manager 
to decide whether a particular sales activity (which may be small or large) should be 
undertaken in-house or outsourced to a third party. It cannot determine what 
model of insourcing (e.g. field sales or web sales) or what model of outsourcing (e.g. 
dealers or temporary staff), but it can reflect how a sales manager would analyse 
the “make-or-buy” decision, as was intended in the research aim. The outcome will 
be “make” or “buy”, depending on each analysis. “The “make-or-buy” decision for 
sales activities” had been defined to the respondents as a choice between 
employees and contractors and most found it easy to discuss their perceptions in 
those terms. There was some ambiguity over categorising business models such as 
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dealers (who take stock) and contractors, but there was no lack of clarity about the 
principle of employees or third parties. 
 
From the point of view of further testing, it is necessary to define and classify the 
constructs within the model.   
 
4.9.2 Construct definition 
 
“A construct is a conceptual term used to define a phenomenon of theoretical 
interest” (Rossiter, 2002, p. 308). It requires an object, attribute and “rater entity” 
in order to be capable of operationalisation and measurement (Rossiter, 2002). 
Rossiter’s COARSE model has been used to address the construct definition 
challenge. 
 
“Rater entity” for all the constructs should be individual sales managers, as it is 
interviews with this category of respondents that has been the medium for defining 
the model, and there is some feedback that it resonates with them. These are 
“expert raters” in that they have expertise and experience concerning the 
constructs within the model. 
 
4.9.2.1 Costs 
 
It has been observed that a desire to decrease costs is an antecedent of resourcing 
decisions. Some respondents mentioned pressure to reduce costs, whereas others 
were not pressurised to reduce costs. The object of this construct, i.e. its focus, is an 
impetus to choose the lowest cost sales resourcing option. It means lowest cost, 
and does not include wider perceptions of value and long-term returns. 
Nevertheless, this should be defined as an “abstract formed object”, as it might 
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mean somewhat different things to the raters (Rossiter, 2002). The literature does 
not offer much guidance about the attributes (dimensions) of the impetus to 
choose the lowest cost sales resourcing option. Implicitly, it should be a simple 
comparison between internal cost and external price, but many respondents said 
they did not have that information, which could cause measurement problems in a 
quantitative survey. Individual measures are subject to a variety of measurement 
errors, and therefore multi-item measures are preferred (Churchill, 1979).  Four to 
six items are recommended for each construct (Hinkin, 1998). Espíno-Rodriguez and 
Padrón-Robaina (2004) used two – desire to obtain a cheaper service and desire to 
enable hotel costs to be reduced. In this study, it has been observed that working 
for a company that positions itself as a cost leader is associated with a cost 
imperative, and that many respondents reported an increase in discussion about 
the cost of sales. Therefore, four scaleable items to test this construct might be: 
 
• I work for a company that considers itself a cost leader. 
• I work for a company where the costs of selling are frequently discussed. 
• It is important to me to obtain the cheapest sales resource available. 
• It is important to me to demonstrate that I can reduce the costs of the sales 
function. 
 
As has been observed from the data, a sales manager will have different 
perceptions about whether or not a contractor is cheaper than an employee. 
 
4.9.2.2 Skills 
 
It has been observed that a desire to access skills is an antecedent of resourcing 
decisions, and this was the highest resourcing priority for a large proportion of 
respondents. The object of this construct, i.e. its focus, is an impetus to access skills 
not currently available to the organisation. This construct has to embrace the 
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granularity of sales skills, so that outsourcing to a lead generation specialist agency 
is encompassed as well as recruiting a global account manager. This should be 
defined as an “abstract formed object”, as with a cost impetus, it might mean 
somewhat different things to the raters (Rossiter, 2002).   Because prior literature 
on sales outsourcing has focused on proving or disproving asset specificity, with 
indicators that have tested for types of sales skills such as knowledge of the 
company culture, knowledge of products and knowledge of customers, it has not 
been directly instructive in exploring an access to skills construct. There are 
exceptions to the rule in this study who have outsourced key account management, 
but did so to access skills that they could not easily recruit, suggest that the 
indicators for the skills construct should be generic to the quest for particular skills 
per activity. This suggests a selection of indicators similar to those for cost, such as: 
 
• I work for a company which prides itself on accessing the highest levels of 
skills available for its activities. 
• I work for a company where the skills needed to address sales activities are 
frequently discussed. 
• It is important to me to obtain the best skills available. 
• It is important to me to demonstrate that I can raise skills levels per sales 
activity. 
 
As has been observed from the data, a sales manager will have different 
perceptions about whether or not a contractor is more skilled than a potential 
recruit or redeployed member of staff, depending on the activity being considered. 
 
4.9.2.3 Flexibility 
 
It has been observed that a desire to have resourcing options in itself is an 
antecedent of resourcing decisions. The object of this construct, i.e. its focus, is an 
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impetus to defer, accelerate or reverse resourcing decisions quickly. This should 
also be defined as an “abstract formed object”, as it might mean somewhat 
different things to the raters (Rossiter, 2002). The real options literature and the 
transaction cost literature are reasonably helpful in identifying items that are 
associated with decisions to maximise flexibility. Indicators for this construct might 
include: 
 
• I work for a company where there is a strong focus on being responsive to 
our markets. 
• I work for a company where there is concern about volatility in our markets. 
• I work for a company where there is strict control on fixed costs. 
• It is important to me to be able to change resource levels quickly. 
 
 
4.9.2.4 Reputational risk 
 
It is posited in this study that the desire for direct control of sales resources is 
underpinned by the sales managers’ concern about reputational risk with 
customers. The object of this construct, therefore, is customers’ association of a 
supplier’s “channel” with their reputation. This construct can borrow from Weiss et 
al. (1999), but since we have observed that channel choice varies per customer 
segment, that must be reflected in indicators: 
 
• Customers in this segment believe that firms with employed salespeople are 
more reputable. 
• Customers in this segment have more confidence in firms with employed 
salespeople. 
• Customers in this segment believe that the best suppliers in this industry 
employ their salespeople. 
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• Customers in this segment believe that firms with employed salespeople are 
more reliable.  
 
4.9.2.5 Availability of suitable direct or indirect resources 
 
It is posited in this study that the intention to recruit or to contract will be 
constrained if either supply market is imperfect. The study has included sales 
managers who have employed because they perceive the availability of contractors 
as very limited, and who have contracted because they have perceived difficulties in 
recruiting. This opens out the “supply market” construct from previous studies that 
have commented on the availability of contract sales organisations, but not on the 
ease or otherwise of recruiting permanent employees. The object of this construct, 
therefore, is the availability of suitable resource from the preferred source. There is 
no particular help from the literature to inform the attributes of this construct. It 
would also be difficult to test since it is a second level moderating factor which 
depends on a prior preference. Indicators would have to be worded with room for 
the respondent’s previous rationale: 
 
• I have no difficulty finding the resource I want to use for this activity. 
• I have no concerns about becoming dependent on the resource I want to 
use for this activity. 
• I would have no difficulty finding a replacement for my chosen 
supplier/employee. 
 
4.9.2.6 Availability of suitable direct or indirect managerial skills 
 
It is posited in this study that the intention to recruit or to contract will be 
constrained if either the firm does not have the “capability to transact” (Argyres & 
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Mayer, 2007) when choosing contractors or transformational sales leadership skills 
(MacKenzie et al., 2001) if employing salespeople. The study has included sales 
managers who have employed because they perceive contractors to be difficult to 
manage, and who have contracted because they have perceived that managing 
salespeople is time-consuming and problematic. This opens out the “managerial 
capability” construct from previous studies that have commented on the capability 
to manage contract sales organisations, but not on the ease or otherwise of 
managing permanent sales employees. The object of this construct, therefore, is the 
availability of managerial skills to elicit performance from the preferred source. 
There are some quite complex models to explain capability to transact, which are 
simplified here.  Indicators would have to be worded with room for the 
respondent’s previous rationale: 
 
• I have or can access the skills necessarily to manage the engagement of the 
resource I prefer to use for this activity. 
• I have or can access the skills necessarily to manage communications with 
the resource I prefer to use for this activity. 
• I have or can access the skills necessarily to manage the performance (to key 
performance indicators) of the resource I prefer to use for this activity. 
• I have or can access the skills necessarily to manage changes in deployment 
of the resource I prefer to use for this activity. 
• I have or can access the skills necessarily to manage dispute resolution with 
the resource I prefer to use for this activity. 
 
Although undoubtedly the model and the constructs require further refinement, 
there is scope to expect that constructs and the model can evolve to the stage of 
quantitative testing. 
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Chapter 5 
 
Conclusions, contribution, managerial implications and limitations of the research 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
This chapter draws the research project to a close. It discusses the conclusions 
drawn from the research and presents the summative theoretical model. The 
contribution of this research to theory and to managerial practice is considered. The 
limitations of the study are discussed, followed by the potential for future studies. 
 
5.2 Conclusions 
 
This thesis set out to explore the practice of outsourcing sales activities in the UK.  
Specifically, this study was designed to ascertain the antecedents of outsourcing 
sales activities and what inhibits the outsourcing of sales activities. Contexts were 
also important, and the nature of tasks outsourced has been examined.  
 
Qualitative studies cannot make claims to generalisable outputs. Statistical 
generalisation has not been sought in this study, but transferability (Morgan, 2007). 
The claims of this study are that something has happened (Wood & Welch, 2010), 
and subjective facts have been observed (Arbnor & Bjerke, 2009). The study has 
been undertaken from the interpretivist paradigm, and its focus has been to build 
theory through conceptualising a model of sales outsourcing as part of a continuum 
of knowledge-generation (Morgan, 2007).   
This project involved in-depth interviews with UK-based senior sales managers to 
establish their perceptions of the phenomena affecting their sales resourcing 
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decisions, with a focus on whether salespeople might be recruited or redeployed, or 
whether third party resources might be contracted to perform the activity. This 
project established constructs based on existing literature and has established their 
positioning and relationship to each other in the resourcing decision-making 
process. One of the benefits of a qualitative approach has been to establish 
contexts, which helps to illuminate even how exceptional circumstances fit the 
model, e.g. why a niche company might outsource highly skilled tasks. This, 
together with several cycles of checking with respondents, has underpinned the 
contingent validity of the model (Maxwell, 1992; Healy & Perry, 2000). 
 
Constructs are presented in the model illustrated in Figure 5.1. This model builds on 
existing theory and extends it to a more holistic level, encompassing all the 
scenarios explored in the research. It is not necessarily an objective truth. It is based 
on the perceptions of people who make sales resourcing decisions, within the 
specific context of this research. Therefore, it is their interpretation of realities 
which affect their decision-making. 
 
Antecedents and moderating factor concepts were derived from extant literature. 
The following propositions were explored: 
 
Proposition 1:  Comparative cost of resource options will be an antecedent in 
“make-or-buy” decisions in the sales function 
Although many respondents reported not having enough information on which to 
make cost comparisons, cost was a priority antecedent for a few respondents, 
notably those working for companies claiming cost leadership. Even where robust 
comparisons were being made, there were disagreements about the cost advantage 
of contract sales organisations. 
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Proposition 2: The ease with which resource options can be controlled will be an 
antecedent in “make-or-buy” decisions in the sales function 
Control was a matter of interest, but it did not appear to be driving resourcing 
decisions; it appeared to be playing a moderating role. 
 
Proposition 3:  The comparative skill level of resource options will be an 
antecedent in “make-or-buy” decisions in the sales function 
Access to skills was a priority for most respondents. This was the topic that 
generated most discussion, and had most nuances. For most categories of skill, 
employees were considered superior, apart from “pure” selling skills, suggesting 
that contract sales organisations are perceived to be very focused on selling as a 
skill in its own right.   
 
Proposition 4:  The comparative speed and flexibility in deployment of resource 
options will be an antecedent in “make-or-buy” decisions in the sales function 
Although only a priority for a few, flexibility was considered desirable and a mix of 
resourcing options was generally considered to be useful. Both employees and 
contractors were considered capable of flexibility.  
 
Proposition 5: The availability of suitable suppliers will be a moderating factor in 
“make-or-buy” in the sales function 
Respondents perceived constraints in the supply market for contract sales and in 
the recruitment market.  
 
Proposition 6:  The ability to manage resource options will be a moderating factor 
in “make-or-buy” in the sales function 
This generated considerable discussion about the different skills involved in 
managing contract sales organisations versus employed salespeople, with some 
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respondents clearly having a bond with their reporting staff. Where more 
outsourcing was done, the more success with outsourcing was perceived.  
 
Proposition 7: The perceived “legitimacy” of resourcing options will be a 
moderating factor in “make-or-buy” in the sales function 
Legitimacy was important, not because of “industry norms”, but because of concern 
about customers’ perceptions of contracting-out sales, leading to reputational risk. 
This appeared to be the root cause of a desire for behavioural control. 
 
The literature offers a variety of explanations for outsourcing in general. 
Transaction costs economics attracts most comment, presenting a desire to reduce 
costs and an expectation that in-house sales will be cheaper where market 
conditions are volatile, skills are specific or behavioural control is difficult. The 
nature of some of the literature, and specific comments by Anderson et al. (2003), 
suggested that desire for behavioural control might be a driving force in its own 
right.  
 
These findings do not contradict the TCE prediction that the costs incurred in 
managing a contract will influence make or buy decisions in the sales function, but it 
places this consideration as a moderating factor.  This is consistent with Williamson 
and Ghani’s (2012) comment that transaction costs may be subsequent.  However, 
this study has attempted to deconstruct transaction costs in a way that is specific to 
the sales function, and proposes that the reason that close behavioural control of 
sales activities might be desirable is to minimise reputational risk with customers.  
This explains to some degree the dominance of insourcing in sales in business 
sectors, but the exceptions in this study flushed out some further TCE 
considerations that can change a resourcing preference – conditions in the supply 
market and skills available internally to manage the resourcing preference. In short, 
TCE proved to be a valuable theoretical basis from which to explore make or buy in 
sales. 
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The findings of this study do not contradict the resource based view either, as 
evidence of consideration for “competences” was common. The language of RBV 
has crossed into use in practice, so several respondents discussed core and non-
core competences.  Access to superior skills was a priority for 52% of respondents in 
resourcing decisions and skills generated the most discussion. However, the 
overlapping concept of “asset specificity” from TCE is perhaps a better theoretical 
foundation for categorising respondents’ perceptions about skills.  Most 
respondents seemed to prefer to insource complex or integrated skills 
(combinations of company, product and customer-specific knowledge and skills).  
Meanwhile, contract sales organisations seem to be respected for possessing non-
specific, transferable skills -selling skills.   
 
When it comes to speed in implementing change or realising opportunities, real 
options has more resonance than transaction cost economics with respondents’ 
perceptions and behaviour, providing several examples of the use of short-term 
solutions from contractors to maximise flexibility and to minimise resource 
commitment.  Therefore this study adds to the body of literature that has found 
real options to be relevant to resourcing decisions. While sales employees have 
shown willingness to change in hard economic times, 69% of respondents perceived 
that commercial contracts were easier to change than employment contracts.  TCE 
would have predicted that employment contracts were more adaptable. The 
economic recession in the UK has had a casualising effect on most forms of work 
(ONS, 2010/11); therefore caution should be applied as this study was conducted at 
a time when flexibility might have been of particular concern.  
 
In an exploratory study of this type, it proved valuable to draw from the literature 
for all three theoretical perspectives in order to provide a framework for discussions 
with sales managers. 
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Figure 10: Model of the Resourcing Decisions in the sales function (2) 
 
This model is the end result of this research study. The study set out to achieve a 
validated model of the use of contract sales organisations and, by comparing 
contract sales organisations with employed salespeople, has established the factors 
which, in general, affect all resourcing decisions in the sales function. Given the 
limited nature of the literature to date on considerations of “make-or-buy” in the 
sales function, this model is a significant contribution to knowledge. However, it is 
based on findings from a small cross-sector, convenience sample in one country, 
and it is not generalisable to all sales management resourcing situations.  It is a 
visual representation of themes emerging from in-depth interviews and requires 
further testing. 
 
Having identified the use of contract sales organisations as an appropriate area of 
study, this research project began with a review of relevant literature. With very 
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little literature devoted to sales outsourcing, or even channel management, the 
literature examined the theoretical foundations for “make-or-buy” across all 
business functions; specifically transaction costs economics, the resource-based 
view and real options theory. The literature was examined with a view to 
understand the field, and to identify the extent of the gap in the literature with 
regard to the outsourcing of sales activities. The lack of studies on sales resource 
decisions from an interpretivist paradigm was noted, together with the limited 
focus on the transaction cost economics approach in prior literature.  
 
Propositions and research questions were developed: 
 
• It was expected that a desire for lower costs would lead to a higher 
propensity to outsource sales, and the two cost leaders in the sample 
did have a high propensity to outsource sales. 
• It was expected that a desire for direct control of the sales function 
would lead to a lower propensity to outsource, and while many 
respondents thought control was very important, it was not an 
antecedent and therefore its role has been examined as the 
moderating factor. 
• It was anticipated that a desire to fill a specific skills gap would lead 
to outsourcing, and this approach was found in this study. 
• It was also anticipated that a desire for a flexible response to market 
conditions would lead to outsourcing, and there was some indication 
of this approach in the study. 
 
Supply imperfections, lack of management skills and industry norms were expected 
to moderate the desire to outsource sales activities. Supply imperfections were 
cited by respondents in both recruitment and contract markets. Rather than a 
conscious lack of skills to manage outsourcing, sales managers expressed a 
preference for coaching the performance of employees rather than contract 
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management (perceiving employees to be easier to manage). Finally, while 
respondents eschewed the idea of being beholden to industry norms, many 
expressed concern about customers’ expectations of their brand ambassadors. 
Reputational risk emerged as a primary moderator of resourcing preference. 
 
The methodology chosen for the research was based on the interpretivist paradigm, 
and involved qualitative methods. Semi-structured interviews were undertaken by 
telephone. The qualitative approach was chosen because, given the lack of prior 
research specifically examining the outsourcing of sales activities, the researcher 
was convinced that breadth of exploration of the topic was necessary as well as 
depth in understanding sales managers’ perceptions of cause and effect. This 
knowledge was necessary to refine and extend current levels of knowledge about 
the topic.  
 
The fieldwork was conducted by four interviewers to avoid interviewer bias, with 
the researcher listening in on several of the discussions for quality control purposes. 
Accessing senior sales decision-makers proved to be very challenging. Nevertheless, 
twenty nine interviews from a variety of substantial companies across different 
industry sectors provided sufficient similarities in terms of themes emerging from 
discussion and sufficient breadth of context to refine the conceptual model. The 
focus of analysis in this study is the “make-or-buy” decision when sales resource is 
needed. (If it had been a quantitative study the dependent variable in the model 
would have been outsourcing behaviour or “propensity to outsource”). Due to the 
qualitative approach, respondents were able to call upon a number of “make-or-
buy” decisions from their experience to explain their preferences.  
 
The data was analysed using Nvivo, a computer program designed to aid qualitative 
data analysis. Interview data was initially analysed sequentially, using the concepts 
emerging from the literature. This data was further analysed by sub-theme, in the 
case of skills requiring five levels of coding. The structure of the findings chapter 
352 
 
reflected the themes identified in the literature review. Most propositions are 
observed, but control in particular has a different role from that first envisaged. The 
model is an assumption and a representation of the constructs and the process 
which may connect them. Feedback has been received from twelve respondents, 
with most indicating that the model does connect with their meaning. 
 
In conclusion, this research project has addressed research questions on the topic 
of outsourcing sales activities with a qualitative research method within the 
interpretivism paradigm. Care has been taken to ensure the quality of the research 
using the literature sources outlined in the methodology chapter. As a result of the 
research, a modified model of resourcing decisions in the sales function has been 
proposed. 
 
5.3 Positioning the research 
 
This table demonstrates the position of this research compared to previous work in 
the field of sales outsourcing.  
 
Previous research This study 
Quantitative Qualitative 
Narrow focus on transaction cost 
economics 
Encompasses three theoretical 
approaches 
Limited scale of samples Breadth across industry sectors within a 
small sample 
Limited insight re: cause and effect Respondents’ perceptions of cause and 
effect 
Concentrated on “all or nothing” 
outsourcing of sales activities 
Examines all degrees of outsourcing, 
from zero to 100% 
Assumptions made about moderating 
factors 
Exploration of the role of moderating 
factors 
Table 30: Positioning the research 
 
353 
 
Anderson’s (1985) study and Krafft et al.’s (2004) study of sales outsourcing, 
together with a small number of narrowly focused studies from Anderson and 
Coughlan (1987) to Rapp (2009) adopted a positivist approach and used 
quantitative techniques. Krafft et al.’s (2004) had the broadest scope (270 
companies across five sectors) but most others have been smaller samples or single 
sectors. Although there is reasonable support for the predictive power of 
transaction cost economics when it comes to sales outsourcing, there is limited 
explanation of cause and effect. Hybrid governance or granular outsourcing has not 
been explored. Some moderating factors have been suggested, but not tested.  
 
In comparison, this study uses qualitative enquiry. It explores three different 
theoretical approaches and has achieved breadth of coverage within a relatively 
small sample of respondents. It explores their perceptions of cause and effect in 
“make-or-buy” decisions in the sales function, based on extensive levels of 
experience (from six years to twenty years), with two-thirds of the sample having 
more than ten years experience. Therefore, the number of “units” of “make-or-buy” 
decision being examined was large, given that respondents reported escalating 
levels of reorganisation.  This study examined different levels of outsourcing, 
eventually categorising them into no outsourcing, minimal outsourcing (1-10%) and 
significant outsourcing (11-100%). There was specific discussion of moderating 
factors which had been suggested in earlier studies. 
 
5.4. Contribution to theory 
 
This research has elaborated a new model for understanding the antecedents and 
moderating factors that influence how sales managers’ perceive sales resourcing 
decisions. Previous studies have examined “all or nothing” sales outsourcing in 
limited contexts from a particular theoretical lens. This study has examined all 
possible instances of outsourcing within the sales function from a variety of 
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theoretical angles, while accommodating respondents’ own world-view. Its breadth 
allows for more than one antecedent of any particular outsourcing decision to be 
the driver of the model, and the model explains the role of previously identified 
moderating factors. Nothing so comprehensive has been attempted before in the 
field of sales research. Given the lack of research about the whole sales function 
explained in previous chapters, this is therefore a significant contribution to an 
emerging body of literature. 
 
This study has addressed a gap in the literature on outsourcing by studying the 
specifics of the sales function, and a gap in the sales literature by studying “make-
or-buy” decisions using a qualitative method. Theory development in the field of 
sales is relatively limited compared to other disciplines. As explained, given the 
findings of Carter et al. (2008), sales managers have lower rates of participation in 
academic studies than other professions. Further work was needed to understand 
sales resourcing decisions.  
 
5.4.1 The theoretical model 
 
This model contributes to the domain of outsourcing by providing a model of the 
connections between constructs previously associated only with one approach, or 
not tested.This study, by exploring in depth the perceptions of sales managers 
about their resourcing choices brings rich linguistic data to bear on the “make-or-
buy” question in sales, which could be further tested by quantitative means. It is the 
first comprehensive approach to explore concepts across theoretical schools.   It 
cannot be generalised to all sales resourcing situations and requires further testing. 
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5.4.2 The core antecedents of sales resourcing choices 
 
The model starts with antecedents to seeking new or alternative resources. 
Respondents to this study saw either the pursuit of lower costs, the acquisition of 
particular skills or the need for speed of response to market conditions as the most 
important factor for them in sales resourcing. Any of these might trigger a 
comparison between resourcing options. Depending on context, direct 
employment, contracting out or even a new model (e.g. on-line) could be the 
appropriate answer. This study confirms that, depending on context, cost, access to 
skills or speed to respond to the market, are important antecedents of resource 
changes and resourcing decisions.  
 
5.4.3 The moderating role of control 
 
It was difficult to deconstruct “control”, which might have been treated as a factor 
moderating cost or an antecedent in its own right. Control of resourcing did not 
register as a priority, apart from one case. This led the researcher to the conclusion 
that its real role in the decision-making process is as a moderator.   
 
5.4.3.1 The connection between reputational risk and desire for behavioural 
control 
 
Many references were made to quality, the need for behavioural control and the 
need to avoid dependence. More pertinently, since we are examining a function at 
the customer interface, there was clear concern about reputation with customers 
from the discussion on industry norms and reputation. It therefore seemed that for 
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the sales function, reputational risk would be the underlying rationale for a desire 
for behavioural control of an activity. Reputational risk would frequently screen out 
contractors, but even if it did not, other factors were taken into account. 
 
5.4.4 Sales managerial competences – managing directly or managing indirectly 
 
Many respondents felt that their skills were geared towards coaching employee 
performance. Most also felt that employees were easier to manage than 
contractors. Managing through third parties was distinguished as a very different 
skill, often undertaken by a dedicated person, which needed to be in place before 
success could be achieved with utilising contract sales organisations. 
 
5.4.5 Supply market  
 
This study confirms the expectation that supply market imperfections would 
constrain outsourcing, but also observes that there are imperfections in the market 
for recruiting salespeople which might provide a reason to proceed with 
outsourcing, at least on a short-term basis (e.g. temp view to perm). 
 
5.5 Contribution to methodology 
 
There are aspects of this study that make a contribution to the literature on 
methodology.   
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5.5.1 Use of telephone interviewing in qualitative studies in the management field 
 
To date, there do not seem to have been many specific metohodological papers on 
the use of telephone interviewing for qualitative studies in a business management 
study. This study is a case of successfully using the telephone to gather large 
quantities of data from respondents in senior roles, without loss of rapport or 
emotional emphasis. 
 
5.5.2 Interviewing elites 
 
To date, there do not seem to have been any studies concerning the interviewing of 
elites in management studies, yet most qualitative and case study work in the 
management field is likely to involve senior decision-makers. When interviewing 
elites, they are highly unlikely to have any deference to the interviewer. In fact, the 
bias may be the other way round, therefore the researcher can have confidence 
that the interviewees expressed their own meaning when prompted for opinions. 
 
5.6 Contribution to practice 
 
5.6.1 A model for decision making 
 
Although this model is not generalisable, as indicated from the feedback from 
respondents (Appendix H), it provides some useful food for thought for sales 
managers making resourcing decisions. Since access to information about 
resourcing comparisons emerged as a concern for 69% of respondents, this model 
provides prompts for the categories of information that are needed to enable 
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robust and defensible decisions to be made. Besides costing data, evidence about 
skills comparisons and speed of deployment are a starting point.  The search for 
potentially elusive “transaction costs” can be illuminated by examining reputational 
risks which would flag up the amount of behavioural monitoring that might be 
required.  However, that is not all that is required, because choice and competition 
in the supply market (recruitment or contract) and the availability of employee or 
contractor management skills can make a resourcing preference untenable, so 
information about both of these factors should be explored. 
 
The model does require further testing, but it can still serve as a prompt to sales 
managers to ensure that they have sufficient information and evidence for 
resourcing decisions, whether they occur during a budget cycle or when shorter-
term changes are necessary. 
 
5.6.2 Assessment of why behavioural control is needed and to what purpose it is 
applied 
 
Behavioural control is often a cultural “given” in some sales departments. This study 
has gone some way to ascertain the roots of a preference for behavioural control in 
business-to-business selling. Although there are exceptions, wherever the customer 
expects the salesperson to be involved in the business relationship for the long-
term, the supplier is likely to provide a framework for that expectation to be 
fulfilled. 
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5.6.3 Objectivisation of quality of supply and quality of internal management 
 
Assumptions about quality of supply and quality of internal management appear to 
have been one-way in the literature, and probably one-way in practice. Comparing 
imperfections in the supply market for contractors with imperfections in the 
recruitment market may result in more objective considerations. Similarly, the 
identification of coaching employee performance and managing contracts as very 
separate jobs requiring different skills and preferences may be helpful to companies 
wishing to get the best out of employed and external resources. 
 
5.7 Limitations of the research 
 
5.7.1. The general constraints of qualitative studies 
 
This research has a number of limitations common to all qualitative studies. It has 
achieved richness and depth in linguistic data, but it required a large resource for 
data gathering, and the process of data reduction may have lost some of the power 
of the data. It offers unique insights into the way the sales resourcing decisions are 
made, but it is not generalisable. It is a relatively small cross-sector study, and while 
no limits are suggested in the literature for qualitative studies, more data would 
mean more confidence. Counting of textual meanings and emphasis can only 
suggest weighting of importance, but cannot test internal validity as with statistics. 
Nevertheless, testing would have limited the desire for breadth and depth of 
coverage of the research aim and objectives. Within the time frame available, data 
absorption was reached and a large amount of comment was gathered. 
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5.7.2 Convenience sampling 
 
Due to the direct involvement of the researcher in the recruitment of many of the 
respondents, this sample can only be described as a convenience sample. However, 
this is modified to some degree by recruitment from contacts of the research 
company as well as from the wider networks of the University of Portsmouth’s MA 
in Sales management and the Sales Leadership Alliance.  The structuring of the 
sample was limited by time and money, but most of all by the difficulty of accessing 
a very busy elite. Nevertheless, the fact that most of the respondents were engaged 
with the development of the sales profession through the MA or SLA emphasised 
their role as opinion leaders, which made them very thoughtful respondents.  All of 
the respondents were senior people in substantial companies with extensive 
experience and therefore had a large number of resourcing decisions to discuss. 
 
5.7.3 Telephone interviewing 
 
Telephone interviewing has been criticised for resulting in poorer quality data than 
face-to-face interviews (Jordan et al., 1980). This study set out to overcome possible 
difficulties of telephone interviewing, such as loss of facial expression and social 
cues, by taping the interviews to check for verbal cues and by prompting for 
strength of feeling. As noted by Carr and Worth (2001), the telephone is probably 
the primary form of communication that a sales manager has with both customers 
and employees. Respondents were used to having lengthy conversations on the 
phone and seemed to prefer the telephone interview. Also, in order to overcome 
possible differences in rapport between interviewers, the researcher maintained 
email contact with respondents in order to validate their meaning. 
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5.7.4 Single culture 
 
All the respondents in this study were senior sales managers based in the UK, 
although many of them had pan-European or global experience and references 
were made to other countries. It would be expected that senior people in large 
companies have international experience, but nevertheless, it must be 
acknowledged that all respondents came from a single national culture and 
therefore some national bias may affect these findings.  
 
5.7.5 Researcher bias 
 
The researcher is someone known to a number of the respondents, some of whom 
might perceive her previous work on sales outsourcing as advocating sales 
outsourcing. Although sales managers proved to be an elite able to rise above any 
perceived influence from a researcher, this potential for bias was minimised by 
engaging a third-party specialist in interviewing in business-to-business research to 
provide interviewers. It was possible that the researcher could introduce her own 
bias at the coding stage, but this was minimised by use of the Nvivo software. The 
researcher was trained on the software both one-on-one and in a group, where 
cross-coding was tested. The mentoring of the software expert was leveraged to 
check that the right approach to data analysis was being undertaken. In addition, 
the researcher referred back to respondents at five stages in order to check the 
accuracy of capturing their meaning and gauge their reactions to her analysis of the 
data overall.   
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5.7.6 Process 
 
Following the processes discussed in the methodology chapter such as piloting and 
validation from respondents, great care was taken to ensure the confirmability, 
authenticity and credibility of the research.  
 
5.8 Suggestions for further research 
 
5.8.1 Other business cultures 
 
This study might be repeated within other national cultures or across national 
cultures. 
 
5.8.2 The skills needed in managing sales third parties 
 
Although this study has established that the skills required to manage through third 
parties are different from the skills needed to coach employees to better 
performance, most respondents were not well-equipped to discuss the skills of 
managing third parties, other than references to compliance control. Case studies of 
the management of third parties in the sales function, including scenarios where 
third party effort has to be integrated with that of employees (such as employees of 
value-added resellers working on key account teams, or contractors providing desk-
based support to key account teams) would be a useful contribution to knowledge.  
 
Case studies could also examine the mechanisms and success rates of behavioural 
control of third parties, such as engendering cultural affinity. The question of the 
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restrictions imposed by employment law on the integration and behavioural control 
of contractors is worthy of exploration. 
 
5.8.3 Characteristics of successful contract firms 
 
Some sales managers have long-term successful relationships with third parties; 
others have had very bad experiences. What do contract sales organisations have to 
do to be perceived as reliable, competent partners? There are some indicators in 
this study, but a dyadic study of both the client and the contractor would furnish 
the best research approach to this topic. 
 
5.8.4 The identity of the sales manager as coach 
 
It was not within the remit of this study to examine the relationship between a sales 
manager and their reporting staff. However, it was clear from some respondents 
that there is a strong bond between sales managers and salespeople. They enjoy 
their role as leader and coach, and the coaching of employees to achieve higher 
levels of performance is part of their identity as a sales manager. It seems that the 
majority of the leader-member exchange studies focus on the way that employees 
perceive their managers. In the sales function, there seems to be a rich source of 
knowledge to be tapped about how managers perceive their responsibilities to their 
reporting staff. It may or may not be unique to the sales profession, but it is 
certainly worth exploring and testing. 
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5.8.5 The changing from employment to third parties and vice versa 
 
If true flexibility is to be achieved in sale resourcing, opportunity realisation will 
often involve transition from one resourcing option to another. Instances have 
emerged in this research of handovers from contractors who have been responsible 
for product launches to employed staff responsible for rolling out products through 
their growth and maturity phases. When products reach decline, they are 
candidates for contracting out again. Similar things may happen with pilots in 
particular customer segments, or customers growing towards key account status. So 
that sales managers can apply optimum resource to opportunities, changes need to 
be prompt and objective, but respondents have observed both employee resistance 
to change and contractor opportunism. Providing the right foundation for changing 
resourcing models must be important to sales managers. Case study research seems 
to be the appropriate method for examining these phenomena. 
 
5.8.6 On-line business-to-business selling as an alternative to indirect sales 
 
Although mentioned by only one respondent in this study, the expectation that the 
Internet would disintermediate the supply chain and result in direct relationships 
between every small customer and brand owners was common in the early days of 
the internet. Porter (2001) commented that the Internet reduced the need for 
established sales forces or traditional channels. In reality, marketing channels of all 
types continue to flourish and brand owners are challenged with the management 
of multiple channels, and customers who switch between them. Even Dow Corning, 
who created a considerable stir with their web subsidiary Xiameter (Gary, 2005), 
also kept distributors and resellers. While there is literature on e-procurement, 
there is not much clarity in the sales literature about the degree to which suppliers 
in business-to-business sectors are transferring selling activity to electronic 
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channels. Case study research would also seem to be the appropriate method for 
examining this trend. 
 
5.9 Reflection and closing comments 
 
This thesis has met its objectives because a model of sales resourcing decisions has 
emerged and significant insights into the decision-making of sales managers faced 
with resourcing challenges have been documented. 
 
Having entered the academic community somewhat late in life, the completion of 
this PhD has had a significant impact on the researcher. It has greatly increased her 
self-awareness about her limited strengths and extensive weaknesses as a 
researcher. It was a major learning experience in understanding the research 
process and the challenges of extending knowledge, and these lessons have had a 
major impact on her career. She experienced considerable difficulty in the early 
stages of the research project, and progress would not have been achieved without 
the support of her supervisor, heads of department, the wider research community 
in the department, faculty and university and last, but not least, the goodwill and 
support of opinion leaders in the sales profession. 
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APPENDIX A 
CONTRACT SALES ORGANISATIONS RESEARCH 
CONDUCTED ON BEHALF OF: BETH ROGERS, PRINCIPAL 
LECTURER IN SALES MANAGEMENT AT PORTSMOUTH BUSINESS 
SCHOOL 
Interview guide 
Introduction 
 
Note to interviewer: Please read this statement to the respondent and ensure that the 
confirmation of the respondent is on the tape. 
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this research. Sharing your experience of making 
sales resourcing decisions is very valuable to us. Please answer explaining your personal 
view, rather than company policy. The focus of this research is on the use of third party 
organisations to replace or augment the effort of employees in achieving revenues for 
companies. These questions are about your use of third parties, such as sales agents, 
contract sales organisations and telesales companies. These organisations sell or have 
sales-related contact with your customers without holding stock like distributors.  
When this questionnaire was piloted, the interviews took between 45-65 minutes to 
complete.  I will prompt you where more detail is needed and move quickly over questions 
where short answers are needed. You may refuse to answer any particular question or give 
a “don’t know” response to any question. You may change your mind about participation at 
any time. 
Please note that the interview will be recorded and subsequently transcribed. Only 
aggregated data, supported by unattributed quotes, will be reported in the final version of 
this research. This research forms part of a doctoral thesis, which is required to be in the 
public domain. You will be contacted by the lead researcher to confirm the main themes in 
your responses and to provide feedback if you have requested it. 
Are you happy to proceed?     YES/NO 
Note to interviewer: If the respondent has any concerns about confidentiality, refer them to 
me on xxxxxxxxx and if necessary reschedule the interview. 
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Section A 
This section is about your company and your role. 
 
Note to interviewer: Short answers are acceptable throughout this section. 
How would you describe your company? 
 Prompts: What industry sector are you in?  What is your market share?  
What is your value proposition compared to competitors? 
 
Note to interviewer: The respondent may be sales manager for a division of a 
company with many business units. In which case, it is his/her division which 
is of interest. 
 
Would you describe your position in your industry as: 
 
One of the top ten 
Medium sized 
Small or niche player 
 
 
On a scale of 1-10, where one is very low and 10 is very high, how would you 
describe the intensity of competition in your industry: 
 
Prompt: high intensity of competition is characterised by low profitability and 
 frequent changes in market share between competitors 
What percentage of your revenue comes from what proportion of your customers? 
(For example, many companies say that 80% of revenue comes from 20% of 
customers)  
REVENUE ......................................................................................   
FROM 
CUSTOMERS .................................................................................   
 
How would you rate your sales productivity (i.e. ratio of sales generated to sales 
costs) versus competitors over the past three years? 
 
Worse 
Same 
Better 
Prefer not to comment 
 
How would you describe the variations in demand that you have experienced in the 
past few years? 
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 Prompts - Stable and predictable?  Volatile and unpredictable? 
What has caused that? 
Do you expect it to continue in this pattern? 
  
What is your job title? ........................................................................... 
 
 How would you describe your current role? 
 
How much control do you have over the way that the sales department is operated? 
 
Prompt – for example, how often do colleagues such as the finance director or HR 
director get involved in resourcing decisions? 
 
How many years experience do you have of sales management? 
  
How would you describe the challenges you have had in managing sales resources 
over the past few years? 
  
In general, how would you describe your approach to using third parties to 
undertake sales activities? 
   
 Why do you think that? 
  
 How strongly do you feel that? 
  
Please could you specify what proportion of your sales activities are delegated to a 
contract sales organisation or similar third party? 
 
Note to interviewer: answer should be x%, prompt for percentage if necessary. 
 
Please could you confirm which of the following tasks third party organisations are 
used, or have been used in the past three years, for by answering with a yes/no, (or 
comment on any partial applicability) 
 
Product launch  ............................................................................... Yes  /  No 
Particular market segments  ........................................................... Yes  /  No 
End of life products  ........................................................................ Yes  /  No 
Sales agency for particular products  .............................................. Yes  /  No 
Sales agency for particular territories  ............................................. Yes  /  No 
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Coverage for extended leave, e.g. sick or maternity leave .............. Yes  /  No 
Coverage for general staff shortages  ............................................. Yes  /  No 
Lead generation  ............................................................................. Yes  /  No 
Lead qualification  ........................................................................... Yes  /  No 
Post -sales follow-up  ...................................................................... Yes  /  No 
Key accounts  ................................................................................. Yes  /  No 
Merchandising  ............................................................................... Yes  /  No  
Sales admin support  ...................................................................... Yes  /  No 
Other, please specify ...................................................................... Yes  /  No 
 
Comments, if made………………………. 
 
Do you have other third party arrangements, such as distributors? 
 
When are sales resourcing decisions made or reviewed? 
 
Prompts: annual review, change in economic conditions 
 
What is the process for contracting out a sales task? 
 
Where you use contractors, how would you describe the degree of success it brings 
to the task contracted out? 
 
Thank you for your comments so far.  I am now going to ask some questions about 
four reasons commonly given for changing resource models in the sales function.  
Please let me know if any of the questions are not relevant to your experience or 
you have no opinion on them. 
 
NOTE: Sections B to E to be rotated between interviews. 
 
Section B    
 
This section is about your thoughts on the costs of employing salespeople 
versus the price offered by third parties for doing a sales task. 
Note to interviewer: Please encourage elaboration with Qu 1 and Qu 2. Short 
answers are acceptable from Qu 3 onwards. 
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In your opinion, is it cheaper to employ salespeople rather than use 
agents/contractors or the other way round?  
  
 Why do you think that?  
  
 How strongly do you think that? 
  
Please could you explain how you would approach comparing costs between 
recruiting or deploying salespeople to do a task or engaging with a third party 
supplier: 
   
How important is it in your company to minimise costs? (In general, not just relating 
to cost of selling) .........................  
  
To what degree are the costs of selling a source of discussion within the company?
  ........................................ 
  
Do you feel that there is enough information available to you on which to base cost 
comparisons between employment and contract options? ...................................................   
  
Within your industry, are you: 
 
The cost leader  
More differentiation-oriented than cost-oriented 
 
Note to interviewer: The intention here is to ascertain whether the company 
focuses on costs or being different to customers in some way.  Their 
differentiation may be “the highest quality in our sector”, “the most innovation 
in our sector”, etc. 
 
Is the overall cost of running the sales function (as a proportion of revenue): 
Increasing 
Decreasing 
 
Overall, are cost considerations having any effect on your use of contractors?  (If so, 
in what way?) 
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Section C    
This section of the interview is about your thoughts on how easy it is to 
control salespeople versus how easy it is to control third parties. 
 
Note to interviewer: Please encourage elaboration with Qu 1 and Qu 2. Short 
answers are acceptable from Qu 3 onwards. 
 
Overall, do you think that employed salespeople are easier to manage than third 
party contractors or the other way round? 
  
 Why do you think that? 
  
 How strongly do you think that? 
  
Please could you explain how you would approach comparing management effort 
between recruiting or deploying salespeople to do a task or engaging with a third 
party supplier. 
 
What is the supply market for recruiting salespeople, compared to the availability of 
contract sales organisations/sales agents? 
   
 How important is it to monitor the behaviour of salespeople or contractors? 
    
 How do you do that? 
  
Do you perceive any differences between employed salespeople and contractors in 
the observance of your business conduct guidelines or ethical code?   
 
What are the implications of becoming dependent on particular employees? 
   
What are the implications of becoming dependent on particular third parties? 
   
What are the implications for your skills in managing employees versus contractors? 
   
How many reputable contract sales providers could you name? (1, 2 or 3, etc.) 
 .. *LIST NAMES if offered 
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Note to interviewer: If the respondent asks what is meant by “reputable”, it is 
contract sales organisations that they would feel confident in using. 
 
Comparing the legal framework in the UK for employment contracts versus normal 
commercial contracts, which is: 
 
CIRCLE ONE THAT APPLIES (and capture comment) 
 Easier to set up?                                       employment  /  commercial  
 Easier to change as and when needed?       employment  /  commercial 
 Easier to terminate?                                  employment  /  commercial  
 
Overall, are control issues having any effect on your use of contractors? (If so, in 
what way?) 
 
Section D  
 
This section of this interview is about your thoughts on the competency/skills 
value of employed salespeople versus third parties. 
Note to interviewer: Please encourage elaboration with Qu 1 and Qu 2. Short 
answers are acceptable from Qu 3 onwards. 
Overall, do you think that employed salespeople are more skilled than third party 
contractors, or the other way round? 
  
 Why do you think that? 
 
 How strongly do you think that? 
 
Please could you explain how you would approach comparing the skills of employed 
salespeople with the sales skills that you might be able to buy from a third party. 
 ........................................   
To what degree is it important for your company to be different from competitors? 
    
How long do you spend on training salespeople about: 
Your company culture 
Your Products 
Your customers 
 
Note to interviewer: Prompt for days/weeks/months if necessary 
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How long do you spend on training contractors about: 
Your company culture 
Your Products 
Your customers 
 
Would customers identify the way you sell as part of your differentiation? (if so, 
how?) 
  
To what degree do personal relationships between your salespeople (whether 
employees or contractors) and customers have a lot of influence on sales success? 
  
To what degree is your approach to selling team-based (i.e. technical or operational 
staff are involved in sales campaigns)? 
  
To what extent do salespeople or contractors get involved in non-selling activity 
such as post-sales support and problem-solving? 
  
To what degree does your company’s reputation in the industry influence your use 
of employees versus contractors? 
  
To what degree is it important for your company to conform to the norm for your 
industry/supply chain in terms of how much you use employed salespeople versus 
contractors?   
   
 Why is that? 
  
When a salesperson leaves the company, which skills set is missed the most (by 
you): 
Selling skills 
Product knowledge 
Knowledge of company culture and procedures 
Knowledge of the customer 
Working relationships with colleagues 
 
When a relationship with a contractor is terminated, which skills set is missed the 
most (by you): 
Selling skills 
Product knowledge 
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Knowledge of company culture and procedures 
Knowledge of the customer 
Working relationships with colleagues 
 
Overall, are skills issues having any effect on your use of contractors? (If so, in what 
way?) 
 
Section E   
 
This section of the interview is about your thoughts on the importance of 
having flexibility in resource options. 
Note to interviewer: Please encourage elaboration with Qu 1 and Qu 2. Short 
answers are acceptable from Qu 3 onwards. 
 
Overall, do you think that employed salespeople, contract sales organisations or a 
combination of both, give you more flexibility when you are making resourcing 
decisions? 
  
 Why do you think that? 
  
 How strongly do you think that? 
   
Please could you describe to what degree you feel that you need internal and 
external options for resourcing the sales department to adjust to change: 
   
How important is it to your competitiveness to be able to increase or decrease 
volume of activity without disproportionate increases in costs? 
  
How quickly can you implement change?   
 Would you be willing to share examples of fast change and slow change? 
  
What is your experience of employed salespeople or third parties helping you to 
accelerate change?   
   
What is your experience of employed salespeople or third parties resisting change? 
   
What is your experience of employed salespeople or third parties helping you to 
avoid financial risk in times of change, e.g. taking a pay cut or extending credit 
terms? 
438 
 
Overall, are flexibility issues having any effect on your use of contractors? (If so, in 
what way?) 
 
Section F 
 
This is the final section. 
 
We have discussed cost, control, skills and flexibility.  In deciding how to 
resource a sales task, how would you prioritise these four factors? 
 
1 
2 
3 
4 
 
Why do you think that? 
 
How strongly do you think that? 
 
The following questions are about aspects of your sales performance versus 
competitors. We only require a very general answer, but if you do not use a 
particular measure, or regard it as too commercially sensitive, you can 
decline to comment. 
On a scale of 1 to 10, where 1 is much worse and 10 is much better: 
How would you rate your revenue growth versus competitors over the past three 
years: 
How would you rate your control of sales-related overheads versus competitors over 
the past three years: 
How would you rate your success with product/service launches versus competitors 
over the past three years: 
How would you rate your overall customer retention versus competitors over the 
past three years: 
How would you rate your success in improving share of wallet in key accounts 
versus competitors over the past three years: 
How would you rate your ability to retain highly valued sales employees versus 
competitors over the past three years: 
How would you rate your success in improving customer advocacy (i.e. number of 
customers recommending you to others) over the past three years, versus 
competitors? 
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How would you rate your success with winning new customers versus competitors 
over the past three years: 
How would you rate your speed in responding to changes in the business 
environment versus competitors over the past three years: 
How would you rate your success with utilising third parties versus competitors over 
the past three years: 
 
Finally is there anything about this topic that you expected me to ask which I have 
not asked? 
 
 What would your answer have been? 
 
 
THANK RESPONDENT AND CLOSE 
 
 
440 
 
APPENDIX AA: Sources of prompts 
The literature foundations for the survey artefact 
 
Questions and 
Prompts 
Derived from 
construct/ 
concept 
Key literature 
source: 
Authors/date 
Type of 
study 
Notes  Expectations 
Section A - 
Contexts 
     
How would you 
describe your 
company? 
 
   Recommended by 
research firm as a good 
way of establishing 
rapport. Respondents 
happy to comment on 
unique selling points. 
 
Industry sector 
 
Industry sector 
is used a) to 
ensure a broad 
mix and b) to 
discern any 
differential use 
of sales 
outsourcing. 
Krafft et al. 
(2004) 
 Some sales outsourcing 
studies have been 
single sector - Anderson 
(1985) was in one sub-
sector of 
manufacturing; Wilson 
& Zhang (2002) in 
manufacturing; Rogers 
(2009) in 
pharmaceuticals. 
More 
outsourcing in 
ICT and 
healthcare. 
Market share  
 
Company size is 
used as a 
control variable 
which may 
indicate 
differential 
need for sales 
outsourcing 
Anderson 
(1985) 
Empirical Company size can be 
determined in many 
ways. Sales managers 
are most likely to be 
aware of market share. 
Companies 
chosen for size 
and influence – 
more likely to 
have some 
experience of 
outsourcing. 
Value 
proposition 
Some types of 
differentiation 
might preclude 
outsourcing 
Wilson & 
Zhang (2002) 
Empirical Expectation from the 
literature that 
differentiation leads to 
insourcing while cost 
leadership leads to 
outsourcing. 
Service-
oriented 
companies least 
likely to 
outsource sales. 
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Questions and 
Prompts 
Derived from 
construct/ 
concept 
Key literature 
source: 
Authors/date 
Type of 
study 
Notes  Expectations 
Intensity of 
competition in 
your industry 
A factor 
requiring 
flexibility, so 
possibly more 
outsourcing 
Fredericks 
(2005) 
Braunscheidel 
& Suresh 
(2009) 
Conceptual 
 
Empirical 
Literature suggests that 
flexibility is a response 
to environmental 
uncertainty and 
competitive intensity. 
More intense 
competition 
should lead to 
more 
outsourcing, 
particularly for 
short-term 
projects 
Percentage of 
revenue comes 
from what 
proportion of 
customers 
 
Transaction 
specificity of 
assets: 
customers 
Anderson 
(1985) 
Empirical Anderson did not find 
the importance of 
customers to be 
relevant, but there is a 
body of literature on 
key account 
management that 
suggests that key 
accounts would be 
insourced. 
A high gearing 
towards 
strategically 
influential 
customers will 
be 
characterised 
by low levels of 
outsourcing. 
Sales 
productivity 
over last few 
years 
Labour 
productivity  
Girma & Görg, 
2004 
Empirical High labour 
productivity associated 
with high levels of 
outsourcing 
High sales 
productivity 
associated with 
high levels of 
outsourcing 
Variations in 
demand 
A factor 
requiring 
flexibility, for 
which TCE 
predicts 
insourcing and 
RO predicts 
outsourcing 
Fredericks 
(2005) 
Braunscheidel 
& Suresh 
(2009) 
Conceptual 
 
Empirical 
Literature suggests that 
flexibility is a response 
to environmental 
uncertainty and 
competitive intensity. 
More volatile 
demand should 
lead to more 
outsourcing, 
particularly for 
short-term 
projects 
Current role 
and  years 
experience of 
sales 
management  
Sourcing 
experience 
Leiblein & 
Miller (2003) 
Empirical Seniority targeted in 
the sampling to ensure 
breadth and depth of 
experience 
 
Control over 
sales 
department 
 Anderson et 
al. (2003) 
Comment Anderson et al. (2003) 
suggested that sales 
directors have more 
autonomy than 
managers of other 
functions over their 
resourcing model 
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Questions and 
Prompts 
Derived from 
construct/ 
concept 
Key literature 
source: 
Authors/date 
Type of 
study 
Notes  Expectations 
Challenges in 
past few years 
   Open question to act as 
a broad check on the 
relevance of the 
theoretical themes. 
Relevance of 
more than one 
theoretical 
theme. 
Approach to 
using third 
parties 
Sales managers 
prefer their 
own “empire”. 
Anderson et 
al. (2003) 
Comment Open question to check 
for general attitudes. 
 
Proportion of 
sales activities 
delegated to a 
contract sales 
organisation or 
similar third 
party 
Outsourcing  
depth 
% activities 
outsourced  
Propensity to 
outsource 
Gilley & 
Rasheed 
(2000) 
Espino-
Rodríguez & 
Padrón-
Robaina, 
(2004) 
Empirical  Majority of 
companies will 
do some 
contracting out, 
but few will do 
a lot 
Which tasks 
third party 
organisations 
are used for  
Outsourcing 
breadth 
Type of 
activities 
outsourced (list 
of options plus 
other) 
Core/peripheral 
outsourcing 
Gilley & 
Rasheed 
(2000) 
Empirical Typically, less skilled or 
less strategic tasks are 
outsourced. 
Non-core sales 
activities most 
likely to be 
outsourced 
When sales 
resourcing 
decisions are 
made/reviewed 
   Recommended by a 
reviewer to indicate 
degree of sophistication 
re management of 
outsourcing 
The more 
formal the 
process, the 
more success. 
Process for 
contracting out 
a sales task 
   
Where 
contractors are 
used, degree of 
success  
 Leiblein & 
Miller (2003) 
Empirical 
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Questions and 
Prompts 
Derived from 
construct/ 
concept 
Key literature 
source: 
Authors/date 
Type of 
study 
Notes  Expectations 
Section B: 
COSTS 
     
Sales 
employees or 
contractors 
regarded as 
cheaper 
Cost saving Kremic et al. 
(2006), based 
on 210 other 
studies 
Empirical 
meta-
analysis 
Noted as main driver of 
outsourcing. 
Contractors 
should be 
regarded as 
cheaper. 
How costs are 
compared 
   Recommended by 
reviewer to test degree 
of knowledge behind 
previous answer. 
 
Importance of 
minimising 
costs(in 
general) 
 
Cost reduction Espino-
Rodriguez & 
Padron-
Robaina 
(2004) 
Empirical Generally associated 
with efficient business 
(Groth & Kinney, 1994). 
 
If important, 
higher 
propensity to 
outsource. 
To what degree 
the costs of 
selling are 
discussed 
 
Drivers for use 
of 
manufacturers’ 
representatives 
Anderson 
(1985) and 
Anderson et 
al. (2003) 
Comment Assumption in 
literature that sales 
costs are increasing. 
If high degree, 
higher 
propensity to 
outsource. 
Enough 
information 
available on 
which to base 
cost 
comparisons 
between 
employment 
and contract 
options 
“textbooks use 
a simple break-
even cost 
analysis” 
Ross et al. 
(2005) 
Modelling Respondents might not 
wish to admit to limited 
information. 
More 
information – 
more 
outsourcing. 
Check if cost 
leader or 
differentiated 
Simple strategy 
type: cost 
leader/ 
differentiated/ 
niche 
Gilley & 
Rasheed 
(2000) 
Empirical Cost leaders using 
contractors more than 
differentiated firms. 
As per Gilley & 
Rasheed. 
Overall cost of 
running the 
sales function:  
increasing or 
decreasing 
 
Drivers for use 
of 
manufacturers’ 
representatives 
Powers 
(1987); Taylor 
(1990); 
Dishman 
(1996) 
Comment Neo-classical 
economics. 
If increasing, 
more likely to 
consider 
outsourcing. 
Overall – are 
cost 
considerations 
having any 
effect on use of 
contractors 
   Recommended by 
reviewer to assess 
impact of this factor on 
changing models. 
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Questions and 
Prompts 
Derived from 
construct/ 
concept 
Key literature 
source: 
Authors/date 
Type of 
study 
Notes  Expectations 
Section C - 
CONTROL 
     
Are sales 
employees or 
contractors 
easier to 
manage? 
Ease of 
adaptation 
Original 
premise of 
TCE (Coase, 
1937; 
Williamson, 
1975) 
Theory-
building 
Sales specifics: 
Anderson (1985) Re-
used by Krafft et al. 
(2004) 
Employees 
believed to be 
easier to 
manage than 
contractors. 
How are 
comparisons 
made? 
   Recommended by 
reviewer to test degree 
of knowledge behind 
previous answer. 
 
 What is the 
supply market 
for recruiting 
salespeople, 
compared to 
the availability 
of contract 
sales 
organisations? 
 
Outsourcing 
risk: 
Companies 
should not 
outsource into 
limited supply 
market 
Lonsdale 
(1999) 
Case study  Moderating factor with 
a TCE foundation 
(contractual hazard) 
Supply market 
for employees 
expected to be 
more 
developed and 
accessible than 
market for 
contractors. 
How important 
is it to monitor 
the behaviour 
of salespeople 
and 
contractors? 
Behavioural 
uncertainty 
Anderson 
(1985) Re-
used by Krafft 
et al. (2004)  
Empirical Where behaviour is 
uncertain, employment 
is preferred. 
 
Are there 
differences in 
observance of 
ethical codes? 
   Not specifically 
mentioned in the 
literature, but relevant 
in practice, especially in 
regulated industries. 
Also associated 
with reputation. 
What are the 
implications of 
dependence on 
particular 
employees? 
Employee 
opportunism 
Jelinek & 
Ahearne 
(2006) 
Comment Authors identified 
problems with 
employed SP 
behaviour. 
 
What are the 
implications of 
dependence on 
particular third 
parties? 
Lock-in 
problems with 
outsourcing 
Bahli & Rivard 
(2003) 
Theory-
building 
Contractors fail to 
deliver predicted 
performance. 
Concern about 
lock-in leads to 
preference for 
employees. 
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Questions and 
Prompts 
Derived from 
construct/ 
quote 
Key literature 
source: 
Authors/date 
Type of 
study 
Notes  Expectations 
Section D - 
SKILLS 
     
What are the 
implications for 
your skills in 
managing 
employees 
versus 
contractors? 
Outsourcing 
competence 
Daugherty et 
al. (2006) 
 
Empirical Relationships with 
contractors need to be 
highly structured. 
The more highly 
skilled 
managers are at 
managing 
outsourcing, the 
more it is done. 
  Brown et al. 
(2000) 
Empirical Need for managers to 
focus on relational 
exchange. 
 
How many 
reputable CSOs 
could you 
name? 
Reps’ 
reputation 
Weiss et al. 
(1999) 
Empirical Concern about use of 
reps and reputation. 
Knowledge of 
good CSOs 
associated with 
higher usage. 
Comparing the 
legal 
framework in 
the UK for 
employment 
contracts 
versus normal 
contract law, 
which is: 
easier to set 
up? 
Easier to 
change as and 
when needed? 
and which is 
easier to 
terminate? 
Flexibility – ease 
of exit 
Implied in 
Krafft et al. 
(2004) 
Comment TCE/ RO. Krafft et al. 
(2004) observed that 
inflexible employment 
contracts might be a 
cause of outsourcing. 
Overlap with Flexibility 
/real options. 
As per Krafft et 
al. (2004). 
Are control 
issues having 
any effect on 
use of 
contractors? 
   Recommended by 
reviewer to assess 
impact of this factor on 
changing models. 
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Questions and 
Prompts 
Derived from 
construct/ 
concept 
Key literature 
source: 
Authors/date 
Type of 
study 
Notes  Expectations 
Section D - 
SKILLS 
     
Are sales 
employees or 
contractors 
most skilled 
Rareness of 
skills 
Newbert 
(2008) 
Empirical General presumption of 
RBV – rare skills should 
be insourced. 
Highly skilled 
salespeople 
employed 
Anderson 
(1985) 
Comment Skills are the only things 
that are asset -specific 
about salespeople. 
How do you 
compare skills 
   Recommended by 
reviewer to test degree 
of knowledge behind 
previous answer. 
 
To what degree 
is it important 
within your 
company to be 
differentiated 
from 
competitors? 
Strategic 
direction 
Gilley & 
Rasheed 
(2000) 
Empirical RBV Differentiation 
associated with 
insourcing. 
How long do 
you spend on 
training 
salespeople 
(company 
culture, 
products, 
customers) 
Transaction 
specificity of 
assets 
Anderson 
(1985) Re-
used by Krafft 
et al. (2004) 
with the “cost 
of training” 
angle (also 
Wilson & 
Zhang, 2002) 
Empirical Time spent on training 
is an indicator of asset 
specificity 
The more sales 
training is 
needed, there 
will be less 
outsourcing. 
How long do 
you spend on 
training 
contractors 
(company 
culture, 
products, 
customers) 
Time spent on 
training 
  Comparison might 
indicate differences in 
tasks 
  
447 
 
Questions and 
Prompts 
Derived from 
construct/ 
concept 
Key literature 
source: 
Authors/date 
Type of 
study 
Notes  Expectations 
Section D - 
SKILLS 
     
Would 
customers 
identify the 
way you sell as 
part of your 
differentiation? 
Perceived 
power and 
influence of 
salesperson 
Liu & Leach 
(2001) 
Empirical RBV. Derived from 
statements from 
customer’s point of 
view 
Differentiated 
selling should 
be associated 
with employed 
salespeople. Perceived 
expertise of the 
salesperson 
Liu & Leach 
(2001) 
Empirical RBV. Derived from 
statements from 
customer’s point of 
view 
Rareness Newbert 
(2008) 
Empirical RBV – very general 
statement re-stated for 
sales specifics 
Salesperson 
navigation 
Plouffe & 
Barclay (2007) 
Exploratory RBV 
To what degree 
are personal 
relationships 
between 
salespeople 
and customers 
important to 
sales success? 
Trust of 
salesperson 
Liu & Leach 
(2001) 
Empirical RBV. Derived from 
statements from 
customer’s point of 
view 
If the 
salesperson is a 
critical 
resource, 
he/she will be 
employed. 
To what degree 
is your 
approach to 
selling team-
based? 
 
Collaborative 
skills 
Menguc & 
Barker (2005) 
Empirical RBV approach – 
Menguc & Barker 
(2005) discerned that 
collaboration skills were 
unique 
The more 
selling is team-
based, the less 
likely it will be 
outsourced. 
To what extent 
do salespeople 
get involved in 
non-selling 
activity? 
Asset specificity Derived from 
Anderson 
(1985) but 
consistent 
with Menguc 
& Barker 
(2005) 
Empirical RBV (also claimed by 
TCE) 
The more 
selling involves 
non-selling, the 
less likely it will 
be outsourced. 
To what degree 
does your 
company’s 
reputation 
affect use of 
employees 
versus 
contractors? 
Own reputation Weiss et al. 
(1999) 
Empirical Concern about use of 
reps and reputation. 
The more 
concern about 
reputation, the 
more likely that 
salespeople will 
be employed. 
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Questions and 
Prompts 
Derived from 
construct/ 
concept 
Key literature 
source: 
Authors/date 
Type of 
study 
Notes  Expectations 
Section D - 
SKILLS 
     
To what degree 
is it important 
for your 
company to 
conform to the 
norm for your 
industry/supply 
chain in terms 
of how your 
sales 
department in 
organised? 
 
Isomorphism DiMaggio & 
Powell (1983) 
Theory-
building 
A moderating factor, or 
negation of RBV 
If competitors 
do not 
outsource, 
companies will 
not adopt it 
themselves. 
Strategic 
conformity 
Deephouse 
(1996) 
Empirical Moderating factor – the 
need to conform to 
industry norms, which 
negates RBV 
When a 
salesperson 
leaves the 
company, 
which skills set 
is missed the 
most (by you): 
Selling skills, 
product 
knowledge, 
knowledge of 
company 
culture and 
procedures, 
knowledge of 
the customer, 
working 
relationships 
with 
colleagues. 
Transaction 
specificity of 
salesperson’s 
skills 
Anderson 
(1985) – skills 
are the only 
aspect of 
specificity in 
selling 
Empirical Anderson specifically 
tested for company 
culture, product 
knowledge and 
customer knowledge.  
Some 
combinations of 
skills more 
valuable than 
others. Selling 
skills per se will 
be associated 
with higher 
level of 
outsourcing. 
Rent generating 
skills 
Menguc & 
Barker (2005) 
Empirical Examination of the 
value of selling skills 
and working 
relationships with 
colleagues. 
When a 
relationship 
with a 
contractor is 
terminated, 
which skills set 
is missed the 
most (by you): 
 
 As above As above Equivalent question, 
rooted in the same 
literature. 
High level of 
selling skills 
associated with 
contractors. 
Are skills issues 
having any 
effect on your 
use of 
contractors? 
   Recommended by 
reviewer to assess 
impact of this factor on 
changing models. 
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Questions and 
Prompts 
Derived from 
construct/ 
concept 
Key literature 
source: 
Authors/date 
Type of 
study 
Notes  Expectations 
Section E - 
FLEXIBILITY 
     
Do employed 
salespeople, 
CSOs, or a 
combination give 
you more 
flexibility when 
you are making 
resourcing 
decisions? 
Flexibility Brouthers et 
al. (2008) 
Empirical Firms need portfolio 
approach. 
Combination 
preferred. 
Please describe to 
what degree you 
feel that you 
need internal and 
external options 
for resourcing the 
sales department 
to adjust to 
change. 
Flexibility De Leeuw & 
Volberda 
(1996) 
Theory-
building 
Real options; also 
relates to managerial 
competence with 
outsourcing 
Options 
desirable. 
How important is 
it to 
competitiveness 
to increase and 
decrease activity 
without 
disproportionate 
increases in 
costs? 
Flexibility - 
robustness 
Sia et al. 
(2008) 
Empirical Real options; 
General statements 
adapted for sales 
specifics 
Need to flex will 
lead to higher 
proportion of 
outsourcing. 
Flexibility as a 
capability 
Jack & Raturi 
(2002)  
Empirical Statements about 
production adapted for 
sales specifics. 
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Questions and 
Prompts 
Derived from 
construct/ 
concept 
Key literature 
source: 
Authors/date 
Type of 
study 
Notes  Expectations 
Section E - 
FLEXIBILITY 
     
How quickly can 
you implement 
change? 
Flexibility as a 
capability 
Jack & Raturi 
(2002)  
Empirical Real options; 
Statements about 
production adapted for 
sales specifics 
Faster 
implementation 
associated with 
higher use of 
outsourcing.  Flexibility as a 
capability 
Rese & 
Roemer 
(2004) 
Theory-
building via 
scenario 
Being responsive to 
markets. 
What is your 
experience of 
employed 
salespeople to 
third parties 
helping you to 
accelerate 
change? 
External/inter
nal 
comparisons 
Martinez-
Sanchez et al. 
(2007) 
Empirical Both internal and 
external flexibility 
associated with better 
performance. 
Evidence of 
both. 
What is your 
experience of 
employed 
salespeople to 
third parties 
helping you to 
avoid financial 
risk? 
Multiple 
sourcing 
King (2006) Case study Availability of other 
models encourages 
financial flexibility of all 
suppliers. 
Limited 
evidence. 
Are flexibility 
issues having any 
impact on your 
use of 
contractors? 
   Recommended by 
reviewer to assess 
impact of this factor on 
changing models. 
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Questions and 
Prompts 
Derived 
from 
construct/ 
concept 
Key literature 
source: 
Authors/date 
Type of 
study 
Notes  Expectations 
Section F - 
PERFORMANCE 
 
     
In deciding how 
to resource a 
sales task, how 
would you 
prioritise cost, 
control, skills 
and flexibility? 
   Suggested by a 
reviewer of the 
questionnaire to 
ensure discernment 
between factors. 
 
Closed 
questions 
 
     
Performance 
on sales 
revenue 
Sales 
revenue 
growth 
Colletti & 
Chonko 
(1997) 
Comment A common point of 
reference for sales 
managers. 
Better performance 
on revenue growth 
– more outsourcing 
Performance 
on control of 
sales-related 
overheads  
 
Return on 
sales 
(typical of 
financial 
performanc
e measures 
used in 
empirical 
studies). 
“Profitability” 
(Menguc & 
Barker, 2005; 
Newbert, 
2008) and 
“Return on 
sales” (Gilley 
& Rasheed, 
2000). 
Empirical Colletti & Chonko 
(1997) used for 
sales specific 
performance 
criteria 
Better performance 
on cost control – 
more outsourcing 
Performance 
on product 
launches 
Product 
innovation 
Product 
innovation 
used by Gilley 
& Rasheed 
(2000) as 
performance 
indicator 
Empirical Colletti & Chonko 
(1997) used for 
sales specific 
performance 
criteria 
Better performance 
on product 
launches  – more 
outsourcing 
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Questions and 
Prompts 
Derived 
from 
construct/ 
quote 
Key literature 
source: 
Authors/date 
Type of 
study 
Notes  Expectations 
Section F - 
PERFORMANCE 
 
     
Performance 
on customer 
retention  
Market 
share 
Market share 
- Performance 
indicator used 
in Newbert 
(2008) 
Empirical Colletti & Chonko 
(1997) used for 
sales specifics  
Better customer 
retention – less 
outsourcing 
Performance 
on improving 
share of wallet 
in customers 
Market 
share 
Market share 
- Performance 
indicator used 
in Newbert 
(2008) 
Empirical Colletti & Chonko 
(1997) used for 
sales specifics  
Better share of 
wallet – less 
outsourcing 
Performance 
on salesperson 
retention  
Employmen
t stability 
Gilley & 
Rasheed 
(2000) 
Empirical Colletti & Chonko 
(1997) used for 
sales specifics 
Better salesperson 
retention – less 
outsourcing 
Performance 
on customer 
advocacy  
Customer 
satisfaction 
Menguc & 
Barker (2005) 
Empirical Customer advocacy 
popular in practice 
as a performance 
measure – Net 
Promoter Score 
Better customer 
advocacy – less 
outsourcing 
Performance 
on winning new 
customers   
Market 
share 
Market share 
- Performance 
indicator used 
in Newbert 
(2008) 
Empirical Colletti & Chonko 
(1997) used for 
sales specifics  
Better market share 
– more outsourcing 
Performance 
on responding 
to change 
 Fredericks 
(2005) 
 
Conceptual 
 
 
Expectation that 
responding quickly 
to change will 
improve 
performance. 
More responsive – 
more outsourcing 
Performance 
on managing 
third parties 
 Díez-Vial 
(2007) 
Empirical Correlation 
between capability 
to manage 
outsourcing and 
success 
Better management 
of CSOs, more 
outsourcing 
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APPENDIX C 
 
INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE IN SALES MANAGEMENT RESEARCH  
  
From:    Serrula Research Limited 
On behalf of:   Beth Rogers, Principal Lecturer in Sales Management, University of Portsmouth 
   Business School, and author of “Rethinking Sales Management” 
 
Portsmouth Business School is the leading business school for sales education in the UK.  Beth Rogers, Principal 
Lecturer in sales management at Portsmouth Business School, is conducting some research on resourcing 
decisions in sales and we are writing to you to invite your opinions on this topic. The focus of this research is on 
the use of third party organisations to replace or augment the effort of sales employees in achieving revenues 
for companies. Their activities might include merchandising, lead generation and qualification, product 
launches, managing market segments with low volume requirements, managing  end of life products, managing 
particular territories, coverage for extended leave e.g. sick leave, maternity leave or for general staff shortages, 
post-sales follow-up or sales team support. 
We invite you to participate in this research through an interview that needs at least 45 minutes, but we would 
be grateful for more time if you can give it.  This research is about your views and experiences, rather than a 
discussion about company policy. In return for your time, you may opt to receive an executive summary of the 
research and/or a £20 donation to a charity of your choice.   
We very much hope that you will be able to help us in this study. 
This invitation letter will be followed up by a telephone call from Serrula Research Limited, who will explain the 
process and book an interview, should you agree to participate.  You may request to see the questions in 
advance, and you may withdraw from the process at any time. We do request that if you do not wish to take 
part, or wish to withdraw at a later stage, that you explain your reason, as that is also important to this 
research. 
If you have any questions please contact us, or if you wish to contact the researcher directly at any time, her 
contact details are beth.rogers@port.ac.uk, telephone 02392 844017.  
Serrula Research abides by the code of conduct of the Market Research Society.   
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Appendix D 
Response information 
 
Response summary and reasons for non-participation 
 
Hi Beth, 
Here are the stats and contact details on the spreadsheet attached. Eight people 
haven’t stipulated their chosen charity but they have all been emailed and they 
know to contact Patricia and tell her where to donate. 
The final total is: 
INTERVIEWS COMPLETED: 32 
Researcher note: 2 tapes unusable, 1 interview with non-target contact. 
PILOT INTERVIEWS: 5 (researcher note: within the 32) 
‘ACTIVE’ REFUSALS: 62 (researcher note – most by phone, 13 emails below) 
‘PASSIVE’ REFUSALS: 137 
Refusal e-mails: 
 
1. apologies for letting you down, work commitments are a priority. 
2. Hi Victoria, I am very sorry but we do not have time in our busy working day 
to spend 45 minutes on the telephone responding to a survey. 
3. Thank you for your e-mail. I am afraid no-one is available to participate in 
your project. 
4. Hello Victoria, I am afraid the relevant person made a decision and he said 
this would not be relevant to our organization. 
5. Victoria, I am not interested to participate. 
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6. Hi Victoria, Thank you for the invitation and hope the project goes well. 
However, we will not be participating in this study. 
7. Dear Victoria, Thanks for this information however xxxxx does not wish to 
partake 
8. Apologies Victoria. I am currently off work after being involved in a bad 
motorway accident. 
I don't know how long I will be away but don't feel up to this just now.  
Sorry to let you down. 
9. Victoria, I do not have 45 minutes to spare I'm afraid. 
10. Many thanks but I am not interested in taking part. 
11. Hello Victoria,  I think on this occasion we will have to give it a miss.Best of 
luck with the study and feel free to get in touch next year if you do a follow 
up study. 
12. Dear Victoria, Thank you for your email (copy below). I regret that I will not 
be available to participate in this study as this time of year is extremely busy 
and, at present, I cannot allocate 45 mins+ for this purpose 
13. Hello Victoria! Hope you are doing well. We have just received an answer 
and unfortunately xxxx is unable to participate. He thanks you so much for 
the invitation anyway.We wish you the best with this project. 
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APPENDIX G 
 
 Interim consultations with respondents 
 
 November 2011 
 
Interim thoughts on contract sales resource research 
 
Dear Respondent 
Thanks again for your contribution to this research.  We are about three quarters of the 
way through the data gathering, and one third of the way through the data analysis.  To 
keep you in touch, here are my preliminary thoughts on emerging trends.  Doubtless you 
will feel that some are “glimpses of the blindingly obvious”, but I hope that others will be 
thought-provoking!    
Best wishes 
Beth Rogers 
 
Compared to the outsourcing boom in most functions in businesses, there is relatively little 
outsourcing of sales activities. Nevertheless, the sales resourcing models explored in the 
study so far vary from 0% outsourced to 100% outsourced, with a number of mixes. The 
theoretical drivers of outsourcing, which include the desire for lower costs and greater 
flexibility (making fixed costs variable), do affect the sales function, but it would appear 
that the intensity of these factors are moderated.  There is also a case that in many 
contexts, insourced can be cheaper and more flexible, especially in the long-term.  Because 
salespeople interface with customers, the drivers for insourcing, primarily protection of 
core skills and close control over their deployment, appear to be strong.   
In general, it appears that contract sales providers need to “up their game” if they are to 
impress sales managers.  However, it is possible to find very professional and highly skilled 
providers of sales services.  They can be used to fill capability gaps (out-tasking) in the 
short-term and the long-term.  The contexts in which contract sales are most used, and are 
therefore sometimes considered to have superior skills, are: lead generation,  account 
management of low value customer segments or difficult to serve territories, and to a 
lesser degree, administrative support within the sales function.  Typically, these are 
activities that in-house salespeople might not consider priorities, or find it difficult to do 
properly because of pressure on their time.  In some B2B segments, all customers are quite 
large and sales cycles are quite long.  Sales managers working in this context are most likely 
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to prefer to employ salespeople – the more complex the activity, the more difficult it is to 
contract it out.  Nevertheless, it is possible to have a contractor playing a role in an account 
team, either because of some specialist knowledge that is needed, absence coverage, or for 
support purposes. 
Analysis of general outsourcing literature suggests that cost is a dominant factor in 
choosing third parties to run functions like information technology, logistics, facilities 
management, human resource management or some aspects of manufacturing.  In the case 
of the sales function, many sales managers have a detailed command of the cost of sales 
resourcing options, and the return on investment in terms of sales outcomes and other key 
performance indicators.  There is no clear message to report as yet – some companies do 
the calculations and find that contractors are cheaper; others find that in-house is cheaper.  
The amount of time over which costs are compared is a factor, but the variations in results 
underlines how much sales resourcing contexts can vary from firm to firm.   This advantage 
of converting fixed costs to variable costs is considered shortly.  Regardless of cost 
advantage, most respondents so far have considered other factors more important when 
making resourcing decisions. 
Economic theory acknowledges that cost/price comparisons should be modified by the cost 
of controlling third parties, which is usually assumed to be higher than the cost of 
controlling in-house staff, who are expected to have allegiance to the organisation.  
Outsourcing may create issues of dependency on an external firm (lock-in). Many studies 
have showed that wherever a firm is particularly differentiated or offering customised 
products or services, employed salespeople are likely to stay with firms for some years, and 
can be developed to the high skills levels necessary.  The literature that critiques the 
theoretical norm points out that employed staff can be challenging and costly to manage, 
and in some countries, the obstacles to termination of employment contracts reduce a 
manager’s degree of control.  Also, third parties might be quite dependent on their clients 
and very willing to enter into “partnership” agreements and vary terms at short notice.  
Apart from individual “temp” situations, outsourcing a sales activity involves outsourcing 
the management of the behaviour of the representatives/agents.  Most companies 
endeavour to engage their suppliers in their own approach to behavioural control (such as 
coaching to key performance indicators).  It is clear that where contractual control has been 
difficult, relationship management has not been workable either, and suppliers or agents 
have disappointed.  Therefore, where success has been achieved with using third parties, 
detailed attention has been given to contract terms, measuring and monitoring (not just 
sales outcomes, but quality factors as well), and on-going management of the business 
relationship.  While the number of contract sales organisations is growing, both according 
to trade directories and sales managers’ awareness of them, sales managers are still 
unconvinced about the quality of the majority.  There needs to be careful discernment to 
ensure that highly organised, highly professional organisations are identified. 
In the 1990s, a theory about the importance of options emerged.  This reflected 
organisations’ need to change resourcing quickly in response to changing market 
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conditions.  Converting fixed costs to variable costs would be desirable, and tactical 
opportunity seeking should be part of the management portfolio.  Tactical use of contract 
sales organisation for particular product launches or marketing campaigns has been useful 
to some companies.  This is a very typical use of contract sales in the pharmaceutical 
industry, where speed to market once a product has been listed is critical.  
Flexibility may be a desirable thing, but theory and practice have changed over time on the 
subject of whether make or buy provides it.  In the early part of the 20th century, vertical 
integration of firms was popular, in the latter part of the 20th century firms outsourced to 
avoid bureaucratic atrophy.  In the past few years, it is clear that employed salespeople 
have responded to the economic conditions by adapting more readily to the changes that 
employers have needed.  That increased flexibility and productivity does not necessarily 
preclude the use of contract sales organisations for particular tasks, but it has confined the 
use of third parties, in most cases, to tactical activity. 
Besides cost, control and flexibility, we asked you about skills and competences.  In the 
academic literature, selling skills are a commodity, and it is the product-specific, company-
specific and customer-specific knowledge of salespeople that makes them valuable to both 
their customers and their employers.  It seems most sales managers would agree with that.  
Increasingly in B2B sectors, consultative selling, team selling and account managers’ 
involvement in non-sales activities make the “sales role” a very variable and creative one.  It 
is also regarded as a “core competence”, i.e. strategic.  For many sales managers, this is the 
critical factor – the highest levels of skills are those that are developed internally (in-house 
salespeople are investments and receive a lot of training and development), and customers 
would expect the “brand ambassador” of the supplier to be employed by them.  This 
argument is compelling at a high level, but deserves some further analysis. 
If the “core competence” approach is applied at a granular level (and notably this has been 
successful in other business functions drawing back from complete outsourcing, such as IT), 
there are still questions to ask about skills gaps in the sales function.  With the purchasing 
profession’s passion to commoditise, many supplier-customer relationships remain 
transactional – where are the best transactional selling skills?  Could good salespeople be 
even more productive if some of their weak areas in the sales process were channelled to 
contracted support?  Could specific market skills gaps be met by specialist sales agents or 
“temps”?  This brings us back to “out-tasking”, which is the most frequently occurring 
model in the research so far.  
Clearly there is more in-depth analysis to be done, but in the meantime I hope this is of 
interest.  Please do not hesitate to contact me if you have any questions: 
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January 2012 
 
Further interim thoughts and some soapbox moments 
Dear Respondents, 
Happy New Year! 
I have now completed first and second level coding of the interview data.  Although there is 
more to be done, I felt it was useful at this point to share some more findings and 
interpretations (and speculations), and enable you to comment on them. I apologise that 
some previous themes from my last update have been repeated.  By drawing in more 
detailed observation, prior research and recent trends in this document, I hope this 
document sheds more light on them.  
First of all, let me explain the nature of the dataset.  Hundreds of comments have been 
gathered about sales leaders’ perceptions of the “make or buy” options in sales resourcing 
(predominantly employed salespeople versus contractors or services from contract sales 
organisations or similar third parties, but also encompassing channel options such as 
dealers, and comparing third party with internet options).  As you will recall from the 
interviews, the themes identified from prior research on “make or buy” suggested that 
cost, control, skills and flexibility were relevant drivers in resourcing decisions.  This was 
consistent with prompted and unprompted comments about resourcing challenges – 
getting the right skills, pressure for greater productivity, change management and 
motivation were all mentioned, and mentions were fairly equally spread. 
Finding or developing sufficiently sophisticated sales or account management skills remains 
difficult, even during a recession.  The UK Sales Board reported in 2008 that 59% of 
employers observed a skills gap in sales, especially for senior account management or sales 
management positions.  This structural fault in the UK employment market seems to be 
persistent. Are there any potential solutions?  External to this dataset, research and 
emerging selling models provide some options for improving sales productivity and up-
skilling (see below). 
It is worth re-stating the situation that most sales managers face:  achieving targets on 
reduced budgets, at a time when most selling situations in B2B are becoming more 
complex.  Respondents were generally very confident about competitive strengths in 
customer retention and share of purse, but less so about launching new initiatives and 
productivity, which is quite logical in the current economic climate. 
Most respondents have expressed views consistent with the “resource based view” theory, 
i.e. that competencies that support company differentiation are “core”; other tasks are 
non-core.  As such there is evidence of a pragmatic granular approach to sales resourcing.  
Sales managers consider different resourcing options based on: 
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• Different customer types, with segmentation by industry sector, company size, 
territory and buying approach 
• Different stages in the sales process 
• Different stages in the product life-cycle 
Third parties are predominantly used where selling is less complex, where they might have 
more focused selling skills, or where they might know the customers better than their client 
could.  Using third parties to focus on opportunity development before bringing a new 
product or segment in-house seems to be a popular theme.  Bearing in mind “resource 
based view” ideas about creating competencies from doing things differently, there is 
plenty of potential in resourcing models to design new routes to effectiveness which can 
accommodate diverse channels and a cultural focus on “the way we sell”.  Most 
respondents were willing to be different about “the way we sell”, showing little concern for 
“industry norms” , but there was less confidence about whether customers would 
recognise “the way we sell” as a differentiating advantage.   
Maximising contribution from all parts of the sales portfolio 
Less complex (usually end of life products and SME sector, but also large-scale transactional 
sales) 
Case histories provide arguments for improving sales productivity via electronic channels.  
Dow’s web spin-off, Xiameter, was very successful for them.  It shifts the skills emphasis to 
fulfilment and user-friendly portals.  Dow is also active in e-marketplaces. Because of costs 
per sale, many companies are trying to shift at least more of the sales process on-line, such 
as providing information, demonstrations, endorsements and initial communications.  The 
aim of this is to maximise the productivity of more expensive telephone and face-to-face 
contact.  Where products or services are not suitable for on-line trading, shifting from field 
sales to telephone sales has also been evident over the past ten years. 
Focused skills 
Telesales has also provided many companies with improved productivity. It is one of the 
aspects of selling where many sales managers perceive that there are reputable contract 
sales organisations with focused telephone selling skills.  These CSOs take pride in 
developing benchmarked competitive skills and retaining skilled staff. However, specific 
performance criteria, encompassing both outputs and expected behaviour, need to be part 
of the contract. Many respondents mentioned very detailed output comparisons, but there 
were no common indicators.  In the pharmaceutical sector, the independently-run “detailed 
follow-up” research gives clients a common benchmark for quality control over employees 
and contractors in the field; call monitoring is common in employed and contracted 
telesales.  In fairness to the contractors, they also need relevant information, training and 
support in order to fulfil their obligations. The relationship with the contract organisation 
also needs to be managed pro-actively, sometimes by project managers rather than sales 
professionals.   
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Usually, contractors (telesales and field sales) are engaged on product launch campaigns, 
developing new territories or segments and other types of lead generation, absorbing risk 
for their client and prepared at fairly short notice to hand the business back in-house or 
terminate the project.   
Longer-term use of third parties 
Telephone account management of smaller customers is also a task which may be 
outsourced, but where it is sensible for a third party to at least partly own the relationship 
with the customer, dealers, agents, resellers and joint ventures are also available choices.  
These third parties are particularly attractive where they have industry-specific, segment-
specific or customer-specific knowledge. This is quite obvious in export markets where 
language, local business culture or local government regulations make local organisations 
desirable long-term partners, but may also apply to new segment opportunities in 
established markets. 
However, dealers and resellers are often working with competitors too, so motivation 
needs vigilance.  The “manufacturers’ representative” model of sales agent in the USA is an 
interesting alternative.  They contract with only one client at a time, offering their products 
together with complementary products and services within a geographical area where they 
know customers very well.  Some sales agents, or complementary producers willing to JV, 
could provide something similar.  The trade-off when working with independent companies 
in the long-term is control.  Where this is a regular aspect of the business, specialist channel 
managers are usually in place. 
Referring back to this data-set, when it comes to transactional selling skills, many 
respondents have found reliable third parties where selling skills are available and quality 
can be monitored, and some reported that availability of third party organisations is 
improving. Assuring relevant product knowledge and understanding of company values has 
been achieved.  With a possible chicken and egg effect, on average contractors get much 
less induction and training than employees. Typically their engagement is short-term which 
justifies that position.  There are also examples of long-term arrangements with third 
parties where equivalent quantity of training is provided, but perhaps with cost-driven 
variations in delivery mode (e.g. on-line) and time restrictions.  
Core business 
Despite the availability of various types of contract staff and organisations, many 
respondents expressed a preference for employed staff (and for some companies, it is a 
cultural preference for all categories of staff). They are perceived by most respondents to 
be more skilled, easier to manage and more cost-effective in the long-term.  In recent 
years, employees have been more willing to embrace change. Nevertheless, many 
respondents commented on imperfections in the recruitment market (including the 
availability of suitably skilled candidates), and the constant challenge of maintaining 
motivation when there are frequent changes in the organisation.  
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Recruitment 
Where more a more sophisticated portfolio of skills is required, the first challenge is 
recruitment, which can be an expensive and lengthy process. Some companies might 
address this by broadening their search, to different countries, or attracting candidates 
from a wider choice of background.  Others might deepen their search, by sticking to 
required qualifications and experience and meanwhile using “temps”.  Some sales 
managers are willing to plug specialist gaps, e.g. sector-specific knowledge and contacts, 
with freelancers or “temps” from agencies, or “temp view to perm” for periodic vacancies. 
The availability of highly skilled temps is often associated with recessionary conditions.  
Notably, for companies who are not well-known employer brands, or where development 
time for a particular project is limited, contract staff or “temp view to perm” can be an 
effective way to gain access to skilled account managers. 
A soapbox moment... 
This is where, as a sales educator, I feel obliged to speculate. Specifying a preference for 
qualifications mapped to the National Occupational Standards for sales, or having done a 
sales option at university, would be a helpful filter, ensuring that candidates with a 
commitment to sales best practice applied. If employers keep ducking the qualifications 
issue, there will always be an incentive for salespeople to avoid studying for their vocation.  
I appreciate that it would put off the majority who are unqualified, and we are where we 
are with an imperfect recruitment market.  
With no particular grounding in this data set, although there is some evidence for it in my 
previous research and an event with the local JobCentrePlus, general improvements in skills 
levels might be achieved by focusing on recruiting for evidence of thinking skills and general 
business acumen, rather than sales experience.  Communication skills and negotiation skills 
can be taught, and if they are in the context of relationship management and consultancy-
style selling rather than the manipulative techniques most non-salespeople fear, a wider 
portfolio of candidates might be attracted to vacancies.  
Training and development 
Consideration is also given to how to stretch existing achievers further. In a recession, many 
people work harder for less reward.  Even if this recession is a long one, it would be unwise 
to rely on this continuing indefinitely.  Respondents reported considerable investment in 
training and staff development, often mapped to robust competency frameworks.  
Interestingly, sales training is a “support” activity within the sales budget that is frequently 
outsourced. There is a great deal of interactive on-line training becoming available, and on-
line coaching to help reinforce it, so there are new ways of “up-skilling” with reduced cost 
and risk.  In particular on-line coaching is an interesting angle – research-based packages 
focusing on helping salespeople to maintain their intrinsic motivation seem worth 
investigating, especially for sales managers with large numbers of reporting staff. I must 
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declare a (non-financial) interest as one of my teaching team is a sales psychologist who 
developed one of them! 
Another soapbox moment... 
Training offerings that involve assignments (for proof of learning), and enable trainees to 
acquire sales qualifications, might ensure greater return on investment for the employer 
and the employee. 
Sales support options  
There is another approach to stretching existing achievers further. Many respondents 
report salespeople getting involved in non-sales activities.  Some of this is necessary, such 
as the negotiations with colleagues within the organisation on topics such as process 
alignment with customers.  Nevertheless, salespeople often complain about administration 
and having a constant battle with emails. A new niche is appearing in third party sales 
support offerings: the virtual personal assistant.  Such services are focused on relieving 
individual salespeople of their administration and communication overheads. However, I 
have also noted requests from employers for placement students to act as information-
gatherers and progress-chasers within account teams.  “Desk account management” by 
junior staff may enable more thinking time for key account managers to come up with ideas 
to take to customers. 
Third parties are also used to enhance account teams when specific technical skills are 
needed, but this is usually outside of the sales manager’s remit. 
Change 
Productivity of current staff also links to discussions about flexibility and change 
management.  Relatively few respondents reported stable economic conditions in their 
market, and although there were more examples of recent downsizing versus upsizing, in 
the case of upsizing, the limitation of risk and speed to market offered by contract sales 
organisations was clearly attractive.  Some respondents praised particular contract sales 
organisations for their speedy implementation of project briefs, and their ability to change 
or terminate projects quickly. This actually runs contrary to theory, which is very supportive 
of employees as more flexible than contractors, but on the basis of a rather unrealistic 
(1937!) assumption of “master-servant” relationships.  Few respondents thought that 
modern day employment contracts are comparatively easy to change or terminate, 
although the situation is better in the UK than some other EU countries.   Use of third 
parties seems to be positively associated with effective access to new markets, and both 
short-term and long-term arrangements have been successful. 
New resource models to realise growth was mentioned as a challenge, but not so much as 
change and restructuring necessitated by the difficult market conditions of the past few 
years.  Can the process of change be accelerated by the deployment of contractors?  A few 
respondents noted that bringing people in with different experiences and viewpoints can 
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have an energising effect, but like all resourcing change, it has to be carefully managed, 
especially after downsizing. 
Control 
Although respondents were clear about their understanding of contractual and relational 
management of third parties, it was also clear that loss of control is a major inhibitor to 
increasing use of third party options.  Some contract sales organisations, like those in the 
pharmaceutical sector, can offer a variety of models that might be reassuring, but others 
are clearly organisations with their own priorities, which may change in a way that 
eventually damages the relationship.  However, some respondents found that contractors 
were easier to control than employees, because contracts are usually short and specific.  
Respondents explained that managing third party relationships involves very different skills 
from managing employees.  Sales managers who enjoy the personal involvement of leading 
their team of directly reporting staff might feel that managing contract organisations is 
more like being a purchasing manager managing suppliers.  In larger organisations, specific 
relationship managers, channel managers or project managers are in the sales team. 
Costs 
The sales function may be less of a target for cost control than a “back-office” function, but 
the cost of selling is a matter for discussion in many companies.  The majority of 
respondents were working in companies focused on differentiation rather than cost 
leadership.  Nevertheless, achieving a financial return on investment over a reasonable 
time period is important, and many respondents had impressive statistical evidence.  I now 
wish I had asked about “balanced scorecard” to explore the relationship between 
shareholder value metrics and metrics oriented to other stakeholders, especially customers 
(many respondents reported customer satisfaction as a behavioural metric).  If anyone is 
doing that to evaluate their sales department – please let me know! 
In conclusion 
Sales directors and managers get little strategic slack when it comes to matching the right 
resource to the right opportunities.  The supply market still needs developing, both for 
employees and third party options, but choices are widening.  Resource-based view 
theorists would argue that difficult-to- imitate models that optimise a benefit to customers, 
such as quality of the sales experience or convenience, will deliver superior “rent” (returns) 
to the company.   
Your comments and questions about this document are very welcome.   
Regards 
Beth  
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 June 2012 
 
A proposed model for resourcing decisions in the sales 
function 
 
 
This model is the end result of this research study.  The study set out to achieve a model of 
the use of contract sales organisations based on the experiences of senior sales managers. 
By exploring the comparison of contract sales organisations with employed salespeople, it 
has discussed the factors which may affect all resourcing decisions in the sales function.   
The model starts with drivers (antecedents in the “academic dialect”) to seek new or 
alternative resources. Respondents to this study saw either the pursuit of lower costs, the 
acquisition of particular skills or the need for speed of response to market conditions as the 
most important factor for them in sales resourcing.  Any of these might trigger a 
comparison between resourcing options.  Depending on context, direct employment, 
contracting out or a new model (e.g. on-line) could be the appropriate answer. 
Control of resourcing was not expressed as a priority by anyone, leading the researcher to 
the conclusion that its real role in the decision making process is as a moderating factor.  
The roots of the control construct were difficult to discern, but since many references were 
Resourcing decisions in the sales function
Skills
Costs
Speed
Reputational
Risk (determining 
degree of 
behavioural control 
required)
Availability of suitable 
direct or indirect 
resources
Availability of direct 
or indirect 
managerial skills
Antecedents 
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Moderating factors 
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made to quality, the need for behavioural control and the need to avoid dependence, it 
seemed that reputational risk might be the real root cause. 
Control often factored out contractors, but even if it did not, there were two other factors.  
One was the availability of suitable employees or contractors, and the other was whether 
the skills set of sales managers was geared towards coaching employee performance or 
managing through third parties, which was distinguished as a very different skill, often 
undertaken by a dedicated person.  After these are taken into account, a pragmatic solution 
emerges. 
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APPENDIX J: Additional Nvivo classification sheets 
 
i) List of transcripts and references 
 
 
Type Memo Link Nodes References Created On 
Created 
By 
Modified 
On Modified By 
Document Yes 131 180 30/09/2011 
13:29 
BR 04/11/2011 
14:52 
BR 
Document   141 266 01/11/2011 
17:49 
BR 02/11/2011 
07:17 
BR 
Document Yes 146 281 10/10/2011 
16:07 
BR 27/10/2011 
11:16 
BR 
Document Yes 132 195 30/09/2011 
13:30 
BR 07/10/2011 
15:42 
BR 
Document   143 219 08/11/2011 
06:58 
BR 08/11/2011 
07:58 
BR 
Document   137 221 08/11/2011 
17:17 
BR 08/11/2011 
18:04 
BR 
Document Yes 142 193 27/10/2011 
09:56 
BR 27/10/2011 
11:16 
BR 
Document   142 198 27/10/2011 
10:00 
BR 27/10/2011 
10:00 
BR 
Document Yes 142 197 30/09/2011 
13:32 
BR 07/10/2011 
15:42 
BR 
Document Yes 149 267 22/09/2011 
09:00 
BR 07/10/2011 
15:42 
BR 
Document Yes 157 281 30/09/2011 
13:33 
BR 07/10/2011 
15:42 
BR 
Document Yes 143 234 30/09/2011 
13:34 
BR 03/10/2011 
09:36 
BR 
Document Yes 138 225 30/09/2011 
13:25 
BR 10/10/2011 
16:19 
BR 
Document   147 250 08/11/2011 
06:59 
BR 08/11/2011 
07:58 
BR 
Document   149 231 08/11/2011 
07:00 
BR 08/11/2011 
08:13 
BR 
Document Yes 132 186 30/09/2011 BR 27/10/2011 BR 
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13:27 14:47 
Document Yes 119 180 30/09/2011 
13:26 
BR 27/10/2011 
15:48 
BR 
Document Yes 131 190 30/09/2011 
13:35 
BR 27/10/2011 
15:48 
BR 
Document   136 210 08/11/2011 
17:18 
BR 08/11/2011 
18:04 
BR 
Document Yes 144 198 07/10/2011 
08:39 
BR 27/10/2011 
15:48 
BR 
Document   144 232 11/11/2011 
15:35 
BR 11/11/2011 
16:07 
BR 
Document Yes 122 180 30/09/2011 
13:27 
BR 01/11/2011 
18:19 
BR 
Document Yes 131 173 30/09/2011 
13:37 
BR 12/02/2012 
14:31 
BR 
Document   132 168 30/09/2011 
13:47 
BR 02/11/2011 
07:47 
BR 
Document   149 297 11/11/2011 
15:36 
BR 11/11/2011 
16:36 
BR 
Document Yes 135 212 30/09/2011 
13:28 
BR 01/11/2011 
18:04 
BR 
Document Yes 145 236 23/09/2011 
11:45 
BR 01/11/2011 
07:54 
BR 
Document Yes 129 191 27/10/2011 
09:58 
BR 01/11/2011 
07:40 
BR 
Document Yes 127 173 27/10/2011 
09:57 
BR 27/10/2011 
16:14 
BR 
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ii) First level of coding 
 
Name Memo Link References Created On Created By Modified On Modified By 
              
Open codes   0 03/10/2011 
09:51 
BR 03/10/2011 
09:51 
BR 
Tree Node Challenges 28 32 23/09/2011 
11:37 
BR 25/12/2011 11:08 
Tree Node Control 29 103 23/09/2011 
11:43 
BR 25/12/2011 11:08 
Tree Node Costs 29 136 23/09/2011 
11:39 
BR 25/12/2011 11:09 
Tree Node Flexibility 29 83 23/09/2011 
11:40 
BR 25/12/2011 11:22 
Tree Node Prioritisation 27 27 23/09/2011 
11:42 
BR 28/12/2011 14:49 
Tree Node Skills 29 140 23/09/2011 
11:41 
BR 25/12/2011 11:12 
Tree Node Use of third 
parties 
29 53 23/09/2011 
11:38 
BR 25/12/2011 11:12 
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iii) Classification of challenges 
 
 
 
 
Name Memo Link References Description 
Challenges   32 How the 
respondent 
describes 
the 
challenges 
they face at 
the 
moment. 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node growth related 5 5 Respondents citing challenges associated 
with revenue growth, or lack of it. 
Tree Node motivation 12 15 Respondents citing their current challenge 
as motivating salespeople (or contractors). 
Tree Node cost control 8 12 Respondents citing cost control as a 
current challenge. 
Tree Node availability of 
skills 
12 13 Respondents citing availability of skills as 
a current challenge. 
Tree Node changing 
resource model 
12 15 Respondents citing changing resource 
model as a current challenge. 
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iv)  Use of third parties 
Name Memo Link 
Use of third 
parties 
  
Type Name 
Tree Node Measurement 
Tree Node Speed of 
response 
Tree Node Risk 
management 
Tree Node Trust 
Tree Node Evaluation 
process 
Tree Node Company 
culture 
Tree Node Product and 
industry 
knowledge 
Tree Node Review 
Tree Node Degree of 
success 
Type Description 
Tree Node Comments indicating 
that success had 
been achieved using 
third parties. 
Tree Node Comments indicating 
lack of success with 
third parties. 
Tree Node Neutral comments 
about success or 
failure with 
contractors. 
Tree Node Suppliers 
Tree Node Trends 
Tree Node Attitude 70 How respondents 
described their general 
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attitude towards 
outsourcing sales 
activities. 
 
Type Sources References Description 
Tree Node 14 36   
Tree Node 16 26   
Tree Node 6 6   
Tree Node Type of use 0 Tasks that have been 
outsourced 
Type Sources References Description 
Tree Node 7 7 Specific comments 
about resourcing key 
accounts. 
Tree Node 4 4 Using third parties 
for sales support 
activities. 
Tree Node 6 11 The role of third 
parties in covering 
particular territories. 
Tree Node 9 12 Specific comments 
about resourcing 
lead generation. 
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v. Coding of the cost responses 
 
Name Memo Link Sources Description 
Costs   29 Comments 
made by 
respondents 
about the 
relative costs 
of employment 
versus 
contractors. 
Type Name Memo Link References Description 
Tree Node Sales 
productivity 
  65 Comments about 
sales productivity 
Tree Node Budget 
setting 
  28 Comments about 
how the sales 
budget is set. 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Budgeting 24 26 Respondents 
comments about 
budgetary control. 
Tree Node Economic 
conditions 
  4 Comments about 
the economic 
climate and its 
effect on cost 
control. 
Tree Node Contractors 
cost 
advantage 
  21 Comments about 
the cost 
advantages of 
contractors/contract 
sales 
organisations. 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Cost 
comparison 
8 13 Comments about 
direct cost 
comparisons. 
Tree Node Efficiency 2 4 Comments about the 
relative efficiency of 
contractors. 
475 
 
Tree Node Headcount 4 5 Comments about the 
necessity to reduce 
headcount. 
Tree Node Speed 2 3 Comments 
suggesting that it is 
speed of deployment 
that results in lower 
cost. 
Tree Node Employees 
cost 
advantage 
  29 Comments about 
the cost 
advantages 
associated with 
employees. 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Efficiency 6 6 Employees deliver 
better results. 
Tree Node Quality leads 
to lower 
costs 
6 6 View that the quality 
of employees leads to 
lower costs. 
Tree Node Control 6 6 If you have control 
over the resource, 
you have a cheaper 
resource. 
Tree Node Cost 
comparison 
5 5 Employees cheaper 
on direct comparison. 
Tree Node Importance 
of cost 
control 
(general) 
  84 Comments about 
how the 
organisation 
approach cost 
control in general. 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Cost control 
very 
important 
23 31 Respondetns 
reporting strong 
feelings about cost 
control. 
Tree Node Degree to 
which sales 
costs are 
discussed 
  35 Comments about 
how much the cost 
of selling is a 
matter for 
discussion in the 
company. 
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Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Frequent 
discussion 
18 18 Where sales costs 
are a matter of 
frequent review. 
Tree Node Not high 
priority 
11 12 Where sales costs 
are not frequently 
discussed or a matter 
for concern. 
Tree Node Influence of 
cost on use 
of 
contractors 
  27 Whether or not cost 
issues influence 
the use fo 
contractors (for or 
against). 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node More use of 
contractors 
5 5 Cost driving more use 
of contractors. 
Tree Node Less use of 
contractors 
6 6 Cost driving less use 
of contractors. 
Tree Node Availability 
of 
information 
re resource 
options 
  33 Comments about 
cost information 
available on 
resourcing options. 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node positive 8 8   
Tree Node negative 20 21   
Tree Node Cost of 
sales 
resource - 
trend 
  28 Comments about 
trends in costs of 
the selling function. 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Decreasing 12 12 Sales costs going 
down. 
Tree Node Increasing 8 9 Sales costs going up. 
Tree Node Static 7 7 Sales costs staying 
the same. 
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Tree Node How costs 
are 
compared 
  45 Comments about 
how the relative 
costs of sales 
resourcing optiosn 
are compared. 
 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Value 1 1 Arguments for wider 
considerations than 
price. 
Tree Node Business 
case 
examples 
22 26 Respondents 
describing business 
cases for resourcing 
decisions. 
Tree Node Supplier 
comparisons 
2 3 Where alternative 
bids are considered. 
Tree Node Comparisons 
not made 
5 5 Where respondents 
explain that they have 
not done analysis. 
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vi. Coding of the control responses 
Name Memo Link Description 
Control   Comments 
made by the 
respondents 
when 
prompted to 
compare ease 
of control of 
employed 
salespeople 
versus 
contractors. 
Type Name References Description 
Tree Node Industry 
norms 
36 Comments about 
"norms" in the 
respondent's 
industry regarding 
use of contractors 
or employees. 
Type Sources References Description 
Tree Node 8 8 Respondents 
expressing some 
preference for 
conforming to 
industry norms. 
Tree Node 21 24 Respondents 
claiming to be 
independent from 
industry norms. 
Tree Node Reputational 
capital 
35 Comments about 
the importance of 
company 
reputation in 
choosing sales 
resource. 
Type Sources References Description 
Tree Node 19 21 Reputation 
influences use of 
contractors 
Tree Node 9 9 Reputation not 
considered an 
influence on use of 
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contractors 
Tree Node 27 35 Comments about 
whether 
contractors are 
different from 
employees in 
observance of 
ethical codes. 
Memo Link Sources References 
  28 35 
Tree Node 28 67 Comments about 
how salesperson 
or contractor 
behaviour is 
monitored. 
Tree Node Ethics 
issues 
35 Comments about 
whether 
contractors are 
different from 
employees in 
observance of 
ethical codes. 
Type Sources References Description 
Tree Node 28 35 Comments about 
the importance of 
company 
reputation in 
choosing sales 
resource. 
Memo Link Sources References 
  27 38 
  19 21 
  9 9 
Tree Node Stake in the 
company 
19 Comments about 
the "stakeholder" 
nature of the 
relationship of an 
employee with an 
organisation, 
versus 
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contractors. 
Tree Node Dependency 
on 
employees 
37 Comments about 
the risks of 
becoming 
dependent on 
particular 
employed 
salespeople (high 
performers). 
Type Sources References Description 
Tree Node 17 17 Respondents’ 
commenting on 
risks of 
dependency on 
sales employees 
and its impact. 
Tree Node 12 14 Respondents’ 
comments about 
how they avoid 
dependency on 
individual 
salespeople. 
Tree Node Dependency 
on 
contractors 
  28 33 Comments on the 
risks of being 
dependent on 
contractors. 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Concern 
about lock-
in 
10 12 Comments from 
respondents about 
risks of 
dependency on 
contractors 
Tree Node Third parties 
steer off 
track 
11 12 Comments from 
respondents about 
third parties 
undermining 
strategy 
Tree Node Monitoring 
behaviour 
  28 67 Comments about 
how salesperson 
or contractor 
behaviour is 
monitored. 
Tree Node contract 
comparison 
  29 57 The perceptions of 
sales managers 
about the nature of 
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employment 
contracts versus 
commercial 
contracts. 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node employment 
law 
constraints 
8 13 Respondents’ 
comments about 
EU employment 
law. 
Tree Node Control of 
performance 
  24 44 Comments about 
how the 
performance of 
employed 
salespeople and 
contractors needs 
to be monitored 
and measured. 
Tree Node Impact of 
control 
issues 
  12 18 Comments about 
whether or not 
control issues 
have an impact on 
resourcing 
decisions. 
 
Note : considerable cross-coding between ethics and
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vii. Coding of the skills responses 
 
Name Memo Link Sources References Description 
Skills   29 140 Comments 
made by 
respondents 
about the 
relative 
skills of 
employed 
salespeople 
and 
contractors. 
Type Name Memo Link Sources References Description 
Tree Node Comparing 
skills 
  29 98 Comments about 
how sales 
managers 
compare the skills 
of employed 
people and 
contractors or 
other third parties. 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Pro 
employee 
24 36 Positive comparisons 
focusing on skills of 
employees. 
Tree Node Anti CSO 10 11 Negative comparisons - 
focused on failings of 
CSOs. 
Tree Node Pro-CSO 16 28 Positive comparisons, 
focused on advantages of 
CSOs. 
Tree Node Process of 
comparison 
20 26 Methods used to compare 
employees and 
contractors. 
Tree Node Product 
knowledge 
  17 38 Comments about 
the importance of 
product knowledge 
Tree Node Customer 
knowledge 
  24 41 Comments about 
the importance of 
knowledge of 
customers. 
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Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Importance 
of personal 
relationships 
27 38 Comments about whether 
relationships between 
individual salespeople and 
purchasing decision 
makers are important. 
Tree Node Company 
culture 
  8 13 Comments about 
the importance of 
salespeople 
understanding 
company culture. 
Tree Node Training 
commitment 
  29 52 Comments about 
how much time is 
invested in 
training, including 
comparisons 
between employee 
and contractor 
training. 
Tree Node Selling 
teams 
  25 35 Comments about 
the role of other 
funtions in selling 
and the 
importance of 
teamwork. 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Team-based 19 19 Respondents reporting 
team-based selling. 
Tree Node Selling skills   17 30 Comments about 
the importance of 
employees' or 
contractors' selling 
skills. 
Tree Node Impact of 
skills 
  19 44 Comments about 
the impact of skills 
requirements on 
sales resourcing 
decisions. 
Tree Node The way we 
sell 
  28 35 Comments about 
whether selling is 
part of the 
company's 
differentiation. 
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Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Differentiated 
selling 
23 29 Respondents who indicate 
that the way they sellis 
part of their differentiation. 
Type Name Memo Link Sources References 
Tree Node Service or 
needs-
based 
  11 11 
Tree Node consultative 
or advice 
  9 9 
Tree Node channel   3 3 
Tree Node Importance 
of personal 
relationships 
  27 38 Comments about 
whether 
relationships 
between individual 
salespeople and 
purchasing 
decision makers 
are important. 
Tree Node Non-selling 
activities 
  29 30 Degree to which 
salespeople get 
involved in 
problem-solving, 
support, etc. 
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Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Considerable 
non-selling 
activity 
11 11 Comments from 
respondents whose 
salespeople do a lot 
of non-selling tasks. 
Tree Node Few non-
selling tasks 
14 15 Comments from 
respondents whose 
salespeople do a 
few/some non-selling 
tasks. 
Tree Node Focused on 
selling 
4 4 Comments from 
respondents whose 
salespeople do no or 
minimal non-selling 
tasks. 
Tree Node Market or 
territory 
knowledge 
  13 25 Comments about 
the salesperson's 
or contractor's 
knowledge of a 
market segment or 
territory. 
486 
 
viii. Coding of the flexibility responses 
 
Name Memo Link Sources References Description 
Flexibility   29 83 Comments 
made by 
respondents 
when prompted 
to discuss the 
advantages or 
otherwise of 
flexibility in 
resourcing 
options. 
Type Name Memo Link Sources References Description 
Tree Node Importance 
of choices 
  29 86 Comments about 
the value of 
choices in sales 
reosurcing. 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Specific 
comments re 
choice 
19 27 The comments that 
pinpoint the 
importance of choice. 
Tree Node Employees 
accelerate 
change 
  21 59 Comments about 
employees 
accleerating 
change or 
contractors 
decelerating 
change 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Specific 
comments re 
employee 
flexibility 
12 20 These comments 
give examples of 
employees' flexibility 
Tree Node Inhibitors to 
change re 
employing 
staff 
13 19 Comments that focus 
on where the 
employment options 
means slow change. 
Tree Node Contractors 
accelerate 
change 
  26 125 Comments in 
favour of 
contractors 
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accelerating 
change (or 
employees 
decelerating 
change) 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Specific 
comments re 
contractors as 
agents of 
change 
14 32 Comments which 
give examples. 
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ix. Coding of prioritisation 
 
Name Sources References Description 
Prioritisation 27 27 Comments made by 
respondents when asked  
to prioritise criteria for 
making resourcing 
decisions. 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Skills 16 17 Comments about the 
rating of skills in 
prioritising drivers of 
resourcing decisions. 
Tree Node Costs 6 6 Comments about the 
rating of cost in 
prioritising drivers of 
resourcing decisions. 
Tree Node Flexibility 5 5 Comments about the 
rating of flexibility in 
prioritising drivers of 
resourcing decisions. 
Tree Node Control 2 2 Comments about the 
rating of control in 
prioritising drivers of 
resourcing decisions. 
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x. Re-coding : Moderators 
 
Name Memo Link Sources References Description 
          
Moderators   0 0 The secondary 
factors 
appearing to 
moderate 
propensity to 
outsource. 
Type Name Memo Link Sources References Description 
Tree Node Recruitment 
market 
  28 58 Comments about the 
availability for 
salespeople for 
recruitment to 
permanent positions. 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Recruitment 
easy 
12 13 Respondents 
express good 
availability  
of candidates 
Tree Node Market 
imperfections 
16 20 Respondents 
experiencing 
difficulties in  
recruiting to 
permanent positions. 
Tree Node Recruitment 
effort 
11 19 Respondents 
comments on the 
effort of  
recruitment to 
permanent positions. 
Tree Node Availability of 
contractors 
28 57 Comments about the 
availbility of services  
from contractors, and 
the perceived quality 
of them. 
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Tree Node Comparison 
of 
management 
skills 
  29 213 Comments 
about the 
different skill 
sets involved 
in managing 
eemployed 
salespeople 
versus 
managing 
contractors 
(and contract 
sales 
organisations). 
Type Name Sources References Description 
Tree Node Employees - 
Skills 
needed for 
managing 
26 67 Respondents' 
comments about 
what  
skills they need to 
manage employed 
salespeople. 
Tree Node Contractors - 
Skills 
needed for 
managing 
23 79 Specific comments 
about the skills  
needed for 
managing 
contractors. 
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xi. Attributes 
Type Name Type Created On Created By Modified On 
Attribute % sales os String 22/09/2011 11:16 BR 11/05/2012 14:46 
Attribute %os 3 types String 08/04/2012 09:34 BR 08/04/2012 09:38 
Attribute Company value 
proposition 
String 22/09/2011 09:34 BR 01/12/2011 15:04 
Attribute Control perceptions String 02/11/2011 07:58 BR 04/11/2011 16:10 
Attribute Cost perceptions String 02/11/2011 07:57 BR 08/11/2011 08:52 
Attribute Customer portfolio type String 22/09/2011 11:06 BR 01/12/2011 15:05 
Attribute Degree of autonomy 
over sales resourcing 
String 22/09/2011 11:32 BR 07/10/2011 08:04 
Attribute Flexibility perceptions String 02/11/2011 07:59 BR 02/11/2011 08:02 
Attribute Industry sector String 21/09/2011 14:05 E 24/12/2011 15:20 
Attribute Intensity of competition String 22/09/2011 11:02 BR 22/09/2011 11:03 
Attribute Least important in 
sales resourcing 
String 22/09/2011 11:20 BR 07/10/2011 07:49 
Attribute Market conditions String 22/09/2011 11:12 BR 07/10/2011 08:26 
Attribute Market position String 22/09/2011 09:23 BR 24/12/2011 15:39 
Attribute Outsourcing model String 08/04/2012 09:43 BR 08/04/2012 09:49 
Attribute Pattern of use of 
contractors 
String 22/09/2011 11:36 BR 24/12/2011 15:44 
Attribute Perceptions of success 
with contractors 
String 22/09/2011 11:35 BR 07/10/2011 08:30 
Attribute Performance - control 
of sales overheads 
String 22/09/2011 11:22 BR 07/10/2011 07:43 
Attribute Performance - 
customer advocacy 
String 22/09/2011 11:26 BR 07/10/2011 07:43 
Attribute Performance - 
customer retention 
String 22/09/2011 11:24 BR 07/10/2011 07:43 
Attribute Performance - product 
launches 
String 22/09/2011 11:23 BR 07/10/2011 07:43 
Attribute Performance - 
responding to change 
String 22/09/2011 11:30 BR 07/10/2011 07:44 
Attribute Performance - revenue 
growth 
String 22/09/2011 11:21 BR 07/10/2011 07:44 
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Attribute Performance - sales 
productivity 
String 22/09/2011 11:10 BR 01/12/2011 15:06 
Attribute Performance - 
salesperson retention 
String 22/09/2011 11:26 BR 07/10/2011 07:44 
Attribute Performance - share of 
wallet 
String 22/09/2011 11:25 BR 07/10/2011 07:44 
Attribute Performance - utilising 
third parties 
String 22/09/2011 11:31 BR 07/10/2011 07:45 
Attribute Performance - winning 
new business 
String 22/09/2011 11:29 BR 07/10/2011 07:45 
Attribute Priority in sales 
resourcing 
String 22/09/2011 11:19 BR 07/10/2011 07:50 
Attribute Skill most missed 
(employees) 
String 13/02/2012 14:47 BR 13/02/2012 14:49 
Attribute Skills most missed 
(contractors) 
String 13/02/2012 14:49 BR 13/02/2012 14:51 
Attribute Skills perceptions String 02/11/2011 07:59 BR 15/11/2011 11:08 
Attribute Years experience in 
sales management 
String 22/09/2011 11:14 BR 07/10/2011 07:45 
 
493 
 
APPENDIX K 
 
Case attributes from Nvivo 
 
Industry sector of respondents’ employers 
 
 
 
Market position of respondents’ employers 
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Competitive environment by propensity to outsource 
 
 
 
Respondents’ experience 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
A : Intensity of 
competition = Low
B : Intensity of 
competition = 
Moderate
C : Intensity of 
competition = 
High
1 : %os 3 types = None
2 : %os 3 types = 1-10%
3 : %os 3 types = 11-100%
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Propensity to outsource 
 
Detail 
 
 
3 broad types 
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Pattern of use of contractors and perceptions of contractors 
 
 
Pattern of outsourcing by propensity to outsource 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1 : Pattern of use of 
contractors = Lead gen/qual
2 : Pattern of use of 
contractors = Target 
segments
3 : Pattern of use of 
contractors = Staff absence
4 : Pattern of use of 
contractors = Mixed
5 : Pattern of use of 
contractors = Widespread
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
A : OS model = 
None
B : OS model = 
Short term 
contracts
C : OS model = 
Long term 
contracts
D : OS model 
= Mixed
1 : %os 3 types = None
2 : %os 3 types = 1-10%
3 : %os 3 types = 11-100%
497 
 
Respondents’ priorities in resourcing 
 
 
Respondents’ least important factor in resourcing 
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Priority in sales resourcing by propensity to outsource 
 
 
Revenue growth performance by propensity to outsource 
 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
A : Priority in 
sales 
resourcing = 
Skills
B : Priority in 
sales 
resourcing = 
Costs
C : Priority in 
sales 
resourcing = 
Control
D : Priority in 
sales 
resourcing = 
Flexibility
1 : %os 3 types = None
2 : %os 3 types = 1-10%
3 : %os 3 types = 11-100%
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
A : Perf rev growth 
= Better
B : Perf rev growth 
= About the same
C : Perf rev growth 
= Worse
1 : %os 3 types = None
2 : %os 3 types = 1-10%
3 : %os 3 types = 11-100%
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Winning new business performance by propensity to outsource 
 
 
Perceptions of skills 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
A : Performance -
winning new 
business = Better
B : Performance -
winning new 
business = About 
the same
C : Performance -
winning new 
business = Worse
1 : %os 3 types = None
2 : %os 3 types = 1-10%
3 : %os 3 types = 11-100%
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Perceptions of skills by propensity to outsource 
 
 
 
 
Perceptions of skills by skills priority ranking 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
A : Employees 
more skilled
B : Contractors 
more skilled
C : Contextual 
differences
D : About the 
same
1 : %os 3 types = None
2 : %os 3 types = 1-10%
3 : %os 3 types = 11-100%
0 2 4 6 8 10
A : Skills perceptions = 
Employees more skilled
B : Skills perceptions = 
Contractors more skilled
C : Skills perceptions = 
Contextual differences
D : Skills perceptions = 
About the same
2 : Priority in sales 
resourcing = Skills
1 : Least important in 
sales resourcing = Skills
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Skills perceptions by portfolio type 
 
 
Skills most missed 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
A : Skills 
perceptions = 
Employees 
more skilled
B : Skills 
perceptions = 
Contractors 
more skilled
C : Skills 
perceptions = 
Contextual 
differences
D : Skills 
perceptions = 
About the 
same
1 : Customer portfolio type = Up 
to 20% customers deliver 80% 
revenue
2 : Customer portfolio type = 21-
40% customers deliver most of 
revenue
3 : Customer portfolio type = 41-
60% customers deliver most of 
revenue
4 : Customer portfolio type = 
Broadly spread customer 
portfolio
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Skills most missed by industry sector 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1 : Skill most missed 
(employees) = Product 
knowledge
2 : Skill most missed 
(employees) = Knowledge 
of customer
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Skills most missed by propensity to outsource 
 
 
 
Type of skills most valued by propensity to outsource 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
A : Skill most missed 
(employees) = 
Knowledge of 
customer
B : Skill most missed 
(employees) = Product 
knowledge
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
A : 
Knowledge 
of company 
culture
B : Product 
knowledge
C :  
Knowledge 
of customer
D : Working 
relationship 
with 
colleagues
E : Selling 
skills
1 : %os 3 types = None
2 : %os 3 types = 1-10%
3 : %os 3 types = 11-100%
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Perceptions of cost by propensity to outsource 
 
 
 
Sales productivity performance by propensity to outsource 
 
 
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
A : Cost perceptions 
= Employees 
cheaper
B : Cost perceptions 
= Contractors 
cheaper
C : Cost perceptions 
= Contextual 
variations
1 : %os 3 types = None
2 : %os 3 types = 1-10%
3 : %os 3 types = 11-100%
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
A : Performance -
sales productivity = 
Better
B : Performance -
sales productivity = 
About the same
C : Performance -
sales productivity = 
Worse
1 : %os 3 types = None
2 : %os 3 types = 1-10%
3 : %os 3 types = 11-100%
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Control of overheads performance by propensity to outsource 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
A : Performance -
control of sales 
overheads = Better
B : Performance -
control of sales 
overheads = About 
the same
C : Performance -
control of sales 
overheads = Worse
1 : %os 3 types = None
2 : %os 3 types = 1-10%
3 : %os 3 types = 11-100%
